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Wanted by Ukraine, Arrested in France: Why Paris Courts Refuse Extradition Over Unfair-Trial Risk

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Wanted by Ukraine, Arrested in France: Why Paris Courts Refuse Extradition Over Unfair-Trial Risk

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You are Ukrainian, you live in France, and one morning the police arrest you on a Ukrainian extradition request for old financial charges. The file looks ordinary: an arrest warrant, a statement of facts, diplomatic assurances that you will get a fair trial in Kyiv. Yet since the full-scale war began, French courts have repeatedly answered no. On 7 November 2023, the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld a refusal to surrender a Ukrainian national wanted for embezzlement and aggravated money laundering, accepting that martial law and the disorganisation of the Ukrainian courts exposed him to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice. In October 2025, the Paris Court of Appeal followed the same path and refused another surrender to Ukraine. This article explains, from inside French extradition procedure, why Paris now says no, what the judges actually verify, and how a person facing such a request can defend himself in France.

The stakes reach beyond one country. When a European court refuses extradition to a state at war, it applies a test built by the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. the United Kingdom: surrender is forbidden where there are serious and proven grounds to believe in a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice. French statute says the same thing in its own words, and French judges use it. What follows is a detailed map of that reasoning, the exact decisions, the exact articles, and the practical steps for anyone arrested in France on a Ukrainian request.

I. Can France refuse to extradite you to Ukraine while martial law continues?

A. What did the Court of Cassation decide on 7 November 2023 about a Ukrainian extradition request?

The leading decision is the judgment of the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation of 7 November 2023, appeal number 23-82.220, published under ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:CR01273. The public prosecutor near the Chambéry Court of Appeal had filed an appeal against a ruling of the investigating chamber of that court dated 30 March 2023, which had given an unfavourable opinion on the extradition of Mr O. E., a Ukrainian national, requested by the Ukrainian government. The request, dated 30 December 2022, sought his surrender for prosecution on charges of misappropriation of property and aggravated laundering, acts allegedly committed in 2007 and on 20 June 2013 in Ukraine. The person concerned did not consent to surrender, and by a ruling of 19 January 2023 the investigating chamber had ordered further inquiries before deciding.

The prosecutor raised three arguments. First, the chamber was said to have ruled in the abstract, without concretely checking whether the person would actually benefit from the guarantees given by the Ukrainian judicial authorities concerning a fair trial and defence rights. Second, the chamber was accused of distorting the Ukrainian derogation declarations by treating restrictions on fair-trial rights as applicable across the whole Ukrainian territory rather than only in the part occupied by Russian forces, and of ignoring that the requesting state is bound by the fair-trial guarantee given with its request. Third, the chamber was said to have misread Article 615 of the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure, because only a judge could supposedly order and extend pre-trial detention after extradition. The Court of Cassation joined the three arguments and rejected all of them.

The reasoning starts from what the Chambéry judges had found. The Court records that, in the words of the judgment:

“s’il est spécifié par le bureau du procureur général de l’Etat ukrainien que la loi martiale instituée en raison de l’entrée des forces armées russes sur le territoire national ne peut déroger à divers droits et libertés constitutionnellement protégés, aucun de ces principes constitutionnels ne protège le droit au procès équitable.” (Court of Cassation, 7 November 2023)

In other words, the constitutional rights that martial law cannot touch do not include the right to a fair trial. The judges then noted that Ukraine had exercised its right to derogate from its treaty obligations, in particular the obligations under Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and that the Ukrainian prosecutor general had drawn up a list of the derogations to fundamental rights resulting from martial law.

The decisive passage concerns detention. The Court of Cassation approved the finding that the wartime amendment of Article 615 of the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure:

“permet désormais des cas de détention sans décision du juge d’instruction ou du tribunal, mais émanant d’un « agent habilité », ainsi que des cas de suspension, jusqu’à la fin de la loi martiale, de l’enquête, sur décision motivée du procureur qui est alors tenu de se prononcer sur la prolongation de la détention provisoire” (Court of Cassation, 7 November 2023)

and that, as a consequence, the pre-trial detention of the requested person would depend on an authorised officer and its extension on the prosecuting authority, for as long as martial law and the war last, with:

“ces restrictions étant applicables sur l’ensemble du territoire ukrainien et non sur la seule partie occupée par les forces militaires russes.” (Court of Cassation, 7 November 2023)

