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Washington Sanctioned the ICC President: How the Court Keeps Working and What France Would Test Before Any Surrender

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Washington Sanctioned the ICC President: How the Court Keeps Working and What France Would Test Before Any Surrender

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On 18 August 2026, the United States added the sitting President of the International Criminal Court to a sanctions list. Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, elected head of the Court, and Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, a Senior Trial Lawyer in the Office of the Prosecutor, were designated for blocking sanctions by Washington. The Court answered the next day that the move was a flagrant attack on its independence, France condemned all coercive measures against the institution the same day, and the judges in The Hague kept working: a reparations hearing in the Darfur case of Ali Kushayb was held on 8 September, and the trial judgment in the Central African case of Mahamat Said is scheduled for 23 September. This article explains what the American designations technically do, why they do not suspend the Court, and, above all, what France would concretely examine before surrendering anyone to the ICC or before letting a French company obey a foreign sanction. It follows our 18 August analysis of the legal effects in France for banks, lawyers and companies and our 4 September analysis of Japan’s challenge and of France’s Rome Statute duties toward Judge Akane, and adds what is new in September: the Court’s hearing calendar, the French surrender procedure before the chambre de l’instruction, and the blocking-statute compliance answer.

I. Washington sanctioned the President of the ICC: what the August 2026 designations change

A. Who was designated on 18 August 2026 and what an American blocking sanction does

The facts are undisputed because both sides published them within twenty-four hours. On 18 August 2026 the United States administration announced a new round of designations against the International Criminal Court, and the sanctions arm of the American Treasury recorded persons blocked on that date, issuing at the same time a general licence titled, in its own words, a wind-down licence for transactions involving the persons blocked that day (OFAC recent actions of 18 August 2026) The list of American measures against the Court had been growing for more than a year: Washington had already sanctioned judges in June and August 2025, so-called lawfare actors in July 2025, and non-governmental organisations in September 2025, each time on the stated ground that the Court was targeting American or Israeli nationals. The August 2026 step crossed a new line because it struck the presidency of the institution itself.

The Court identified the two new names on 19 August 2026: its President, Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, and Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, a Senior Trial Lawyer in the Office of the Prosecutor (ICC statement of 19 August 2026). An American blocking designation has three practical effects that readers should distinguish. First, any assets the designated person holds under American jurisdiction are frozen. Second, American nationals and companies are forbidden from dealing with them, which in practice cuts access to dollar clearing and to American service providers. Third, foreign banks, insurers, airlines and technology vendors that continue to serve a blocked person expose themselves to secondary pressure, including the risk of being cut off from the American market. That third effect is the one that travels: a European bank that processes the salary of a sanctioned judge, a Dutch landlord who rents to a sanctioned prosecutor, or a cloud provider that hosts the working files of a sanctioned trial lawyer must each ask whether touching the American financial system makes the transaction punishable in Washington.

The Court’s response used unusually strong language for a judicial institution. It called the move a “flagrant attack” on the independence of an impartial judicial institution holding its mandate from States Parties across regions. The presidency of the Assembly of States Parties, the political body of the Rome Statute system, expressed the same day its deep regret at what it called the extension of American sanctions to the President and a staff member, warning that the escalation risked undermining ongoing investigations. France spoke the same day through its Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs in Paris, condemning all threats and coercive measures against the Court, its staff and supporting civil society, calling them an attack on the Court and all 125 States Parties and contrary to the principle of “judicial independence”, and expressing solidarity with the judges targeted (French statement of 19 August 2026).

Two clarifications keep this story legally exact. First, an American designation is an American administrative act: it does not remove Judge Akane from office, does not vacate any warrant of arrest, and does not bind any French authority. Only the Rome Statute system can discipline or remove its own judges. Second, the French statement deliberately recalled the scale of the institution under attack: 125 States Parties, a number Paris invoked to frame the sanctions as an attack on a collective system rather than on two individuals. For victims, counsel and witnesses, the operational question is narrower and will be answered in part I.B: with nine judges under sanctions, can the Court still hold hearings in September. The answer emerging from The Hague is yes.

