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France’s Shadow-Fleet Boardings: What Article 110 UNCLOS Really Allows—and When a Captain Faces Prosecution

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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France’s Shadow-Fleet Boardings: What Article 110 UNCLOS Really Allows—and When a Captain Faces Prosecution

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The legal temperature around Russia’s so-called shadow fleet rose again this month. On 12 August, the Associated Press reported that Vladimir Putin had threatened retaliation after Western states seized or detained suspected Russian shadow-fleet tankers, describing the operations as piracy and warning that Russian forces could inspect or detain “unfriendly” vessels. On 19 August, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot defended France’s recent operations, saying that the vessels had been approached on solid legal grounds and that France would continue to act. Earlier, an Italian-led European operation had boarded the tanker Toa Payoh in international waters after treating its nationality and documentation as questions requiring verification.

The important legal question is narrower than the political language suggests. A French warship does not receive a general licence to seize any tanker that appears on a sanctions list. The real sequence is more disciplined: identify the vessel, test its nationality, verify the flag, record the documents, decide whether a diversion or coercive measure is justified, and only then consider detention, confiscation or prosecution. Article 110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is central to the first step, while French maritime-police provisions determine much of the operational chain. This analysis explains where that authority begins, where it ends, and why a captain can face serious exposure without every boarding becoming an automatic seizure.

I. Can France board a Russian shadow-fleet tanker in international waters?

A. What does Article 110 UNCLOS permit when a flag looks false?

International waters are not a legal vacuum, but the high seas are also not an extension of a coastal State’s ordinary police territory. The starting point is the freedom of navigation and the jurisdictional protection ordinarily attached to the vessel’s flag. A foreign ship is normally governed by its flag State on the high seas. That rule is precisely why the nationality question matters so much when a vessel uses inconsistent registries, changes flags without a credible chain of title, disables its tracking signal, or presents documents that do not match its ownership, IMO number or voyage.

Article 110 UNCLOS creates a limited right of visit. A warship may approach and board a foreign ship on the high seas only where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting piracy, slave trading, unauthorised broadcasting, that the ship is without nationality, or that it is in reality of the same nationality as the warship despite flying a foreign flag. The provision also allows the warship to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag. The official English text matters here: the power is framed around “reasonable ground for suspecting”, not around political hostility or the mere fact that a company, owner or vessel appears on a sanctions list. The same text requires the warship to proceed “with all possible consideration” and provides for compensation if the suspicion proves unfounded and the visit causes loss or damage. The primary treaty reference is available through the United Nations legal portal’s UNCLOS materials.

That distinction is the first practical filter for a suspected shadow-fleet tanker. A designation under a European sanctions regulation may support a risk assessment, but it does not silently add “sanctioned vessel” to the five Article 110 grounds. A French boarding team still needs a legally defensible theory: no nationality, a false flag, a genuine uncertainty about the flag, or another ground recognised by the Convention or a separate treaty. The evidence may be cumulative. A registry that denies the vessel is on its books, a second State that says the registration was withdrawn, a forged flag certificate, a mismatched IMO number, contradictory ownership documents and an AIS history showing repeated identity changes may together support the conclusion that the ship cannot rely on a genuine flag. None of those facts should be treated as conclusive without a documented verification process.

French law connects that international threshold to the State’s maritime-police powers. Article L1521-1 of the Code de la défense applies the relevant provisions to foreign vessels and vessels without a flag or nationality in French waters and, “in accordance with international law”, on the high seas. It expressly excludes foreign warships and foreign State vessels used for non-commercial purposes. It also covers a vessel whose flag State has requested or approved French intervention. The provision is therefore a jurisdictional bridge, not an independent power to ignore UNCLOS. The current text is available at Article L1521-1 of the Code de la défense.

The next stage is identification. Article L1521-2 authorises the commanders of State vessels to exercise control and coercive powers recognised by international law and French law. Article L1521-3 gives the operational question its proper order: the authorities identify the vessel and ask the captain to state the vessel’s identity and nationality. Article L1521-4 then provides for an order to permit a visit so that the onboard documents can be checked and the relevant international-law and French-law verifications carried out. Those are three different acts, and collapsing them into the word “seizure” creates unnecessary legal risk. The official provisions are Article L1521-2, Article L1521-3 and Article L1521-4.

The phrase “shadow fleet” is consequently descriptive rather than self-executing. It points to a pattern of concealment and sanctions evasion, but the boarding authority still has to be anchored in the ship’s status and conduct. The European Council says that shadow-fleet vessels commonly use false flags, opaque ownership structures and tracking practices that create risks for maritime safety and critical infrastructure. That is important context, and the EU’s July package added 41 vessels to a list that already contained more than 600. Yet a listing produces sanctions consequences such as asset freezes, port restrictions and service bans; it does not by itself replace the high-seas rules on visit and flag-state jurisdiction. The Council’s explanation of the sanctions framework is at Sanctions against Russia explained, and its July package is described in the official Council release.

