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Sent Back to France Under ‘One In, One Out’: What French Law Does With Returnees Now the UK Deal Has Ended

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Sent Back to France Under ‘One In, One Out’: What French Law Does With Returnees Now the UK Deal Has Ended

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On 1 October 2026, the most unusual migration experiment in recent Franco-British history came to an end. For 423 days, the United Kingdom sent small-boat arrivals back to France under the “one in, one out” pilot, and admitted an asylum seeker from France through a legal route for every person returned. Around 1,500 people were flown or escorted back to French soil, according to The Guardian’s reporting of 1 October 2026, while more than 40,000 crossed the Channel in small boats over the same period. The British government wanted to extend the scheme. Paris refused, confirmed it was negotiating the exit terms, and demanded instead a European Union-wide agreement, as Le Monde reported on 30 September 2026.

This article looks at the story from the French side of the Channel, which the British coverage largely ignores: what does French law actually do with a person the United Kingdom puts on a plane to France? Can that person claim asylum in France? Can France detain them, order them to leave, or send them onward? Can London ask for them back? And now that the pilot has expired, what should returnees and their families do? The answers lie in the Code de l’entree et du sejour des etrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA), in Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, known as the Dublin III Regulation, and in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Every legal proposition below is tied to the verified text of the provision it relies on.

I. Returned to France: what French law does with you after the British plane lands

A. How to claim asylum in France after a removal from the United Kingdom

The first thing to understand is that a removal from the United Kingdom does not extinguish the right to seek protection in France. Any foreign national on French territory may register an asylum claim with the French authorities, including someone who has just been returned under a bilateral readmission arrangement. Article L. 521-1 of the CESEDA provides: “Tout étranger présent sur le territoire français et souhaitant demander l’asile se présente en personne à l’autorité administrative compétente qui enregistre sa demande et procède, dans des conditions fixées par décret en Conseil d’Etat, à la détermination de l’Etat responsable en application du règlement (UE) n° 604/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 26 juin 2013, établissant les critères et mécanismes de détermination de l’Etat membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande de protection internationale introduite dans l’un des Etats membres par un ressortissant de pays tiers ou un apatride, ou en application d’engagements identiques à ceux prévus par le même règlement.”

In practice, registration takes place at the single desk for asylum seekers (guichet unique) run jointly by the prefecture and the French Office for Immigration and Integration. The prefecture records the claim, takes fingerprints for the Eurodac database, and determines which State is responsible for examining it. This is where the end of the Dublin system for the United Kingdom matters enormously. Since Brexit, which took effect on 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom is no longer part of the European Union asylum system, and the Dublin III mechanism for allocating responsibility no longer binds London, as the official French briefing service vie-publique.fr recalled in its brief of October 2026. The consequence is straightforward and one-directional: France cannot transfer a returnee back to the United Kingdom under Dublin, and the United Kingdom cannot use Dublin to take charge of someone either. Once the person is on French soil and no other European Union Member State is identified as responsible, France is the State that must examine the claim.

Examination on the merits belongs to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA). Article L. 531-1 of the CESEDA states: “L’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, dont les missions, le statut et l’organisation sont définis notamment aux articles L. 121-7 à L. 121-16, statue sur les demandes d’asile dont il est saisi.” The same article adds the Dublin reservation: “Il n’est toutefois pas compétent pour connaître d’une demande dont l’examen relève de la compétence d’un autre Etat en application du règlement (UE) n° 604/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 26 juin 2013, ou en application d’engagements identiques à ceux prévus par le même règlement avec d’autres Etats.” For a returnee whose journey passed through Italy, Spain or Greece, that reservation is not theoretical: Eurodac fingerprints can trigger a take-charge or take-back request to another Member State under Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (the Dublin III Regulation), and the United Kingdom will never be that other State.

A rejection by OFPRA is not the end of the road. Appeals go to the National Court of Asylum (Cour nationale du droit d’asile, CNDA). Article L. 532-1 of the CESEDA provides: “La Cour nationale du droit d’asile, dont la nature, les missions et l’organisation sont notamment définies au titre III du livre I, statue sur les recours formés contre les décisions de l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides prises en application des articles L. 511-1 à L. 511-8, L. 512-1 à L. 512-3, L. 513-1 à L. 513-5, L. 531-1 à L. 531-35, L. 531-41 et L. 531-42.” Returnees should therefore keep every document handed to them on arrival, attend every prefecture and OFPRA appointment, and treat each notification as the starting point of a short appeal deadline. Readers who need the full step-by-step procedure will find it in our guide on how to claim asylum in France through OFPRA and the CNDA, which details registration, interview, decision and appeal.