B. Nine judges sanctioned and the Court still sits: the September calendar test

The most striking figure in the Court’s 19 August statement is its tally of the damage: nine of eighteen judges, both Deputy Prosecutors, the former Prosecutor and one staff member are now sanctioned by the United States. Half the bench is therefore personally targeted by the financial power of a non-State Party. The figure explains why commentators asked openly whether the institution could still function, and the first two weeks of September supplied a factual answer.

On 8 September 2026 the Court held a hearing on reparations in the case of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, known as Ali Kushayb, the Darfur case. Reparations hearings belong to the final phase of a case: they concern what victims receive once criminal responsibility has been addressed. Holding such a hearing three weeks after the sanctions on the Court’s own President demonstrates that the judicial calendar was neither suspended nor moved. Then the Court announced that Trial Chamber VI will deliver its trial judgment in the Said case on 23 September 2026. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani is tried for crimes allegedly committed in the Central African Republic, and a trial judgment is the heaviest act a trial chamber performs: acquittal or conviction, with reasons, in public. Scheduling and keeping that date while the presidency is under foreign sanctions is the institution’s practical reply to the pressure.

The Court said so itself in the same August statement, pledging to keep discharging its mandate independently and impartially under the Rome Statute and in the interest of victims. Three legal reasons support that posture. First, sanctions do not amend the Rome Statute: jurisdiction, admissibility and the rights of the defence remain governed by the treaty, and no American measure can strike a case from the docket. Second, the presidency of the Assembly of States Parties recalled, in the parallel controversy over announced withdrawals by Chad and Venezuela, that leaving the treaty does not erase obligations incurred while a State was a Party (ASP presidency statement on the withdrawals). The same continuity logic protects pending cases: obligations already incurred, cooperation already owed and proceedings already opened do not evaporate because the political environment hardens. Third, the Court’s daily functioning depends on its host state and on States Parties that keep cooperating regardless of Washington’s lists, starting with France, whose foreign ministry pledged to work with European partners and States Parties to keep the Court able to fulfil its mission independently and impartially for victims of the gravest crimes.

For an international reader the lesson of September is therefore double. The sanctions are real and personally painful for the judges and staff they name, several of whom must now organise their banking, travel and family life around a foreign blacklist. But the judicial machine they were meant to slow is visibly still running: reparations for Darfur victims were debated on 8 September, and a Central African verdict will be read on 23 September. That is the context in which the French part of the story matters, because France is one of the States Parties on which the Court relies for arrests, surrenders, asset preservation and the protection of witnesses. Part II examines what Paris actually checks before handing someone over, and what it tells its own companies when Washington orders them to choose sides.

II. What France does when an ally sanctions the court it is legally bound to support

A. How France would surrender a suspect to the ICC while the Court is under sanctions

France is not a bystander in the Rome Statute system: it signed the treaty, ratified it, and wrote a full cooperation title into its own Code of Criminal Procedure. The opening article of that title states the principle without ambiguity: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” (Code of Criminal Procedure, article 627) The American sanctions change nothing in that sentence. A French judge asked to surrender a suspect to The Hague applies the Code, not the American blacklist, and the Code organises a procedure that is both fast and fenced with guarantees.

The procedure runs before the chambre de l’instruction, the judicial panel that also handles extradition cases. The statute gives that panel a simple test and a short clock: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée.” (Code of Criminal Procedure, article 627-8) Three features deserve attention. First, the panel checks for manifest error, not the merits of the international case: defences on the substance belong to The Hague, since every other question is sent to the Court. Second, the fifteen-day deadline makes the French phase one of the fastest surrender procedures in Europe. Third, the person sought is detained for surrender where necessary, which means counsel must be ready immediately with identity, nationality, asylum and health arguments rather than with a full defence on the facts.

