Susan Smith, who was convicted of murder in South Carolina for the 1994 drowning deaths of her two young sons, is scheduled to appear again before the South Carolina Board of Paroles and Pardons, according to reports published by FOX Carolina on October 26, 2026 and by CNN on November 15, 2026. Those reports place the hearing on Thursday, November 19, 2026, and the Board’s official 2026 meeting calendar lists a full Board session that day. CNN reported that she is serving a sentence of 30 years to life, that the Board unanimously rejected her first request for release in 2024, and that her former husband, David Smith, intends to speak against release again. According to the same report, her lawyer told the Board in 2024 about mental health problems dating from childhood and untreated postpartum depression, and she told the Board she would give anything to go back and change what she did.
The discussion that follows is general in scope: it explains how South Carolina’s parole rules work in comparable cases and makes no prediction or finding about Susan Smith’s case.
The short answer for readers following the hearing is this. In South Carolina, parole for a violent offense is a discretionary decision that requires a two-thirds vote. The Board must measure the file against criteria written into state law. Victims’ families have a constitutional and statutory right to be notified, to attend and to comment, but the decision belongs to the Board. If parole is denied in a violent-offense case, state law schedules the next review two years later. Federal courts, as the Supreme Court of the United States has held more than once, do not act as a second parole board.
I. How does the South Carolina parole board decide a violent-offense case?
A. Eligibility, the statutory criteria and the two-thirds vote
The first question in any South Carolina parole case is whether the person is eligible at all, and the answer depends on the law tied to the offense. Today, section 16-3-20(A) of the South Carolina Code punishes murder by death or by a mandatory minimum term of thirty years to life, and it states plainly: “No person sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life pursuant to this section is eligible for parole.” A parole hearing in a murder case from the early 1990s therefore rests on the sentencing law that applied to that older offense, not on the current text of the statute. That is why two people serving what sounds like the same sentence can face completely different parole prospects: the date of the crime, not the label of the sentence, usually decides which rules apply.
The second question is whether the conviction is for a “violent crime.” South Carolina answers it by a list. Section 16-1-60 of the South Carolina Code defines violent crimes for purposes of state law, and murder is the first offense on that list. The classification matters because several parole rules turn on it: the number of votes needed, the interval between hearings after a denial, and the way the Board can sit to decide the case.
Once eligibility and classification are settled, the governing parole provisions are collected in Chapter 21 of Title 24 of the South Carolina Code. Section 24-21-645(A) provides that “at least two-thirds of the members of the board must authorize and sign orders authorizing parole for persons convicted of a violent crime as defined in Section 16-1-60.” Section 24-21-650 repeats the two-thirds requirement for the order of parole itself. The Board has seven members, one from each of the state’s congressional districts, appointed by the Governor with Senate approval, as its official Board page explains. Section 24-21-30(B) adds a separate rule for violent offenders whose crimes fall on or after that section’s effective date, referring to a two-thirds majority vote of the full board. Which provision governs a particular file therefore depends on the offense date, and families and lawyers should ask the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services how it is counting votes in the case that concerns them.
The Department’s own guide, Understanding Parole, sets out the timeline in practical terms. For violent offenders, it applies the two-thirds majority when the crime was committed on or before May 23, 1977 or after June 3, 1986, and a simple majority when the crime fell between May 24, 1977 and June 2, 1986. A crime committed in October 1994 falls in the two-thirds group. The guide also explains that hearing dates are published approximately 30 days before the hearing, and that an inmate granted parole continues to serve the sentence under supervision once pre-release conditions such as employment, residence and programming are met. The guide is agency guidance, not the statute, but it shows how the Department reads the rules it applies.
Barton v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, 404 S.C. 395 (S.C. 2013), decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina on July 3, 2013, shows how much the counting rule can matter. The inmate had pleaded guilty in 1982 to the murder of a child and had been denied parole repeatedly since her first hearing in 1997. At her January 2012 hearing, six of the seven Board members participated and four voted for parole, but the Board said she needed five votes, two-thirds of all seven seats. The court held that applying the two-thirds rule retroactively to her pre-1986 crime violated the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws, and that, in any event, inmates convicted of a violent crime “must only convince two-thirds of the Parole Board members participating in their hearing.” For a family or an inmate preparing for a hearing, the practical lesson is to find out how many members will sit, because under Barton the two-thirds requirement is measured against the members participating, not against absent seats. Our citation search did not surface a recent opinion on an official court site or CourtListener applying Barton, so treat its vote-counting rule as the last authoritative statement we verified and confirm the Board’s current practice.