The legal question in the next few minutes is therefore not “does France dislike this tanker?” It is “what objective facts allowed the French warship to doubt the claimed nationality, and what did the crew do when asked to resolve that doubt?” That framing is more precise, more defensible before a court, and more useful to shipowners, insurers and masters than the rival headlines about piracy and retaliation.

B. Why is a French naval boarding not the same as an automatic seizure?

Article 110 is a right of visit, not a blank cheque for permanent detention. The warship may verify nationality and inspect the material needed to test the legal basis for the visit. If the suspicion is unfounded, the Convention’s compensation principle points in the opposite direction from a confiscation theory. The operation must be proportionate to the question being answered. A short verification of certificates, a radio exchange with the claimed flag State and an inspection of the ship’s identity documents are legally different from taking possession of the cargo, diverting the ship for days, searching every crew member’s personal effects or transferring the vessel to a port without a further basis.

French maritime law does, however, provide a sequence for what follows a refusal or an unresolved inspection. Article L1521-5 of the Code de la défense allows an order to divert when access is refused or impossible, including in circumstances recognised by international law, statute, a court decision or a request from a judicial-police authority. The same provision recognises coercive measures during transit. The text is available at Article L1521-5. The surrounding statutory section, which includes Articles L1521-6 to L1521-8, is published by Légifrance at the Code de la défense maritime-police section.

That sequence should be documented as a decision tree. First, the commander records the attempted contact, the vessel’s reply and the material creating the nationality concern. Second, the team requests the documents needed to check the flag, ownership and voyage. Third, the authorities decide whether the visit resolves the concern. Fourth, if access is refused, the ship is ordered to divert or stop in accordance with the applicable legal ground. Fifth, any force is recorded by reference to the warnings given, the refusal, the danger created by the manoeuvre and the least intrusive measure capable of restoring control. A sanctions list may explain why the vessel was selected for scrutiny; it does not eliminate the need to record each link in this chain.

The August operation involving the Toa Payoh illustrates the difference. Reporting on the Italian Navy’s action said that the tanker was in international waters, was linked to European sanctions, flew a Cameroonian flag, and had initially failed to cooperate. The operation was presented as a boarding to verify documents under Article 110 UNCLOS, with the documentation then examined. That description does not establish that every later step was lawful or unlawful; it shows why “boarded”, “detained”, “diverted” and “confiscated” should not be used interchangeably. It also explains why a vessel’s captain should seek the written operational basis as soon as communications are restored.

French case law reinforces the importance of the flag State in high-seas operations, even though the cases arise from different factual and treaty settings. In Cass. crim., 20 December 2017, no. 17-84.085, the Criminal Division dealt with a foreign-flag vessel intercepted on the high seas in a narcotics investigation. The Court treated the flag State’s consent and the applicable treaty framework as material conditions; in the decision’s terms, “the flag State’s renunciation must be express”. This is not a shadow-fleet ruling, and it should not be presented as one. Its value is structural: French authorities cannot assume that a foreign flag has disappeared merely because the vessel’s conduct appears suspicious. They must establish the international-law basis for acting against the flag State’s ordinary jurisdiction.

An older customs decision must be read with the same caution. In Cass. crim., 13 June 1996, no. 96-80.189, the Court recognised, in the relevant customs maritime zone, that the right to visit could include a power to divert a vessel where necessary to reach the nearest customs office. That decision does not convert a contiguous-zone customs power into a general high-seas power against any foreign tanker. It is useful because it demonstrates the importance of maritime space: territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the high seas do not carry the same jurisdictional consequences.

The final safeguard is notice. Where French coercive measures are taken against a foreign ship, the flag State is to be informed through the diplomatic channel under the Code de la défense framework. That is not a ceremonial afterthought. It gives the claimed flag State an opportunity to contest nationality, consent, the scope of the visit and the treatment of the crew. It also creates a record against which a later allegation of arbitrary detention or unlawful interference can be tested. The more controversial the vessel’s registry, the more important it is for France to preserve that documentary trail.

The result is a narrow but meaningful power. France can board a vessel on the high seas where Article 110 or another applicable international-law basis is satisfied. France can require identification and documents, order a diversion in an appropriate case and use proportionate coercion after warnings. But a boarding is not a final judgment on ownership, sanctions liability or criminal guilt. Those questions require the second legal stage.

