The UK–France “one-in, one-out” returns arrangement has suffered its most important legal setback so far. On 10 July 2026, the High Court of Justice held in R (AYA, EXR, GIP, HRE and KAG) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin) that the Home Office acted unlawfully when it removed a reconsideration route for negative modern-slavery decisions affecting people whom the government intended to return to France. The judgment did not cancel the bilateral agreement, order that every returned person be brought back, or decide every individual asylum claim. It did something more precise: it held that a fast transfer policy cannot be made administratively “safe” by removing a safeguard designed to catch late evidence of trafficking. The ruling matters on both sides of the Channel. In the United Kingdom, a person facing removal can insist that new medical, detention or witness evidence is capable of reopening a negative trafficking assessment. In France, the person must still secure an appropriate protection route quickly, because French recognition of trafficking and French asylum support do not operate through the same system. With 1,087 people returned to France and 1,117 transferred into the UK by 30 June 2026, this is no longer a theoretical treaty dispute. It is a live cross-border procedure affecting detention, evidence, asylum and access to protection.
I. Can the UK return an alleged trafficking victim to France under the one-in, one-out deal?
A. What the High Court actually held in [2026] EWHC 1742
The arrangement is based on the UK–France Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys. It entered into force on 6 August 2025. In operational terms, the United Kingdom may seek the readmission to France of an eligible person who arrived in the UK by small boat from France, while France accepts an equivalent number of people from France through a planned route into the UK. The government’s official description of the scheme says that it is intended to deter dangerous crossings, disrupt organised immigration crime and save lives. The arrangement is often described as “one-in, one-out” because the two directions are presented as reciprocal.
The treaty is not the same legal instrument as extradition. A person returned under the readmission arrangements is not being surrendered to a foreign prosecutor to face criminal charges. The immediate decision concerns immigration control, protection claims and the bilateral conditions for readmission. That distinction does not make the decision administrative routine. A removal can expose a person to a new asylum procedure, a different trafficking-identification system, detention or a risk of further exploitation. The legality of the UK decision therefore depends on the domestic statutes and public-law duties governing the removal, not only on the political purpose of the bilateral arrangement.
The High Court case concerned five anonymised claimants, identified as AYA, EXR, GIP, HRE and KAG. Some had been removed or faced removal to France under the treaty. Each alleged that they had previously been a victim of human trafficking before arriving in the United Kingdom. The common issue was not whether every allegation was true. It was whether the Home Secretary could amend the Modern Slavery statutory guidance so that a person facing removal to a country that had signed the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights could no longer request reconsideration of a negative “reasonable grounds” or “conclusive grounds” decision.
The disputed change was paragraph 14.216 of the guidance, introduced on 17 September 2025. Before that amendment, a negative trafficking decision could be reconsidered where new evidence emerged or where the initial decision appeared inconsistent with the guidance. The new paragraph removed that route for the cohort being removed to an ECAT and ECHR state, including France. The timing was significant. The judgment records that officials knew a successful reconsideration could defer removal and therefore interfere with the practical operation of the treaty. The court was asked to decide whether an administrative measure adopted to keep removals moving had unlawfully weakened the victim-identification process.
Mr Justice Sheldon allowed the common challenge. The official High Court press summary for [2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin) explains that the statutory scheme required a robust and effective set of arrangements for identifying trafficking victims. A reasonable-grounds decision is normally taken quickly, often within five days of referral. The court accepted that people arriving after a difficult Channel crossing may be malnourished, sleep-deprived, affected by language barriers or unable to disclose exploitation during an early interview. Evidence may emerge later through a medico-legal report, a doctor’s Rule 35 report or a more complete account of coercion.
The court placed weight on the evidence that 79% of reasonable-grounds decisions reconsidered in 2025 resulted in a positive trafficking determination. That statistic did not prove that every negative decision was wrong. It showed why a system that closes its reconsideration route immediately after a rapid first decision risks excluding material evidence that can change the outcome. The problem was not simply that officials might make mistakes. It was that the policy deliberately prevented the decision-maker from seeing evidence that the statutory scheme needed it to consider.
