On 23 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union annulled two rounds of EU sanctions relistings imposed on former Russian senator Oleg Polikarpovich Tkach. The judgment in Tkach v Council (T-584/24), handed down by the Fourth Chamber after a hearing on 25 February 2026, wipes out the Council acts of September 2024 and September 2025 insofar as they kept his name on the Ukraine sanctions lists. As the specialist press summarised on the day the news broke (Global Sanctions, 28 September 2026): the annulment of former Russian senator Oleg Tkach’s September 2024 and 2025 EU sanctions relistings under Regulation (EU) 269/2014. For anyone holding frozen funds in France, the ruling is both an encouragement and a warning. It confirms that the EU courts genuinely review whether a listed person still meets the listing criterion at the date each renewal is adopted, years after the original designation. But it does not put an end to the freeze: by a decision of 16 March 2026, which was not covered by the action, the Council kept Tkach listed until 15 September 2026. This article explains why the Court annulled the two relistings, what the annulment changes in practice for assets frozen in France, and how a listed person or a company dealing with frozen funds can challenge a listing or obtain the release of money from France.
I. Why did the EU General Court annul Oleg Tkach’s September 2024 and September 2025 relistings?
A. Who is Oleg Tkach and why has he been listed since March 2022?
Oleg Polikarpovich Tkach sat in the Federation Council of Russia, the upper house of the Russian parliament, from January 2004 until September 2022. Reporting on the case notes the essential timeline: Tkach sat in Russia’s Federation Council from 2004 to 2022 and was first listed on 9 March 2022. That first listing came days after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in the wave of designations by which the Council of the European Union targeted members of the Federation Council who had supported the recognition of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics.
EU sanctions against Russia rest on two paired instruments: Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP, which defines the listing criteria and the persons covered, and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, which imposes the asset freeze itself and is directly applicable in every Member State, including France. The listing criterion applied to Tkach appears in Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. As the commentary on the judgment explains: a criterion covering those responsible for, supporting or implementing actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The Council maintains the lists through periodic review acts, adopted in practice in March and September each year. In Tkach’s case, the file therefore contains a chain of measures: the initial 2022 listing, then successive renewals, including the acts of September 2024, March 2025 and September 2025, and most recently Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/614 of 16 March 2026.
For the September 2024 renewal, the Council kept Tkach on the lists on two stated grounds. The judgment records the statement of reasons in substance as follows: a former member of the Federation Council who had ratified the government decisions on the treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk republics, and the director and founder of the OLMA publishing house, presented as consequently supporting actions threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. For the September 2025 renewal, the Council kept the first ground and reworked the second: Tkach was described as the founder of the OLMA publishing house, now called OLMA Media Group, who, through a system of apparent change of ownership, continued to control and influence the activities of the group. The applicant challenged the renewals by an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, lodged on 13 November 2024 and extended to the later acts. His request, as the Court file in Tkach v Council (action brought on 13 November 2024, language of the case French) summarises it, was that the judges annul the measures insofar as they kept his name on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures. The language of the case was French, and the judgment was delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 September 2026 by the Fourth Chamber, following a hearing held on 25 February 2026, as reported by EU Law Live the same day. That procedural calendar is confirmed by the Court file.
Readers familiar with this sanctions litigation will recognise a pattern already seen in other recent annulments covered on this site, such as the annulment of a 2025 relisting for lack of current evidence and the challenge to an autocracy-linked company asset freeze. Each case turns on its own file, but the method is the same: the Court checks, renewal by renewal, whether the evidence proves that the person still meets the criterion when the act is adopted.
B. Why did the Council’s evidence collapse: the 2022 vote, OLMA and the error of assessment?
Tkach’s central argument was simple and factual. His functions in the Federation Council belonged to the past: when the September 2024 acts were adopted, he had left the upper house two years earlier, in September 2022, so there was no temporal proximity between the criticised vote and the renewal. He added that his resignation, combined with the acquisition of two new nationalities preventing any return to Russian political life, showed a deliberate withdrawal from politics. The Council answered with four evidence files. Their content, inventoried in detail by the judgment, deserves attention because it shows exactly what the EU courts accept and what they reject.