II. What happens after the boarding, and what can the captain challenge?

A. Which French offences, evidence and confiscation rules may apply?

The most direct French criminal exposure concerns nationality. Article L5223-2 of the Code des transports provides for one year of imprisonment and a €150,000 fine where a captain, controlled at sea under the relevant maritime-police rules, cannot justify the nationality of the vessel. The same provision refers to confiscation under Article 131-21 of the Penal Code. The wording matters: the offence is not “being Russian”, being listed by the EU or carrying a cargo associated with sanctions. It is built around the inability to justify the vessel’s nationality after a lawful control. The official text is Article L5223-2 of the Code des transports.

In practice, the prosecution would need to prove more than an untidy registry file. It would need to establish the control, the identity and role of the accused captain, the request for nationality evidence and the objective failure to produce a document or explanation capable of satisfying the legal test. The defence would examine whether the boarding had a lawful basis, whether the request was intelligible, whether the captain had access to the relevant registry records, whether the documents were seized or damaged during the operation, and whether the prosecution has confused a defective document with the absence of nationality. A vessel may have an administrative defect, a disputed flag transfer or a genuine nationality dispute without the captain intentionally operating a stateless ship.

A separate offence concerns refusal to obey a French warship. Article L5242-6-3 of the Code des transports punishes the captain who, at sea, does not obey the call of a French warship and thereby compels the warship to use force. The official article provides a two-year custodial penalty. Its wording is narrower than a general offence of “being uncooperative”: the prosecution must connect the call, the failure to obey and the resulting use of force. The provision is available at Article L5242-6-3.

That distinction will matter in the shadow-fleet cases. A master may challenge the authenticity of a radio order, the identity of the calling vessel, the language used, the time allowed to comply, or the navigational safety of an immediate manoeuvre. A master who asks for clarification while making a safe reduction of speed is not in the same position as a master who deliberately accelerates, changes course and forces a warship to fire warning shots. The French court would also have to separate the conduct of the captain from the conduct of the owner, operator, charterer and beneficial owner.

The Code does not turn every corporate participant into an automatic criminal defendant. Article L5242-6-5 provides a mechanism under which a fine for specified maritime offences may be imposed in whole or in part on the owner or operator when the relevant procedural conditions are met, including that the person be summoned. The text is at Article L5242-6-5 of the Code des transports. It should not be used to assert automatic owner liability for every refusal under Article L5242-6-3. The charge, the statutory cross-reference and the person’s role must be identified with precision.

Evidence will decide whether the legal story is a real prosecution or only an enforcement headline. A robust French file would be expected to preserve the original flag certificate, registry responses, IMO-number history, ownership and management documents, voyage records, AIS data, radio recordings, bridge logs, photographs of markings, cargo documents, the sequence of warnings, and the officers’ body-camera or shipboard records where available. It should also show when the flag State was contacted and what it answered. A forged certificate may support a strong inference; an answer from the claimed registry may be decisive; an AIS gap may be relevant but does not prove statelessness by itself.

Sanctions evidence is related but separate. The EU’s restrictive measures may make a vessel or owner subject to asset freezes, port-access restrictions or bans on maritime services. Those consequences can make a voyage commercially impossible and can support a request to preserve cargo or accounts. They do not automatically establish the French criminal offence under Article L5223-2, and they do not replace the legal basis for a high-seas visit. France would have a stronger case if it can show both a lawful maritime control and a specific offence proved by admissible evidence.

The captain’s first response should therefore be factual rather than rhetorical. The bridge should preserve the precise documents requested, the exact orders received, the ship’s replies and the reason for any delay or refusal. The operator should secure registry and insurance communications without rewriting the original logs. The crew should identify witnesses to the boarding and record any injury or property damage. The defence can later argue the law; it cannot recreate an unrecorded radio exchange with confidence.

The possible detention of the vessel, cargo or crew also requires a further legal decision. A vessel can be diverted for verification without becoming forfeit. A cargo can be frozen under sanctions without proving that the captain committed a nationality offence. A captain can be placed under judicial control or questioned as a witness before prosecutors decide whether to bring charges. Those stages should be reported separately, because international media coverage often compresses them into the word “seized”, creating an inaccurate picture of both the rights of the flag State and the exposure of the crew.

B. Can Russia call the operation piracy, and what remedies remain?

President Putin’s use of the word “piracy” is politically powerful, but it is not the end of the legal analysis. UNCLOS defines piracy in a specific way, centred on illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft on the high seas. A State warship performing a public enforcement operation is not automatically a pirate vessel because Russia disputes the underlying sanctions or the boarding. The definition and the related high-seas provisions appear in the United Nations legal portal’s UNCLOS materials.