The vote is only the last step. Section 24-21-640 tells the Board what it must find before it can grant parole at all. The Board must “carefully consider the record of the prisoner before, during, and after imprisonment,” and no prisoner may be paroled until it appears to the Board’s satisfaction that the prisoner has shown a disposition to reform, will probably obey the law and lead a correct life, has merited a lessening of the rigors of imprisonment by his or her conduct, that the interest of society will not be impaired, and that suitable employment has been secured. The same section requires the Board to establish written, specific criteria for granting parole, including a review of the prisoner’s disciplinary and other records, and to make those criteria available to prisoners and to the general public. In practice, the seriousness of the original crime is part of the record, but the statutory questions also look at conduct during and after imprisonment. The question is whether the whole record, including the years in prison, satisfies the Board on each of those statutory points.
Two further requirements are easy to overlook. Under section 24-21-610, no prisoner who has served ten consecutive years or more may be paroled until the Board has first received a report from a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist on the prisoner’s mental condition and ability to adjust to life outside prison. For a long-serving inmate, that report is part of the file whatever the outcome. Section 24-21-640 also requires an inmate, before release on parole, to agree in writing to warrantless searches by probation agents and other law enforcement officers, and it states that parole may not be granted if the inmate does not comply. When the Board in Barton denied parole, it cited the nature, seriousness and indication of violence of the offense, which shows how heavily the circumstances of the crime can weigh even decades later.
B. What federal law adds, and what it does not
Families sometimes assume that a federal court can review whether a parole denial was fair on the merits. The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected that view. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 29, 1979, arose when Nebraska inmates argued that the state’s parole procedures denied them due process. The Court held: “There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” It then found that Nebraska’s procedure, which gave an inmate an opportunity to be heard and, when parole was denied, told him in what respects he fell short of qualifying, gave all the process the Constitution required in that setting. Applied to a South Carolina hearing, Greenholtz means the federal Constitution guarantees at most a fair hearing and an explanation, not release after any particular number of years.
That reading is still applied by courts deciding parole disputes. In Beckman v. Ohio Parole Bd., 2024-Ohio-5784, decided on December 10, 2024, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District, cited Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1, for the rule that an inmate has no constitutional or statutory right to release on parole before the sentence expires. The inmate was serving life for aggravated murder with parole eligibility after 20 years; the Ohio board had found him unsuitable, continued his next hearing for ten years and cited the extreme violence of the offense. The Ohio court held that he had received meaningful consideration and that the board could weigh the serious nature of the crime against the other information before it. The Ohio framework is not South Carolina law, but the reasoning shows how often courts defer to a parole board’s judgment about the gravity of a homicide.
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 24, 2011, narrowed federal review further. Two California prisoners, one convicted of attempted first-degree murder and one of first-degree murder, had won federal habeas relief because lower federal courts concluded that the state’s “some evidence” standard for parole decisions had been misapplied. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining: “In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures required are minimal.” Because the prisoners had been allowed to speak at their hearings, to contest the evidence, to see their records in advance and to learn why parole was denied, the federal inquiry should have ended there. For anyone hoping that a federal court will second-guess a South Carolina parole denial on the merits, Swarthout is the obstacle: the federal question is what process was given, not whether the Board weighed the evidence correctly.
Federal courts continue to rely on that limit. In Snyder v. Wilson, No. 1:23-cv-00176-DCN (D. Idaho Feb. 4, 2026), the United States District Court for the District of Idaho cited Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, when it rejected a former inmate’s claim that his prison record should have been corrected so that the parole board would not consider disputed charges, explaining that no liberty interest in parole eligibility arises from the federal Constitution. The court added that Idaho law did not create one either. The point for a South Carolina reader is practical: arguments about the accuracy of a parole file should be raised with the Board and in the state system first, because a federal court will usually look only at whether minimal procedures were provided.
The interval between hearings raises a different federal question. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 28, 2000, involved a Georgia prisoner serving life for murder after the state board extended reconsideration for life-sentenced inmates from every three years to at least every eight years. He argued that applying the change to him was an ex post facto law. The Court reversed a ruling in his favor and held that such a change is not automatically unconstitutional: “The question is whether the amended Georgia Rule creates a significant risk of prolonging respondent’s incarceration.” The Court also gave weight to the board’s stated policy allowing expedited reconsideration after a change in circumstances or new information. For South Carolina, where a denial in a violent-offense case brings the next review two years later, Garner explains why a challenge to the review schedule turns on evidence that a change adopted after the crime creates a significant risk of longer custody, not on the length of the wait alone.
