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Tarkett Seized in Russia: What French Groups With Assets Abroad Can Still Protect

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Tarkett Seized in Russia: What French Groups With Assets Abroad Can Still Protect

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On 16 October 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ordering the compulsory seizure of the Russian assets of five European groups that had kept operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to Euronews. The named groups are French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, paper packaging producer Kappa Rus, formerly part of Ireland’s Smurfit Kappa, hygiene products maker Ontex RU, part of the Belgian Ontex group, metal packaging manufacturer Eviosys Packaging Kuban, part of United States-based Sonoco Products Company, and Menshen Packaging CIS, owned by German plastics producer Menshen. Their combined annual revenue exceeds 50 billion roubles, about 532 million euros, still according to Euronews. The seized assets were placed under the interim control of a management company called Centre Capital, registered in February 2026, whose chief executive is listed as Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former regional administration official who stood down in 2025 after an injury sustained in the war in Ukraine.

This decree does not come out of nowhere. According to the same reporting, it follows a wave of similar measures in September 2026, when the Russian assets of Swiss food group Nestle, German hypermarket chain Metro, French retailer Auchan and French home improvement chain Leroy Merlin were placed under temporary administration and transferred to a company called LEV Management, established shortly before the decision. A manufacturer of plastic dispensing systems owned by French holding Aptar Europe Holding was also placed under temporary administration shortly afterwards. The first targets of the mechanism, created by a presidential decree signed in April 2023, had been Danish brewer Carlsberg and French dairy group Danone. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov directly linked the transfer of Nestle’s and Auchan’s assets to the fact that they are companies from what Moscow terms unfriendly countries, an official Russian designation applied to the states that imposed sanctions after 2022. Russia has framed the seizures in part as a response to the European Union’s freezing of approximately 300 billion euros in Russian sovereign assets.

At the date of writing, no court has ruled on the lawfulness of the October 2026 decree, no liability has been established, and the contracts signed by each group remain the governing documents of their operations. The analysis below is general in scope: it describes the checks and remedies that are useful in any comparable situation of foreign seizure of a French group’s assets and it does not describe the situation of Tarkett, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, Danone or Aptar, on which this article makes no finding. Only a judge or an arbitral tribunal ruling on the specific file can decide these questions. The first part explains what the October 2026 mechanism changes for French-owned assets in Russia, and the second part sets out how a French group in such a position can still protect itself through arbitration, recognition in France and enforcement within the narrow gate that French law opens against foreign states.

I. Putin seizes five European firms: what the October 2026 decree changes for French-owned assets in Russia

A. How does the Russian temporary administration mechanism work against groups that stayed?

The mechanism described by Euronews rests on a presidential decree signed in April 2023 that authorises the imposition of temporary administration over certain Russian assets of foreign companies. In practice, the October 2026 decree converts presence into exposure: the five groups targeted are precisely those that continued operating in Russia, keeping plants, paying taxes to the Russian budget and serving the local market. According to Euronews, Tarkett kept two plants in Russia out of its 34 production sites worldwide and continued paying taxes to the Russian budget, citing its 2024 annual report. The decree then transfers interim control to a designated Russian management company, Centre Capital in the October wave and LEV Management in the September wave, which Russian media linked to the country’s security services.

From a French lawyer’s perspective, three features of this mechanism deserve attention because they shape every later remedy. First, the measure is presented as temporary administration, not as a final transfer of ownership. That label matters: whether the operation could be characterised as an expropriation, a creeping expropriation or a provisional measure is a question that only an arbitral tribunal applying the relevant treaty could answer, and the answer changes the compensation standard. Western governments and international legal experts have described the move as unlawful expropriation, according to Euronews, but that political and doctrinal assessment is not a judgment, and a company that repeats it as an established fact in its own communications takes a litigation risk. Prudence commands the conditional tense as long as no tribunal has ruled.

Second, the designation of the manager and the opacity of its ownership create an evidence problem from day one. Proving who controls the seized plant, who receives its revenues and who gives operating instructions will determine whether a claim targets the Russian Federation itself, a state entity or a nominally private manager. The October reporting already identifies Centre Capital’s registration date and its chief executive, and that kind of corporate trace, collected early, often decides the jurisdictional battle two years later. Board minutes recording the loss of control, correspondence with the appointed manager, banking records showing where revenues flow and insurance notifications should be secured immediately, because each of them may later support a claim for the full value of the investment rather than a discounted settlement.