One practical warning emerges directly from the British press coverage of the pilot. The Guardian reported that scores of returnees made their way back to the United Kingdom because they felt unsafe in France, that some were returned to France a second time, and that many vanished after being returned. Disappearing after arrival is the worst possible legal strategy: it exposes the person to an obligation to leave French territory, to detention, and to a re-entry ban, while destroying the credibility of any later asylum claim. The lawful path, however slow, is registration, OFPRA, and CNDA.

B. Detention, removal orders and the judges who control them: retention, OQTF, JLD and the waiting zone

Returnees who do not immediately enter the asylum channel, or whose claim is channelled elsewhere, face the French removal machinery. Its central instrument is the obligation to leave French territory (obligation de quitter le territoire francais, OQTF). The CESEDA organises enforcement from the moment the decision is issued: Article L. 721-1 states that “Les dispositions du présent chapitre sont applicables à l’étranger faisant l’objet d’une décision d’éloignement dès son édiction puis à tout moment de la procédure jusqu’à ce qu’il soit procédé à son éloignement effectif.” If the person does not comply, Article L. 722-1 authorises forced execution: “Lorsque l’étranger n’a pas satisfait à son obligation d’exécuter la décision d’éloignement dont il fait l’objet, l’autorité administrative peut prendre les décisions prévues aux titres III et IV, nécessaires à l’exécution d’office des décisions d’éloignement, sous réserve de ne procéder à l’éloignement effectif que dans les conditions prévues aux articles L. 722-7 à L. 722-10.”

Those enforcement decisions include placement in an administrative detention centre (centre de retention administrative, CRA). Article L. 741-1 of the CESEDA sets strict conditions: “L’autorité administrative peut placer en rétention, pour une durée de quatre-vingt-seize heures, l’étranger qui se trouve dans l’un des cas prévus à l’article L. 731-1 lorsqu’il ne présente pas de garanties de représentation effectives propres à prévenir un risque de soustraction à l’exécution de la décision d’éloignement et qu’aucune autre mesure n’apparaît suffisante à garantir efficacement l’exécution effective de cette décision.” Detention is therefore not automatic: the prefecture must show insufficient guarantees of representation and the inadequacy of any lighter measure, such as house arrest (assignation a residence).

Beyond ninety-six hours, a judge must authorise continued detention. Article L. 742-1 provides: “Le maintien en rétention au-delà de quatre-vingt-seize heures à compter de la notification de la décision de placement initiale peut être autorisé, dans les conditions prévues au présent titre, par le magistrat du siège du tribunal judiciaire saisi à cette fin par l’autorité administrative.” That judge is the juge des libertes et de la detention (JLD), a judicial judge who verifies the regularity of the procedure, the reality of removal prospects, and respect for fundamental rights. Longer extensions follow the same judicial logic: Article L. 742-4 allows the judicial judge to extend detention beyond thirty days in cases of absolute emergency, threat to public order, loss or destruction of travel documents, concealment of identity, wilful obstruction, failure by the consulate to issue travel documents in time, or lack of transport, stating that “Si le juge ordonne la prolongation de la rétention, celle-ci court à compter de l’expiration de la précédente période de rétention et pour une nouvelle période d’une durée maximale de trente jours. La durée maximale de la rétention n’excède alors pas soixante jours. La prolongation de la rétention peut être renouvelée une fois, dans les mêmes conditions.” Oversight is continuous: Article L. 743-1 recalls that “Pendant toute la durée de la rétention de l’étranger, le procureur de la République ou le magistrat du siège du tribunal judiciaire peut se transporter sur les lieux, vérifier les conditions du maintien”.