The file on the 2022 vote contained the lists of results of the public vote at the 518th meeting of the Federation Council on 22 February 2022, concerning ratification of the treaties at issue. The vote list showed the applicant’s name in Cyrillic script, O.P. Tkach. Alongside it stood an undated list of Federation Council members, an undated biography from the Council’s official website stating that Tkach had been a senator from January 2004 to September 2022 and had received an honorary certificate from the Russian president, a screenshot taken on 7 June 2023 from the Nowheretorun website recording that he was sanctioned by Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Monaco, Switzerland and Australia because of his position in the Federation Council, an article dated 22 February 2022 from the Federation Council’s official website reporting the unanimous vote of senators in favour of ratification, and a screenshot taken on 9 May 2023 from the Putin’s List website. On the publishing side, the Council produced a Kompromat article of 13 January 2023 recalling that Tkach founded OLMA in 1991 and served as its director general, a Baltic News article of 19 September 2022 stating that he had stopped serving as senator for personal circumstances, an announcement published on 23 February 2024 by the OLMA publishing house on the VKontakte network promoting its publications for Russia’s Defender of the Fatherland Day, a New York Times article of 1 November 2014 on the privatisation of the Enlightenment publishing house after its acquisition by OLMA Media Group and the award of government contracts worth several million dollars, and press material alleging that he had obtained lucrative government contracts through close relations with senior Russian officials.
The Court’s review method follows settled case law. The Council may rely on information relating to circumstances predating the adoption of the maintaining act, but only insofar as that information supports the reasons given in the act. And under the judgment of 13 March 2025 in Shuvalov v Council (C-271/24 P), such material must help establish that, despite the passage of time and in light of all the circumstances of each case, the person still meets the listing criterion. Applied to the September 2024 acts, that test failed twice over. On the senatorial past, a 2022 vote plus undated biographical material could not, two years after the resignation, prove that Tkach was still, in September 2024, a person meeting criterion (a). On OLMA, the reasons imputed to him an official function as director of the publishing house, but the file did not show that he actually held that post when the acts were adopted. When the Council argued in its defence that he in any event played an essential role in the management of OLMA and maintained control and influence over its business, the Court replied that the stated reasons said nothing about any essential management role or maintained control and influence over the OLMA publishing house business, and merely imputed an official function in it to him. The Council’s argument was therefore inoperative, because it could not justify the reasons as drafted.
The conclusion follows in the operative language of EU sanctions litigation: the Council had made an error of assessment in treating the applicant, when the September 2024 acts were adopted, as responsible for actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine or its stability or security, or as supporting such actions or policies. The first plea was therefore upheld and the September 2024 acts annulled insofar as they concerned him, without any need to rule on the second plea alleging breach of proportionality and fundamental rights. The same fate befell the September 2025 acts, annulled for the same structural defect in the evidence. The claims directed against the March 2025 acts, by contrast, were rejected as to the surplus, with each side bearing its own costs.
The operative part therefore annuls the four September 2024 and September 2025 instruments insofar as Mr Tkach’s name was maintained on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to those restrictive measures. The instruments concerned are Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 of 12 September 2025. The full references, with their Official Journal citations, are set out in paragraph 1 of the operative part, ECLI:EU:T:2026:584.
II. What does the Tkach annulment change for frozen assets and listings in France?
A. Can a French bank release frozen funds after an EU annulment?
The short answer is that an annulment opens the door but does not automatically unlock the account, and the Tkach case itself illustrates why. The Court took care to delimit the temporal effects of its ruling: the annulment of Decisions 2024/2456 and 2025/1895 covers the listing periods from 14 September 2024 to 15 March 2025 and from 16 September 2025 to 15 March 2026, but that annulment does not extend to Decision 2026/614, which was not covered by the action. Since the applicant remained subject to new restrictive measures, the Council’s fallback request to preserve the effects of the annulled decisions was dismissed as moot. In concrete terms, Tkach won the retrospect but remains listed under the March 2026 renewal until 15 September 2026. Any release of funds in France must therefore be assessed against the listing in force on the day of the request, not against the annulled periods.
