On 20 October 2026, the confrontation between the United States, Israel and Iran dominates the international news wires in English-speaking countries. According to a live blog followed by thousands of readers in the United Kingdom, President Donald Trump says the United States continues to hit Iran economically and militarily, while praising Russia for doing nothing to help Tehran. The day before, at a campaign rally in Kansas reported by Gulf News, the same president said the United States was in a position to leave the Iran war now, adding that Tehran would not obtain a nuclear weapon and describing the country’s navy, air force, radar and air defences as destroyed. At the same time, Axios reports that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth travelled to Israel for an unannounced meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid discussions about resuming major combat operations, while Iran’s foreign minister says a ceasefire proposal is still on the table. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held talks in Tehran with his counterpart Abbas Araghchi on 19 October, Germany summoned the Iranian ambassador the same day over alleged plots targeting Jewish community leaders, and Etihad Airways cancelled its Abu Dhabi routes to Dammam, Riyadh and Jeddah through 24 October as regional flights were disrupted.
For an international reader with assets, contracts, family ties or pending litigation connected to France, the decisive question is not who controls the Strait of Hormuz this week. It is what American escalation changes inside French courts, French banks and French criminal law. France applies European Union restrictive measures against Iran, runs its own national asset-freeze regime, and has produced some of the most creditor-friendly and some of the most state-protective case law in Europe on frozen funds. This article explains, step by step, which Iranian assets are frozen in France and what the freeze forbids, whether creditors can seize those funds in Paris, how a listed person or company can seek release or delisting, and what criminal penalties punish sanctions circumvention from French territory.
I. What American escalation against Iran changes for frozen assets in France
A. Which Iranian assets are frozen in France and what the freeze actually forbids
Two layers of law freeze Iranian assets in France, and they must not be confused. The first layer is European. Since 2007, the Council of the European Union has adopted successive regulations imposing restrictive measures over the Iranian nuclear and ballistic programmes, starting with Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 of 19 April 2007, followed by Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 of 25 October 2010 and Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012. These are the very instruments cited in the titles of the leading French judgment on the subject, the Assemblée plénière decision of 10 July 2020 in the Bank Sepah cases, which this article examines in detail below. The regulations freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by designated persons and entities, and they forbid making any funds or economic resources available to them. Their lists are updated regularly, and each new American escalation is usually followed by fresh European designations or by tighter enforcement of the existing ones.
The second layer is French and national. Under Article L.562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, the Minister for the Economy and the Minister of the Interior may decide jointly, for six months renewable, to freeze funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by individuals, legal entities or any other entity that commit, attempt to commit, facilitate or finance acts of terrorism, incite or participate in them, as well as funds belonging to entities themselves held or controlled by such persons or acting knowingly on their behalf or instructions. The exact statutory wording matters because it shows the mechanism: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”. In practice, the French Treasury implements both the European regulations and the national decisions through its published lists, and French banks screen every transaction against them automatically.
The scope of a freeze is deliberately broad. Under Article L.562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, “funds means financial assets and economic benefits of every kind, from cash and claims to deposits, savings products, asset-management contracts, life-insurance contracts and financial instruments. In the Bank Sepah litigation examined below, the Paris judges read this definition as covering only the asset side of the frozen bank, including interest, dividends and other income and capital gains collected on assets, and not the liabilities side of its balance sheet. The Court of Justice gives the European concept an even wider reach, as the Cour de cassation recalls in the judgment analysed in Part I.B, and it treats the purpose of the freeze as preventive, stopping any use of frozen holdings that could support nuclear proliferation, with consequences that can lawfully be heavy even for operators who bear no responsibility for the situation that led to the measures.
Concretely, for a reader in London, New York, Dublin, Toronto or Sydney with an Iranian connection, this means the following. A bank account in Paris held by a designated Iranian bank cannot be debited, even to pay a genuine commercial debt. A dividend declared by a French company but payable to a listed shareholder cannot be transferred. A Paris apartment owned by a designated person cannot be sold with the proceeds remitted to the seller. Insurance contracts, portfolio management mandates and even safe-deposit contents fall inside the perimeter. Anyone who holds, manages or owes money to frozen assets must declare and immobilise them, and any use, movement or change of destination of the funds without prior authorisation from the competent authority exposes the operator to severe penalties, examined in Part II of this article.
The current escalation makes this machinery more dangerous for three reasons. First, the lists move: every new round of American measures increases the probability of additional European designations, including of banks, shipping companies, oil traders and intermediaries that international businesses routinely deal with. Second, enforcement intensifies: banks apply enhanced due diligence to any payment chain touching Iran, the Gulf, or intermediaries, and over-compliance means even non-designated clients see transfers blocked for weeks. Third, the facts on the ground create new designations risk for individuals: executives, agents and advisers involved in circumventing measures can themselves be listed. The French litigation record shows exactly how these freezes behave once they reach a courtroom, and it is to that record that we now turn.
