On 8 October 2026, Europol announced that nearly 50 suspects had been arrested in an international operation targeting a drug trafficking network with Western Balkan members, linked to killings, kidnappings and grenade attacks across Europe. The action day took place on 6 October 2026, when police searched 42 properties across Slovenia and Spain, with investigators from those two countries working alongside Croatian authorities and arrests coordinated in real time from a Europol-supported coordination centre in Ljubljana. Slovenia accounted for 34 arrests, Spain for one and Croatia for one, while eleven suspects had already been arrested before the action day. On the day itself, the authorities seized 66 kilos of drugs, 51 kilos of cannabis and 15 kilos of amphetamine, alongside firearms, jewellery and cash. For readers with family members, employees or clients caught up in a sweep of this kind, two questions matter immediately: how does surrender between European countries work for the people arrested, and what happens to the encrypted messages, in this case SKY ECC and CryptCom communications, on which the prosecution relies. This article answers both from the standpoint of a French court, because France applies the same European instruments, the European Arrest Warrant and the European Investigation Order, under the same case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and because French decisions of 2022, 2024 and 2025 settle the two points most often raised by defence lawyers: whether a judge can refuse surrender, and whether encrypted-network evidence is admissible.
I. Arrested in Slovenia, Spain or Croatia: how surrender works after a joint sweep like this
The Europol release describes an investigation that involved representatives from 22 countries and culminated in coordinated arrests in three of them. When suspects arrested in one European Union member state are wanted by the courts of another, the instrument that moves them is the European Arrest Warrant, not classical extradition. Understanding that mechanism is the first step for any family or adviser, because the procedure is fast, largely mandatory, and very different from the extradition proceedings that apply to suspects from outside the Union, such as the Bosnian, Serbian or Turkish nationals mentioned in the Europol release.
A. How France executes a European Arrest Warrant after a cross-border operation
The European Arrest Warrant is, in the words of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, a judicial decision issued by one European Union member state with a view to the arrest and surrender by another member state of a person wanted for criminal prosecution or for the execution of a custodial sentence. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states this in full: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” The provision adds that the judicial authority is competent, under the rules and conditions of the chapter, to send such warrants to the authorities of other member states or to execute warrants received from them. The European source of the mechanism is Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 (CELEX:32002F0584), whose first article enshrines the same principle and whose recitals present surrender as based on a high level of confidence between member states.
In practice, a person arrested in France under a European Arrest Warrant issued, for example, by a Slovenian, Spanish or Croatian court is brought before the general prosecutor, and if the prosecutor decides not to leave the person at liberty, the person is presented to the first president of the court of appeal or a judge designated by the first president. Article 695-28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that this magistrate orders the incarceration of the wanted person at the remand prison of the seat of the court of appeal in whose district the arrest took place, unless the magistrate considers that appearance at every stage of the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed, in which case supervision measures can be ordered instead. This is the French equivalent of what happens in every member state after a coordinated sweep: the arrested person is either detained for surrender or placed under conditions that guarantee surrender, and the decision belongs to a judge, quickly.
The procedure then moves to the investigating chamber of the court of appeal, which rules on surrender within short statutory time limits. Surrender is the rule and refusal the exception: the Framework Decision lists the grounds on which the executing authority must or may refuse, and the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that these lists are exhaustive. One practical consequence, often overlooked by families, is the specialty rule. Once surrendered, the person may in principle be prosecuted only for the offences covered by the warrant. Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the investigating chamber jurisdiction over any later request by the issuing state to extend prosecution or enforcement to offences committed before the surrender other than those that justified it. In a file like the Balkan sweep, where the investigators have reconstructed far larger quantities than those physically seized, about 2.5 tonnes of cannabis, 474 kilos of cocaine, 104 kilos of heroin and dozens of kilos of other substances according to the Europol release, the specialty question is not theoretical: defence counsel in the issuing state must check that each charge pursued after surrender was covered by the warrant or later authorised.
The sweep also illustrates why surrender matters beyond the three arrest countries. The network allegedly moved cocaine, cannabis, amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine from Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain to other European countries, recruited drivers mainly from Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, and used extremely secure encrypted platforms to coordinate. Any suspect located later in another member state, France included, could be surrendered under a warrant issued by the Slovenian, Spanish or Croatian prosecution. For a person arrested in Paris on the basis of such a warrant, the French procedure described above would apply in full, and the attached guide on arrest in France on an international alert and the fight against surrender explains the first steps from custody to the investigating chamber.
