KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
US Designates Palestine Action: Can French Banks Freeze Its Funds Without an EU Listing?

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

US Designates Palestine Action: Can French Banks Freeze Its Funds Without an EU Listing?

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 26 August 2026, the United States added Palestine Action and its alias, Palestine Action Group, to OFAC’s SDN List as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The designation arrives while the United Kingdom’s proscription is challenged before the UK Supreme Court. For a French association, donor, or bank, the question is whether an American designation automatically turns a euro account in France into a frozen account.

No. The U.S. measure is serious and can make a transaction impossible where it has a U.S. nexus. It can also trigger enhanced screening, payment rejection, or a request for evidence from a French bank. But an OFAC entry is not, by itself, a French administrative freeze, an EU restrictive measure, or a French criminal judgment. France has its own mechanism: the relevant French, European, or United Nations measure must be identified, and the bank’s decision must be classified correctly.

That distinction matters because “blocked,” “rejected,” “suspended for review,” “reported to TRACFIN,” and “frozen under French law” are not interchangeable descriptions. Each carries a different legal basis, authority, remedy, and evidential burden. The following analysis uses the official OFAC notice, the UK Supreme Court case record, French Code monétaire et financier provisions, and the European Union’s blocking-statute text as available on 26 August 2026.

This is therefore a cross-border sanctions analysis, not a conclusion about the merits of Palestine Action’s political claims or the criminal liability of any individual. The decisive issue for a French account is the legal chain connecting the named entity, the funds, the transaction, the bank, and the jurisdiction that claims power over them.

I. Can a U.S. Palestine Action designation freeze money in France?

A. What the OFAC listing changes for French-facing transactions

The factual starting point is now precise. OFAC’s official changes to the 2026 SDN List record the entry “PALESTINE ACTION (a.k.a. PALESTINE ACTION GROUP),” identify the United Kingdom as the group’s location, give an establishment date of 30 July 2020, and mark the organisation as a “Transnational Terrorist Group [SDGT].” The same notice separately records “PALESTINE ACTION GROUP (a.k.a. PALESTINE ACTION).” A compliance team should preserve both names and every relevant alias when testing a payment. A match against only one spelling can be a false negative; a match against an imprecise name can be a false positive.

The American legal effect follows from the counter-terrorism sanctions authority cited in the notice. OFAC’s official SDN List service identifies the entries, while the 26 August 2026 update cites section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886. Executive Order 13224 states that, subject to its exceptions and licences, property and interests in property of covered persons located in the United States, later entering the United States, or later coming within the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked. Its section 2 also prohibits transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States involving blocked property, including contributions of funds, goods, or services for the benefit of a designated person.

That wording gives the first operational boundary. A French bank is not a U.S. person merely because it is a bank. A euro transfer between two French accounts does not become a U.S. transaction simply because OFAC has listed the payee. The analysis changes if the payment travels through a U.S. correspondent, is denominated or cleared in a way that brings it within U.S. jurisdiction, involves a U.S. person, touches property already subject to U.S. jurisdiction, or is processed by a U.S.-incorporated group or branch. The bank must map the payment chain, not read the word “SDGT” in isolation.

OFAC itself describes the wider risk. Its official FAQ explains that U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with SDGT property and that non-U.S. persons may face U.S. penalties for dealings subject to U.S. jurisdiction. It also warns that a foreign financial institution may face correspondent-account or payable-through-account sanctions if it knowingly facilitates a significant transaction for or on behalf of an SDGT. That OFAC FAQ is not a French prohibition, but it explains why a French bank may stop a payment even where the bank is not directly compelled by French sanctions law to freeze the account.

The distinction between legal compulsion and risk management is central. An institution may decide that maintaining a relationship creates unacceptable U.S. exposure, correspondent-bank exposure, reputational exposure, or an internal policy risk. It may ask for source-of-funds evidence, the identity of donors, the purpose of a grant, the identity of beneficiaries, the payment route, and confirmation that no U.S. person or U.S. service is involved. It may decline the transaction under its contractual and compliance framework. That decision can be burdensome and contestable, but it is not the same thing as saying that French law has automatically frozen every asset of Palestine Action.

A French payment provider should separate at least four questions. First, is the named beneficiary actually the listed organisation, or is the alert an alias or homonym problem? Secondly, is the beneficiary receiving the money directly, or is it an independent person or organisation with a documented purpose and no ownership or control link? Thirdly, does the payment have a U.S. jurisdictional connection? Fourthly, does a separate French, EU, or UN measure apply? A “yes” to the first question can produce a serious U.S. block; it does not answer the fourth.

