South Africa has raised the temperature around the Gaza proceedings before the International Court of Justice. On 28 August 2026, its Department of International Relations and Cooperation said that a substantial dossier had been filed with the Court on 25 August concerning Israel’s alleged non-compliance with the provisional-measures orders in the proceedings brought under the Genocide Convention. The filing is presented as material for the judges monitoring implementation. It is not, by itself, a new judgment, a new sanctions list or an order addressed directly to private companies.
That distinction matters to French groups, banks, insurers, logistics operators, technology providers and contractors. A dossier submitted by one State does not automatically make every transaction unlawful. It can, however, change the quality of the information available to a compliance team, expose gaps in an end-use review, and become part of the record used in future diplomatic, judicial, regulatory or civil proceedings. The practical question is therefore not whether a company must accept South Africa’s legal characterisation. It is whether the company can show, today, what it supplied, to whom, for what final use, with what warnings, under which licence, and after which escalation.
The French and European analysis begins with that evidence. A French company should separate the ICJ’s inter-State procedure from its own duties under French criminal law, export controls, corporate vigilance, anti-money-laundering rules, contracts and insurance. It should also preserve the file before the facts become impossible to reconstruct.
I. What does South Africa’s new ICJ dossier change for French companies?
A. Is the dossier a new ICJ order, and what can it establish?
The underlying proceedings are the case officially titled Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), General List No. 192. The International Court of Justice case page records the procedural framework. The Court has previously indicated provisional measures in orders dated 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024 and 24 May 2024. Those orders are accessible through the Court’s official pages for the 26 January order, the 28 March order and the 24 May order.
South Africa’s 28 August statement says that the Court has issued three legally binding provisional-measures orders intended to protect the rights of Palestinians in Gaza under the Genocide Convention. It also reports that the 25 August submission was made under Article 11 of the Court’s Rules concerning Internal Judicial Practice, which provides that a committee of judges “shall examine information supplied by the parties in relation of provisional measures”. That quotation describes a procedural mechanism for the Court’s internal examination of information. It does not mean that the judges have already accepted every factual assertion in the dossier, nor that the filing has altered the operative text of the earlier orders.
The first legal consequence is therefore evidential, not automatic. A party’s dossier may contain witness material, public reports, satellite imagery, procurement records, shipping information, communications, photographs, medical information, expert analysis or other material directed to compliance. The Court will determine what weight to give it. The State filing is an allegation and a procedural submission; it is not a merits judgment establishing genocide, complicity or unlawful conduct by a named French business. A responsible article must keep those categories separate.
The second consequence concerns the time horizon. International litigation is slow, but corporate decisions are made while the record is developing. A company that reviewed a transaction six months ago may now possess more information about the alleged use of a product, the identity of an intermediary, the geography of a project or the operational connection between a customer and a contested activity. A new dossier can be a trigger to reopen that review. It does not rewrite the past, but it may make a previous “we did not know” explanation harder to defend if the business continues without asking questions that are now obvious.
The third consequence is documentary. A compliance team should not write that the ICJ has “ruled against” a company when the Court has not done so. It should record precisely what the Court has ordered, what South Africa has alleged, what independent material has been checked, what the counterparty has said, and what remains unresolved. The distinction protects the company from careless defamation while preserving a defensible record of serious risk assessment.
French law also gives a domestic vocabulary for the conduct alleged in the international proceedings. Article 211-1 of the French Penal Code defines genocide by reference to a concerted plan and acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. Its text begins: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”. Article 212-1 addresses crimes against humanity and states: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après”. Those provisions do not convert the ICJ’s inter-State case into a French criminal prosecution. They show why the same factual material can become relevant in another legal forum.
The same caution applies to public commentary. A company should not conclude that a dossier has “imposed sanctions” or that every transaction with an Israeli counterparty is prohibited. It should identify the specific transaction, actor, destination, end use and legal instrument. International criminal law, export control, sanctions, humanitarian law and corporate vigilance answer different questions. Treating them as interchangeable produces both false reassurance and unnecessary business disruption.
B. Why can a non-binding dossier still alter a French company’s risk assessment?
The ICJ’s provisional measures bind the parties to the case. They do not directly impose a general injunction on every private French supplier, lender or insurer. A company’s exposure arises through the facts and through the domestic or European rules that govern its own conduct. The relevant connection may be a French headquarters, French personnel, a French bank account, a French export licence, a French subsidiary, a French contract, a French-listed parent or a habitual residence that brings a person within French jurisdiction.