A distinct regime applies at the border. A person refused entry who arrives by air, sea or rail may be held in a waiting zone (zone d’attente) rather than a CRA. Article L. 341-1 of the CESEDA provides: “L’étranger qui arrive en France par la voie ferroviaire, maritime ou aérienne et qui n’est pas autorisé à entrer sur le territoire français peut être placé dans une zone d’attente située dans une gare ferroviaire ouverte au trafic international figurant sur une liste définie par voie réglementaire, dans un port ou à proximité du lieu de débarquement ou dans un aéroport, pendant le temps strictement nécessaire à son départ.” Returnees under a readmission arrangement are normally admitted to the territory rather than refused entry, so the CRA and OQTF track is the relevant one for them; the waiting zone matters for those intercepted at sea or refused at the airport. The Channel context, including rescue duties and the French legal framework at sea, is examined in our analysis of small-boat Channel crossings under French rescue and asylum law.

European human rights law sets outer limits on all of this. The European Court of Human Rights, whose published case law has condemned collective push-backs at sea in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (application no. 27765/09, judgment of 23 February 2012), held in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (application no. 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011) that transferring an asylum seeker to a State where reception conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment violates Article 3 of the Convention, and required in Tarakhel v. Switzerland (application no. 29217/12, judgment of 4 November 2014) individual guarantees before returning a family with children to Italy under Dublin. These judgments explain the litigation risk the British scheme carried from the start: The Guardian reported that force was used against one in ten of 224 returnees during removal in the first three months of 2026, according to Home Office freedom-of-information data, and that both Medecins Sans Frontieres and the French organisation Samusocial documented physical and psychological injuries among returnees. Any removal involving excessive force, or any onward removal from France without individual examination, is exposed to challenge before the French administrative courts and, ultimately, in Strasbourg.

II. Why “one in, one out” collapsed and what comes next

A. Why the experiment failed: the numbers that killed it, the French demand for a European deal, and the legal risks

The official timeline is now settled by the French government’s own briefing service: the experimental agreement was concluded on 10 July 2025, entered into force on 6 August 2025, was extended in June 2026, and ended on 1 October 2026 for lack of a new extension, with the stated objective of deterring foreigners arriving in France from crossing the Channel illegally, according to vie-publique.fr. The concept was unprecedented: as Le Monde recalled, it established for the first time the principle of returning to France migrants turned away from the United Kingdom, something Paris had consistently refused until Bruno Retailleau became interior minister in September 2024.

The arithmetic never matched the ambition. In January 2026, the Home Secretary told LBC that 281 migrants had been sent back to France while 350 people had come to the United Kingdom through the legal route, with the Home Office blaming an operational complication on the French side for the imbalance, as the BBC reported on 27 January 2026. By the end of the pilot, roughly 1,500 people had been returned and a similar number admitted legally, while more than 40,000 small-boat arrivals reached Britain during the scheme’s lifetime, according to The Guardian. The BBC’s data puts 2025 crossings at 41,472, almost 5,000 more than the previous year and the highest since 2022, with 20,478 arrivals between 1 January and 5 October 2026, down 40 percent on the same period in 2025. Removing 1,500 people while more than 40,000 arrive is not a deterrent; it is a rounding error, and both governments eventually treated it as one.

Paris had a structural objection beyond the numbers. France did not want to bear the Channel burden alone and demanded that the arrangement be folded into a European Union-United Kingdom agreement, a position the French interior minister Laurent Nunez expressed bluntly at a parliamentary hearing, asking why France should manage the border on its own, as reported by The Guardian. No other European country agreed to join. Meanwhile the new Labour Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, urged President Emmanuel Macron at their early-September meeting in London to continue the programme, according to Le Monde, but the French Interior Ministry confirmed to the newspaper that it was discussing the exit terms with the British. A bilateral pilot that one party experiences as a solitary burden rarely survives its first renewal date.

The legal and humanitarian record compounded the political failure. Returnees told The Guardian they felt unsafe in France, feared smugglers to whom they owed money, and feared onward removal to their home countries or to transit States. Scores came back to the United Kingdom; some were removed to France a second time while others were allowed to stay and have their claims processed; many are believed to have vanished. Each of those trajectories represents a failure of the French follow-up procedure: a returnee who absconds is neither examined nor removed, and a returnee subjected to force during transfer becomes a potential applicant in Strasbourg. The scheme’s defenders pointed to the 40 percent fall in crossings in 2026, but the Home Secretary herself told the Commons Home Affairs Committee that it was difficult to attribute that fall to the pilot, with the overall drop in arrivals to Europe a likely partial explanation. When neither the numbers, the partner, nor the courts validate an experiment, expiry becomes a relief for everyone except the smugglers, who, as one returnee quoted by The Guardian put it, simply wait for the next agreement.