Courts still begin from that rule. In Jones v. Fairbairn, No. 25-1104 (10th Cir. July 29, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, for the principle that the Ex Post Facto Clause bars retroactive parole statutes that increase a prisoner’s sentence compared with the parole law in effect when the crime was committed. In that order, which the court said is not binding precedent, it denied a Colorado prisoner a certificate of appealability on his challenge to a recalculated parole eligibility date. The case confirms that the comparison is always between the rules in force when the crime was committed and the rules applied later.
South Carolina has its own history on this point. Barton recounts that the Fourth Circuit upheld South Carolina’s 1986 parole amendments against a federal challenge in 1997, reasoning in part that nothing in section 24-21-645 prevents the Board from scheduling an expedited hearing when circumstances warrant. Barton also recounts that the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Jernigan v. State in 2000, nonetheless treated retroactive application of the two-year review schedule as an ex post facto violation under its own analysis. Those disputes concerned people whose crimes predated the 1986 changes. For a violent crime committed after June 3, 1986, the Department’s guide applies both the two-thirds vote and the two-year cycle, so the retroactivity arguments that succeeded in those cases have no obvious application to a later offense.
II. What can victims’ families and the inmate do before and after the hearing?
A. Notice, presence and a voice for victims’ families
South Carolina gives crime victims rights at the constitutional level. Article I, section 24 of the South Carolina Constitution, the Victims’ Bill of Rights, guarantees victims the right to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity, and, under subsection (A)(10), to be informed of any proceeding when post-conviction action is being considered and to be “present at any post-conviction hearing involving a post-conviction release decision.” A parole hearing is such a release decision. The Constitution also defines who counts as a victim: the term includes the spouse, parent, child or lawful representative of a crime victim who is deceased or who was a homicide victim. A parent whose children were killed therefore holds these rights in his or her own name.
The statutes turn those principles into concrete duties. Section 16-3-1560(A), in the same chapter of the code as the murder statute, requires the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services to make a reasonable attempt to notify each victim who has indicated a desire to be notified of proceedings affecting parole, and “of the victim’s right to attend and comment at these proceedings.” The notice must come early enough for the victim to exercise those rights. The statutory definition in section 16-3-1510 includes the spouse, parent or child of a deceased victim, and it expressly excludes anyone convicted of the offense in question. A parent who was convicted of killing a child is therefore not a “victim” for these purposes, even though he or she is also the child’s parent.
The parole chapter adds more specific rules. Section 24-21-221 requires the director to give thirty days’ written notice of any Board hearing that will consider parole to the victim or, if the victim is deceased, to members of the immediate family to the extent practicable, as well as to the prosecuting solicitor and the arresting agency. Section 24-21-35 requires the Board to make its administrative recommendations available to a victim before it conducts the parole hearing. Section 24-21-30(C) requires all parole hearings in cases relating to a single victim to be held on the same day, and section 24-21-30(D) allows the Board, at a victim’s request, to have the victim and the offender appear simultaneously to provide testimony.
Section 24-21-710 deals with families who cannot or do not wish to travel. Video and other recorded statements submitted by a victim must be considered by the Board. The Board operates closed-circuit television systems for parole hearings, and the statute states: “A victim of a crime must be allowed access to this system to appear before the board during a parole hearing.” A recording kept by the Board may be submitted again at later hearings, each time the person who submitted it provides a written statement declaring that it still represents his or her present position. For families facing a hearing every two years, that provision can spare them from recording the same statement each time, although many choose to attend in person. CNN reported that in South Carolina inmates communicate with the Board by video from prison, so a victim attending in Columbia may not be in the same room as the inmate.
What families cannot do is decide the outcome. Nothing in the constitutional or statutory provisions gives victims a vote; the Board alone must be satisfied of the statutory criteria and must reach the required majority. Article I, section 24(B) states that the section creates no civil cause of action against public employees or agencies, but it allows the rights to be enforced by a writ of mandamus issued by a justice of the Supreme Court or a circuit judge. Section 16-3-1565 likewise provides that the victims’ article creates no cause of action for money damages and that a sentence may not be invalidated because of a failure to comply with it. The practical consequence is that a family that was not properly notified should raise the problem immediately, before the hearing date, rather than expect a later lawsuit to undo a decision.
For a family preparing to speak, several checks are useful. Confirm that the family is registered for notification with the Department’s victim services, because the duty in section 16-3-1560 runs to victims who have indicated a desire to be notified. Watch for the published hearing date, which the Department’s guide says appears approximately 30 days in advance. Ask for the administrative recommendations that section 24-21-35 makes available. Decide whether to speak in person, by closed-circuit television or by recorded statement, and keep any recording identified as section 24-21-710(C) requires: each voice and face identified, the date of recording stated and the name of the person whose parole is being considered. Focus the statement on matters the Board must weigh under section 24-21-640, such as the effect of the crime and the interest of society, because that is the framework the Board applies.