The American designation may also affect property that is not visibly held in the group’s name. OFAC’s rules commonly require an ownership and control analysis, and the U.S. executive order reaches persons acting for or on behalf of designated persons. A French bank that identifies a signatory, payment intermediary, fundraising vehicle, or controlled entity must therefore examine the relationship rather than rely only on the account title. At the same time, an internal risk score is not a substitute for proof. A similar name, a political association, a public statement, or a past donation does not automatically establish that a particular French account belongs to or is controlled by the listed entity.

The safest description of the immediate U.S. effect is consequently “a U.S. sanctions and jurisdictional risk that can block U.S.-connected dealings,” not “a worldwide seizure of French funds.” The difference is not semantic. A U.S. block may require an OFAC licence, a withdrawal from the payment, or a U.S.-law challenge. A French administrative freeze points towards the Direction générale du Trésor, the competent ministers, French publication rules, and the French administrative courts. A private bank refusal may instead require analysis of the account agreement, the payment-service rules, the bank’s stated reason, and the evidence available to the customer.

Finally, the public designation should not be confused with a confiscation. OFAC’s framework normally blocks dealings in property and interests in property; it does not mean that every asset has been transferred to the U.S. Treasury. Nor does the notice decide a French court case about ownership, unjust enrichment, defamation, protest activity, or criminal participation. Those issues require their own proceedings and legal tests. The SDN entry is a powerful compliance fact, but it remains one fact in a larger cross-border analysis.

B. Why the UK ban and Supreme Court appeal do not answer the French question

The United Kingdom supplies a second, separate legal event. Palestine Action was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, with the implementing order taking effect on 5 July 2025. The official case record identifies the proceedings as UKSC/2026/0099, R (on the application of Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Supreme Court describes the issue as whether the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 was lawful. It records the statutory language that the power can be used only where the Home Secretary believes an organisation “is concerned in terrorism,” and it notes the earlier disagreement between the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal.

The appeal is live, not decided. The Supreme Court record says permission was granted in part on 29 July 2026, the appeal was expedited, and a full hearing was listed for 4 and 5 November 2026. Until the court changes the position, the UK proscription remains a material fact for UK activity, UK accounts, UK donors, and people physically present in the United Kingdom. A UK criminal prohibition can also create practical consequences for a French person who travels, communicates, raises funds, or provides services in a way that falls within the scope of UK legislation. The precise conduct and territorial link would have to be analysed before any conclusion.

But the UK order is not a French freeze order. It does not appear in France’s legal system simply because a French bank sees it on a screening database. Nor does it replace the need for a French or European legal trigger. The same separation applies in the other direction: a French national freeze would not automatically make the UK proscription valid or resolve the Supreme Court’s human-rights analysis. Each state is applying its own power, through its own institutions, against the same organisation.

This separation protects against an important category error. A French account holder may be described in public reporting as a supporter, donor, director, employee, lawyer, service provider, or member of a group. Those labels do not have identical legal consequences. The OFAC notice names Palestine Action and an alias. The UK order concerns a proscribed organisation. A French bank’s alert may concern an individual, an account holder, a beneficial owner, a payment message, or a beneficiary. The bank must identify which person or entity has actually been matched and under which legal instrument.

French criminal law also cannot be inferred from a foreign political label alone. The fact that the United States calls a group an SDGT and the United Kingdom calls it a proscribed organisation does not, without more, answer whether a person in France has committed a French offence. That conclusion cannot be reached from an alert screen. It would require the relevant French offence, the act alleged, the mental element, the location of the conduct, any participation or financing link, and the applicable procedural safeguards. Conversely, a French person cannot assume that a foreign designation is irrelevant: evidence of the designation may prompt investigation, and conduct connected with financing or material support can raise independent questions under French law.

The legal difference is also visible in the form of the measure. The United Kingdom’s public-law challenge examines the Home Secretary’s statutory power, the evidence relied on, and the effect of proscription on Convention rights. The French asset-freeze regime operates through an administrative act and publication mechanism. The U.S. measure operates through an executive sanctions regime administered by OFAC. These are not three names for the same legal act. A lawyer reviewing a French account must obtain the actual notice or decision relied on by the bank, rather than accepting a general reference to “international sanctions.”

For a French association, the UK litigation may still be commercially and procedurally relevant. A UK fundraising page, UK bank, UK supplier, or UK-controlled donor may be unavailable. A pending Supreme Court hearing may change the UK legal position. An organisation may need to preserve records in anticipation of disclosure or litigation. None of those points gives a French bank authority to describe a French euro account as frozen under French law without identifying the French measure that produces that result.