French readers need to understand how the freeze operates on French territory. EU asset-freeze regulations are directly applicable: a bank established in France must freeze the funds of a listed person without waiting for any French transposition. French domestic law reinforces this architecture. The Monetary and Financial Code requires the institutions concerned to apply freezes and making-available prohibitions immediately: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10” (Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code). The persons subject to anti-money-laundering duties must set up internal organisation and procedures for implementing asset freezes and making-available prohibitions, including those laid down by European regulations (Article L562-4-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code), with organisation and procedures adapted to their size and business and capable of ensuring implementation without delay (Article R562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code). Alongside the EU regime, France maintains national freeze regimes decided by the Minister for the Economy, acting alone or jointly with the Minister of the Interior, for renewable six-month periods: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” (Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code), a mechanism extended by Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, by the foreign-interference freeze in Article L562-2-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, and framed by the definitions in Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code and the scope provisions of Article L562-8 of the Monetary and Financial Code. A person checking why a Paris bank froze an account must therefore first identify which regime applies: an EU listing under Regulation 269/2014, a national freeze, or both.
Two recent Cour de cassation decisions show how strictly French courts treat frozen assets. On 5 February 2026, the Second Civil Chamber rejected an appeal by a Kuwaiti company holding an arbitral award against the Libyan state, which had obtained authorisation to attach sums held in the name of the Libyan Investment Authority at Société Générale in Paris (Cass. 2nd Civil Chamber, 5 February 2026, appeal No. 23-15.936). The court of appeal had annulled the attachment, and the Cour de cassation endorsed that outcome: “en l’absence d’autorisation délivrée par la direction générale du Trésor, le juge de l’exécution ne pouvait autoriser la société [T] à pratiquer une mesure de saisie-attribution sur les biens gelés” – without an authorisation issued by the Directorate General of the Treasury, the enforcement judge could not authorise attachment of frozen property – and it simply “REJETTE le pourvoi.” Even a creditor armed with an enforceable title cannot seize frozen assets without a Treasury authorisation under the applicable sanctions regulation, here Regulation 2016/44 on Libya. The lesson for a listed person is symmetrical: if even third-party creditors cannot touch frozen funds, the account holder’s own release request stands no chance without the listing being lifted or a specific authorisation being granted by the competent national authority, in France the Directorate General of the Treasury.
The second decision goes further back and frames the still-open questions. On 10 July 2020, the Full Assembly of the Cour de cassation, in the Bank Sepah case opposing the Iranian bank to American creditors (Cass. Full Assembly, 10 July 2020, appeals No. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814), stayed proceedings and referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The key question was whether the EU Iran sanctions regulations must be interpreted as opposing, on frozen assets and without prior authorisation from the competent national authority, a measure with no transfer effect such as a judicial security or a conservatory attachment under French enforcement law: “doivent-ils être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à ce que soit diligentée sur des avoirs gelés, sans autorisation préalable de l’autorité nationale compétente, une mesure dépourvue d’effet attributif, telle une sûreté judiciaire ou une saisie conservatoire” The Court ordered: “RENVOIE à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne aux fins de répondre aux questions suivantes :” For practitioners in Paris, the message is that every enforcement step touching frozen assets passes through the Treasury authorisation filter, and that the boundary between prohibited making-available and permissible conservatory steps remains a matter of EU law.
In practice, after an annulment such as Tkach’s, the account holder should send the bank a documented written request attaching the judgment, the ECLI reference and proof of the listing currently in force, and simultaneously approach the Directorate General of the Treasury where an authorisation is the applicable route. The bank will check the consolidated EU list as updated, not press commentary: as long as a later renewal such as Decision 2026/614 keeps the name listed, the freeze stays. Where the annulment does remove the only legal basis for the freeze, the bank must lift it, but experience shows that compliance departments move slowly and ask for official confirmation. Every exchange should be kept in writing, with dates, because a refusal or a prolonged silence becomes the factual basis for the next legal step. And anyone tempted to move funds through intermediaries should understand that circumvention of EU restrictive measures is itself sanctioned: the lawful paths are delisting, annulment and Treasury authorisation, not informal arrangements.