B. When a French court can refuse to surrender you, and when it cannot
The most common misunderstanding is that the judge of the executing state reviews the whole case, the proportionality of the prosecution, or the strength of the evidence. French law says otherwise. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that execution of a European Arrest Warrant is refused in defined cases: where the acts could be prosecuted and tried by the French courts and the prosecution is extinguished by amnesty, where the person has already been finally judged for the same acts by the French authorities or by another member state, with the sentence executed or being executed where there was a conviction, and where other listed bars apply, including the age of criminal responsibility and certain statute-of-limitations configurations. Outside these cases, the investigating chamber surrenders. It does not retry the file.
The Court of Cassation confirmed this strictly in a decision of 7 August 2024 that every practitioner should know. The investigating chamber of the Rennes Court of Appeal, seized of a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Italian authorities, had ordered supplementary information even though the wanted person relied on no listed ground for refusal. The criminal chamber quashed that decision, recalling the architecture of the whole mechanism: “conformément au principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement (CJUE, [GC], 6 juin 2023, O.G, C-700/21, § 33).” (Crim., 7 August 2024, No. 24-81.863). Surrender is the principle and refusal the strictly interpreted exception: a chamber cannot delay or derail surrender by requesting additional information where no listed ground is even invoked.
That does not mean fundamental rights are absent from the procedure. In a decision of 21 January 2025, the criminal chamber ruled on a man arrested in France under an Italian warrant who argued that surrender would endanger his life. The Court approved the investigating chamber, which had held that although the danger that transfer would pose to life is not among the refusal grounds of Articles 695-22 to 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the chamber must still verify that fundamental rights will be respected upon surrender: “si l’effectivité du danger que représenterait pour sa vie le transfert de la personne recherchée n’entre pas dans les motifs de refus prévus par les articles 695-22 à 695-24 du code de procédure pénale, il appartient néanmoins à la chambre de l’instruction de vérifier si les droits fondamentaux de celle-ci seront respectés en cas de remise.” The Court added that enforcement of the Framework Decision rests on mutual trust, requiring each state to presume, absent exceptional circumstances, that the others respect Union law and fundamental rights. Because the defence had produced only general press articles and reports, with no objective and precise evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing state’s detention system, the chamber was entitled to order surrender without seeking further information: “elle a, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir souverain d’appréciation, en réponse à l’argumentation du demandeur relative au risque d’exposition à des traitements inhumains ou dégradants et aux conséquences de la remise sur sa santé, d’une part, écarté le risque de défaillances systémiques et généralisées au sein des établissements pénitentiaires de l’Etat membre d’émission, d’autre part, relevé l’absence de motifs sérieux et avérés de croire que la remise exposerait l’intéressé à un risque réel de réduction significative de son espérance de vie ou de détérioration rapide, significative et irrémédiable de son état de santé, de sorte qu’elle n’était pas tenue de surseoir à ladite remise ni de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès de l’autorité judiciaire d’émission.” (Crim., 21 January 2025, No. 24-87.212). The lesson for anyone arrested in connection with a sweep like the Balkan operation is direct: arguments about the scale of the prosecution, the age or health of the person, or family hardship do not block surrender unless they are tied to a precise, listed ground or to a clearly identified fundamental right supported by objective and precise evidence, such as documented systemic detention conditions in the issuing state within the meaning of the Court of Justice rulings in Aranyosi and Căldăraru (Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-399/16) and LM (C-216/18).
A second distinction matters for this particular sweep. The Europol release states that the group included nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, alongside suspects from Slovenia, Bulgaria, Türkiye and the Netherlands. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Türkiye are not European Union member states, so surrender of their nationals between member states still runs through the European Arrest Warrant when both states concerned are in the Union, but any transfer to or from a non-member state follows classical extradition. French extradition law is codified separately, and its bars are absolute. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that extradition is not granted where the wanted person is a French national, where the offence is political or the request pursues a political aim, where the acts were committed on French territory, where they have already been finally prosecuted and tried in France, or under further listed bars including limitation and amnesty. Procedure is protective: Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where the wanted person tells the general prosecutor that they do not consent to extradition, the investigating chamber is seized without delay, the person appears before it within ten working days, and, absent consent, the chamber gives a reasoned opinion on the request, normally within one month of the appearance. In short, inside the Union surrender is quasi-automatic, while outside it the requested person keeps the full shield of the political-offence exception, the nationality bar and the territoriality bar, and the French government decides only after the investigating chamber has given its opinion.
