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EU Sanctions List Upheld: Why Roman Trotsenko Lost at the General Court and How to Challenge a Freeze From France

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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EU Sanctions List Upheld: Why Roman Trotsenko Lost at the General Court and How to Challenge a Freeze From France

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On 16 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg dismissed the sanctions challenge of Russian businessman Roman Trotsenko and kept his name on the EU asset-freeze list for Ukraine-related restrictive measures. The judgment, Roman Trotsenko v Council, Case T-459/24, is a cold shower for listed persons who believed that selling shares after designation would automatically earn delisting. The Court held that the Council was entitled to include and then maintain the applicant’s name on the lists, ordered him to pay the costs, and confirmed a line of case law that makes EU sanctions listings exceptionally hard to overturn once the Council produces one solid reason. For anyone who banks, invests, or lives in France under an EU freeze, the ruling is both a warning and a roadmap: it shows exactly which arguments fail, which evidence the Council cannot ignore, and where the real battle for frozen money is fought, in Luxembourg against the listing itself, and in Paris over every euro that moves while the freeze lasts.

I. Why Did the EU General Court Keep Roman Trotsenko on the Russia Sanctions List?

The dispute started in 2024, when the Council listed Trotsenko under the Ukraine territorial-integrity regime, the package built on Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. The statement of reasons presented him as a leading businessperson operating in Russia, with business interests in iron ore and steel, coal, infrastructure and energy companies. The file added that he was an adviser to the president of the state company Rosneft, Igor Sechin, the founder and co-owner of the investment company AEON Corporation, a director of Geopromining Investment (CYP) Limited, and the man behind businesses such as Vorkutagol JSC, operating in sectors that fund the Russian state. In the Council’s words, businesses controlled by the applicant, such as Vorkutagol JSC, operate in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, so that in his role the applicant is supporting materially a government responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. The Council renewed the listing several times, through the September 2024 acts, the March 2025 acts, and the September 2025 acts, and Trotsenko asked the General Court to annul all of them, raising duty to state reasons, rights of the defence, error of assessment, property rights, and proportionality. Every plea failed. Understanding why matters, because the same two listing criteria decide the fate of dozens of pending challenges, and the Court’s answers reveal the narrow path that remains open.

A. What Does Businessperson in a Sector Funding the Russian Government Actually Mean?

The legal hook of the whole case is the third prong of the modified criterion (g): Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, which allow the Council to freeze the funds of businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Trotsenko attacked the criterion itself, arguing through a plea of illegality that it lacked a sufficient link with Russia and that the Council had to prove, person by person, that each listing would actually increase pressure on Moscow. The Court rejected that reading outright. It recalled that the objective of the individual and sectoral restrictive measures taken since 2014 was, among other things, to increase the costs of Russian actions against Ukraine, citing the Rosneft judgment of 28 March 2017, C-72/15, and the VTB Bank judgment of 25 June 2020, C-729/18 P, and it accepted that the EU legislature progressively extended the criteria to an increasingly wide circle of persons precisely to raise that cost. Then came the decisive endorsement: targeting businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation is liable to increase the costs of the actions of that government, since such sectors contribute, directly or indirectly, to that government’s capacity to act, following the Court’s own 20 November 2024 rulings in Uss v Council, T-571/23, and Zubitskiy v Council, T-1074/23. In short, the criterion is lawful, no individual pressure-test is required, and belonging to a revenue-providing sector is enough in principle.

Applied to Trotsenko, that principle bit hard. The Council’s evidence file described AEON Corporation as an investment company, a holding company, and a conglomerate with interests in various sectors, the flagship of the applicant’s family, owning 22 airports, waterway transport lines and a number of river ports, with subsidiaries able to invest heavily in large transport infrastructure construction projects. The Court concluded that the exhibits showed the applicant had significant capital holdings which enabled him to control companies active in the transport infrastructure sector, such as AEON Corporation and its subsidiaries, companies which owned and operated ports and numerous regional airports. Trotsenko replied that he held only a passive minority shareholding of 31 percent in AEON and an indirect 25.075 percent in Vorkutagol, that he controlled nothing, and that he had divested from Arctic Energy Group, the parent of Northern Star, back in December 2023 before any coal production began. The Court was unmoved. It held that his minority-shareholder arithmetic could not succeed against the EU Best Practices concept of ownership and control, and it treated his companies’ footprint in iron ore, steel, coal, infrastructure, and energy as squarely inside sectors that fund the Russian state. The lesson for future applicants is stark: arguing about percentages misses the point when the Council documents real operational control and sector exposure, and a divestment that postdates the listing, or covers only part of the empire, does not erase the historical basis on which the name went onto the list.