The European Union layer must also be kept distinct. The European Commission’s Blocking Statute, Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, protects certain EU operators against the extra-territorial application of the laws listed in its Annex and restricts compliance with requirements based on those listed laws. It is not a general rule that neutralises every U.S. sanctions designation. The Annex must be checked, the affected activity must fall within the regulation, and any authorization or remedy must be assessed under the regulation’s own conditions. A French bank cannot treat the Blocking Statute as a universal answer; a customer cannot invoke it as a universal shield.

That is why the headline question has to be answered in two stages. The U.S. listing can make a transaction impossible or dangerous where U.S. jurisdiction or U.S. secondary-sanctions exposure is real. It does not itself publish a French freeze. The French state may later adopt its own measure, or a bank may take a defensible AML or contractual decision, but those are legally different events requiring separate proof.

II. What should a French bank, donor, or association do now?

A. How to test for a French, EU, or UN asset-freeze trigger

The French analysis starts with the Code monétaire et financier, not with the OFAC search result. Article L. 562-1 of the Code monétaire et financier defines the vocabulary used by the French freeze regime. It treats “fonds” broadly, including cash, claims, payment orders, deposits, account balances, financial instruments, income, and other financial advantages. It also defines economic resources as assets that are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods, or services. The code describes a freeze as action aimed at preventing changes to volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, nature, or destination that could enable use.

The national terrorism route is Article L. 562-2. It allows the Minister for the Economy and the Minister of the Interior to decide jointly, for six months, renewable, on the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held, or controlled by persons or entities that commit, attempt to commit, facilitate, or finance terrorist acts, incite them, or participate in them. The statutory words “pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” are important: the measure is a French decision with a defined legal duration, not an automatic consequence of an overseas list.

A different route concerns international sanctions. Article L. 562-3 permits a French freeze in connection with actions sanctioned or prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions or acts adopted under the relevant EU Treaty provisions, including persons designated on that basis. If a person or entity is designated under a United Nations or EU instrument, the French implementing framework has its own conditions. A U.S.-only designation does not become a United Nations or EU designation by repetition in a French bank’s screening software.

The decisive publication rule is in Article L. 562-9. Decisions taken under Articles L. 562-2 and L. 562-3 are published by extract in the Journal officiel and are enforceable from the date of publication. The phrase “publiées par extrait au Journal officiel et sont exécutoires à compter de leur date de publication” gives the compliance team a concrete verification step. If a bank claims that a French national freeze applies, it should be possible to identify the published decision, the named person or entity, the relevant aliases, the date, and the legal basis. A generic reference to “OFAC” is not that publication.

The French Treasury explains the same architecture in its public guidance on the national asset-freeze mechanism. It states that France has autonomous national designation powers under the Code monétaire et financier while also applying United Nations and EU measures. The guidance directs operators to the national register of asset freezes and explains that the register covers measures in force in France. Its sanctions page also identifies the national terrorism regime under Article L. 562-2, the EU and UN routes under Article L. 562-3, and the obligation to report suspected breaches to the Direction générale du Trésor. A careful file should record the date and result of each search, not merely attach a screenshot with no timestamp.

The persons obliged to implement an actual French freeze are identified in Article L. 562-4. It requires the measures to be applied without delay and extends the obligation to natural persons in France, financial and other persons covered by Article L. 561-2, and legal persons established under French law or carrying out an operation in France. The text includes French entities for activities abroad and foreign entities for activities in France. Once the French trigger exists, territorial and cross-border details do not permit a bank to ignore the freeze.

The consequence is stated in Article L. 562-5: persons covered by Article L. 562-4 may not “mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement” funds or economic resources for persons whose funds and resources are subject to a measure of freeze under the listed French, European, or international provisions. The prohibition is powerful, but its wording matters. It presupposes a measure made under one of those provisions. The U.S. entry is evidence of a serious risk; it is not named in Article L. 562-5 as an independent French freeze instrument.

French law also prevents deliberate evasion. Article L. 562-6 prohibits persons covered by Article L. 562-4 from participating “sciemment et volontairement” in activities intended or having the effect of circumventing the French freeze measures. This is why an association or donor should not change the payee name, split transfers, use an undisclosed intermediary, or send money through a friend merely to defeat a screening alert. The correct response is to clarify the legal identity, transaction purpose, and jurisdictional basis.

There is also a useful distinction between a frozen account and a refused incoming payment. Article L. 562-7 provides that the prohibitions do not prevent funds from being paid into accounts whose funds are frozen under the relevant French provisions, while the person crediting the account must inform the Minister for the Economy without delay. That rule demonstrates that French law can contemplate a payment into a frozen account in a defined situation. It does not mean that every bank may describe a rejected payment as a statutory freeze, nor that every frozen-account payment is automatically authorised for withdrawal.