Third, the retaliation narrative openly assumed by Moscow does not cancel private rights, but it complicates their exercise. The European Union’s sanctions architecture, built notably on Council Regulation 269 of 2014 on restrictive measures against actions undermining Ukraine and on Council Regulation 833 of 2014 on sectoral restrictions, and answered in Moscow by countersanctions and the April 2023 seizure mechanism, creates a mirror in which each side points to the other’s freeze. For the French groups concerned, the mirror is concrete on both sides: their Russian plants are seized in Moscow while, in France, the ministers of the economy and of the interior may order domestic freezes. French law provides that the two ministers may decide jointly, for a period of six months, renewable, to freeze funds and economic resources belonging to designated persons, since the text states that they act “pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable”, and the provision sits in a chapter whose key definitions, including funds, economic resources and the acts that trigger a freeze, are set by Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code. A French group with interests on both sides of the mirror must therefore manage two freezes at once, each under its own procedure and its own judge. The related analysis of the French freeze regime for Russian assets frozen in France, published on this site, completes this picture and can be read as the companion to the present article: Russian frozen assets in France and the French freeze framework for Ukraine.

B. Why does staying in Russia after 2022 expose a French parent more than leaving did?

The groups that left Russia in 2022 generally booked a loss, negotiated a sale price, sometimes with a buyback clause, and closed the file. The groups that stayed kept revenues but accumulated a different risk: a taxable, visible, operating presence that a seizure decree can designate with precision. The October 2026 decree illustrates the pattern. It does not target dormant holdings; it targets flooring plants, packaging factories and hygiene production lines that continued to produce and sell. For counsel, the lesson is that continued operation must be paired from the start with continued documentation: updated valuations of the Russian subsidiaries, records of dividends blocked or authorised, correspondence with Russian authorities on countersanctions compliance, and proof of the instructions given by the French parent. When control is lost overnight, only the paper trail predating the decree allows the group to reconstruct what it owned and what it lost.

French courts will not rewrite the Russian decree, but they control the legal effects that foreign acts produce in France. That control runs through a settled triple test. Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that foreign judgments are enforceable in France in the manner and cases set by statute, and the full text in force is available at Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Construing that text, the First Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation held on 17 May 2023, in case number 21-18.406 between an Albanian company and the Italian Enel group, that a French judge seized with an exequatur request must verify indirect international jurisdiction based on the link between the dispute and the court seized, compatibility with international public policy as to substance and procedure, and the absence of fraud: Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 17 May 2023, No. 21-18.406. The same ruling recalls that where recognition of an earlier foreign arbitral award is opposed to the exequatur, refusal may follow in the cases listed by Article 1520 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whose in-force text is here: Article 1520 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Concretely, a Russian court decision validating the seizure would have to pass that triple filter before producing any effect in France, and a French judge remains free to refuse it effect if fraud on the process is shown.

The practical consequence for a French parent is twofold. On the defensive side, no creditor of the seized Russian subsidiary and no assignee of the appointed manager should be able to enforce in France a title born of the seizure without surviving the Article 509 control. On the offensive side, the parent that obtains abroad an award or judgment condemning the seizure can bring it to France for recognition, provided the award itself satisfies the French conditions for reception. The bridge between the seizure in Moscow and money recovered in Paris is therefore procedural, and its two pillars are investment arbitration where available and the French law of recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, examined in the second part.

II. Seized in Russia, protected from Paris: arbitration, recognition and the narrow gate of enforcement

A. Where can a French investor sue: investment arbitration or the ordinary courts?

The first question counsel asks after a seizure is where to sue. International practice points to investment arbitration where a bilateral investment treaty covers the investment: the treaty typically offers a neutral forum, a direct action by the investor against the host state and a compensation standard for expropriation. According to Euronews, companies whose assets are seized can in principle pursue compensation through international arbitration under the bilateral investment treaties Russia has signed with European Union member states. That statement is carefully conditional, and counsel should keep it so: each file requires checking whether a treaty applies to the specific investor, whether the investment qualifies, whether the seizure breaches the treaty’s standards and whether any waiting period or negotiation precondition must be exhausted first. Where no treaty covers the investment, the investor falls back on contract claims, on any available forum clause and on negotiation backed by the credible threat of a treaty or contract claim. Nothing in press reporting decides these points, and asserting treaty protection without reading the treaty would be the first error.

The second forum question is France itself. French law receives foreign arbitral awards generously but not blindly. Article 1514 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in full: “Les sentences arbitrales sont reconnues ou exécutées en France si leur existence est établie par celui qui s’en prévaut et si cette reconnaissance ou cette exécution n’est pas manifestement contraire à l’ordre public international”, and the two conditions it states, proof of the award’s existence by the party relying on it and absence of manifest contrariety to international public policy, frame every recognition strategy. An award condemning a state for an unlawful seizure will normally survive that filter, but the 17 May 2023 ruling recalled above sounds a warning that sophisticated opponents use: where parallel proceedings suggest manipulation of fora, the French judge may refuse reception for fraud, as the Court of Cassation approved in the Albanian-Italian dispute. A group that multiplies proceedings in several countries to obtain indirectly what arbitration refused it therefore risks losing in Paris what it seemed to win elsewhere. Coherence of fora is part of the protection strategy.

