On 22 September 2026 at 9.15 a.m., the European Court of Human Rights held a Chamber hearing in Strasbourg on the fate of ten Ukrainian children who have not been seen since 2014. The case, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union on behalf of ten Ukrainian children v. Russia (application no. 6719/23), concerns children who were living in childcare institutions in Crimea when Russia asserted control over the peninsula. According to the association acting on their behalf, Russian nationality was imposed on the children and they were put up for adoption and may have been adopted. There has been no information on their whereabouts since 2014, despite the Ukrainian authorities’ repeated requests. The association argues that this amounts to the enforced disappearance of the children. The hearing is the most visible European courtroom moment so far for the wider allegation that Ukrainian children have been taken, re-registered and placed with Russian families — the same factual pattern that led the International Criminal Court to issue arrest warrants in the situation in Ukraine, where Pre-Trial Chamber II found reasonable grounds to believe that each suspect bears responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population and that of unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, in prejudice of Ukrainian children. For families, NGOs and lawyers working from France, the Strasbourg hearing matters for three practical reasons: it tests whether Russia can still be judged in Europe after its expulsion, it builds a European factual record that French prosecutors and French courts can later use, and it shows the exact procedural path — complaint, evidence, third-party intervention — through which cases about deported children reach a judge.
I. Strasbourg hearing 22 September 2026: what happened to the ten Ukrainian children of Crimea
A. Who are the ten children and what does application no. 6719/23 allege
The ten applicants are children who were placed in childcare institutions in Crimea and who were still minors when Russia took effective control of the peninsula in 2014. The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), acting on their behalf, describes a sequence that will be familiar to anyone who has followed the deportation files: after establishing effective control, the new authorities changed the children’s legal identity, concealing information on their whereabouts and including them in Russian adoption or foster placement systems. The association states that certain applicants have possibly already been adopted, and that the combination of identity change, concealment and placement amounts to enforced disappearance. The factual allegation is therefore not only about displacement. It is about erasure: new nationality papers, new names on adoption websites, and no answers to repeated Ukrainian requests for information since 2014.
The legal construction is equally precise. Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private life) of the European Convention, UHHRU argues that the arbitrary change of the children’s citizenship, their listing on adoption websites, which was carried out by the Russian authorities in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, failed to respect and protect their social identity as Ukrainian nationals. Social identity — the bundle of name, nationality, family ties and personal history that makes a child who he or she is — is the doctrinal hook. Strasbourg case law has long treated the protection of a child’s identity as part of private life, and the applicants ask the Court to apply that logic to a situation where identity was not merely neglected but administratively rewritten. Alongside Article 8, the disappearance allegation engages the most serious Convention guarantees: the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman treatment, since the Court has consistently held that the anguish of relatives of disappeared persons, kept for years without any information, can itself reach the threshold of severity. The Convention states the core prohibition in one sentence: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The procedure itself tells a story of persistence. The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 14 January 2023. More than two years later, On 25 March 2025 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government of the Russian Federation and invited them to answer specific questions, and the Court put additional questions to the parties by letters of 26 March 2026. UHHRU and the intervening Ukrainian Government filed observations, as did several NGOs admitted as third parties. One chair stayed empty. As the Registry notes: The Russian Government have not submitted any observations. At UHHRU’s request, citing the exceptional gravity and public importance of the case and the need for factual and legal clarification, the Court agreed to hold a public hearing on admissibility and merits — a rare step, decided on 10 July 2026 and executed on 22 September 2026. After the hearing the judges retired to deliberate in private; the judgment will come later. For practitioners, the lesson of this timeline is concrete: even against a non-cooperating respondent State, a well-documented file lodged in 2023 can reach a public hearing in 2026, and every procedural step — notice, questions, third-party briefs — is an opportunity to place evidence on the record.
B. Can the ECHR still judge Russia after its expulsion from the Council of Europe
Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022, and Russia ceases to be a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022. Many readers assume that Strasbourg therefore has nothing left to say about Russian conduct. The opposite is true for facts that predate the exit: the Court will deal with applications directed against Russia in relation to alleged violations of the Convention that occurred until 16 September 2022. Because the ten children’s disappearance began in 2014 and the concealment has continued ever since, the application falls squarely within that residual jurisdiction. The 22 September 2026 hearing is itself the proof: the Court summons, questions and will judge a State that no longer sits at the table, for acts committed while it was still bound.
