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EU Courts Bolt the Back Doors to the Russia Asset Freeze: ISDS Claims Thrown Out, Yukos Creditors Turned Away

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Hassan KOHEN
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EU Courts Bolt the Back Doors to the Russia Asset Freeze: ISDS Claims Thrown Out, Yukos Creditors Turned Away

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In seventy-two hours, between 7 and 9 October 2026, the European legal order sent the same message three times to everyone circling frozen Russian money: the back doors are shut. On 7 October, an EU court barred the creditors of the former Yukos group from challenging the Russian asset freeze, closing the enforcement-creditor route. On 8 October, the Council prolonged its restrictive measures over Russia’s hybrid activities until October 2027, keeping the freeze machinery running for another year. And on 9 October, the EU General Court dismissed challenges brought by Russian investors against the ISDS-related provisions of the EU sanctions legislation, killing the investment-arbitration escape route in its crib. For funds, banks, trustees and listed persons with assets in France, the practical question is no longer whether the freeze will hold — Luxembourg says it will — but what a Paris defence looks like when the only doors left are the front ones: annulment, delisting, licences, and evidence.

I. The two back doors Luxembourg has just bolted shut

A. Russian investors against the sanctions wall: the investment-arbitration route dismissed

Sanctioned Russian investors had increasingly turned to investor-State dispute settlement, bringing arbitral claims against the EU and its Member States in the hope that an arbitration tribunal might offer what the EU courts would not: damages for the losses caused by the sanctions themselves, or a lever to bypass the restrictions. The analysis published by the Celis Institute described the movement plainly: sanctioned Russian investors bringing claims against the Union in the hope that arbitration might succeed where a direct challenge had failed. Brussels watched, and then legislated.

On 18 July 2025, the European Union adopted its eighteenth package of sanctions against Russia, one of its most robust to date, tightening measures across the energy, banking and defence sectors. Uniquely, as legal commentator Theodore Hanna noted on Opinio Juris on 27 August 2025, this package targets investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms themselves. The measures were enacted through Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 for Russia and a parallel Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 for Belarus. They prohibit designated Russian or Belarusian parties from pursuing or enforcing ISDS arbitral awards or judgments connected with EU sanctions, and they empower EU Member States to countersue for the costs and damages incurred in defending such claims. The technique is an extension of the well-known no-claims clause of Article 11 of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, stretched to cover arbitration.

The policy rationale is straightforward. By targeting ISDS claims brought by listed Russian and Belarusian investors, the EU aims to close legal loopholes that could otherwise allow sanctioned entities to recover damages or bypass restrictions through arbitration, which Brussels regards as undermining the effectiveness of its sanctions regime. The doctrinal debate is real — commentators ask whether suspending treaty-based arbitration rights is a proportionate countermeasure to aggression or a breach of principles such as pacta sunt servanda and due process — but for practitioners the debate moved on 9 October 2026. As specialist outlet IAReporter reported that day, the EU General Court dismissed Russian investors’ challenges to the ISDS-related provisions of the EU sanctions regulation. The headnote matters more than the paywalled detail: the first direct judicial assault on the anti-ISDS shield failed, in Luxembourg, at first instance.

Three consequences follow. First, no listed Russian or Belarusian investor can any longer treat an investment treaty as a parallel exit from the freeze: filing an arbitration claim against France or another Member State over sanctions losses now runs into an EU-law prohibition on pursuing and enforcing the resulting award, plus the prospect of a countersuit for defence costs. Second, awards already obtained elsewhere face an enforcement wall inside the Union, because national courts apply the same regulations. Third, the clock now runs toward the Court of Justice: the General Court’s dismissal can be appealed on points of law, but an appeal does not suspend the prohibition, and the success rate of such appeals in sanctions matters is historically thin. For counsel in Paris, the message is operational: stop pricing ISDS as a recovery scenario for listed clients, and reallocate the budget to the remedies Luxembourg still accepts.