The court concluded that a process which was not robust and effective could not have been within Parliament’s contemplation when it gave the Secretary of State power under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to make arrangements for identifying victims. The court also found an unlawful fetter of the Secretary of State’s discretion: even if officials reconsidered some cases in practice, the guidance did not permit that to happen consistently. The court further found that the change did not advance the lawful purposes of the 2015 Act and directed officials toward unlawful decision-making. It did not find a breach of the Tameside duty of inquiry on the evidence before it.
The judgment is not a general ruling that all returns to France are unlawful. The court dealt with common issues and individual claims separately. It found that many decisions affecting the individual claimants, including some decisions declaring protection claims inadmissible or certifying asylum claims as clearly unfounded, had been lawfully made. It also separated the question of selecting people for removal and the treatment of people who claimed to be under eighteen; those matters were being handled separately. The judge stated that remedies would be considered later. That means the ruling created a legal obligation to correct the policy, but the exact remedy for each person still depends on the procedural record.
The ruling must also be read with the treaty’s legal status. The judgment records that the agreement binds the UK and France in international law but had not been incorporated into domestic law in England and Wales. The treaty could shape cooperation between the governments, but it could not silently reduce the duties imposed by the Modern Slavery Act. In other words, an international commitment to process removals quickly does not authorise the Home Office to remove a domestic review safeguard that Parliament’s victim-identification scheme requires.
The operational data makes the timing relevant. The official UK statistics published on 16 July 2026 report 1,117 people transferred into the UK and 1,087 people returned to France between 6 August 2025 and 30 June 2026. Returns increased to 264 in June, while transfers into the UK reached 314. The policy is therefore operating at a scale where a late-evidence safeguard affects a repeatable administrative pathway, not a handful of exceptional cases.
B. Why removing reconsideration was unlawful even though France is an ECAT state
The government’s central answer was that France is a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the European Convention on Human Rights. On that view, a person transferred to France would remain within a state that had anti-trafficking obligations, so the UK could remove the extra reconsideration stage without undermining protection. The High Court rejected that shortcut. The existence of a receiving-state obligation does not answer whether the sending state has lawfully identified a possible victim before removal.
Article 10 of the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention requires a system for identifying and protecting victims. The Modern Slavery Act gives that international obligation a domestic setting through the National Referral Mechanism and the statutory guidance. A negative reasonable-grounds decision is not a criminal conviction and a positive decision is not a final finding on every fact. It is an early protection decision. The person may receive a recovery and reflection period, support and a later conclusive-grounds assessment. That staged design assumes that information can improve after the first interview.
The High Court’s analysis was therefore about institutional design. If a policy causes the first assessment to ignore later medical evidence, trauma-related explanations or information from detention, the system may produce a formally quick result but a substantively unreliable one. The court did not require an endless appeal process. It required the Home Office to retain a lawful means of looking again when new evidence or an apparent inconsistency justifies doing so. A treaty timetable cannot turn a provisional screening decision into an unreviewable conclusion.
The territorial issue is more complicated. The court found that the Modern Slavery Act applied to alleged trafficking wherever it occurred, so long as the putative victim was present in the United Kingdom. That finding is important for a person who says the exploitation occurred in another country before the Channel crossing. But the court also held that there could be no breach of Article 4 of the European Convention if the UK failed to identify a person as a trafficking victim where all of the alleged trafficking occurred abroad, unless there was a credible suspicion that the person faced a real risk of being trafficked in the country of return. The international human-rights question and the domestic statutory question are related but not identical.
The practical consequence is that a person cannot rely on the words “I was trafficked abroad” without evidence. The claim should identify the recruiters, transporters, controllers, locations, dates, threats, debts, violence, deception or abuse of vulnerability, and the point at which the person reached the United Kingdom. It should also explain why the return to France creates a real risk of renewed trafficking or why late evidence changes the reasonable-grounds assessment. The High Court’s decision protects the route to reconsideration; it does not presume the facts of the underlying exploitation.