For large French companies, the duty of vigilance is a central starting point. Article L. 225-102-4 of the French Commercial Code requires a qualifying company to establish and implement a vigilance plan. The plan must contain “les mesures de vigilance raisonnable propres à identifier les risques et à prévenir les atteintes graves envers les droits humains et les libertés fondamentales, la santé et la sécurité des personnes ainsi que l’environnement”. The statute applies to companies meeting the employee thresholds set by the text and covers risks arising from the company, controlled entities and established commercial relationships with subcontractors and suppliers.
The new dossier can matter under that rule even when it does not name a French company. The question is whether the information changes the company’s reasonable-risk map. If a logistics subcontractor moves equipment into a location identified in the dossier, if a software product is integrated into a surveillance or targeting chain, if an insurer covers a project whose operation is disputed, or if a supplier’s end-user certificate no longer describes reality, the company may need to update its mapping and prevention measures. The duty is not a requirement to predict the ICJ’s final judgment. It is a requirement to take reasonable steps in light of material risk.
Article L. 225-102-5 provides that, under Articles 1240 and 1241 of the Civil Code, a failure to meet the vigilance obligations can engage the author’s liability and require repair of harm that proper performance would have prevented. The general civil rule in Article 1240 of the Civil Code states: “Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer.” A claimant would still have to establish the applicable conditions, a breach, damage and causation. The filing is not proof of all those elements. It is a reason to examine whether the company’s prevention system is real, current and connected to operations rather than a paper exercise.
The risk also reaches companies below the vigilance thresholds. A smaller exporter may be bound by an individual or global export licence, contract terms, anti-bribery controls, professional rules, insurance warranties, bank covenants or general criminal law. A French bank may have to understand a payment chain even when the customer is not a listed person. An insurer may have to examine whether a policy covers an activity that was misdescribed or became materially different. A technology company may need to determine whether its service is ordinary infrastructure or a functional contribution to an operation with a serious international-law risk.
The business question should therefore be framed narrowly: what new fact has appeared, what decision did it affect, who reviewed it, and what evidence supports the decision? A board minute that says “the ICJ issue is political” is weak. A dated memorandum identifying the order, the dossier’s allegations, the product’s end use, the customer’s response, the independent checks and the reasons for continuing or pausing is much more useful. It does not guarantee immunity. It demonstrates a process capable of detecting and correcting risk.
The same record helps preserve fair treatment of counterparties. Allegations must not be converted into a finding of guilt by internal shorthand. A French company can ask for updated end-use certificates, source information and contractual assurances without declaring that the customer has committed an international crime. It can suspend a transaction pending clarification under a neutral contractual clause. It can document the reasons in terms of risk, evidence and legal duties rather than nationality or political opinion.
II. What should a French company do before supplying, financing or insuring a linked operation?
A. Which operations create criminal, export-control and financial exposure?
The criminal analysis begins with contribution and knowledge, not with the existence of a headline. Article 121-7 of the French Penal Code provides: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.” The word “sciemment” matters. A company is not criminally liable merely because a product later appears somewhere in a conflict zone. Investigators will ask what the company knew, when it knew it, what it did with that knowledge and how closely its contribution was connected to the alleged offence.
Article 121-2 provides that legal persons, other than the State, are criminally responsible for offences committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives. It adds that corporate responsibility does not exclude the responsibility of natural persons who are authors or accomplices of the same facts. The board, executive, sales manager, compliance officer or intermediary therefore cannot assume that a corporate structure will absorb the risk. Conversely, the existence of a corporate investigation does not establish an individual offence without evidence of the person’s role and mental element.
Article 121-3 states: “Il n’y a point de crime ou de délit sans intention de le commettre.” The provision also deals with negligence and imprudence where the law permits such liability. In practice, this means that the file must distinguish an intentional contribution from a control failure, and a deliberate decision to ignore a warning from an honest mistake. That distinction is not a drafting detail. It determines what questions should be asked in interviews, what documents should be preserved and whether the matter requires immediate escalation.
The international-crimes provisions show why the nature of the operation matters. Article 461-1 defines war crimes as offences committed during and in relation to an international or non-international armed conflict in violation of the laws and customs of war or applicable international conventions. Article 461-9 provides: “Le fait de lancer des attaques délibérées contre la population civile en tant que telle ou contre des personnes civiles qui ne prennent pas part directement aux hostilités est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” Article 461-25 addresses the act of starving civilians as a method of warfare by deliberately depriving them of indispensable goods.