Three consequences follow, and each of them matters for French practice. First, admissibility objections based on the exit will fail for pre-September 2022 facts, so defence and victims’ teams should stop treating the expulsion as a jurisdictional full stop and start treating it as an enforcement problem. A Strasbourg judgment against Russia remains a binding legal finding, even if Moscow ignores it. Second, non-cooperation does not paralyse the Court. The Registry’s press release records that Russia filed nothing at all, yet the case advanced from lodging to notice to hearing. When a respondent State refuses to engage, the Court draws inferences from the applicant’s consistent, corroborated account — which is why the quality of the initial file (institutional records, adoption listings, official correspondence showing unanswered requests) decides the outcome. Third, enforcement runs through the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervises the execution of judgments, and through the political and financial weight that member States, including France, give to that supervision. A judgment finding enforced disappearance and identity violations would arm every subsequent forum — national prosecutors, the ICC, sanctions authorities — with an authoritative European factual record. That is the deeper stake of the hearing: not only ten individual fates, but a judicially established account of a method — take the children, change their papers, place them, deny everything — that can then be cited, case after case, in Paris, in The Hague and wherever a suspect travels.
The parallel ICC track sharpens the picture. On the Prosecutor’s applications of 22 February 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II found that Mr Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, born on 7 October 1952, President of the Russian Federation, is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute), with crimes allegedly committed in occupied Ukrainian territory at least from 24 February 2022, and the same findings were made against the Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Ms Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. Two courts, two legal languages — war crimes in The Hague, Convention violations in Strasbourg — are therefore documenting the same machinery from complementary angles. The ICC route targets individual criminal responsibility, including through command responsibility; the ECHR route establishes State responsibility for the disappearance and the identity rewriting. Neither court can physically return a child tomorrow. Both can do something nearly as important for the long term: fix the facts in judgments that no later denial can erase, and keep files alive while the children grow up and the archives open.
II. What France can do from Paris for Ukrainian children deported by Russia
A. Can French courts prosecute deportation of children as a crime against humanity
French criminal law gives an answer that surprises many foreign observers: yes, under defined conditions, a French court can try a person suspected of having committed genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes abroad, even when neither the victims nor the crime have any prior link to France. The general principle is stated in the Code of criminal procedure: Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. Two doors then open. The first is the treaty door: En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles. The second, broader door is the autonomous universal jurisdiction created for the gravest crimes: peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.
The substantive offences fit the Crimean pattern without stretching. Genocide under French law expressly includes, among the listed acts, transfert forcé d’enfants, committed in execution of a concerted plan to destroy a protected group in whole or in part — Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants. Crimes against humanity cover 4° La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population ; 5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international, when committed in execution of a concerted plan against a civilian population group as part of a widespread or systematic attack — Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique. A prosecutor characterising the taking, re-registration and concealed placement of institutionalised children would therefore work primarily under crimes against humanity — deportation, forcible transfer, grave deprivation of liberty — with genocide available only if the specific intent to destroy a protected group can be demonstrated, which is a far heavier burden. The wartime variant of crimes against humanity exists alongside: Lorsqu’ils sont commis en temps de guerre en exécution d’un plan concerté contre ceux qui combattent le système idéologique au nom duquel sont perpétrés des crimes contre l’humanité, les actes visés à l’article 212-1 sont punis de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité. And time does not run against the victims: L’action publique des crimes mentionnés aux articles 211-1 à 212-3 du code pénal est imprescriptible. A file opened in Paris in 2026 for facts from 2014 loses nothing to delay — a decisive feature for disappearance cases where proof matures over years.
The Cour de cassation has transformed these texts from paper into practice, and its two landmark rulings of 12 May 2023, both given in plenary assembly, map the exact conditions a Paris complaint must satisfy. On the residence condition, the Court held that la condition de résidence habituelle, au sens de l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, qui suppose un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France, doit être appréciée en prenant en compte un faisceau d’indices, tels que la durée, actuelle ou prévisible, les conditions et les raisons de la présence de l’intéressé sur le territoire français, la volonté manifestée par celui-ci de s’y installer ou de s’y maintenir, ou ses liens familiaux, sociaux, matériels ou professionnels (Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, appeal no. 22-82.468, decision no. 669 B+R). In that case the Court accepted that a stay of just over three months, combined with university studies and social and material ties, could satisfy habitual residence — habitual residence is neither a main residence nor a permanent one, but it demands more than a transit of a few hours. Concretely, if a person implicated in the deportation machinery lives, studies, owns assets, receives medical care or regularly visits family in France, the French forum can attach. On double criminality, the same plenary day produced the second key: la condition de double incrimination, telle qu’énoncée dans ledit article, ne requiert pas une identité de qualification et d’incrimination (Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, appeal no. 22-80.057, decision no. 668 B+R). It is enough that the underlying acts — murder, barbarity, rape, violence, torture — are punished by the law of the State where they were committed; the foreign code need not know the label of crimes against humanity. The Court added that the wording mirrors extradition law, where the punishable fact is what counts: the provision on extradition requires only Les faits qui peuvent donner lieu à l’extradition, qu’il s’agisse de la demander ou de l’accorder, sont les suivants : 1° Tous les faits punis de peines criminelles par la loi de l’Etat requérant. Finally, on the relationship with The Hague, the Court approved the reasoning that an international court cannot decline a jurisdiction it does not possess — a point of direct relevance where ICC warrants already target the top of the chain while mid-level organisers, camp directors, registrars and adoption intermediaries remain prosecutable nationally. The current Code also centralises these prosecutions: they may only be brought at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor, and only if no international or national court seeks the person’s surrender or extradition — La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne. A cette fin, le ministère public s’assure de l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale et vérifie qu’aucune autre juridiction internationale compétente pour juger la personne n’a demandé sa remise et qu’aucun autre Etat n’a demandé son extradition. The architecture is therefore complementary by design: The Hague takes the architects it can reach, Paris can take those who touch French soil, and the two levels check with each other before either moves.