French law shows why a blanket assumption of equivalent protection is unsafe. Article 225-4-1 of the French Criminal Code defines trafficking through acts such as recruiting, transporting, transferring, housing or receiving a person for exploitation in specified coercive circumstances. It is a criminal-law definition, not a general immigration-status rule. French authorities must still determine whether the facts fall within the offence and whether the person has taken the procedural steps required by the residence framework.
For a foreign national who becomes a victim in a French case, Article L. 425-1 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum provides for a one-year “private and family life” residence card where the person files a complaint against an alleged trafficker or testifies in a criminal procedure, subject to the statutory condition that the person has broken contact with that individual. The rule is meaningful, but it is not an automatic status for every person returned to France who says that exploitation occurred elsewhere. It depends on the facts, the complaint or testimony and the legal pathway used.
The connected provisions matter when planning the request. Article L. 425-2 of the same code addresses access to the relevant allowance for a holder of the Article L. 425-1 residence card, subject to the statutory conditions. Article L. 425-5 sends the conditions for issuing, renewing and withdrawing the card, together with protection, reception and accommodation arrangements, to implementing rules. Those provisions do not create an immediate entitlement for every person transferred from the UK, but they show why the first complaint, the proof of vulnerability and the request for accommodation must be assembled as one procedural record.
Recent French administrative decisions illustrate the procedural point. In CAA Bordeaux, 8 July 2026, no. 25BX02873, the court examined the relationship between an alleged trafficking situation, Article L. 425-1, police information duties and an order to leave France. In CAA Nancy, 10 March 2026, no. 24NC02692, the court held that police officers had to inform a potential victim about the relevant rights when the statements gave reasonable grounds to consider that the person might be a victim, even though the person had not initially described herself as a victim. These judgments are not the same as the UK High Court case, but they show that French protection can turn on the quality and timing of the first official interaction.
The reception system is also distinct from trafficking recognition. Article L. 551-8 of the CESEDA defines the material reception conditions for an asylum seeker, including benefits and an allowance under the relevant chapters of the code. If a returned person makes an asylum claim that France is responsible for examining, that person may seek the French reception process, subject to the applicable rules and any responsibility or admissibility question. Article L. 345-2-2 of the Code of Social Action and Families provides that a person without shelter who is in medical, psychological or social distress has access at any time to emergency accommodation meeting human-dignity and safety requirements. Neither provision is a substitute for a UK trafficking reconsideration decision, but both can become relevant after a transfer.
The difference is the legal delta at the centre of the litigation. The United Kingdom cannot abolish its own reconsideration safeguard simply because France has a criminal definition of trafficking, a residence route for complainants and an asylum reception system. Those mechanisms may be relevant to the assessment of risk, but they do not cure an unlawful UK policy. Equally, the High Court did not hold that France must reproduce the UK National Referral Mechanism for every returnee. The two states have different legal systems; the person must navigate both in sequence.
II. What does the ruling mean for a person facing removal to France?
A. What protection continues in the UK before transfer?
The first practical question is whether the person has received a negative reasonable-grounds or conclusive-grounds trafficking decision. The two stages are not interchangeable. A reasonable-grounds decision asks whether there are sufficient grounds at an early stage to treat the person as a possible victim. A positive decision can trigger a recovery period and support while the case develops. A conclusive-grounds decision is a later assessment of whether the person is a victim on the evidence available. A negative result at either stage should be read together with the evidence that was available, the reasons given and the date fixed for removal.
The High Court’s judgment means that a person in the affected France-return cohort cannot be told that no reconsideration is possible merely because France has signed ECAT and the ECHR. A request should identify the new evidence or the defect in the original assessment. It should not be a general repetition of the asylum claim. The legal target is the trafficking decision and the way the decision-maker applied the guidance.
Medical evidence is often decisive. A medico-legal report may document scars, trauma, dissociation, sleep disorders or symptoms consistent with coercion. A Rule 35 report from a doctor working with a detained person may explain why an interview produced fragmented answers or why disclosure occurred only later. The High Court specifically treated this kind of material as capable of changing the assessment. The report should connect the clinical evidence to the alleged exploitation and to any inconsistency identified by the Home Office; a diagnosis alone does not prove trafficking, but it can materially affect how an account must be assessed.