The judgment also locks in a procedural rule that multiplies the Council’s advantage. The Court recalled the Kala Naft principle in these terms: Having regard to the preventive nature of a decision adopting restrictive measures, if the EU Courts consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned in the contested acts is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of those acts. One solid reason saves the whole listing. That is why the Court could state, in the key holding of the case: It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the Council was entitled to include and then maintain the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under the third prong of the modified criterion (g) by means of the contested acts. And that is why it added: Consequently, the action is dismissed in its entirety without there being any need to examine the merits of the other complaints raised by the applicant seeking to call into question the inclusion or maintenance of his name on the lists at issue under the first prong of the modified criterion (g) or, as regards the initial acts and the September 2024 acts, under criterion (f). A challenger must therefore knock out every reason, while the Council needs only one to survive. Anyone preparing an annulment action should count the independent reasons first: if two or three stand on their own feet, the case is almost lost before it begins.

B. Can Selling Your Shares After Listing Get You Removed From the EU List?

Trotsenko’s most human argument was also his most instructive failure. He told the Court that he had produced evidence on 10 February 2025 demonstrating his full divestment from AEON Corporation and Vorkutagol, including Group Russian Energy, within the deadline the Council itself had set, and that the Council simply ignored it, breaching good administration and legitimate expectations. The Court examined the paper trail and sided with the Council. It found that the Council had carried out an adequate examination of those observations and considered that certain information contained in those observations justified maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue. In its observations on later filings, the Council explained that the information provided by the applicant on 10 February 2025 in support of his claims relating to the divestment of his shareholdings, in particular in AEON Corporation, did not demonstrate that it had made an error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue, and that following a thorough examination of all that information, there was no justification for it to reconsider its position. The Court even noted that by letter of 15 September 2025 the Council explained that, despite the arguments and evidence produced in requests of April, June, and July 2025, it had decided to maintain the listing, referring to its court pleadings and to exhibits in a second evidence file that justified maintenance. A divestment claim, in other words, is not a magic password: the Council may lawfully answer that the sale was incomplete, unverifiable, structured to keep influence, or simply outweighed by the rest of the file, and the judge will defer to that assessment unless the applicant proves a manifest error.

This is where the contrast with the winners of the same season becomes essential reading. In the very same weeks, the General Court annulled the later listings of other applicants, including Polina Gagarina, whose file could not sustain the same criteria, a story this firm covered in our analysis of the Gagarina annulment. The difference between Trotsenko and Gagarina is not luck and not politics: it is evidence. Where the Council’s file on Trotsenko stacked airports, ports, coal, steel, energy holdings, and a documented control position, the files that collapse are the ones where the Council re-lists by inertia, recycling old reasons without fresh material at renewal time. EU sanctions are renewed every six months, and each renewal is a new decision that must be justified on its own facts. A listed person who does nothing between renewals will usually lose, as Trotsenko did; a listed person who forces the Council to justify the maintenance, with dated proof of genuine exit, independent valuations, and third-party records the Council cannot wave away, gives the Court something to grip. The practical takeaway is a calendar discipline: submit observations before every renewal with evidence that is complete, dated, and externally verifiable, request access to the file, and build the annulment action around the weakest renewal, not the strongest initial listing. Trotsenko fought the whole chain at once and lost on the strongest link; future winners will isolate the renewal where the Council had nothing new to say.

Two closing details of the judgment deserve attention because they shape litigation strategy. First, on costs, the Court applied the standard rule: Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those of the Council. The operative part is brutally short: Dismisses the action; Orders Mr Roman Trotsenko to pay the costs. Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 September 2026. Sanctions litigation is therefore a cost gamble as well as a legal one, and applicants should weigh settlement-style routes, delisting requests and targeted observations, before committing to a full annulment action with adverse costs. Second, the Council had asked, in the alternative, that if any measure were annulled, the effects of several 2024 and 2025 decisions and implementing regulations be maintained until replacement acts take effect, a standard request that shows how even a victory can be delayed in its effects. Winning the listing battle does not always mean immediate access to the money, which brings us to the second half of this analysis: what actually happens to frozen funds in France while Luxembourg decides.

II. How Do You Challenge an EU Asset Freeze When You Live or Bank in France?

A Luxembourg annulment action decides whether the name stays on the EU list, but it does not manage daily life under the freeze, and daily life happens where the money sits. In France, EU restrictive measures bite through a dense national enforcement web: banks freeze without warning, notaries refuse to close sales, the land registry records the freeze against apartments and houses, and creditors discover that frozen money is untouchable without special permission. The French framework is codified in the Monetary and Financial Code, interpreted by the Court of Cassation in a line of recent rulings, and backed by criminal penalties for anyone who tries to slip around the freeze. Anyone listed, anyone married to a listed person, anyone doing business with one, and any creditor owed money by one needs to understand this machinery before acting, because the wrong move in Paris can destroy the right case in Luxembourg, and the right move in Paris can preserve assets that a Luxembourg victory will later release.

