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Spain Lifted Puigdemont’s Arrest Warrant: What Happens to European Arrest Warrants and What a Paris Court Would Do

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Spain Lifted Puigdemont’s Arrest Warrant: What Happens to European Arrest Warrants and What a Paris Court Would Do

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On Tuesday 6 October 2026, after nearly nine years in exile, Carles Puigdemont saw the most immediate legal obstacle to his return to Spain disappear. Pablo Llarena, the investigating magistrate of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court, set aside the national search, capture and arrest warrants against the former president of the Generalitat of Catalonia and two former regional ministers, Antoni Comín and Lluís Puig. The order takes effect at once and remains in force until any further express judicial decision, as reported from the ruling, and it directs the National Police, the Guardia Civil, the Mossos d’Esquadra and every other authority holding the warrants not to detain the three men on that basis. The measure is provisional, it decides nothing on the merits of the amnesty, and it concerns national warrants, not European ones. But it is the first time since the autumn of 2017 that the Spanish judiciary itself has acknowledged that keeping these warrants alive could deprive three men of their liberty without justification. For anyone arrested in France on a Spanish European arrest warrant, and for every lawyer who defends surrender cases in Paris, the ruling raises the question that matters most: what would a French chambre de l’instruction do with a Catalan-style file today, and which arguments can actually stop a surrender when the issuing state is a fellow European Union member bound by mutual recognition.

I. Spain lifted Puigdemont’s arrest warrant: what the judges actually decided

A. Why the Constitutional Court sided with Dolors Bassa on the amnesty law

The entire sequence starts not with Puigdemont but with Dolors Bassa, a former Catalan minister convicted of embezzlement for diverting public funds to pay for the unlawful independence referendum of 1 October 2017. After Spain adopted Organic Law 1/2024, the Catalan amnesty law, Bassa asked for the amnesty to be applied to her conviction. The Supreme Court refused twice, by orders of 1 July and 30 September 2024. Its reasoning had two branches. First, the Court held that conduct tantamount to diverting public money fell within the amnesty law’s exclusion for embezzlement committed to obtain personal financial enrichment. Second, it considered that the independence process had endangered the financial interests of the European Union, which also took the conduct outside the amnesty.

Bassa then filed an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Court, the specialised remedy by which individuals ask the Court to protect them against violations of their constitutional rights by courts or public authorities. In its press release Nota Informativa 91-2026, the Constitutional Court announced that it upheld that appeal. It annulled the Supreme Court’s orders of 1 July and 30 September 2024 and ordered the Supreme Court to issue a new ruling declaring the embezzlement offence amnestied. On the first branch, the Constitutional Court held that the personal-enrichment exclusion is an autonomous concept, designed to screen out private corruption unconnected with financing the secession process, and that it cannot be stretched to cover funds channelled into organising the referendum. On the second branch, the Court rejected the European Union financial interests argument as inconsistent with the facts established in the 2019 procés judgment of the Supreme Court itself, the trial judgment that had examined the independence bid in detail. The practical consequence is narrow but weighty: the Supreme Court must now re-examine the file and declare the offence amnestied, and the constitutional reading of the exclusion binds the ordinary courts in every comparable file, including those of the men who never appealed.

This is the doctrinal hinge of the whole autumn. An amnesty exclusion drafted to keep ordinary corrupt officials outside the benefit of the law cannot be reinterpreted, case by case, into a device for keeping political beneficiaries outside it. The Constitutional Court did not declare anyone innocent and did not rewrite the facts of 2017. It ruled that the legal category of personal enrichment has its own meaning, that financing a secession process is not personal enrichment within that meaning, and that a court which refuses an amnesty on a misreading of the exclusion violates the constitutional rights of the convicted person. Every defence brief filed in a Catalan-related case in the coming months, in Madrid as in Paris, will quote that distinction, because it transforms the Spanish amnesty from a political promise into an enforceable judicial standard.

B. National warrants lifted, criminal liability intact: what the order does not decide

Judge Llarena drew the procedural consequence within hours. In his order, he reasoned that the Constitutional Court’s ruling may undermine the very basis of the warrants he had maintained in his own order of 1 July 2024, and that executing them in the meantime, by arresting men returning to Spain, could cause, in the reported formulation, a deprivation of liberty that might later prove unjustified, contrary to the right to liberty guaranteed by Article 17 of the Spanish Constitution. Prevention of an unjustified detention is the stated ground of the measure, and it explains both its speed and its limits.