B. How to challenge an EU listing or a frozen account from France?
Four routes exist, and they must not be confused. The first is the direct action for annulment before the General Court in Luxembourg under Article 263 TFEU – the route Tkach took. It is subject to a strict two-month time limit running from notification or publication of each renewal, which means that every March and September act must be challenged separately and promptly; Tkach’s action, lodged on 13 November 2024, was extended to the later acts as they were adopted. An application for interim measures can be added where urgency is shown, though suspensions of sanctions listings are rarely granted. The Tkach file teaches the winning evidentiary method: prove change with dated, verifiable documents. Resignation letters, corporate register extracts recording the end of functions, evidence of new nationalities incompatible with a return to office, audited proof of the end of any control over a company – all of it dated and specific. Conversely, the losing method is now documented: undated website biographies, years-old vote records, screenshots from sanctions-tracking sites and press allegations cannot prove that a person still meets the criterion years later. The Council’s 2022 vote evidence and its unproven assertion of a current directorship at OLMA were not enough, and the upgraded 2025 allegation of continued control through an apparent change of ownership met the same fate.
The second route is the administrative delisting request addressed to the Council, supported by the same change-of-circumstances evidence. It can be filed at any time and is the natural complement of litigation: even Tkach, having won on the 2024 and 2025 acts, remains listed under the March 2026 renewal, and only a fresh annulment or a Council decision not to renew will end the freeze. The third route is the damages action for the harm caused by an unlawful listing, which requires proof of a sufficiently serious breach, actual damage and causation – a high threshold on which the Tkach judgment, having set aside the proportionality plea without examining it, offers no shortcut. The fourth route lies before the French courts, but only against French measures: a refusal by a bank to release funds after the legal basis has genuinely fallen away can be brought before the enforcement judge with the Luxembourg judgment and the updated list, while a challenge to a national freeze decision can seek suspension before the interim-relief judge where urgency is shown and a serious doubt about legality is raised: the Code of Administrative Justice provides that suspension may be ordered “lorsque l’urgence le justifie” (Article L521-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice), urgency being justified and a ground capable of creating serious doubt as to legality being stated. What the French judge cannot do is annul an EU listing itself: that jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the EU courts, as the Bank Sepah reference to Luxembourg illustrates.
Timing matters as much as substance. Because the Council reviews the Ukraine lists in March and September cycles, a delisting file should be lodged early enough to be examined before the next renewal, and any annulment action must be filed within two months of each new act. Legal fees and court-ordered payments raise a specific sub-issue: EU regulations provide for authorisations allowing the release of frozen funds for defined purposes, and requests go to the competent national authority, in France the Directorate General of the Treasury – the very authority whose prior authorisation the Cour de cassation required before any attachment of frozen assets in the Libyan Investment Authority case. A complete file therefore runs on two tracks at once: Luxembourg for the listing, Paris for the concrete effects on accounts, with counsel on each side coordinating dates, exhibits and translations. The Tkach timeline shows the pace to expect: action in November 2024, hearing in February 2026, judgment in September 2026 – roughly twenty-two months from application to ruling, during which the freeze continued to bite.
Conclusion
The General Court’s judgment of 23 September 2026 in Tkach v Council is a serious retrospective victory built on a simple principle: a sanctions listing is not a permanent status, and each renewal must be justified by evidence showing that the person still meets the criterion when the act is adopted. A 2022 parliamentary vote, undated biographies and unproven claims about a publishing house could not sustain the September 2024 and September 2025 relistings of a man who had left the Federation Council in September 2022. Yet the victory is bounded: the claims against the March 2025 acts failed, each side bears its own costs, and Decision 2026/614 of 16 March 2026 keeps Tkach listed until 15 September 2026. For holders of frozen assets in France, the practical consequences are clear. Monitor the consolidated list rather than the headlines, because only the listing in force determines whether a bank may release funds. Build delisting and annulment files around dated proof of change, since stale evidence now fails as a matter of routine. And run the Luxembourg and Paris tracks together, combining the challenge to the EU act with Treasury authorisation requests and, where the legal basis has truly fallen, enforcement proceedings before the French judge. Annulments like this one do not end sanctions regimes, but they set the evidentiary price of every future renewal – and that price keeps rising.