A. Which Court Can Annul the Freeze, and What Proof Actually Wins?

The starting point is jurisdiction, and the rule surprises many clients: an EU listing can only be annulled in Luxembourg, never in Paris. Only the General Court, on appeal the Court of Justice, can strike a name from the annexes of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 and Decision 2014/145/CFSP. French courts, administrative or judicial, cannot disapply the EU freeze on their own authority; under the primacy of EU law, they must enforce it. What French law adds is a parallel national layer. Alongside EU measures, the Minister for the Economy, and for terrorism-related freezes jointly with the Minister of the Interior, can order domestic freezes, and the Code organizes the whole system. The general EU-linked provision states: Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes. See Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code. The terrorism-specific twin provision gives both ministers the same six-month renewable power over terrorist funds. See Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Definitions sit in Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, which anchors French concepts to EU instruments such as Regulation (EU) No 2580/2001 on terrorist freezing. A national freeze is challengeable before the French administrative judge, while the EU listing behind it goes to Luxembourg, so a well-defended file often runs two cases in parallel, each aimed at a different decision.

Winning in Luxembourg requires understanding what the Trotsenko Court actually rewards. First, the duty to state reasons is real but modest: the Council must give reasons that are sufficiently detailed and specific, identifying the criterion applied and the factual basis, and the reasons may evolve between initial listing and renewals, as they did for Trotsenko between 2024 and 2025. Recycled, generic, or contradictory reasons are vulnerable, and several 2026 annulments turned exactly on that weakness. Second, rights of the defence mean the listed person must be heard before maintenance decisions, with access to the file and a real opportunity to submit observations, which is why the calendar discipline described above is not optional politeness but a legal weapon: observations filed before each renewal force the Council to answer them, and unanswered observations become annulment grounds. Third, error of assessment is reviewed with deference but not blindness: the Court checks whether the facts are accurate, whether the evidence supports control or sector involvement, and whether divestment proof was genuinely examined. Trotsenko lost because the Council had examined his February 2025 file and given reasons for rejecting it; applicants win when the Council cannot show any such examination. Fourth, property rights and proportionality almost never win alone: the Court accepts that freezes are preventive, temporary, and reversible, with authorization procedures for basic needs, so the interference is deemed proportionate to the foreign-policy objective. Do not build a case on hardship alone; build it on facts the Council got wrong.

Paris plays three supporting roles that can decide the Luxembourg outcome. The first is evidence gathering under French law: bank statements, share registers, notarial deeds of sale, auditors’ certificates, and tax filings that prove exit dates and loss of control must be collected early, because the Council’s evidence file is assembled from open sources and member-state input that a well-documented applicant can contradict. The second is the authorization track: EU regulations let listed persons apply to the national competent authority, in France the Directorate General of the Treasury, for releases covering basic needs, legal fees, and certain pre-existing obligations, and a documented history of reasonable authorization requests strengthens credibility while keeping life and litigation funded. The third is timing: the two-month action deadline runs from notification or knowledge of each listing or renewal act, so diary every renewal in March and September and treat each as a fresh decision with a fresh deadline. Miss the window against a weak renewal and the weakest link in the Council’s chain escapes review for another six months. A Paris lawyer’s real added value is therefore procedural quarterbacking: synchronizing observations to the Council, authorization requests to the Treasury, and annulment actions to Luxembourg so that each move feeds the next instead of contradicting it.

B. What Happens to Frozen Money in France While You Fight the Listing?

While Luxembourg deliberates, French daily enforcement is uncompromising, and three recent Court of Cassation rulings map the terrain. The starting rule is total immobilization through private actors: banks, insurers, notaries, and every person operating in France must apply freezes immediately and report to the minister. The Code states: Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie : 1° Toute personne physique, ressortissante nationale ou ressortissante étrangère se trouvant sur le territoire national. See Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Internal compliance systems are mandatory, with procedures adapted to each institution’s size and business and trained staff. See Article R562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Mirror prohibitions then close the circle: it is forbidden to make funds available, directly or indirectly, to listed persons. The Code provides: Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel en vertu des articles L. 562-2 , L. 562-2-1 , L. 562-2-2, L. 562-3 , L. 562-3-1 , L. 712-4 ou L. 712-10 . See Article L562-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Knowing circumvention is separately banned: Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de participer, sciemment et volontairement, à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures prises en vertu du présent chapitre et des articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 . See Article L562-6 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Real estate is not spared: freezes can be published in the land registry against the listed person’s buildings. See Article L562-8 of the Monetary and Financial Code. And banking secrecy is no shield: bank and professional secrecy cannot block information exchanges with the state services preparing or implementing freezes. See Article L562-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code. A client who discovers a frozen account should therefore assume the freeze is visible to every French institution within days, and should never move money through relatives or intermediaries to dodge it: that is precisely the circumvention the Code punishes.