The limits matter as much as the headline. The judge stressed that the measure is provisional. It does not declare the amnesty applicable to Puigdemont, Comín or Puig. It does not extinguish any criminal liability. It does not execute the Constitutional Court’s judgment ahead of time, and it does not extend that judgment automatically to parties who never brought an amparo appeal. Bassa won her case; her co-defendants benefit only indirectly, through the collapse of the legal reasoning that kept the warrants alive, and only until the Supreme Court issues the new ruling the Constitutional Court ordered, or any further express judicial decision. A return to Spain is therefore legally possible today without the certainty of arrest at the border, but it is not a return with a clean criminal record, and the underlying proceedings continue.

A second limit is territorial and technical, and it is the one most often misunderstood in international coverage. The warrants that were set aside are national warrants: search, capture and arrest within Spain. A European arrest warrant is a different instrument, governed by different rules, addressed to the judicial authorities of other member states, and capable of surviving or lapsing on its own timetable. Anyone reading the order of 6 October as the end of every cross-border exposure confuses two layers of the same file. The European layer has its own history, including the Grand Chamber judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 31 January 2023 in case C-158/21, the Puigdemont immunity litigation, which the French Court of Cassation itself still cites in its current European arrest warrant case law. The distinction between the national and the European warrant is precisely where the French analysis begins, because a Paris court seized with a Spanish warrant applies neither Spanish constitutional law nor Spanish criminal policy: it applies the European arrest warrant as defined and framed by French statute.

II. Arrested in Paris on a Spanish European arrest warrant: how French judges decide surrender

A. Surrender is the rule, refusal the strict exception: the French test

French law defines the instrument in plain terms. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” The anchor link for the official text is Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Everything that follows in a Paris surrender hearing flows from the nature of that decision: a judicial request from one member state to another inside a system built on mutual recognition, not the diplomatic request of classic extradition.

The Court of Cassation states the consequence without ambiguity. In its judgment of 7 August 2024, no. 24-81.863, published in the Bulletin, the Criminal Chamber recalled, in its own words, that “conformément au principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement (CJUE, [GC], 6 juin 2023, O.G, C-700/21, § 33).” The full decision is available at Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 7 August 2024, no. 24-81.863. The framework decision in question is the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between member states, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, and the French provisions that transpose it are Articles 695-11 to 695-51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A defence that asks a Paris court to refuse surrender for a reason invented for the occasion, however sympathetic, collides head-on with this paragraph.

The closed list has three layers. First, the mandatory grounds for refusal in Article 695-22, whose official text is available at Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court must refuse surrender, first, where “Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis pouvaient être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises et que l’action publique est éteinte par l’amnistie”. This amnesty ground is narrower than it looks, and the nuance decides Catalan-style cases: it requires both that the French courts could have tried the facts and that the public prosecution is extinguished by amnesty, which in practice means an amnesty under French law, not the amnesty of the issuing state. A Spanish amnesty, even fully applied in Madrid, does not by itself trigger this paragraph in Paris. The same article also imposes refusal where the person was under thirteen at the time of the facts, where a final judgment for the same facts already exists in France or in another member state, and, decisively for politically coloured files, where “S’il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre, ou qu’il peut être porté atteinte à la situation de cette personne pour l’une de ces raisons.” Political opinion is therefore examined in Paris, but through the lens of discriminatory prosecution, with the burden of establishing the purpose, not through a general political-offence exception.

That absence is the great divide between the two regimes. In classic extradition to a non-member state, Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that extradition is not granted “Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”, as shown in Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inside the European arrest warrant system, that paragraph does not exist. The Framework Decision abolished the political-offence exception between member states, and no French court can reintroduce it through the back door. Counsel who pleads a Catalan file in Paris as if it were a nineteenth-century political-refugee case, invoking the romance of asylum rather than the text of Article 695-22, loses the only battle that counts: credibility with a chamber that reads the statute first.

Second, the double-criminality layer in Article 695-23, available at Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Surrender may be refused where the conduct is not an offence under French law, except that no such control applies where the conduct is punishable in the issuing state by at least three years of deprivation of liberty and falls within one of the listed categories of Article 694-32, in which case the legal characterisation belongs exclusively to the issuing authority. For conduct built on the diversion of public money, this battlefield is usually barren ground for the defence, because French law criminalises the same core behaviour: Article 432-15 of the Criminal Code punishes “Le fait, par une personne dépositaire de l’autorité publique ou chargée d’une mission de service public, un comptable public, un dépositaire public ou l’un de ses subordonnés, de détruire, détourner ou soustraire un acte ou un titre, ou des fonds publics ou privés, ou effets, pièces ou titres en tenant lieu, ou tout autre objet qui lui a été remis en raison de ses fonctions ou de sa mission, est puni de dix ans d’emprisonnement et d’une amende de 1 000 000 €”, and the official text stands at Article 432-15 of the Criminal Code. Ten years of imprisonment comfortably clears the three-year threshold, so the double-criminality argument in a funds-diversion file is, at best, a secondary line.