Once surrender is ordered, the Code fixes a strict timetable for the handover itself: “La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive, faute de quoi elle est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction, à moins que sa remise ait été retardée par des circonstances insurmontables.” (Code of Criminal Procedure, article 627-10) The one-month rule with automatic release is a genuine safeguard, and practitioners should calendar it from the day the decision becomes final, keeping evidence of every delay. Force majeure can extend the period, but the burden of showing insurmountable circumstances lies with the authorities, not with the detainee. A suspect whose transfer stalls because banks refuse to process mission payments or airlines refuse to board a sanctioned escort would have a concrete factual basis to test that clause, which is one of the places where the American sanctions could indirectly bite the French procedure.

France also preserves the Court’s economic cases on its own soil. When the ICC needs assets frozen in France pending trial, the Code provides: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” (Code of Criminal Procedure, article 627-3) The assignment of these protective measures to the anti-terrorism prosecutor of Paris, with Treasury advances and a maximum duration that can be renewed at the Court’s request, shows that asset preservation for The Hague runs through ordinary French judicial channels. An American sanction against a judge does not cancel a French preservation order, and a French bank served with such an order obeys the French prosecutor, not a foreign list.

Two recent rulings of the Cour de cassation illustrate the method French courts use when a surrender or extradition file reaches them, and both are worth knowing because they show what Paris refuses to delegate. In a 3 September 2025 extradition case involving a request from Switzerland, the criminal chamber recalled the European rule from the Petruhhin judgment of the Court of Justice: a Member State that receives a third-state extradition request against a Union citizen from another Member State must warn that citizen’s home state. The French formulation is worth quoting because it governs everyday practice: “il incombe à l’État membre requis d’informer les autorités compétentes de l’État membre dont la personne réclamée a la nationalité non seulement de l’existence d’une demande d’extradition la visant, mais encore de l’ensemble des éléments de droit et de fait communiqués par l’État tiers requérant dans le cadre de cette demande d’extradition.” (Cour de cassation, 3 September 2025, no. 24-86.757) The lesson for ICC files is structural: before surrendering anyone, France runs its own checks and informs the States concerned; it does not rubber-stamp a foreign request, whether that request comes from an ally or from The Hague itself.

The second ruling, dated 2 December 2020, quashed an extradition refusal issued at Douai in a Moroccan request, and its reasoning draws the exact boundary between judges and government. The chamber had refused surrender because the person had earlier been transferred from Belgium under a European Arrest Warrant and Belgium’s consent to onward extradition was missing. The Cour de cassation recalled the specialty rule in these terms: “lorsque le ministère public qui a délivré un mandat d’arrêt européen a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être extradée vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne sans le consentement de l’autorité compétente de l’Etat membre qui l’a remise.” But it quashed the refusal, holding: “En effet le consentement de l’Etat étranger à l’extradition de la personne remise en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne n’entre pas dans les conditions légales visées par l’article 696-15 du code de procédure pénale.” The operative part follows: the Court “CASSE et ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt susvisé de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Douai, en date du 15 novembre 2019”. (Cour de cassation, 2 December 2020, no. 19-87.428) The message is clear and it protects ICC surrenders too: judges verify the exact statutory conditions, and political considerations such as a foreign State’s consent or a foreign State’s sanctions belong to the government’s stage, not to the judicial authorisation. Applied to the present crisis, the method means a French surrender to a sanctioned Court stands or falls on French statutory conditions, which the American measures do not amend.

B. Must a French bank or company obey the American sanctions against ICC staff

The second French front is economic, and it concerns every compliance officer in Paris: when Washington blacklists a judge, a prosecutor or a staff member, must a French company cut all ties with that person. The short answer is that European and French law push in the opposite direction, but the shield has conditions that must be read carefully.

The European shield is Council Regulation 2271/96, the blocking statute, whose Article 5 forbids European operators from complying, directly or through intermediaries, actively or by deliberate omission, with foreign requirements or prohibitions, including requests of foreign courts, that stem from “the laws specified in the Annex” (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, Article 5). In plain terms, a European operator is forbidden from obeying the foreign prohibitions listed in the annex, and may even recover damages caused by their application. The decisive technical point is in the quotation itself: the prohibition targets compliance with “the laws specified in the Annex”. Whether the American ICC sanctions round falls inside that annex is therefore the first question counsel must answer, and if it does not, the honest advice is to say so and to watch for a European update rather than to promise a protection that does not yet exist. The regulation also allows authorised exceptions where refusal would seriously harm the operator’s interests, which is the valve through which real cases, such as a bank threatened with the loss of its dollar clearing, must pass with a formal authorisation request rather than with quiet disobedience.