B. How victims and families in France file, prove, and preserve a case
A case about deported children is won or lost long before any hearing, in the file-building phase. The Strasbourg application shows the method: identify each child individually, reconstruct the institutional trail (care home registers, transfer orders, transport records), capture the re-registration evidence (new nationality certificates, adoption listings and screenshots with dates and URLs preserved by a bailiff or equivalent certified process), and document every request for information addressed to the authorities together with the absence of reply. The press release for the 22 September 2026 hearing confirms that this is exactly what persuaded the Court to go further: repeated Ukrainian requests met with silence since 2014, third-party briefs from NGOs admitted into the proceedings, and specific questions put by the Court itself in March 2025 and March 2026. Families in France can replicate that discipline from day one: centralise identity documents, keep every message and administrative response, record witness accounts promptly, and commission certified translations, because a Paris investigating judge and a Strasbourg section work in French and every exhibit must be readable without friction.
On the French procedural side, the entry point is a complaint with constitution of civil party before the investigating judges of the Paris judicial court, addressed to the specialised unit handling crimes against humanity, so that the anti-terrorism prosecutor — the only authority that can trigger this track — is seised of a structured, sourced file rather than a bare allegation. The file should plead the residence link expressly, using the bundle-of-indicators test from the 12 May 2023 case law: duration of presence, reasons for it, studies, family, social, material and professional ties in France. It should plead double criminality in facts, not labels, listing the underlying punished acts. And it should anticipate the complementarity check by stating what the ICC has and has not done — warrants exist against two named suspects for the deportation and transfer of children, which both supports the characterisation of the facts and leaves room for national prosecution of other links in the chain. Parallel applications should be considered without delay: an individual application to Strasbourg remains possible for victims within the Court’s jurisdiction and time limits, NGO third-party interventions can carry field evidence into pending cases, and requests for interim measures can be lodged where a child is at imminent risk of irreversible placement. None of these tracks requires waiting for the judgment in application no. 6719/23; all of them become stronger once it is delivered, because a European finding of enforced disappearance and identity violation will be citable in every later forum. The practical message for relatives, guardians, journalists holding archives and whistleblowers is therefore simple: preserve now, structure now, file now. Children’s files do not expire — the prosecution of these crimes is imprescriptible — but memories fade, links rot and registers close, and the teams that win are the ones whose exhibits were already certified when the judges asked.
Conclusion
The Chamber hearing of 22 September 2026 did not return ten children to their families, and no single judgment from Strasbourg or The Hague will. What it did was harder to dismiss: a European court spent a public morning testing, question by question, how ten institutionalised children from Crimea acquired a new nationality, appeared in adoption systems and vanished from every register, while the respondent State said nothing. That method — documented identity by documented identity — is now on the judicial record, inside a case that Russia’s departure from the Convention cannot stop, because the facts predate 16 September 2022. Around that core, the wider machinery is being named in matching vocabularies: unlawful deportation and transfer of children as war crimes in The Hague, enforced disappearance and violation of social identity in Strasbourg, deportation, forcible transfer and grave deprivation of liberty as crimes against humanity in the French Code. France’s contribution is neither rhetorical nor distant. Its courts can receive complaints, its specialised prosecutor can open files, its judges can try suspects who build a life on French soil, and its lawyers can carry certified evidence into each of the three forums. The children of application no. 6719/23 are growing up somewhere under other names; the law’s answer is to make sure that every paper trail leading to them stays open, citable and imprescriptible until the day those names are restored.