Third, the optional grounds in Article 695-24, whose official text is at Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: concurrent French proceedings, territoriality, and, most useful in settled-life cases, the residence ground, which allows refusal where “Si la personne recherchée pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privatives de liberté est de nationalité française, a établi sa résidence sur le territoire national ou demeure sur ce territoire et si la décision de condamnation est exécutoire sur le territoire français en application de l’article 728-31”. Its purpose, as the Court of Cassation recalled in the 7 August 2024 judgment, is to increase the prospects of social rehabilitation of the requested person. A Catalan figure long settled in France with family, work and habitual residence would plead this paragraph rather than grand constitutional theory, provided the file concerns the execution of a sentence and the sentence can be enforced on French soil.

The outer boundary of judicial creativity was fixed one year later. On 6 August 2025, in no. 25-84.847, the Criminal Chamber quashed a Paris investigating chamber judgment of 9 July 2025 that had refused to surrender a man to Romania on a European arrest warrant issued for the execution of a three-year-and-four-month sentence for influence trafficking and complicity in abuse of office. The Paris judges had accumulated sympathetic reasons: two earlier refusals in France and Malta, refusals by British and Greek courts for co-defendants on fair-trial grounds, very old facts tangled in parallel civil litigation over a royal succession, condemnation of Romania by the European Court of Human Rights in 2010 for unreasonable delay, deletion of the person from Interpol files with serious concerns about political elements, fragile health and family hardship, and a finding that the warrant was disproportionate. The Court of Cassation swept all of it aside in two strokes, recalled at Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 6 August 2025, no. 25-84.847. First, it restated that, subject to fundamental rights and the principles of Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union guaranteed by Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision, “l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne saurait être refusée pour des motifs autres que ceux que prévoient la décision-cadre et les textes pris pour son application.” Second, it held that the chamber could not refuse surrender on disproportionality grounds, because disproportionality “ne figure pas parmi les motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative, prévus aux articles 3, 4 et 4 bis de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, cette appréciation relevant de la seule autorité de l’Etat d’émission.” Disproportionality belongs to the issuing state, not to the executing court. Prior foreign refusals, Interpol deletions and old age, standing alone, do not appear in the closed list either. The judgment even records that the Paris reasoning invoked the Court of Justice rulings of 31 January 2023 in case C-158/21 and of 29 July 2024 in case C-318/24, the first being the Grand Chamber ruling in the Puigdemont immunity dispute, and still the Court quashed the refusal for lack of a specified fundamental right. That is the clearest possible warning for Catalan-style defences: European citations decorate a brief, they do not replace a listed ground.

B. How to fight a politically sensitive European arrest warrant from Paris: procedure, evidence and time limits

The fight starts on the day of the arrest and it runs on rails. The person is brought before the prosecutor, then before the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal, which alone decides surrender. Two tracks then diverge. If the person consents to surrender, the chamber informs them of the legal consequences and of the irrevocable character of consent, asks whether they also waive the specialty rule, and, where the legal conditions are met, grants surrender, since “La chambre de l’instruction statue, sauf si un complément d’information a été ordonné dans les conditions énoncées à l’article 695-33, dans les sept jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne recherchée.” That decision cannot be appealed. If the person refuses consent, “Si la personne recherchée déclare ne pas consentir à sa remise, la chambre de l’instruction statue par une décision dans le délai de vingt jours à compter de la date de sa comparution, sauf si un complément d’information a été ordonné dans les conditions énoncées à l’article 695-33 . Cette décision peut faire l’objet d’un pourvoi en cassation, par le procureur général ou par la personne recherchée, dans les conditions énoncées aux articles 568-1 et 574-2.” The official text is at Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Seven days with consent and no appeal, twenty days without consent and a possible appeal to the Court of Cassation: the whole calendar of a contested surrender in Paris fits inside three weeks, and every piece of evidence must be ready before the hearing, not after. Where the person enjoys a privilege or immunity, those time limits run only from the day the chamber is informed that it was lifted, a detail that counts double in files involving elected representatives.

Between arrest and decision, the most underused weapon is the request for supplementary information. Article 695-33 provides that “Si la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’Etat membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit Etat la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires”, and the official text is at Article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ten days maximum for receipt, a suspensive effect on the decision deadlines, and a direct channel to the issuing authority: used well, this request forces Madrid to put on the record the exact offences, the exact procedural stage, the exact effect of the amnesty case law on the individual file, and the exact detention conditions awaiting the person. Used badly, it backfires, because the Court of Cassation forbids fishing expeditions. In the 7 August 2024 judgment, the Court held that where the requested person has not invoked the residence ground of Article 695-24, paragraph 2, the judges cannot order supplementary inquiries simply to check on their own motion whether that ground might apply. The lesson for counsel is operational: every request for additional information must be anchored to a ground already pleaded in a written memorial, with the missing document identified and the legal consequence spelled out.