These are not labels that a private compliance department should assign casually. They are legal categories requiring proof of the underlying conduct and the applicable mental element. But a French business cannot ignore an operation simply because it sells a component rather than a finished weapon. A satellite-data provider, transport company, cloud host, fuel supplier, construction contractor, maintenance company, security integrator or financial institution should assess whether its contribution is operationally significant, replaceable, contractually required and knowingly connected to a disputed activity.
The Cour de cassation has already given French practitioners a demanding example in the context of alleged complicity in crimes against humanity. In Criminal Chamber, 7 September 2021, appeal no. 19-87.367, the Court criticised the annulment of a company’s indictment and held that “le versement en connaissance de cause d’une somme de plusieurs millions de dollars à une organisation dont l’objet n’est que criminel suffit à caractériser la complicité par aide et assistance”. The decision concerned a specific organisation, evidence and procedural posture. It does not mean that an ordinary commercial payment to a company operating in a conflict zone automatically constitutes complicity. It does mean that a financing rationale such as “we were only supporting the business” will not answer the question if the recipient, purpose and knowledge show a direct criminal contribution.
Jurisdiction must be tested separately. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that persons who commit or assist offences outside the Republic may be prosecuted and tried by French courts in the cases set out by law. For genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Article 689-11 provides a specific framework for a person suspected of having committed such offences abroad, subject to conditions including habitual residence in France and the role of the national anti-terrorism prosecutor. The provision also addresses the relationship with an international or foreign court’s request for surrender or extradition. The existence of a French company or French transaction is not a shortcut around those conditions, but it can make French evidence and French actors significant.
The procedural approach to foreign criminality is also not a simple translation exercise. In Assembly Plenary, 12 May 2023, appeal no. 22-80.057, the Cour de cassation stated that the double-criminality condition does not require identical legal classifications in both countries, but requires that the conduct be criminalised by each legal system. The Court explained that foreign-law incrimination can be satisfied by a common-law offence forming the basis of the crime prosecuted, such as murder, rape or torture. For a French company, the lesson is practical: a legal review must examine the underlying conduct, the law of the place where it occurred, French law, evidence and jurisdiction together.
Export control is a separate gate. Article L. 2335-2 of the Defence Code states that “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne … est prohibée.” A company must identify whether the goods are military material, an assimilated item, dual-use technology or an ordinary commercial product whose end use still creates a contractual or regulatory concern. Article L. 2335-3 permits export licences to contain conditions or restrictions concerning final use. The licence is therefore not a blank cheque: an end-use change, intermediary, destination or technical configuration may require a new assessment.
Financing and insurance require the same discipline without inventing a sanctions prohibition. A dossier submitted to the ICJ does not itself freeze a bank account. A French bank must still apply risk-based customer and transaction controls. Article L. 561-4-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires the level of vigilance to be determined “en fonction de l’évaluation des risques présentés par leurs activités”. Article L. 561-5 requires identification of the customer and, where applicable, the beneficial owner. Article L. 561-6 requires “une vigilance constante” over the business relationship. Article L. 561-8 provides that, where identification cannot be completed, the institution does not execute the operation.
An insurer or lender should ask a different but related set of questions: is the insured activity accurately described; are the policy warranties still true; is the payment going to the declared beneficiary; does the collateral reflect the real project; are there side letters or undisclosed intermediaries; and is the company relying on a representation that has become obsolete? A risk-based pause is not the same as a politically motivated refusal. The decision should be tied to evidence, contractual language, legal duties and a route to resolve the uncertainty.
B. What evidence, approval and escalation file should be created before continuing?
The first step is to define the transaction in operational terms. “Gaza-related business” is too broad to make a lawful decision. The file should identify the product or service, technical capabilities, quantity, destination, delivery route, end user, beneficial owner, subcontractors, payment path, insurer, financing structure, project site and intended date of use. For a digital service, the company should identify the data, user permissions, retention period, integration and customer administrator. For physical goods, it should identify serial numbers, maintenance, re-export rights and the person who controls the goods after delivery.