Language and interpretation evidence also matters. A person may have understood the interpreter’s words but not the legal meaning of “trafficking”, “exploitation”, “debt” or “control”. The request should record the language used, the interpreter arrangements, the length of the interview, any detention or medication and any reason the person could not disclose facts at the first opportunity. The High Court’s reasoning recognises that a rapid interview after a dangerous journey can be an imperfect point at which to make a final protective assessment.
A person should ask for the complete decision, the interview record, the evidence considered, the guidance version applied and the removal notice. If the Home Office says the reconsideration route is closed, the response should identify [2026] EWHC 1742 and ask what lawful process is now available. The judgment is not a substitute for an individual remedy, and it does not automatically suspend a removal date. An urgent application may still be required to prevent removal while the reconsideration request, judicial review or other protection claim is determined.
Judicial review remains relevant, but it is not a reason to omit the reconsideration request. The High Court recorded the government’s argument that judicial review remained available. It nevertheless found that judicial review alone did not make the identification process robust and effective. A court reviewing legality after removal may not replicate the practical value of allowing the original decision-maker to see new evidence before the person is transferred. Counsel should preserve both routes, explain the urgency and ask for interim relief where removal would make the evidence or protection claim harder to assess.
The consent and removal documents should be checked for the destination and the legal basis. The treaty’s readmission process applies only if its conditions are met. The person should obtain the statement or notification sent to France, the identity information used by the Home Office, any protection-claim decision and any record of a previous return. A discrepancy between the person’s identity, the travel document, the asylum claim and the treaty notice can affect the legality of the transfer and the ability to seek support on arrival.
The High Court judgment did not finally decide the cases of every claimant. The judge indicated that remedies would be addressed later. That makes a person’s own procedural status critical: a person removed, a person with a scheduled flight, a person detained after a negative decision and a person still awaiting a decision may require different relief. The ruling is a legal foundation for urgent action, not a guarantee that an application will be allowed without a file-specific analysis.
There is also a separate vulnerability issue for anyone who may be under eighteen. The judgment expressly identified treatment of people claiming to be under eighteen as a matter being handled separately. A person with an age dispute should raise it immediately and obtain any identity, family, medical or educational evidence. The France-return challenge cannot be used as a reason to postpone a separate age-assessment challenge, and the remedies available may differ.
B. What must lawyers verify about asylum and trafficking support in France?
Once a return is imminent, the legal plan must cross the Channel. The person should know which French authority or organisation will receive them, where they will be taken, how they can request an interpreter and how they can make an asylum or protection claim. A transfer document that says “France is safe” does not answer those operational questions. The relevant issues are whether the person will be able to access a procedure, whether accommodation exists, whether medical and psychological needs have been recorded and whether evidence of trafficking will be preserved.
The High Court accepted, for the purposes of its reasoning, that a person who claims asylum in France may receive accommodation and healthcare, including psychiatric healthcare, during the asylum determination process. That finding does not mean that every person is housed immediately or that every claim is examined by France. The person may face an admissibility, responsibility or transfer question under the applicable European asylum framework. A lawyer must determine where the claim should be registered and what proof shows that the person is vulnerable or at risk.
The French material-reception framework is relevant to that first appointment. Article L. 551-8 of the CESEDA links material reception to benefits and an allowance for an asylum seeker. If the person has no stable accommodation, Article L. 345-2-2 of the Code of Social Action and Families provides an emergency-accommodation framework for a person in medical, psychological or social distress. These provisions should be translated into a practical request: state the person’s vulnerability, ask for a safe address, request medical and psychological assessment, preserve proof of the request and record any refusal or absence of response.
Trafficking protection requires a separate French strategy. Article 225-4-1 of the French Criminal Code concerns the acts and coercive circumstances that constitute trafficking. Article L. 425-1 of the CESEDA concerns a residence card for a foreign national who files a complaint against an alleged trafficker or testifies in a criminal case, subject to breaking contact with that person. If the facts occurred entirely outside France and the trafficker is not connected to France, that residence route may not fit the case. The lawyer should therefore distinguish three questions: is the person a victim, does France have jurisdiction over the alleged exploitation, and which immigration or asylum status can lawfully be requested?