The Court added two practical observations drawn from the file: the recommendations published by the Council of Judges of Ukraine on court activity under martial law, which advise postponing non-urgent cases, together with the destruction of court buildings and the fact that participants in proceedings are themselves victims of hostilities, mean that a trial within a reasonable time is not guaranteed. The investigating chamber had therefore concluded, in terms the Court of Cassation expressly endorsed:

“l’Etat requérant n’est pas en mesure de garantir que M. [E] sera jugé par un tribunal assurant les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense.” (Court of Cassation, 7 November 2023)

The legal conclusion is stated without ambiguity:

“il existe des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire que cette personne serait exposée à un risque réel de déni de justice flagrant en l’état des dispositions relatives à la détention provisoire résultant de la loi martiale en vigueur et de la situation de conflit armé qui sévit en Ukraine, de nature à désorganiser profondément le système judiciaire et à empêcher l’avancement des procédures.” (Court of Cassation, 7 November 2023)

On those grounds alone, the Court held that the investigating chamber had breached none of the texts cited in the appeal, that its decision met the essential conditions of its legal existence, and it closed with the operative words: “REJETTE le pourvoi”. The unfavourable opinion stood, and the extradition failed.

Three lessons emerge from this ruling for every later file. First, the review is concrete, not theoretical: the chamber examines the foreseeable situation of the requested person if surrendered, after further inquiries, and general assurances do not replace that examination. Second, the territorial objection fails: martial law covers the entire Ukrainian territory, including Kyiv, so the argument that courts function normally in the capital does not answer the structural objection. Third, detention is the heart of the analysis: where pre-trial detention and its extension can depend on a non-judicial officer and on the prosecutor for the duration of martial law, the guarantee of an independent tribunal collapses, and the reasonable-time requirement falls with it.

B. Why do diplomatic assurances from Kyiv no longer secure surrender?

Every extradition request from Kyiv now arrives with the same attachment: written assurances that the requested person will receive a fair trial and that defence rights will be respected. Before 2022, such letters carried real weight. Since the war began, French courts treat them as one piece of evidence among others, never as an answer in themselves. The 7 November 2023 ruling states the principle plainly: the investigating chamber assessed the foreseeable situation of the person “nonobstant les garanties données à l’appui de la demande”, notwithstanding the guarantees given with the request. A promise of fairness does not cure a procedure that structurally prevents fairness. (Court of Cassation, 7 November 2023)

The reason lies in the derogation mechanism. In time of war or public emergency, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights allows a state to derogate from some of its obligations, within strict limits. Ukraine notified such derogations in 2022, covering Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention, and has extended them since. The current status of these declarations can be checked on the Council of Europe treaty office pages. Derogations of this kind are lawful in principle. The French courts do not hold them against Ukraine as a reproach; they draw a factual consequence from them. A state that has lawfully suspended part of its fair-trial machinery cannot simultaneously guarantee, by a diplomatic letter, that the machinery will work normally for one extradited person.

The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed this logic in a reported judgment of 29 October 2025, delivered by its ninth investigating chamber in case number 2024/10328, as analysed in a detailed report by the extradition law observatory Extradando. Despite all the basic conditions of extradition being met, the Paris judges refused surrender. They found that the derogations were not sufficiently limited or clearly circumscribed, that martial law extends across the entire Ukrainian territory with no stable distinction between combat zones and cities such as Kyiv or Lviv, and that Article 615 of the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure allows detention decisions by non-judicial authorities. Particular weight was given to the structural disruption of the courts and to recommendations to suspend non-urgent proceedings, which made a trial within a reasonable time largely theoretical. The diplomatic assurances offered by Ukraine were described as too general, formulaic references to fair-trial principles without concrete operational guarantees. The conclusion was identical to Chambéry: surrender would expose the person to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice.

This French position is part of a wider European movement. British extradition lawyers now describe surrender to Ukraine as a “yes, no, maybe” question, analysed case by case in a widely read commentary on extradition to Ukraine, and courts in several European states have begun to demand the same concrete examination of wartime criminal procedure that Paris and Chambéry require. The trend does not mean that every request from Kyiv fails. It means that no request from Kyiv succeeds on assurances alone. Prosecutors who want a surrender must now bring file-specific proof: which court will try the person, under which exact procedural regime, with which judge deciding detention, and within what verifiable time frame. General letters no longer cross that threshold.