The second step is to build a chronology. Preserve the original order, tender, purchase request, end-use certificate, licence, customs documents, shipping instructions, bank messages, insurance proposal, compliance alerts, customer answers, public reports and internal approvals. Preserve metadata and translations where they are relevant. Do not replace a contemporaneous document with a clean summary. If a document is ambiguous, retain the ambiguity and record the question asked about it. A later investigation will focus on what the company knew at each decision point, not only on the final policy adopted after the headline.
The third step is source grading. The company should distinguish the ICJ’s official orders from South Africa’s allegations, a government statement from an independent judicial finding, a media report from a primary record, and a social-media assertion from verified operational data. The current dossier should be cited as a submission by South Africa. The official ICJ case page and orders should be kept in the file with the retrieval date. If the company relies on a UN report, a court judgment, an export-control classification or a customer representation, it should preserve the exact version and explain why it is reliable.
The fourth step is an end-use interview. Ask the counterparty who will control the product, what the product will do, where it will operate, who can access it, whether it will be transferred, and what safeguards protect civilians and humanitarian operations. Ask for an updated written answer when the risk has changed. A vague assurance that the transaction is “commercial” is not enough if the technical capability, location or customer chain suggests a different function. Refusal to answer is itself a risk signal, although it is not proof of an offence.
The fifth step is legal classification. The review should run in parallel across at least five questions:
- Does the transaction fall within military, dual-use or other export-control rules, and do the licence and end-use restrictions still match the facts?
- Could the product, service, transport or money facilitate conduct described in an international-crimes allegation, and what evidence exists on knowledge and contribution?
- Does a French corporate-vigilance, civil-liability or contractual duty require additional prevention, consultation or disclosure?
- Does the payment or insurance structure create a customer, beneficial-owner, intermediary, anti-money-laundering or suspicious-transaction concern?
- What jurisdiction, regulator, prosecutor, court or arbitral forum could later examine the decision and the company’s records?
The sixth step is to choose a documented outcome. A useful internal matrix can separate red, amber and green decisions, but the labels must be defined. A red outcome may require stopping delivery, refusing a payment, suspending coverage, notifying the relevant compliance function or seeking urgent external advice. An amber outcome may permit continuation only after a new licence analysis, an independent end-use verification, a contractual amendment, enhanced monitoring and senior approval. A green outcome should state why the operation is outside the identified risk, what evidence supports that conclusion and when it will be reviewed. “Green because no one has yet proved an offence” is not a sufficient rationale.
The seventh step is governance. The decision-maker should have authority appropriate to the exposure. A sales team should not overrule export control. A local subsidiary should not silently bypass the group’s vigilance plan. The board or a designated committee should receive a concise escalation note where the transaction is material, the evidence is contested or the potential consequence includes criminal investigation, civil proceedings, licence breach, policy invalidity or severe reputational harm. The note should record dissenting views rather than erase them.
The eighth step is communications discipline. Do not tell a customer that South Africa has proved the customer committed genocide. Do not tell investors that the ICJ has authorised the transaction merely because no new order appears on the case page. Do not describe a pause as a final legal finding if it is only an interim risk-control measure. Use precise language: “pending verification”, “in light of information submitted to the ICJ”, “subject to end-use confirmation”, or “unable to proceed under the applicable licence conditions”. Precision preserves fairness and makes the company’s reasoning auditable.
The final step is a review date. A dossier can be followed by a response, further evidence, a Court order, a national investigation, a sanctions designation, a licence amendment or a change in the customer’s operational plan. The file should state who monitors those developments, which sources are checked and when the decision must be revisited. A company that continues a transaction for months without a review mechanism may create a new knowledge problem even if the original approval was defensible.
Conclusion
South Africa’s new filing should be read as a warning about evidence and timing, not as an automatic judgment against private enterprise. The ICJ proceedings, provisional-measures orders, French criminal provisions, export-control rules, corporate-vigilance duties and financial controls operate on different legal planes. The question for a French company is whether its own operation can be explained and defended with primary documents, a current end-use analysis, a reasoned assessment of knowledge and contribution, and a decision-maker who had authority to pause or change course.
The safest immediate response is a targeted re-review of any supply, financing, insurance, logistics, data or technology arrangement whose facts have changed or whose warnings were previously treated as remote. Preserve the file, separate allegations from findings, verify the licence and end use, escalate unresolved facts and record the reason for continuing, pausing or ending the operation. That approach does not prejudge the ICJ’s eventual decision. It gives the company a credible answer if a court, regulator, bank, insurer, shareholder or journalist later asks what it knew and what it did.