B. Yukos creditors against the asset freeze: no standing to force an unfreezing

The second bolt was fitted two days earlier. On 7 October 2026, the Global Arbitration Review reported that an EU court had barred Yukos creditors from mounting a challenge to the Russian asset freeze. The Yukos affair — the destruction of the Russian oil major in the mid-2000s and the roughly 50 billion dollar arbitral awards rendered in favour of its former majority shareholders — has haunted European enforcement courts for a decade. Creditors holding those awards have chased Russian State assets across jurisdictions, seeking seizure wherever a State-owned account, building or shareholding could be found. Inevitably, their path crossed the EU’s own freeze: assets they wanted to seize were already frozen under the Union’s Russia sanctions, and the creditors tried to attack the freeze itself to clear the way for enforcement.

The court’s answer was jurisdictional and principled at once. An asset freeze imposed by the Union is a public-law measure of foreign and security policy, not a private escrow account waiting for the fastest creditor. Third-party creditors of the targeted State have no general standing to demand the lifting of a freeze so that they can enforce their own awards against the same pot. The freeze serves the Union’s objectives; it does not arbitrate between competing private claims on sanctioned wealth. A creditor’s award, however legitimate, does not create a right to dictate the fate of measures adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The distinction is worth stating precisely, because clients confuse it constantly. Freezing is not confiscation, and it is not allocation. A freeze immobilises; it preserves the assets while depriving the listed person of their use. It creates no distributable fund and no ranking of creditors. Enforcement of an arbitral award against a frozen asset requires two separate permissions that are routinely conflated: a sanctions authorisation to deal with the frozen asset at all, and an enforcement title recognised by the courts of the place of execution. The 7 October ruling removes the shortcut — suing the freeze itself — and forces creditors back onto the long road of individual authorisation requests, which competent authorities grant only in narrow humanitarian or judicial-proceedings exceptions. In France, that means the Treasury’s freeze department and, behind it, the administrative courts, not a creative standing argument in Luxembourg.

Taken together, the two rulings draw a clean perimeter. The sanctioned investor cannot go around the freeze through arbitration, and the third-party creditor cannot go through it by challenging it. The freeze is a wall with front gates only. Section II examines those gates as they operate in France.

II. Frozen in France: what the closed back doors change for funds, banks and defence lawyers

A. How a freeze bites in Paris: banks, beneficial owners, land registry and criminal risk

France implements Union freezes through a dense national apparatus built around Chapter II of Title VI of the Monetary and Financial Code. The architecture starts with definitions. Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, in force, defines the vocabulary of the chapter — terrorist acts by reference to EU Regulation 2580/2001, acts of interference, drug trafficking and the other predicates of national freezes — so that every later prohibition points to a precise category.

Two ministerial freeze powers coexist. Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides, verbatim: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent ; 2° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes morales ou toute autre entité elles-mêmes détenues ou contrôlées par les personnes mentionnées au 1° ou agissant sciemment pour le compte ou sur instructions de celles-ci.” Alongside it, Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code gives the Minister for the Economy a parallel six-month renewable power targeting persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions of the United Nations Charter or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — the exact legal bases of the Russia sanctions. A newer layer, Article L562-2-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, extends the joint-ministerial freeze to acts of interference committed at the request or on behalf of a foreign power. The six-month renewable format is not a technicality: every renewal is a fresh decision, a fresh statement of reasons, and a fresh opportunity for judicial review.

The bite comes from the scope of persons bound. Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires, without delay, every natural person on national territory and every entity listed in Article L561-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code — banks, payment institutions, electronic-money institutions, insurers, asset managers and the full catalogue of anti-money-laundering obliged entities — as well as any legal person constituted under national law or operating on national territory, to apply the freeze and no-availability prohibitions and to inform the Minister for the Economy immediately. In practice this is why a Paris bank freezes first and asks questions later: the statute imposes an obligation of immediate application and immediate reporting, and the Commission describes compliance as an obligation of result. Screening counterparties, beneficiaries and indirect parties against the sanctions lists is the floor, not the ceiling.

The substantive prohibition is equally broad. Article L562-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code states: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel en vertu des articles L. 562-2 , L. 562-2-1 , L. 562-2-2, L. 562-3 , L. 562-3-1 , L. 712-4 ou L. 712-10 .” Direct or indirect making available, and any use for the benefit of the frozen person, are covered. And the freeze follows wealth into stone: Article L562-8 of the Monetary and Financial Code allows freeze decisions and prohibitions to be published in the land registry or the land book of the property belonging to the frozen person, at the request of the Minister for the Economy. A Paris apartment held through a chain of companies does not escape the freeze by being immovable; it gets flagged in the fichier immobilier itself.