Applied to the October 2026 sweep, the map is therefore the following. Suspects arrested in Slovenia, Spain or Croatia who are wanted by one of the other two countries face surrender under the Warrant, with detention or supervision from the first appearance and only the narrow refusal grounds of Article 695-22 available. Suspects who fled beyond the Union, or whose transfer would involve Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia or Türkiye as requesting or requested states, fall under extradition treaties and the bars of Article 696-4, where arguments about political purpose, prior French judgment or territorial commission of the acts can genuinely stop the transfer. Defence strategy must identify on day one which track applies, because the two tracks give the judge entirely different powers.
II. The SKY ECC messages behind the charges: encrypted evidence across borders
The second pillar of the Europol file is electronic evidence. The release states that members of the network used highly secure encrypted communication platforms, including SKY ECC and CryptCom, to coordinate drug transports, communicate with each other and attempt to conceal their activities, and that evidence obtained from SKY ECC communications, together with other material collected during the investigation, enabled the authorities to reconstruct additional transports and transactions far beyond the quantities physically seized between February 2022 and September 2026. In France, this type of evidence has already produced a full body of case law, and the rulings go in a consistent direction: challenges to the collection of encrypted-network communications almost always fail, while the real fight has moved to the cross-border transmission of that evidence between member states. Both points deserve a precise account, because they determine what a French judge would do with a file built the way the Balkan file was built.
A. Why French courts admit evidence from encrypted networks like SKY ECC
French criminal procedure authorises the most intrusive technical measures for organised crime. Article 706-102-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the installation, without the consent of the persons concerned, of a technical device whose purpose is to access computer data wherever it is, to record, preserve and transmit it, as stored in a computer system, as displayed on screen, as entered by keystroke, or as received and emitted by peripheral devices. It is on this basis, combined with interceptions authorised by investigating judges, that the French authorities collected the SKY ECC material used in a series of major drug cases, and the Court of Cassation has upheld the resulting convictions and rejected the nullity motions brought against the collection.
The leading decisions all point the same way, and the most authoritative one comes from the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary formation. A man in custody during a drug investigation had refused to give investigators the unlock codes of two smartphones found on him, and was prosecuted for refusing to hand over the secret decryption convention of a cryptology device. Acquitted at trial and on appeal in Douai, he saw the prosecution’s appeal succeed: the Court held that the protection of encrypted communications has a strict counterpart, the duty to cooperate once justice lawfully requires access. Construing the two governing texts together, the Court stated: “Selon le premier de ces textes, est punissable toute personne qui, ayant connaissance de la convention secrète de déchiffrement d’un moyen de cryptologie susceptible d’avoir été utilisé pour préparer, faciliter ou commettre un crime ou un délit, refuse de la remettre aux autorités judiciaires ou de la mettre en oeuvre, sur les réquisitions de ces autorités délivrées en application des titres II et III du livre Ier du code de procédure pénale.” It defined the protected and the punishable precisely: “un moyen de cryptologie s’entend de tout matériel ou logiciel conçu ou modifié pour transformer des données, qu’il s’agisse d’informations ou de signaux, à l’aide de conventions secrètes ou pour réaliser l’opération inverse avec ou sans convention secrète.” And it drew the decisive consequence for everyday devices: “une convention de déchiffrement s’entend de tout moyen logiciel ou de toute autre information permettant la mise au clair d’une donnée transformée par un moyen de cryptologie, que ce soit à l’occasion de son stockage ou de sa transmission. Il en résulte que le code de déverrouillage d’un téléphone mobile peut constituer une clé de déchiffrement si ce téléphone est équipé d’un moyen de cryptologie.” (Ass. plén., 7 November 2022, No. 21-83.146). In plain terms, there is no blanket right to hide behind encryption once a judge has authorised the investigation: whoever knows the key and refuses to surrender it on lawful requisition commits a separate offence, and the judge must examine, telephone by telephone, whether the device carries cryptology and whether its code unlocks the encrypted data.
The same severity governs the networks themselves. In the SKY ECC line of cases, culminating in the criminal chamber’s decision of 12 April 2022 (No. 22-80.632), the Court rejected the argument that collecting the communications of an encrypted network used for criminal purposes amounts to unlawful mass surveillance of the population: the measures were ordered and implemented against the users of an undeclared cryptology tool used to conceal offences, not against the public at large, and challenges based on the sheer scale of the collection fail where the judicial authorisations for interception and data capture were regular. For a file like the Balkan sweep, where movements of trucks, vans and cars along commercial routes from Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain are reconstructed from message traffic, this means the message content and the location trails derived from the encrypted devices are admissible together, provided each interception and capture was authorised by a judge and each exhibit attributed to the defendant is authenticated.