B. Preparing a parole file, and what happens after a denial
From the inmate’s side, the statute effectively lists what a parole file must show. Under section 24-21-640, the Board looks for a disposition to reform, a probability of obeying the law in the future, conduct that merits a lessening of the rigors of imprisonment, no impairment of the interest of society and secured employment. Each of those elements calls for evidence rather than assertion: program completion records, work assignments, education, the disciplinary record, letters from people who will supervise or employ the inmate, and a realistic residence plan. The same section makes in-prison disciplinary records subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and, with the prisoner’s consent, records of awards, honors and earned credits as well. An applicant should assume that the Board will see every infraction and should be ready to explain it.
Mental health evidence plays a particular role in long sentences. The report required by section 24-21-610 for anyone who has served ten consecutive years or more must address the prisoner’s mental condition and ability to adjust to life outside prison. A history of untreated illness at the time of the offense may help explain the crime, but the statutory question looks forward: what treatment has occurred since, what the current evaluation shows and what support will exist after release. A file that addresses those forward-looking points tends to engage directly with the criteria the Board must apply, whereas a file that only revisits the circumstances of the crime may not.
If the Board grants parole, release does not follow automatically. The Department’s guide describes a conditional parole: the inmate is released to supervision once pre-release conditions such as employment, residence, programming and the resolution of any detainers are met, and then serves the rest of the sentence on parole. Section 24-21-645(B) requires the conditions of parole to include warrantless searches of the parolee, his or her vehicle and possessions by probation agents and other officers. A grant is therefore the start of a supervised period that can last for the remainder of a very long sentence, not an end to the sentence.
If the Board denies parole in a violent-offense case, section 24-21-645(D) provides that prisoners in confinement for a violent crime “must have their cases reviewed every two years for the purpose of a determination of parole.” Section 24-21-650 says the same, and the Department’s guide lists reconsideration every two years for inmates serving sentences for violent offenses. Practically, that means a denial sets the next review roughly two years out, and both the inmate and the victims’ family should plan for a recurring cycle rather than a single decision. The Fourth Circuit’s observation, recounted in Barton, that the statute does not prevent expedited hearings when circumstances warrant suggests that a significant change, such as a serious medical condition, should be brought to the Board’s attention without waiting for the next scheduled date. Section 24-21-610 separately allows the Board to parole a prisoner up to one year before the eligibility date when medical information shows the prisoner is not reasonably expected to live more than a year.
Challenging a denial is possible but narrow. Barton shows the state-court route: the inmate took the Board’s decision to the Administrative Law Court, and the case then reached the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which applied the deferential standard of review in South Carolina’s Administrative Procedures Act and still reversed, holding that the retroactive vote rule was unconstitutional as applied and that the two-thirds requirement had been misread. Barton also quoted the court’s earlier statement in Cooper that parole is a privilege, but that an inmate is entitled to require the Board to follow the statutory requirements in deciding. The successful arguments in Barton were legal ones: which version of the statute applied and how the votes should be counted. Disagreement with the Board’s weighing of the evidence is a much harder argument, and, as Swarthout makes clear, it is not a federal question at all.
A final practical point concerns the passage of time. Families sometimes expect that a long sentence served without serious incident must eventually lead to release, while inmates sometimes expect that the original crime will be held against them forever. South Carolina law supports neither assumption. The statute requires the Board to look at the record “before, during, and after imprisonment,” and the federal decisions above confirm that the Board’s judgment, exercised through fair procedures, is what controls. Each hearing is a fresh decision on the record as it stands that day, which is why preparation for every hearing matters on both sides.
Conclusion
In South Carolina, parole in a violent-offense case is a discretionary decision. The Board must be satisfied, on the prisoner’s whole record, of the criteria listed in section 24-21-640, it must have a psychiatric or psychological report for long-serving inmates, and it needs a two-thirds vote, which the Supreme Court of South Carolina has measured against the members participating in the hearing. Victims, including the parents of homicide victims, have the right to be notified, to attend, to comment, and to appear by closed-circuit television or by recorded statement, but not to decide. A denial brings the next review two years later. Under the federal decisions discussed above, federal courts ask only whether minimal procedures were followed and whether a later change in the rules creates a significant risk of longer custody. Anyone preparing for a hearing should confirm the hearing date and notification status, identify which voting rule applies to the offense date, and build the file around the statutory criteria that the Board must apply.