If a French national freeze exists, partial unblocking is a separate administrative step. Article L. 562-11 allows the competent ministers to authorise the release and making available of part of the funds in circumstances compatible with public order. For a legal person, the text refers to an activity compatible with the safeguarding of public order, and it also allows requests by the affected person or by a third party with a right in the funds. That is a route for an actual French freeze; it is not an application for permission merely because an American bank has rejected a transfer.

The bank’s decision tree should therefore be recorded in a short written memorandum. The first branch asks whether the name is an exact match, an alias, or a potential homonym. The second asks whether the French national register, the Journal officiel, an EU regulation, or a United Nations designation creates a French freeze. The third maps U.S. jurisdiction: U.S. person, U.S. correspondent, U.S. dollar or other U.S.-connected clearing, U.S.-controlled service, or blocked property. The fourth applies French AML duties. The fifth identifies the precise action: execute, pause, reject, freeze, report, or seek an administrative authorisation. Those verbs should never be collapsed into “sanctions issue.”

French autonomous power means that the absence of an EU listing is not an absolute guarantee that France cannot act. The ministers may use Article L. 562-2 if its statutory conditions are met. But it also means that a U.S. listing does not do the ministers’ work for them. Until a French measure is adopted and published, a bank may still have strong reasons to investigate or reject a payment, especially if U.S. exposure exists, but it must identify the actual basis on which it is treating the funds or transaction.

B. What to do when a payment or account is refused

The first practical step is to obtain the bank’s decision in writing without asking the bank to reveal a confidential suspicious-transaction report. The customer should ask whether the transaction was rejected, returned, suspended pending review, or placed under a legal freeze; whether the bank relies on French law, EU law, United Nations measures, U.S. law, an internal policy, or a contractual risk clause; whether the alert concerns the organisation, a person, an alias, a beneficial owner, or a payment intermediary; and whether the money remains in the account or has been returned. The answer may be limited, but the categories matter.

The customer should then preserve the entire payment file: the payment instruction, SWIFT or payment-service reference, account statement, bank messages, date and time of the block, identity documents, statutes and governance documents of the association, beneficial-owner information, donor identity, source-of-funds evidence, grant or service agreement, intended use of funds, and any evidence that the payment has no U.S. person or U.S. jurisdictional connection. The aim is not to argue that a political cause should be exempt from screening. The aim is to prove whether the alert concerns the named entity and whether the legal basis reaches the particular money.

French customer-due-diligence law operates even when no asset-freeze decision exists. Article L. 561-5 requires covered professionals to identify the client and, where appropriate, the beneficial owner before entering a business relationship or assisting with a transaction. Its concise commands are “Identifient leur client” and “Vérifient ces éléments d’identification.” For a French association receiving an international donation, this can require a clear description of governance, controllers, donor, beneficiary, purpose, and payment route.

Where the transaction is unusually complex, unusually large, or lacks an apparent economic or lawful purpose, Article L. 561-10-2 requires an enhanced examination. The institution must seek information about the origin of the funds, their destination, the purpose of the transaction, and the identity of the person benefiting. A fresh U.S. terrorism designation can reasonably increase the intensity of that examination. It does not remove the bank’s duty to assess the facts of the specific transaction or entitle the customer to defeat the examination by changing labels.

If the facts create the statutory suspicion, Article L. 561-15 requires the covered person to report sums or operations it knows, suspects, or has good reasons to suspect are proceeds of a sufficiently serious offence or connected with terrorist financing. Article L. 561-16 requires the institution to abstain from carrying out the operation until the relevant declaration has been made, subject to the statutory conditions for proceeding. A short-term pause can therefore be an AML measure rather than a French asset freeze.

The customer should not insist that the bank disclose whether it filed a TRACFIN report. Article L. 561-18 states that the declaration is confidential and prohibits disclosure of its existence and content to the owner of the funds or to third parties, subject to defined exceptions. The statute even uses the phrase “La déclaration mentionnée à l’article L. 561-15 est confidentielle.” The appropriate request is for the non-confidential legal category of the action and for the documents needed to correct an identity or jurisdictional error.

Where the bank cannot complete the required identification or obtain the required relationship information, Article L. 561-8 provides that it “n’exécute aucune opération,” does not establish or continue the business relationship, and may make the statutory declaration. That power can support a refusal that is not based on a French freeze at all. It also creates an evidential question: did the customer fail to provide information, or did the bank treat a weak name match as conclusive without testing the identity and beneficial ownership?