B. Can creditors seize frozen Iranian funds held in Paris
The leading answer comes from the highest French civil court, in a case that concerned an Iranian bank directly. By a judgment of 26 April 2007 that became final, the Paris Court of Appeal ordered Bank Sepah, together with several individuals, to pay the companies Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance the euro equivalent of 2,500,000 and 1,500,000 US dollars respectively, with statutory interest running from that judgment. Shortly afterwards, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007 ordering member states to freeze all assets of Bank Sepah, designated as an entity supporting the Aerospace Industries Organisation and contributing to the Iranian military and ballistic programme, and the European Commission transposed the freeze in Regulation (EC) No 441/2007 of 19 April 2007. Years later, in July 2016, the two creditor companies served third-party attachments and seizures of shareholder rights and securities on the Paris bank Société Générale against Bank Sepah, and the Iranian bank asked the enforcement judge to record that the embargo had frozen its estate, to treat the freeze as equivalent to a criminal seizure, to recognise force majeure suspending interest, to cap the seizures at principal, and to exempt it from the increased statutory interest rate.
On 10 July 2020, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation, the most solemn formation of the French supreme court, gave its answer on the two appeals, published in the Bulletin under numbers 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2020:PL00653 (Ass. plén., 10 July 2020, No 18-18.542). Its central holding deserves full quotation: “Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités.” A freeze imposed because of the activities of the targeted person is not, for that person, an external event. The Court added: “Il en résulte que l’impossibilité où se serait trouvée la banque Sepah, qui n’a pas contesté sa désignation devant les juridictions de l’Union, d’utiliser ses avoirs gelés pour exécuter l’arrêt du 26 avril 2007, ne procède pas d’une circonstance extérieure à son activité.” Three practical consequences follow for any creditor or debtor dealing with frozen Iranian assets in France.
First, interest keeps running. The frozen debtor cannot invoke the freeze to stop statutory interest on a French condemnation, even though it is legally unable to pay. The freeze immobilises the assets; it does not suspend the debt. For creditors, this is good news with a time dimension: the claim grows while the funds sit frozen, which increases leverage in any future settlement or authorised release. For debtors, it means a freeze obtained against them is never a financial pause. The Paris judges also applied the ordinary five-year prescription to interest arrears under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, retrenching from the seizures the interest that matured before 17 May 2011 where no interrupting act had occurred before the payment orders of 17 May 2016. Creditors must therefore interrupt prescription diligently even while enforcement is paralysed, or the oldest interest will be lost.
Second, a creditor cannot simply attach frozen funds without the Treasury. In a second leading case concerning Libyan funds, the First Civil Chamber held on 7 September 2022 (Civ. 1re, 7 Sept. 2022, No 19-25.108) that no enforcement measure may be taken against frozen funds or economic resources where it would remove them from the debtor’s estate or even merely confer a preference on the pursuing creditor, without the prior authorisation of the Director of the Treasury, the national authority designated under the European regulation. The exact holding reads: “Il en résulte que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11 § 2 du règlement n° 2016/44, une telle interprétation étant indispensable pour assurer l’efficacité des mesures restrictives, quels qu’en soient les effets sur les créanciers étrangers aux détournements de fonds publics opérés sous l’ancien régime libyen.” The Court grounded this solution in the Luxembourg case law on the Iranian programme, recalling that « la notion de “gel des fonds” englobe toute utilisation de fonds ayant pour conséquence, notamment, un changement de la destination de ces fonds, même si une telle utilisation des fonds n’a pas pour effet de faire sortir des biens du patrimoine du débiteur » (§ 49), and that « les mesures de gel des fonds et des ressources économiques visent par conséquent à éviter que l’avoir concerné par une mesure de gel soit utilisé pour procurer des fonds, des biens ou des services susceptibles de contribuer à la prolifération nucléaire en Iran » (§ 55). The case concerned the Libyan Investment Authority and its subsidiary Lafico, but the Court expressly reasoned that freeze measures are defined in similar terms in the Iran and Libya regulations, and it quoted at length the Court of Justice case law on the Iranian nuclear context. Any creditor holding a French judgment or arbitral award against an Iranian debtor whose Paris assets are frozen must therefore apply to the Treasury before attaching, or the seizure will be lifted.