France adds its own national shield, the law of 26 July 1968 on the communication of documents and information to foreign persons, whose article 1bis is regularly invoked in Paris litigation. In January 2023 the Paris Court of Appeal had to arbitrate exactly this kind of invocation in a dispute between Veolia Environnement and Bracap over pre-trial investigative measures sought for foreign proceedings. Veolia, the record notes, relied first on “article 1bis” of the 26 July 1968 statute known as the “loi de blocage”, arguing that the requests fell within the scope of the blocking law and that the attached criminal penalties made enforcement manifestly excessive. The court, ruling on the stay of provisional enforcement, rejected Veolia’s request for a stay. The outcome matters more than the slogan: French judges take the blocking law seriously enough to examine it in every file, but they apply it strictly and refuse to let it paralyse ordinary French proceedings. A bank that invokes the 1968 law against an American instruction must therefore prove the precise scope of the request and the reality of the conflict, not merely wave the statute.

France also operates its own fund-freezing machinery, which shows where American and French concepts of sanctions overlap and where they diverge. The Monetary and Financial Code allows the ministers of the economy and of the interior to order jointly, for six renewable months, national freezes, in these terms: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”. (Monetary and Financial Code, article L562-2) That tool targets terrorism financing and interference, and the Code’s definitions expressly plug into European restrictive-measures regulations, including regulation 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures against certain persons and entities in the fight against terrorism. The architecture is therefore layered: United Nations and European Union measures apply directly, French ministers add national designations, and judges enforce. An American ICC designation sits outside all three layers: it is neither a United Nations listing, nor a European regulation, nor a French ministerial order. No French bank commits an offence by refusing to apply it, while obeying it blindly could breach the European prohibition on compliance with listed foreign boycotts and could expose the bank to contractual liability toward the customer cut off without a valid legal basis.

For readers who follow this publication, two companion pieces complete the picture: the analysis of the European Court of Justice ruling that struck down a sanctions freeze in the Inter Rao Lietuva case, which shows how European judges review the reasons behind a listing, and the analysis of the European debate over Russian frozen assets held at Euroclear, which shows where frozen money actually sits and who decides its fate. The ICC crisis belongs to the same family of questions: who freezes, on what reasons, under which judge’s control. The practical checklist for a French operator facing an American instruction against an ICC judge or staff member follows from everything above. First, identify the exact legal basis of the instruction and the nexus with the American jurisdiction. Second, check whether the foreign law appears in the annex of the European blocking regulation before claiming its protection. Third, document the conflict in writing and seek the European authorisation where continued business would seriously damage the company’s interests. Fourth, never cut a customer, an employee or a supplier on the sole basis of a foreign list without a European or French measure that compels it, and notify the relationship manager and counsel before any account closure. Fifth, where the person concerned is connected to international justice, consider informing the French authorities, since France has publicly committed to keeping the Court able to work.

Conclusion

The sanctions imposed on 18 August 2026 against the President of the International Criminal Court and one of its trial lawyers are the gravest American step yet against international justice, and the Court’s own tally, nine of eighteen judges sanctioned alongside both Deputy Prosecutors, shows the personal pressure behind the institutional confrontation. Yet the September calendar gives the lie to any claim that the Court has stopped: reparations for Darfur were heard on 8 September and a Central African trial judgment will be delivered on 23 September. France, which publicly pledged with its European partners to keep the Court able to fulfil its mission independently and impartially for victims of the gravest crimes, backs that position with domestic law: fast judicial surrender proceedings with a one-month handover clock, asset preservation through the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, and a blocking architecture that forbids blind obedience to foreign prohibitions. Anyone concerned by these measures, whether a staff member organising his professional life, a bank served with conflicting instructions, or a suspect whose surrender is sought, should have the file examined now: the hearings of September will not wait for the sanctions debate to end.

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