B. After 1 October 2026: no more British removal flights, but the French removal machine keeps running

The expiry of the pilot changes nothing in French domestic law. The prefectures retain the full arsenal described above: registration or refusal of asylum claims, OQTF decisions with or without a voluntary departure period, detention in CRA under prefectural order with JLD control, house arrest, and forced removal where travel documents and transport allow. What ends is only the bilateral conveyor belt that delivered a specific cohort, people removed by the United Kingdom, to French territory. Small boats continue to cross, interceptions continue on French beaches, and the ordinary French procedures for entry refusal, waiting zones, asylum and removal continue to apply to everyone else.

For the roughly 1,500 people returned under the pilot, the priority is legal stabilisation in France. First, anyone who has not yet done so should register an asylum claim at the prefecture without delay, because the claim triggers a documented status, an interview by OFPRA, and access to the CNDA on rejection, as explained in our guide to how to claim asylum in France through OFPRA and the CNDA. Second, anyone served with an OQTF must observe the appeal deadline printed on the decision itself, which is counted in days and varies with the type of order and the person’s situation; missing it renders the order final and enforceable. Third, anyone placed in a CRA should know that the JLD reviews the detention at ninety-six hours and at each extension, and that irregularities in notification, in the assessment of guarantees of representation, or in removal prospects can end detention. Fourth, trafficking survivors and torture victims should disclose their situation immediately: the documented injuries among returnees show that vulnerability screening failed too often during the pilot, and French law provides specific protections once vulnerability is identified.

Families split between the two shores face a harder question. A person returned to France cannot be sent back to the United Kingdom under Dublin, and the United Kingdom’s legal route from France, the “in” side of “one in, one out”, has closed with the pilot. Family reunification now depends on ordinary immigration law on each side: British family and asylum rules for entry to the United Kingdom, French family reunification and asylum rules for settlement in France. Attempting a fresh small-boat crossing exposes the person to interception, to a new removal order, and to the criminal liability attached to irregular entry and to smuggling networks, without improving the legal position.

The wider European picture is moving in parallel. The European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in May 2024, entered into force for the most part on 12 June 2026, and it reshapes the Dublin allocation rules and solidarity mechanisms among Member States, as vie-publique.fr recalled. France is currently facing legal challenges to its implementing decrees, examined in our analysis of France’s EU Migration Pact decrees under legal challenge. The United Kingdom stands outside all of this, which is precisely why Paris wants the next Channel arrangement to be negotiated with the Union rather than bilaterally. Whether London accepts an EU-wide framework, and whether Brussels wants one, will decide the next chapter. Until then, the Channel remains what it has been since 2018 and what the statistics confirm it still is: one of the deadliest small-boat routes in Europe, with the International Organization for Migration counting 355 people missing since 2014 and a peak of 85 deaths and disappearances in 2024, according to the French government’s figures. No pilot scheme changes those waters; only lawful status, obtained in whichever country can actually grant it, changes the fate of the people who cross them.

Conclusion

“One in, one out” lasted 423 days, returned around 1,500 people to France, and expired on 1 October 2026 because it deterred almost nobody, burdened France alone, and generated the injuries and legal challenges that its critics predicted. Its end is not the end of Channel crossings, nor of French removal law. For returnees, the French legal position is actually clearer without the pilot than with it: claim asylum promptly and the Dublin system designates France, not the United Kingdom, as the examining State; face an OQTF or detention and the JLD controls every extension; suffer violence during transfer and the Convention offers a remedy. The British debate will now move to return hubs in third countries and to a possible European agreement that Paris has demanded from the start. The French lesson is simpler and was visible from the first flights: a person returned without a status is not a case closed, but a file opened, and French courts, prefectures, OFPRA and the CNDA will be working through those 1,500 files long after the last removal flight has landed.

📄 Official circular