Third, where the debtor is the Iranian state itself rather than a designated bank or company, state immunity from enforcement adds a further wall. French statute now provides that conservatory or enforcement measures against property belonging to a foreign state may be authorised by a judge only if one of three conditions is met: express consent of the state, earmarking of the property for the claim at issue, or a judgment or arbitral award against the state combined with use of the property for other than non-commercial public service purposes with a link to the party proceeded against, under Article L.111-1-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures. And under Article L.111-1-3 of the same Code, conservatory or enforcement measures cannot be implemented against property, including bank accounts, used or intended for use in the functions of a foreign state’s diplomatic mission, consular posts, special missions or missions to international organisations, except with the express and special waiver of the state concerned: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.”
The Cour de cassation polices this boundary strictly. On 10 January 2018, the First Civil Chamber annulled a Paris Court of Appeal judgment that had validated attachments of accounts held by the diplomatic mission to Paris and the UNESCO delegation of the Republic of Congo on the sole basis of a general 1993 waiver (Civ. 1re, 10 Jan. 2018, No 16-22.494). The Court held that the 2016 Sapin II law provisions “subordonnent la validité de la renonciation par un Etat étranger à son immunité d’exécution, à la double condition que cette renonciation soit expresse et spéciale”, and returned to the earlier case law requiring both qualities. Conversely, where the asset has nothing diplomatic about it, an express waiver suffices: on 13 March 2024, the same Chamber rejected the Congo’s appeal against the seizure of an aircraft assigned to the presidency, holding that “Selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale”, while recalling that Article L.111-1-3 must be interpreted strictly: “Il en résulte que doivent être interprétées strictement les dispositions de l’article L. 111-1-3 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, selon lesquelles les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales ne peuvent faire l’objet de mesures conservatoires ou de mesures d’exécution forcée qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés” (Civ. 1re, 13 Mar. 2024, No 21-17.599).
Applied to Iran in the present crisis, the map is therefore the following. Embassy and consular accounts in Paris are practically untouchable without an express and special Iranian waiver, which will never come. Commercial assets of designated entities, such as bank balances of a listed bank, can in principle be attached by a creditor holding an enforceable French title, but only after the Director of the Treasury authorises the release, and the authorisation is discretionary and conditional. Non-diplomatic state assets covered by an express waiver in a contract or arbitral clause can be seized without a special waiver. And throughout, the frozen debtor gains no interest holiday. Readers who want the broader European picture of freezing and delisting strategy from Paris will find it in our companion analysis of the record October 2026 European sanctions listings and how to challenge a freeze from France.
II. How to challenge a freeze or stay clear of criminal liability from France
A. How to get frozen funds released or a sanctions listing reviewed
A freeze is an administrative measure, not a confiscation, and European and French law provide three structured exit routes. None of them is automatic, and each has its own forum, so choosing the wrong one wastes the months during which interest accrues and commercial opportunities disappear.
The first route runs through the authority that froze: the release authorisation. Under the European regulations, the competent national authority, in France the Director of the Treasury, may authorise the release of frozen funds or economic resources where strict conditions are met, for example where a payment is due under a contract concluded or an obligation incurred before the designation, and where the released sums will not be made available to the listed person. The Cour de cassation made this authorisation the keystone of enforcement against frozen assets: without it, even a measure conferring a mere preference on the creditor is forbidden. In practice, the application file must prove the pre-designation origin of the claim, trace the exact funds, demonstrate that no value will reach the listed person or entity, and propose payment mechanics, such as escrow or direct payment to a non-listed creditor, that the Treasury can monitor. Files prepared with bank statements, the underlying contract, the designation act and a concluded French judgment or award succeed far more often than bare requests. A refusal can itself be challenged before the French administrative courts.
The second route attacks the designation itself before the European courts in Luxembourg. A person or entity listed by the Council can bring an action for annulment of the listing regulation insofar as it concerns them, and the European case law requires the Council to state individual reasons and to support them with evidence that withstands judicial review. The Bank Sepah story carries a warning on this point that the Assemblée plénière recorded without deciding: the bank “n’a pas contesté sa désignation devant les juridictions de l’Union”, it never challenged its designation before the Union courts, as the Assemblée plénière recorded in its 10 July 2020 Bank Sepah judgment (“qui n’a pas contesté sa désignation devant les juridictions de l’Union”), and that silence closed off arguments that might otherwise have been available. The lesson for anyone newly designated in the current escalation is symmetrical: contest early, demand the statement of reasons, and require the Council to prove the factual basis. Strict procedural time limits run from notification or publication of the listing act, so the statement of reasons must be requested and counsel instructed in Luxembourg within days, not months. Success leads to delisting and unfreezing with retroactive effect; failure leaves the Treasury authorisation route as the only practical path.