The French case law offers a useful warning about police information. In CAA Nancy no. 24NC02692, the court treated the police information duty as protective and conservatory, before a final criminal qualification had been made. In CAA Bordeaux no. 25BX02873, the court analysed whether the person’s account had actually triggered the relevant duty and whether the facts supported a residence claim. A person returned under the UK–France arrangement should not wait for a prosecutor to label the conduct “trafficking” before asking for information and legal protection. The request should be made at the first credible opportunity and documented.
There is also a safety question about the alleged trafficker. If the person fears a recruiter, transporter, exploiter or debt controller in France, the fear should be stated to the receiving authority, the asylum officer, the police and the lawyer. The High Court’s Article 4 analysis identifies a real-risk exception where a person faces a credible suspicion of being trafficked in the return country. The exception is fact-sensitive. It requires evidence about the person’s network, the threats, the location, the ability of the authorities to protect them and why relocation or ordinary support would not remove the danger.
Lawyers should create a two-country evidence bundle before the transfer. It should include the UK trafficking decision, the reconsideration request, medical reports, detention records, witness statements, proof of exploitation, identity documents, asylum documents, the treaty removal notice, the French contact details and any evidence of threats in France. Every document should have a reliable date and an accurate translation. The bundle should be usable in a UK interim-relief application and in a French asylum, residence, emergency-accommodation or criminal complaint process.
The timeline is short because the treaty is designed to move people quickly. The government’s statistics show that the monthly number of returns increased during the first half of 2026. A person who waits until the day of a flight may not have time to obtain medical evidence or an interpreter. The urgent question is not only “can this person be returned?” It is also “which decision must be made before return, which evidence is still missing, and which authority can prevent an irreversible loss of protection?”
The agreement’s reciprocal character should not obscure the individual case. A numerical exchange of people does not create a legal presumption that the person in front of the Home Office is interchangeable with someone admitted from France. Identity, vulnerability, age, trafficking history, asylum status and risk must be assessed individually. A person cannot be removed simply because the statistical balance requires another “out” transfer, and a French applicant cannot be admitted into the UK without the eligibility, security and identity checks described by the official scheme.
The UK court’s ruling is therefore best read as an evidence decision. It tells public authorities that a quick first assessment must remain open to material evidence that could change the result. French authorities operate under their own statutes and procedures, but the person’s first French contact may determine whether the claim is understood as asylum, trafficking, criminal victimhood, emergency distress or none of these. The French legal sources do not create an automatic guarantee; they give counsel the tools to ask the right authority for the right protection.
For a person or family trying to act now, the sequence should be clear:
- obtain the full UK trafficking decision, the guidance relied on and the removal documents;
- request reconsideration with every new medical, linguistic, detention or witness document;
- ask for urgent interim relief if removal is scheduled before the request can be decided;
- prepare the French asylum, reception and trafficking-protection applications before arrival;
- record any fear of renewed exploitation or contact with an alleged trafficker in France; and
- preserve evidence of every request, refusal, delay and transfer decision for review in the appropriate court.
The firm’s French analysis of residence permits for victims of trafficking covers the domestic CESEDA route in more detail. The present cross-border ruling adds the preceding question: whether the United Kingdom lawfully assessed the person before sending them to that French route. A complete strategy needs both layers.
Conclusion
The High Court’s decision in [2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin) does not abolish the UK–France returns agreement. It prevents the government from treating France’s treaty status as a reason to close the UK reconsideration route for negative trafficking decisions. The legal message is simple: a reciprocal migration arrangement cannot be operated through a process that discards late evidence capable of identifying a victim.
For the person facing removal, the next step is evidence and timing. Challenge the negative decision, obtain the medical and detention material, ask for interim protection where necessary, and prepare the French asylum, reception and trafficking applications before the transfer. France may provide meaningful protection, but it does so through different legal routes and not necessarily through the same recognition system. The UK judgment makes that distinction operational rather than academic.