The specialty rule deserves its own paragraph because clients waive it without understanding it. A surrendered person may in principle be prosecuted, sentenced or detained in the issuing state only for the offences covered by the surrender, and the chamber must ask expressly whether the person waives that protection. In politically layered files, where the initial charges of rebellion or sedition may later be reframed as embezzlement, disobedience or misuse of funds, the specialty reservation is the lock on the door: it prevents the issuing state from substituting, after surrender, a charge that the executing court never examined. The 7 August 2024 file itself records that the arrested man declared that he did not waive specialty, and Paris practitioners treat that declaration as routine. Routine is the right word: waiving specialty to look cooperative is almost never worth the price, and no chamber draws an adverse inference from a reservation that the statute expressly organises.

On the evidence, the case law draws a map with three safe roads and one cliff. The first safe road is the discrimination ground of Article 695-22, paragraph 5: the defence must establish, with documents, that the warrant was issued to prosecute or punish the person for their political opinions, or that their situation risks being harmed for that reason. General denunciations of a politicised judiciary do not meet the statutory verb, which demands proof, not atmosphere. The second safe road is a specified fundamental right, typically the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or the right to a fair trial, supported by objective, precise and current material on detention conditions or systemic deficiencies, plus the individual exposure of the client. The 6 August 2025 judgment is the template in negative: age, health, old facts, family hardship, parallel civil litigation, Interpol deletion and foreign refusals were all recited and all discarded, because the chamber never said which fundamental right the surrender would violate. The third safe road is residence and rehabilitation under Article 695-24, paragraph 2, with pay slips, leases, school certificates and tax notices rather than press cuttings. The cliff is proportionality and fairness in the abstract: arguing that the prosecution is excessive, outdated or politically motivated without attaching the argument to a listed paragraph ends, as the Romanian file shows, in cassation and remand before a differently composed chamber. A related analysis from this firm, examining how a second European request fares after a first refusal, walks the same line between listed grounds and general grievance and is worth reading alongside this piece: Belgium Said No to Georgia, France Was Asked Next: the ECJ Kamekris Ruling and How to Fight a Second Extradition Request.

Two practical consequences follow for a Catalan-style warrant landing in Paris tomorrow. First, the Spanish amnesty helps, but it helps sideways. It does not trigger the French amnesty ground of Article 695-22, which needs French jurisdiction and a French amnesty, and it does not revive the political-offence exception, which does not exist in surrender law. What it does is evidentiary: the Constitutional Court’s reading of personal enrichment, Judge Llarena’s own acknowledgement that continued detention might prove unjustified, and the forthcoming new Supreme Court ruling are objective facts about the trajectory of the Spanish proceedings, usable to support a discrimination argument, a fair-trial argument or a request for supplementary information asking Madrid to state, in writing, what remains of the individual file. Second, time is the defence’s scarcest resource and the prosecution’s strongest ally. Twenty days from first appearance to decision, a memorial to draft, translations to commission, Spanish procedural documents to obtain and certify, medical evidence to organise: the file that wins is the file that was half-ready before the arrest, with residence proofs updated, specialty instructions signed and the listed ground chosen in advance rather than improvised at the bar.

Conclusion

The order of 6 October 2026 changes the atmosphere without settling the law. Three men can consider returning to Spain without the near-certainty of being detained at the frontier, because one judge concluded that enforcing warrants whose foundation the Constitutional Court has just shaken could unlawfully deprive them of liberty. Yet nothing is amnestied by that order, nobody is acquitted, and the Supreme Court still owes the new ruling the Constitutional Court demanded in the Bassa case, a ruling whose reasoning will shape every Catalan file for years. At European level, the warrants addressed to other member states obey their own regime, and the Grand Chamber’s 2023 ruling in the immunity dispute remains part of the landscape that any executing court must navigate. In Paris, the test will not be sympathy for a cause or severity toward it. It will be the closed list of Articles 695-22 to 695-24, the strict reading imposed by the Court of Cassation in August 2024 and August 2025, and the quality of the evidence tying the individual file to a listed paragraph within twenty days. Surrender remains the principle and refusal the narrowly read exception. The doors that stay open are marked, in the statute itself, discrimination, specified fundamental rights, and rehabilitation through residence. Everything else is commentary, and commentary has never stopped a surrender.

📄 Official circular