For the requested person, the practical consequence is significant. Assurances can be challenged, and they should be challenged with documents rather than declarations: the text of the applicable Ukrainian provisions, the derogation notifications and their extensions, the recommendations of the Ukrainian judicial authorities on wartime court activity, and any evidence about the state of the specific court concerned. The 2023 and 2025 decisions show that French judges read these materials closely and order further inquiries when the file is thin. An extradition defence that stops at contesting the facts of the underlying charges misses the point. The battle is fought on procedure, detention and time.

II. How does a Paris extradition court examine your case before giving its opinion?

A. Which French legal rules block surrender when a fair trial is at risk?

French extradition law starts with a simple rule. Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

“En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. Ces dispositions s’appliquent également aux points qui n’auraient pas été réglementés par les conventions internationales.” (Article 696, Code of Criminal Procedure)

With Ukraine, the applicable treaty is the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 and its additional protocols, completed by domestic statute. But the treaty does not displace the protective core of French law. The central shield is Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which lists the cases where extradition is not granted. Its seventh paragraph states the fair-trial ground in full:

“L’extradition n’est pas accordée : […] 7° Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense”. (Article 696-4, Code of Criminal Procedure)

That single sentence is the statutory home of the entire Ukraine case law. The Chambéry chamber applied it in March 2023, the Court of Cassation confirmed that application in November 2023, and the Paris court used the same anchor in October 2025. Note the verb: “serait jugée”, would be tried. The judge does not wait for a violation; he anticipates it. The question is always forward-looking, and the answer turns on evidence about the court that would actually try the person.

The procedure that leads to that answer is adversarial and tightly framed. Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the central hearing:

“Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure. La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de dix jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général. […] Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne réclamée déclare ne pas consentir à être extradée, la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition. Elle rend son avis, sauf si un complément d’information a été ordonné, dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente.” (Article 696-15, Code of Criminal Procedure)

Several points matter for the defence. Refusal of consent sends the file to the investigating chamber, which must give a reasoned opinion within one month unless it orders further inquiries. Those inquiries are not a formality: in both the Chambéry and Paris cases, the chambers used them to obtain the Ukrainian texts, the derogation lists and the explanations of the requesting authorities, and the resulting analysis filled pages. The opinion is unfavourable whenever the legal conditions are not met or there is a manifest error, and an unfavourable opinion ends the matter: the government cannot surrender a person whom the court protects.

Review by the Court of Cassation is narrow by design. Article 591 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that rulings of the investigating chamber, when clothed in the forms prescribed by law, can only be quashed for violation of the law:

“Les arrêts de la chambre de l’instruction ainsi que les arrêts et jugements rendus en dernier ressort par les juridictions de jugement, lorsqu’ils sont revêtus des formes prescrites par la loi, ne peuvent être cassés que pour violation de la loi.” (Article 591, Code of Criminal Procedure)

And Article 593 of the same Code annuls rulings that lack reasoning or whose reasoning is insufficient for the Court of Cassation to exercise its review:

“Les arrêts de la chambre de l’instruction, ainsi que les arrêts et jugements en dernier ressort sont déclarés nuls s’ils ne contiennent pas des motifs ou si leurs motifs sont insuffisants et ne permettent pas à la Cour de cassation d’exercer son contrôle et de reconnaître si la loi a été respectée dans le dispositif. Il en est de même lorsqu’il a été omis ou refusé de prononcer soit sur une ou plusieurs demandes des parties, soit sur une ou plusieurs réquisitions du ministère public.” (Article 593, Code of Criminal Procedure)

This explains why the prosecutor general lost in November 2023. The Court of Cassation does not retry the facts; it checks that the chamber answered the essential arguments with sufficient, fully consistent reasons after a concrete examination. The Chambéry ruling had done exactly that, so the appeal was rejected. The same narrow review applies to the composition that decides: the 7 November 2023 case was heard by a three-judge panel under Article 567-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the criminal chamber to sit in restricted formation when the outcome appears clear, another sign that the solution now looks settled to the Court itself.

When the opinion is favourable, the file moves to the executive: surrender is authorised by a decree, which can itself be challenged before the administrative courts. But where the investigating chamber gives an unfavourable opinion, as in Chambéry in March 2023 and in Paris in October 2025, no decree can follow. The refusal is final for that request, and the person walks out of the extradition proceedings.