A further French specificity strengthens the Paris route for genuine awards. Recognition, once granted, converts the foreign award into a French enforcement title, opening the full arsenal of French enforcement measures against assets located in France. That is where the real battle usually moves, because the seized plants are in Russia while the recoverable assets, bank accounts, receivables, shares, real estate, transit through or sit in France. Before seizing anything, however, counsel must identify which assets belong to the state itself and which belong to separate entities, because French law draws that line strictly, and it must clear the immunity gate described below.

B. Can a French judge let the group seize Russian state assets in France?

Enforcing against a foreign state in France is possible but fenced by a statute that leaves little room for improvisation. Articles L111-1-2 and L111-1-3 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, introduced by the Sapin II law of 9 December 2016, condition every conservatory or enforcement measure against property of a foreign state on prior judicial authorisation. Article L111-1-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures opens with the rule that “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie”, and it then lists three alternative conditions: express consent of the state to the measure, reservation or earmarking of the asset for satisfaction of the claim, or a judgment or award rendered against the state combined with use of the asset for non-public commercial purposes linked to the entity proceeded against. The companion provision, Article L111-1-3 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, shields outright the assets used for diplomatic, consular, military, cultural and tax functions. Any enforcement roadmap that ignores this gate fails at the first hearing.

The Court of Cassation polices the gate closely, and its rulings give counsel the exact standards to plead. On 10 January 2018, in case number 16-22.494 opposing the Republic of Congo to atlading creditor, the First Civil Chamber annulled without remand a decision that had validated seizures on Congolese diplomatic accounts, visaing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations alongside Articles L111-1-2 and L111-1-3: Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 10 January 2018, No. 16-22.494. The ruling confirms that accounts held by an embassy or a permanent delegation benefit from a presumption of assignment to diplomatic functions, comforted by the account titles, and that the creditor who fails to rebut it loses. Transposed to our context, the message is that Russian diplomatic and consular accounts in France are practically untouchable, and that effort spent pursuing them is effort wasted.

The 2024 case law then clarified the waiver key that sometimes opens the gate. On 13 March 2024, in case number 21-17.599, again concerning the Republic of Congo, the First Civil Chamber held that under the principles of customary international law reflected in the United Nations Convention of 2 December 2004 on jurisdictional immunities of states, an express waiver of immunity from execution suffices for any state asset to be subjected to enforcement, with no additional special waiver required. The exact holding states that “la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale”: Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 13 March 2024, No. 21-17.599. For counsel, the operational point is to hunt for express waivers signed before the dispute, in loan agreements, bond documentation, investment contracts or correspondence, because a single express clause can convert an immune asset into a seizable one. But the hunt must be honest: customary law as reflected in the 2004 Convention requires the waiver to be express, and French courts will not infer it from commercial activity alone outside the statutory cases.

The hardest asset class remains sovereign reserves, and here the debate over the 300 billion euros of Russian sovereign assets frozen in Europe meets a French wall built for a different dispute. Article L153-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Ne peuvent être saisis les biens de toute nature, notamment les avoirs de réserves de change, que les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères détiennent ou gèrent pour leur compte ou celui de l’Etat ou des Etats étrangers dont elles relèvent.” The provision then opens a single narrow exception for a creditor holding an enforceable title for a liquid and due claim who shows that the assets form part of property assigned by the central bank to a principally private-law activity. On 12 May 2021, in case number 19-13.853, the First Civil Chamber applied that architecture to accounts linked to the Bank of Central African States and annulled seizures where the courts below had not checked for a valid waiver: Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 12 May 2021, No. 19-13.853. The lesson for French groups is symmetrical and sobering: just as Moscow cannot easily be forced to pay by seizing French sovereign property, a French award-holder cannot easily satisfy itself on Russian central bank reserves sitting in Europe. Political debate about confiscating frozen reserves to fund Ukraine is intense, and it is legitimate, but it belongs to legislators and treaty-makers, not to the enforcement judge, who applies L153-1 as written. Counsel should therefore aim enforcement at commercial assets linked to the debtor entity, document their private use with bank and accounting evidence, and seek prior authorisation with a file that already answers the judge’s three questions under L111-1-2.

Conclusion

The October 2026 decree marks a new stage in a crackdown that began with an April 2023 mechanism and already passed through a September 2026 wave: remaining in operation no longer reads as neutrality but as exposure, and each group concerned must now choose its forum with full knowledge of the odds. The protective sequence runs from immediate evidence preservation, through the choice between investment arbitration where a treaty applies and contract or forum claims where none does, to recognition in France under the generous but policed standard of Article 1514, and finally to enforcement through the narrow statutory gate of Articles L111-1-2 and L111-1-3, with diplomatic assets out of reach, express waivers as the key and central bank reserves behind the wall of Article L153-1. At the date of writing, no court has characterised the October seizures as lawful or unlawful, no liability of any named group or authority has been established, the signed contracts remain the governing framework of each operation, and only the judge or tribunal seized of a specific file can rule. Groups that prepare their file now, with valuations, correspondence, banking traces and waiver clauses assembled before litigation starts, keep every option open; groups that wait for the politics to settle may find that the assets, the evidence and the fora have all moved on.

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