That does not mean every State boarding is lawful. If France boards without a recognised ground, uses disproportionate force, ignores a valid flag-State objection or holds a vessel without a further legal basis, the operation can raise questions of international responsibility, compensation and domestic judicial review. The proper answer to an unlawful operation is evidence and procedure, not an assumption that the political label proves the legal result. The same caution applies to Russia: a threat to retaliate against commercial shipping does not establish a legal right to interfere with a French or European vessel, and the threatened act would itself have to be assessed under the law of the sea, the law of State responsibility and any applicable sanctions framework.

For the captain and owner, the immediate remedies are practical. They should request the identity of the boarding State and the officers in charge, the stated legal ground, the written order to stop, board or divert, and the record of any notification to the claimed flag State. They should ask that the vessel’s nationality documents be copied before removal, that the crew’s passports and medical needs be documented, and that a lawyer and consular contact be allowed as soon as the applicable procedure permits. Any claim of force, damage or injury should be recorded with time, location, witness and photographic evidence. These steps preserve arguments on the lawfulness of the visit, the proportionality of coercion, the admissibility of evidence and the scope of any confiscation.

The French courts’ procedural case law shows why standing and remedy cannot be assumed. In Cass. com., 5 July 2023, no. 22-22.290, the Commercial Division held, in the context of a customs visit, that “only the occupant” of the private part of a vessel could bring the relevant challenge; an owner who was not the occupant did not automatically acquire the same standing. That does not decide a high-seas naval challenge, but it is a warning to identify the claimant, the property affected and the specific search or detention being contested. The captain, shipowner, cargo owner, charterer and insurer may have overlapping but different procedural interests.

Another decision underlines the importance of an effective judicial route. In Cass. crim., 20 April 2017, no. 15-86.227, the Criminal Division considered the compatibility of an older customs search regime with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and treated the absence of an effective judicial remedy as a serious defect. The factual and statutory setting was not a French Navy boarding of a sanctioned tanker. The transferable lesson is narrower: an exceptional maritime power still needs a reviewable record and a court capable of examining the legality, necessity and consequences of the measure.

The flag State’s position also remains relevant after the ship reaches port. Under the French maritime-police framework, measures taken against a foreign vessel are to be notified to the flag State through diplomatic channels. If the registry says that the vessel was validly registered, the dispute may become one about consent, jurisdiction and the scope of the international-law exception rather than a simple nationality offence. If the registry denies the vessel entirely, the captain’s defence may focus on the reliability of that denial, the timing of the withdrawal, any fraudulent documents and whether the captain knew or could reasonably have known of the defect.

This is also where the existing French analysis of Russian countermeasures should be kept separate from the present question. The legal consequences of a State claiming that Western seizures justify a response are addressed in the separate analysis of threatened Russian countermeasures against French merchant shipping. The present article concerns the anterior and more technical issue: what a French warship may verify, what the captain must do when called, and what evidence is needed before a boarding becomes a prosecution or a confiscation.

The commercial consequences are immediate even when a criminal case is weak. An insurer may suspend cover questions while the vessel’s flag and voyage are investigated. A bank may freeze a payment because the owner or vessel is listed. A charterer may claim delay or repudiation. A port may refuse entry under EU restrictive measures. Those consequences should not be confused with a judicial finding of guilt, but they make early legal advice valuable. The operator needs a coordinated record for the maritime, sanctions, criminal and contractual tracks rather than four disconnected explanations of the same incident.

The final answer is consequently balanced. France has a credible legal route to investigate a tanker whose nationality is objectively doubtful, particularly where the ship’s documents, registry history and conduct reinforce one another. A refusal to obey a lawful order can create separate criminal exposure, and the inability to justify nationality can trigger the specific penalty in Article L5223-2. But the operation remains reviewable. The captain can contest the high-seas basis, the factual grounds, the warnings, the force, the evidence, the jurisdiction and the status of the owner or cargo. Russia’s “piracy” label may shape the diplomatic confrontation; it does not decide those questions for a French court.

Conclusion

The shadow-fleet dispute is often presented as a contest between Russian accusations of piracy and Western claims of sanctions enforcement. The law is more granular. Article 110 UNCLOS can support a carefully grounded right of visit where a warship has reasonable grounds to question nationality or another listed status. French law then supplies an operational sequence for identification, document inspection, diversion, warnings and proportionate coercion. It does not transform every sanctions designation into a power of confiscation.

After a boarding, the captain’s exposure depends on proof: whether the vessel’s nationality could be justified, whether a French warship’s call was disobeyed in a way that compelled force, and whether the authorities preserved a reliable record. The owner, charterer, cargo holder and flag State may have different remedies and different standing. The most durable legal strategy is therefore to separate the acts, preserve the evidence and challenge each jurisdictional step on its own terms. That is the difference between a headline about a tanker and a defensible cross-border case.

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