Two practical consequences follow for suspects and their families. First, a defence built solely on the massive scale of the SKY ECC or CryptCom collection will not succeed before a French court: counsel must instead attack the concrete authorisations in the specific case, the commission rogatoire of the investigating judge, the scope and duration of the technical measure, and the chain of custody of the exhibits actually used against the defendant. Second, the usable remedy is adversarial access: obtaining the full technical records, the sealed exhibits and the transcription methods, and testing whether each message attributed to the defendant is reliably authenticated. French courts admit the material in principle but still require the prosecution to prove, message by message, who wrote what, and that is where serious defence work makes a difference.
B. How that evidence travels to another country through the European Investigation Order
In a 22-country investigation coordinated from Ljubljana, the evidence does not stay where it was collected. France sends SKY ECC material to its partners, and receives theirs, through the European Investigation Order created by Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014 on the European Investigation Order (CELEX:32014L0041). This is the second European instrument families need to understand, because it decides whether messages lawfully collected in one country can be used at trial in another, and which judge reviews the transfer.
The Court of Cassation has already confronted exactly this configuration: a person prosecuted in Germany for drug trafficking and criminal association challenged, before the Paris investigating chamber, the transmission by the French authorities to the German authorities of evidence derived from the monitoring of SKY ECC accounts, transmitted in August 2022 in response to a European Investigation Order issued by the German authorities the previous month, with material gathered in France during a French judicial investigation. The criminal chamber stayed its ruling in September 2025 so that the underlying questions could be put to the Court of Justice, a procedural marker that shows how seriously French courts take the issue: the admissibility of transmitted encrypted evidence is now partly a matter of European Union law. The background to that reference is the judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 April 2024 in case C-670/22, M.N., concerning EncroChat material, in which the Court clarified the conditions for issuing an Investigation Order aimed at evidence already in the possession of the executing state and the remedies that must remain available to the person concerned.
For the Balkan sweep, the consequence is concrete. Messages collected under Slovenian, Spanish or Croatian judicial authorisations can be transmitted to the courts of the other countries for use at trial, and French courts receiving such material apply the same European framework. A defendant cannot simply argue that the messages were collected abroad and are therefore unusable; counsel must examine whether the Investigation Order was issued by a competent judicial authority, whether the transfer respected the purpose limitation of the Order, whether the defence had access to an effective remedy in the state where the evidence will be used, and whether the messages were authenticated and completely disclosed, including exculpatory context. The Court of Justice case law requires that intrusions be authorised by law, pursue a legitimate aim and remain proportionate, with independent review available, and French investigating chambers now measure Investigation Orders against exactly that standard.
One further protection connects the two halves of this article. Evidence transmitted under an Investigation Order, like a person surrendered under an Arrest Warrant, remains governed by purpose limitation: material obtained for one case cannot be freely recycled into another prosecution without the applicable authorisation, and the French provisions on specialty and on the extension of prosecution after surrender, recalled above, have their evidential counterpart in the rules on secondary use of transmitted material. In a sprawling file with violence counts, murder, attempted murder, kidnapping and grenade attacks, alongside trafficking counts reconstructed from message traffic, the separation between charges matters enormously, because each additional charge must rest on evidence lawfully obtained and lawfully transmitted for that purpose.
Conclusion
The Europol announcement of 8 October 2026 is a textbook illustration of contemporary European criminal enforcement: a network operating across commercial freight routes from Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, communications shielded by SKY ECC and CryptCom, violence used to settle disputes, and a coordinated answer, 42 searches, dozens of arrests, a coordination centre in Ljubljana and an investigation spanning 22 countries. For the people arrested and their families, the legal landscape is now clear. Within the European Union, surrender under the European Arrest Warrant is fast and nearly automatic: French courts detain or supervise from the first appearance and refuse surrender only on the narrow grounds of the statute, with proportionality left to the issuing state and fundamental-rights objections admitted only when tied to a precise right and objective evidence. Beyond the Union, classical extradition keeps its full protections, from the political-offence exception to the bar on surrendering nationals. On the evidence side, French courts admit encrypted-network material collected under judicial authorisation and reject mass-surveillance challenges against undeclared cryptology tools, while the cross-border circulation of that material runs through the European Investigation Order under the growing supervision of the Court of Justice. Anyone concerned by a sweep of this kind should therefore act on three fronts at once: identify immediately whether the case follows the surrender track or the extradition track, demand complete disclosure of the technical authorisations and message exhibits rather than attacking the scale of the collection in the abstract, and verify, charge by charge, that both the person and the evidence were transferred for the offences actually prosecuted. Those are the checks a French court performs, and they are the checks that decide these cases.