Three recent Luxembourg developments make this French machinery harsher than many clients realise. First, the Court of Justice has endorsed a substance-over-form reading of ownership and control. In case C-483/23 and joined cases C-428/24 and C-476/24, the Court interpreted “belonging to” and “control” under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 broadly, as encompassing all forms of power or influence over assets even without a legal link, with trust structures under particular scrutiny: the formal trust deed is not decisive, and removing a beneficiary or inserting compliance clauses cannot defeat the freeze where de facto influence persists. Second, in case C-84/24 the Court confirmed that a 50 percent shareholding suffices to presume ownership or control, eliminating the old “more than 50 percent” debates. Third, the Commission’s presumption — that funds made available to an owned-or-controlled entity ultimately benefit the listed person — is rebuttable, but the burden lies on the entity. A Paris compliance officer who reads only the legal ownership chart is therefore reading the wrong document; the question is who can use, benefit from, or direct the asset.

Criminal exposure completes the picture. Financing a terrorist enterprise is itself a terrorist act under Article 421-2-2 of the Criminal Code: “Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de financer une entreprise terroriste en fournissant, en réunissant ou en gérant des fonds, des valeurs ou des biens quelconques ou en donnant des conseils à cette fin, dans l’intention de voir ces fonds, valeurs ou biens utilisés ou en sachant qu’ils sont destinés à être utilisés, en tout ou partie, en vue de commettre l’un quelconque des actes de terrorisme prévus au présent chapitre, indépendamment de la survenance éventuelle d’un tel acte.” Beyond terrorism, handling the proceeds of sanctions evasion feeds the general money-laundering offence of Article 324-1 of the Criminal Code — “Le blanchiment est le fait de faciliter, par tout moyen, la justification mensongère de l’origine des biens ou des revenus de l’auteur d’un crime ou d’un délit ayant procuré à celui-ci un profit direct ou indirect” — and exposes assets to the complementary penalty of confiscation under Article 131-21 of the Criminal Code, which the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation applies with rigour: in its judgment of 5 October 2022, No. 21-86.043, published in the Bulletin (Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, 5 octobre 2022, n° 21-86.043), the Court confirmed that only the legal owner of confiscated property, retaining full ownership rights, may bring post-conviction proceedings on the execution of a final confiscation order. The lesson for sanctions-adjacent structures is blunt: informal holders, nominees and discretionary beneficiaries have no standing when the State comes to take the asset.

One more 9 October development tightens the compliance vice from an unexpected direction. Freshfields’ risk-and-compliance analysis of that day recalls that in case C-798/24 the Court of Justice held that the GDPR precludes national legislation requiring certain personal data to be made publicly available, among other purposes to implement sanctions, without conditioning access on a demonstrated legitimate interest. Banks must therefore screen exhaustively and document everything, while simultaneously justifying every personal data item they collect, store and share. Over-collection breaches data law; under-collection breaches sanctions law. The structural tension is now part of the defence file: a frozen client’s bank will produce screening records, and those records must be both complete and lawful.

B. The defences that still work: annulment, delisting, licences and evidence

With the back doors closed, the front gates matter absolutely — and the first gate is the annulment action before the General Court. EU sanctions listings are reviewable acts, and the Court does annul them when the Council’s reasoning fails. The most visible recent proof is the successful challenge by major shareholders of a Russian conglomerate, where the General Court found the Council’s reasons unsubstantiated and annulled the relistings — a judgment widely reported in September 2026, including the annulment of the September 2024 and 2025 relistings of sanctioned businessmen. The method that wins is well known to specialist counsel: attack the statement of reasons, demand the evidence underlying each listing criterion, contest the reliability of press-only sourcing, demonstrate a genuine and definitive severance of control over formerly owned entities, and document the timeline. The Council relists twice a year; each relisting is a new act with new reasons that must be self-sufficient. The October 2026 dismissals concern the ISDS provisions and creditor standing, not the listing criteria themselves — the annulment gate for wrongly listed persons stands open.