The third route concerns French national freezes taken under Article L.562-2. Because these are individual decisions of the ministers, taken for six months renewable, each renewal is a new decision that can be referred to the administrative judge. The review covers competence, procedure, factual accuracy of the grounds and proportionality. Here too, speed matters: the freeze bites from notification, banks apply it within hours, and the economic damage of even a short freeze on an operating company can be irreversible. Affected persons should therefore combine the administrative challenge with an immediate request for interim relief and, in parallel, negotiate with the Treasury the authorised channels for essential payments such as salaries, taxes and legal fees, which the regulations generally allow under supervision.
For families and companies straddling France and Iran, one further reflex is essential during the present escalation. Check every counterparty against the consolidated European and French lists before signing, paying or shipping, and re-check at performance, because designations made overnight in response to military developments apply immediately. Contractual protection should include a sanctions clause allocating the risk of designation, a right to suspend performance without liability while an authorisation is sought, and a duty on each party to disclose any designation within twenty-four hours. French judges will not treat the freeze as force majeure for the listed party itself, as Bank Sepah learned, so the contract must say expressly what happens if one party becomes unable to pay or deliver because of restrictive measures.
B. What criminal penalties punish sanctions circumvention organised from France
The criminal side of the current escalation is frequently underestimated by international operators who assume that American secondary sanctions are the only risk. French law punishes the violation of freezes directly and severely. Under Article L.574-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, in force in its current wording punishes with customs penalties both the professionals subject to freeze duties, their managers and employees, and the frozen persons themselves who “de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre”, with the customs rules on investigation, prosecution, litigation and punishment of offences applying to the breach
Two features of this offence deserve emphasis. First, its personal scope is double: it targets both the professionals subject to anti-money-laundering and freeze obligations, their managers and employees, and the frozen persons themselves who evade the obligations or obstruct implementation. A bank officer in Paris who deliberately processes a payment for a listed client, and a listed individual who organises transfers through nominees, fall on the two sides of the same provision. Second, the procedural regime is that of customs law, with its extensive powers of investigation, observation and prosecution. Customs penalties in this category include imprisonment and heavy fines proportionate to the offence, and the offence is complete as soon as the obligation is evaded or its implementation obstructed, without any need to prove that the funds actually reached a prohibited destination.
Beyond the freeze itself, neighbouring criminal qualifications regularly appear in sanctions files. Financing of terrorism, money laundering of the proceeds of sanctions evasion, forgery and use of forged commercial documents such as false end-user certificates or misdeclared bills of lading, and criminal conspiracy can combine with the customs offence and multiply the sentences incurred. Investigations typically start with a suspicious transaction report filed by a bank, a customs control at Roissy or Marseille, or a foreign judicial assistance request transmitted to Paris. Once opened, they involve searches, seizures of servers and telephones, and pre-trial detention where the risk of flight or collusion is characterised. Anyone questioned in such a file should treat the first police interview as determinative: the choice of what to declare about the beneficial owners, the destination of goods and the knowledge of the designation shapes the entire file.
The European context of October 2026 reinforces this vigilance. On 19 October, Germany summoned Iran’s ambassador over alleged plots against Jewish community figures, with the German Foreign Ministry warning of legal consequences, and European interior ministries have publicly hardened their posture toward networks suspected of acting for Tehran. In France, the same period sees the government applying the full range of its economic-security arsenal, from investment screening to the freezing tools described above. An international business that routes Iran-related payments through Paris entities, French banks or French logistics hubs during an American bombing campaign takes a risk that no margin justifies: each transfer leaves a trace, each trace can ground a prosecution, and French courts, as the Bank Sepah saga shows, grant no indulgence to those targeted because of their own activities.
Conclusion
The war of statements and strikes between Washington and Tehran in October 2026 will be decided by soldiers and diplomats, but its economic and human consequences in France will be decided by judges applying the texts and cases set out above. Funds frozen in Paris stay frozen until the Treasury authorises their release or the European courts annul the designation, and interest continues to run against the frozen debtor in the meantime. Creditors holding French judgments can reach non-diplomatic frozen assets only with prior Treasury authorisation, and they cannot touch embassy accounts without an express and special waiver that sovereign practice never grants. Listed persons who sleep on their European remedies lose them, as Bank Sepah’s silence in Luxembourg demonstrated. And anyone tempted to route around the freeze from French territory faces customs criminal law with its full investigative arsenal.
For readers in the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, Canada and Australia following the escalation hour by hour, the operational checklist is therefore short: verify every Iranian-linked counterparty against the current European and French lists before any payment or shipment, insert sanctions suspension clauses in every contract, apply to the Treasury at the first sign of a freeze rather than attempting self-help, challenge any new designation in Luxembourg without delay, interrupt prescription on interest claims even while enforcement is blocked, and treat any contact with investigators as the decisive moment of the file. In a crisis where oil exceeds one hundred dollars, flights are cancelled and undersea cables are threatened, the parties who survive legally are those who understood early that in Paris, the freeze is not an event to wait out but a procedure to work through.