Creditors face the mirror frustration: the debtor’s money is there, in a Paris bank, but the law forbids touching it. On 5 February 2026 the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation settled a major enforcement question in the Libyan-assets saga, appeal No. 23-15.936, published in the Bulletin. A creditor wanted an attachment order over frozen Libyan funds without prior Treasury authorization, arguing that the judge’s own permission sufficed. The Court disagreed, holding that the lower court had correctly reasoned from EU primacy: qu’il découle du principe de primauté du droit de l’Union sur le droit national que l’autorisation administrative doit précéder celle du juge de l’exécution et que le juge de l’exécution violerait le règlement n° 2016/44 s’il autorisait une mesure sur des fonds gelés sans que le créancier ne justifie d’une autorisation de l’autorité nationale compétente. The conclusion followed: De ces énonciations, la cour d’appel a exactement déduit qu’en l’absence d’autorisation délivrée par la direction générale du Trésor, le juge de l’exécution ne pouvait autoriser la société [T] à pratiquer une mesure de saisie-attribution sur les biens gelés. The appeal was rejected, with costs and a 3,000 euro order against the creditor. See Court of Cassation, Second Civil Chamber, 5 February 2026, No. 23-15.936. The message for creditors of sanctioned debtors is procedural and strict: apply to the Treasury first, get the authorization, then go to the enforcement judge, and never in the reverse order.

Two more rulings complete the picture, one civil and one criminal. In a landmark 2020 decision, the Full Court of the Court of Cassation held that a freeze is not force majeure for the listed person itself: Le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités, ne constitue pas pour elle un cas de force majeure, faute d’extériorité, de sorte que, malgré l’impossibilité où elle se trouve d’exécuter une condamnation au paiement d’une somme d’argent, le cours des intérêts légaux sur cette somme n’est pas suspendu. See Court of Cassation, Full Court, 10 July 2020, No. 18-18.542. A sanctioned debtor therefore keeps owing interest while frozen, a detail that transforms settlement arithmetic: every month of litigation adds lawful interest to the underlying debt. On the criminal side, the Criminal Chamber confirmed that dodging a freeze is a customs-tracked offence within the jurisdiction of judicial customs officers: Dès lors que les modalités de constatation, de poursuite et de répression du délit de soustraction aux mesures de gel des avoirs dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme sont prévues par le code des douanes, cette infraction constitue une infraction prévue par le code des douanes au sens du 1° du I de l’article 28-1 du code de procédure pénale. See Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 29 November 2023, No. 22-85.867, a case that partially quashed only the confiscation and customs-fine calculations while upholding the offence itself. Families and advisers should read these three decisions together: creditors need Treasury permission first, debtors keep accruing interest during the freeze, and anyone tempted to move frozen value faces prosecution by specialized officers. The only lawful exits are authorization requests, delisting in Luxembourg, and court-approved enforcement paths, which is why the earliest weeks after a freeze notice are the most valuable: that is when authorizations are filed, evidence is preserved, and the Luxembourg clock starts.

Conclusion

The Trotsenko judgment of 16 September 2026 will discourage weak sanctions challenges and sharpen strong ones. The General Court confirmed that the businessperson-in-a-revenue-sector criterion is lawful without a person-by-person pressure test, that documented operational control beats minority-shareholding arithmetic, that post-listing divestment claims fail unless the Council’s rejection shows a manifest error, and that a single solid reason saves the entire listing under the Kala Naft rule. At the same time, the annulments granted to other applicants in the same weeks prove the Council is not invincible: recycled reasons at renewal time, unanswered observations, and files without fresh evidence still collapse. The winning formula emerging from Luxembourg is therefore selective and disciplined: challenge the weakest renewal rather than the whole chain, file complete externally verifiable evidence before every March and September deadline, and attack each independent reason until none stands alone. In France, the parallel discipline is just as strict: banks and notaries freeze immediately and report, real estate can be bound in the land registry, creditors must secure Treasury authorization before any attachment, frozen debtors keep accruing interest because the freeze is not force majeure, and circumvention is a criminal offence pursued by judicial customs officers. Whether you are listed, related to a listed person, or owed money by one, the weeks after the freeze notice decide everything: observations to the Council, authorization requests to the Treasury, and, where the file justifies it, an annulment action in Luxembourg within the two-month window. Trotsenko lost because his file could not break the Council’s strongest link; the next winners will be those who find the renewal where the Council has nothing new to say and strike exactly there.

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