A French association should not assume that a general right to a bank account eliminates these restrictions. Article L. 312-1 recognises, subject to its conditions, a right to open a deposit account for a person or legal entity domiciled in France that lacks an account in France. But Article L. 562-14 requires prior authorisation from the Minister for the Economy when a credit institution designated under the right-to-account procedure is to open an account for a person whose funds and economic resources are subject to a freeze. The right to an account and the sanctions regime must be read together.

If the file reveals an actual French national freeze, the affected person should consider two parallel routes. The first is a request for partial release under Article L. 562-11, supported by a precise budget, contracts, payroll or essential operating expenses, legal fees where relevant, and evidence that the requested activity is compatible with the statutory public-order test. The second is a challenge to the administrative decision. The Direction générale du Trésor states that an order adopted under Article L. 562-2 may be contested within two months of notification by a graceful appeal to the competent ministers or by a contentious claim before the Administrative Court of Paris. The deadline should be calculated from the actual notification, not from a press article or an informal bank email.

If there is no French freeze, the dispute changes character. The customer may have a claim arising from the account agreement or payment-service relationship, subject to the bank’s lawful AML, sanctions, security, and termination rights. An urgent application may be considered where funds are needed for a time-sensitive lawful purpose, but a court will need to know the bank’s reason and the applicable mandatory rules. A court is unlikely to order a bank to perform a transaction that would breach a genuine French, EU, UN, or U.S.-jurisdiction prohibition. Conversely, a bank that relies on an incorrect identity match, misstates a U.S. designation as a French freeze, or refuses to explain a non-confidential contractual decision may face a different analysis.

Good-faith implementation has its own protection. Article L. 562-13 provides that the French State is responsible for harmful consequences of good-faith implementation of freezes or prohibitions by covered persons, their officers, or employees, and that no professional sanction may be imposed on them for that reason. This is not a licence for careless screening. It is a reason for the bank to document the legal measure, identity analysis, escalation, and decision. It is also a reason for a customer challenging the decision to target the exact statutory basis rather than making a general accusation of discrimination.

The confidentiality rules reinforce the need for disciplined correspondence. Article L. 574-1 attaches a fine of 22,500 euros to breach of the disclosure prohibition referred to in Article L. 561-18 and related provisions. A customer should not threaten bank staff or demand a copy of a TRACFIN report. The useful record is the bank’s external decision, the payment status, the legal instruments named, the evidence requested, and the dates on which clarification was provided.

There is one final practical warning. Do not route around the alert by using an undisclosed related association, a personal account, a new payment processor, a different spelling, or a series of small transfers. If the organisation is actually subject to a French measure, the anti-circumvention rule in Article L. 562-6 may become relevant. Even where no French freeze exists, concealment can create a new AML suspicion and make it harder to show that the original transaction was transparent and lawful. A better strategy is a documented legal-identity review, a written request for the bank’s non-confidential reason, and, where needed, an application to the competent French authority or court.

For donors, the same framework means that a charitable or political intention is not enough to answer the sanctions question. The donor should identify the recipient, the ultimate beneficiary, the intended use, and any intermediary; test the payment route for U.S. exposure; obtain written confirmation where a bank has cleared the transaction; and keep the evidence. For counsel, the file should distinguish the group’s designation, the UK proscription, the U.S. jurisdictional nexus, a possible French autonomous measure, and ordinary AML suspicion. That separation is what makes a challenge or authorisation request credible.

Conclusion

As at 26 August 2026, the U.S. designation of Palestine Action is an effective OFAC compliance event. It can block U.S.-connected property and transactions, expose a French financial institution to serious correspondent and secondary-sanctions risk, and cause a bank to pause or reject a payment. The United Kingdom’s proscription remains a separate live legal regime while the Supreme Court considers UKSC/2026/0099 on 4 and 5 November 2026.

Neither event automatically freezes a euro account in France. A French bank must test the French national register, the Journal officiel, the relevant EU and United Nations measures, and any French order under Article L. 562-2 or L. 562-3. It must then apply its independent customer-due-diligence, enhanced-review, reporting, and confidentiality duties. The outcome may be an actual French freeze, an AML suspension, a U.S.-jurisdiction refusal, a contractual termination, or a mistaken match. Those outcomes should not be described as though they were identical.

The most effective response is evidence-led: identify the exact person or entity matched, map the money and payment route, obtain the bank’s non-confidential reason, preserve proof of ownership and purpose, avoid any attempt to circumvent controls, and use the appropriate administrative or judicial remedy. The absence of an EU listing does not prevent France from adopting an autonomous measure; the presence of a U.S. listing does not create that measure automatically.

📄 Official circular