The second gate is administrative: the delisting request and the authorisation request. Listed persons may petition the Council for removal at any time, and the petition succeeds when it proves a material change — divestment completed and verified, functions resigned with no retained influence, entities wound down. Parallel to delisting, the regulations provide derogations: competent national authorities may authorise the release of frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees, humanitarian purposes, or the satisfaction of pre-listing judicial decisions, subject to strict conditions and, for certain grounds, a no-objection procedure with other Member States. In France these requests go to the Treasury’s sanctions office, and refusals are reviewable before the administrative courts. The Yukos-creditor ruling of 7 October does not close this gate; it confirms that this gate, with its narrow humanitarian and judicial exceptions, is the only gate for third parties.

The third gate is evidential, and after the autumn 2026 case law it is the decisive one: rebutting the ownership-or-control presumption. An entity that is not itself listed but is frozen as owned or controlled by a listed person must prove the negative — that making funds available to it does not benefit the listed person. Following the trust rulings, that proof must go beyond paper: resignations must be real and irrevocable, trustees must be demonstrably independent, distributions must not track the listed person’s needs, and communications must show no instructions flowing. The 50 percent rule of case C-84/24 gives a bright line for shareholding, but influence below 50 percent still freezes where de facto control is shown. Defence files should therefore be built like corporate-governance audits: board minutes, bank mandates, dividend records, trustee correspondence, and a clean, dated severance trail. Assertions fail; documents rebut.

For persons physically present in France, two further layers apply. First, every national implementing decision — a ministerial freeze under Articles L562-2, L562-2-1 or L562-3 — is an individual administrative act subject to review before the administrative judge, including interim relief where urgency and serious doubt about legality are shown. The six-month renewable structure means the administration must continuously justify the measure; a freeze that outlives its factual basis becomes vulnerable. Second, criminal defence must be coordinated from day one: any use of frozen funds without authorisation, any intermediated transfer designed to route around the freeze, and any false justification of fund origins can trigger prosecution for money laundering and confiscation of the instrumentalities, with the standing rules of the 5 October 2022 Court of Cassation judgment limiting who may later contest the confiscation. Counsel should therefore ring-fence the frozen perimeter immediately — no informal payments, no “temporary” arrangements, no undocumented loans from group companies — and channel every necessary expenditure through a formal authorisation request.

Finally, a Paris-specific checklist emerges for the week of 6 October 2026. Map every asset and every link in the holding chain against the consolidated EU list and the national freeze register before any transaction. Treat trusts, foundations and discretionary vehicles as frozen until proven otherwise, not the reverse. Calendar the Council’s renewal dates and the six-month national renewal dates as litigation deadlines, not administrative background noise. File delisting petitions when facts change rather than relitigating frozen history. Request authorisations for legal fees early, since the right to a defence is the strongest derogation ground. And keep the sanctions file and the data-protection file consistent: screening records that violate the GDPR are discreditable evidence, and compliance files that ignore data minimisation create a second front with the data-protection authority. For a fuller map of how delisting and unfreezing actions are sequenced from France, readers can consult the firm’s standing analysis of EU delisting practice and frozen-account challenges run from France.

Conclusion

The week of 7 to 9 October 2026 will be remembered as the week Luxembourg finished the perimeter wall around the Russia asset freeze. The General Court’s dismissal of the Russian investors’ ISDS challenges confirms that investment arbitration is no longer a detour around EU sanctions; the barring of the Yukos creditors confirms that third-party awards are no battering ram against the freeze; and the Council’s extension of the hybrid-activity measures to October 2027 confirms that the wall is staying up. For listed persons, banks, trustees and creditors with interests in France, strategy must now be frontal and forensic: challenge listings on their reasons, petition for delisting when facts genuinely change, seek authorisations through the proper channels, and prove — with documents, not assertions — who really owns and controls each asset. The Court of Justice has shown, in the trust cases and the 50 percent rule, that it looks at economic reality rather than legal form; the same realism, turned around, is the listed person’s best weapon, because a severance that is real will survive scrutiny that paper structures cannot. In sanctions law as in all property law, reality wins — the only question is which side has documented it.

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