B. What should you prepare in Paris to oppose extradition to a war zone?

Arrest usually comes first and fast: police custody on the basis of an arrest request or an Interpol red notice, then presentation to the prosecutor general, who questions the person on identity and consent. From that moment, three tracks run in parallel: the liberty track, the evidence track and the hearing track. Each of them needs a lawyer immediately, because positions taken in the first hours shape the entire file.

The liberty track decides whether you wait for the hearing in detention or outside. Extradition detention is not a punishment, and the investigating chamber can order house arrest with electronic monitoring or judicial supervision instead. Litigation on these measures is constant, including in Ukrainian files: on 9 August 2023, the criminal chamber rejected an appeal against a Chambéry ruling of 27 April 2023 that had decided a request to lift judicial supervision in extradition proceedings brought at the request of Ukraine, a decision indexed under ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:CR01033, appeal number 23-83.192. The lesson is practical. Gather from day one everything that makes supervision credible: a stable address in France, proof of lawful residence and family ties, employment or business records, medical certificates if detention would endanger health, and the surrender of travel documents. Judges release more easily when the alternative to detention is documented rather than promised.

The evidence track is where Ukrainian files are won or lost. The defence must build the concrete dossier the chamber needs for its forward-looking review. Useful materials include the current text of the Ukrainian procedural provisions relied upon, with their wartime amendments; the derogation declarations and their extensions, dated and sourced; any official statement from the requesting authority about the court, the detention regime and the timetable; and country-level evidence about the state of the courts, destroyed or displaced tribunals, and postponed proceedings. Where the requesting authority answers a request for further information with generalities, say so explicitly and ask the chamber to order a second round of inquiries. The Chambéry chamber did exactly this in January 2023 before ruling in March, and the Court of Cassation treated that careful preparation as a mark of a lawful decision, not a delaying tactic.

The hearing track turns on non-consent and reasoning. Refusing consent is what sends the case to the investigating chamber for a reasoned opinion, and the hearing is the moment to connect each legal condition to a document in the file. Structure the argument the way the judges write: first, the applicable tribunal and its wartime regime; second, who decides detention and its extension, and for how long; third, whether a trial within a reasonable time is actually possible given the state of the courts; fourth, why the assurances given do not answer those three points concretely. Cite the 7 November 2023 ruling by its number and operative finding, and invite the chamber to reason in the same concrete terms. Remember that the prosecutor general can appeal an unfavourable opinion, but only on defects of form capable of depriving the ruling of the essential conditions of its legal existence. A dense, document-backed, fully consistent opinion survives that review, as Chambéry proved.

Two warnings complete the picture. First, do not confuse the extradition judge with the trial judge of the underlying charges. French courts do not decide whether the person committed the embezzlement, the fraud or the laundering alleged by Kyiv. Arguments about innocence belong to the Ukrainian trial, and raising them alone changes nothing in Paris. The extradition judge decides only whether surrender would expose the person to trial by a court without fundamental guarantees. Second, do not assume that one refusal protects against every future request. Each request is examined on its own file and on the law as it stands at that date. If martial law ends, if the derogations are lifted, or if the requesting state produces court-specific, judge-specific, verifiable guarantees, the analysis can change. Keep the evidence updated and treat every new request as a new case.

A related resource for readers facing other requesting states is worth noting. The firm has analysed how French courts handle extradition defences built on specialty and procedural bars in a case involving surrender to Canada for fraud, published as an analysis of specialty and extension of extradition after surrender to Canada. The requesting state differs, but the method is the same: concrete review, documented procedure, and reasoned opinions that withstand appeal.

Conclusion

France does not refuse extradition to Ukraine out of hostility to Kyiv or sympathy for the persons concerned. It refuses because its statute and its highest criminal court require a concrete answer to a concrete question: by which tribunal, under which detention regime, and within what time would this person actually be tried. On 7 November 2023, the Court of Cassation held that martial law, nationwide derogations from fair-trial obligations, detention decisions by authorised officers and prosecutors, and courts too disorganised to try cases within a reasonable time add up to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice. In October 2025, the Paris Court of Appeal applied the same test and refused again. Diplomatic assurances, however sincerely given, cannot fill a structural gap. For anyone arrested in France on a Ukrainian request, the strategy follows directly: secure a credible alternative to detention, build a documented file on wartime procedure, demand concrete answers through further inquiries, and argue the foreseeable trial, not the past facts. The courts of Paris have shown they listen. Give them the materials to rule.

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