The United States has extended its sanctions campaign against the International Criminal Court to Judge Tomoko Akane, the Court’s President, and Abdoulaye Seye, a Senior Trial Lawyer in the Office of the Prosecutor. The announcement matters far beyond the personal position of those two officials. A victim’s counsel may now face a bank refusing a transfer, a technology provider restricting an account, a counterparty asking whether a mandate exposes it to U.S. law, or a client fearing that confidential evidence will become inaccessible. The immediate question for French lawyers is therefore practical: can a French lawyer continue representing an ICC victim when the Court and some of its personnel are targeted by U.S. measures?
The answer is yes in principle. A U.S. designation does not, by itself, cancel a French mandate, suspend the right of an ICC victim to communicate with counsel, or create a French asset freeze. It does create a conflict-of-laws and execution risk. The file must be separated into the mandate, the lawyer’s professional secrecy, the movement of money, the handling of evidence, and any service with a U.S. nexus. French and European rules may protect the first two while banks still restrict the third. This article explains the distinction, the procedural framework and the continuity plan that a French counsel should document before the next payment or disclosure.
I. Can French counsel continue representing ICC victims after the August 2026 sanctions?
A. Why a U.S. designation does not terminate a French ICC mandate
The news is serious, but its legal effect must be identified with precision. The International Criminal Court’s statement of 19 August 2026 records the designation of Judge Tomoko Akane and Abdoulaye Seye and describes the measure as “a flagrant attack against the independence of an impartial judicial institution”. The Court also stated that nine of its eighteen judges, both Deputy-Prosecutors, its former Prosecutor and a staff member had already been sanctioned by the United States. The Court’s conclusion was that “the international legal order itself” was placed at risk. That is a constitutional and institutional warning, not an order ending the representation of victims.
A U.S. designation normally operates through U.S. sanctions law. Its consequences may include blocked property within U.S. jurisdiction, restrictions on U.S. persons, loss of access to American financial infrastructure, visa consequences and pressure on businesses that fear secondary exposure. Those effects can be severe even when a French lawyer has never signed a contract with the United States. A bank may decide that a transaction is too risky, a cloud provider may demand additional information, and an international NGO may suspend a programme while its compliance team investigates. None of those private decisions automatically changes the lawyer’s authority under French law or the counsel’s procedural status before the ICC.
The first legal separation is between the sanctioned official and the victim’s counsel. The designation of a judge or prosecutor does not designate every lawyer who communicates with the Court, every victim who participates in a case, or every French entity that supports access to justice. A French counsel must still screen the names of the client, the beneficial payer, the intermediary, the relevant organisation and any person who will receive funds. But the screening must not be replaced by a vague assumption that any activity connected with the ICC is prohibited. The relevant question is always: which legal instrument applies to which person, property, service, payment or territory?
The Rome Statute reinforces the institutional distinction. Article 48 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court addresses the privileges and immunities of the Court and its officials. Article 48(2) gives judges, the Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar, when acting on Court business, “the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to heads of diplomatic missions”. Article 48(4) separately addresses counsel, experts, witnesses and other persons whose presence is required at the Court. The provisions protect the exercise of the Court’s functions; they do not transform every victim lawyer into a U.S. person and they do not make a U.S. designation a French criminal or civil prohibition.
France has also built a domestic cooperation framework around the Rome Statute. Article 627 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure states the principle that France cooperates with the ICC under the conditions in the relevant title of the Code. Articles 627-1 and 627-4 distinguish mutual assistance requests from requests for arrest and surrender. A victim’s lawyer is not an enforcement officer executing an arrest request, but the existence of this framework is important: French law recognises a channel through which evidence, procedural acts and communications can support the Court. The lawyer’s mandate sits inside that legal relationship rather than outside it.
The operational provisions should be read together. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes cooperation with the ICC. Article 627-1 provides the French route for ICC requests for mutual assistance, including the transmission of certified documents through the competent prosecutorial channel. Article 627-4 concerns requests for arrest and surrender and their transmission to the Paris prosecutor general. Article 627-15 addresses consent to transfer by a detained person. These provisions show why a French lawyer advising a victim should identify whether a document is ordinary client work, a voluntary submission to the ICC, or a formal request governed by the French cooperation title.
The French legal position is also visible in the criminal procedure decisions concerning ICC cooperation. In its judgments of 4 January 2011, nos. 10-87.759 and 10-87.760, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation examined the French procedural route for ICC arrest and surrender requests. The official decisions are available on Légifrance, no. 10-87.759 and Légifrance, no. 10-87.760. They are not decisions about the 2026 sanctions, but they confirm a useful principle for present purposes: ICC-related acts can enter French procedure through identified statutory channels. A lawyer who assists a victim is therefore not operating in a legal vacuum.
That distinction answers the first question. A French counsel can continue to act unless a separate rule applies to the specific person, transaction or service. The sanctions may make the work harder, slower and more expensive. They may require a different bank, a written licence request, an additional identity file or a change of secure communication system. They do not automatically remove the mandate. Any decision to stop acting should instead be based on a documented conflict, a real prohibition, an inability to receive lawful payment, a professional-independence concern or the client’s informed instructions.
B. Where French professional secrecy and ICC procedure become decisive
The second separation concerns information. A victim’s file may contain medical records, witness identities, photographs, relocation information, draft submissions, communications with investigators and the lawyer’s assessment of the evidential value of each item. A sanctions screening request from a bank or technology provider does not give that provider an automatic right to receive the entire file. The lawyer must explain the legal basis and the minimum information necessary for the transaction while preserving the client’s confidence.
French professional secrecy supplies a strong starting point. Article 66-5 of Law no. 71-1130 on the reform of regulated legal professions covers consultations addressed by the lawyer to the client or intended for the client, correspondence exchanged between them, and the documents in the client file, subject to the statutory limits and the lawyer’s rights of defence. The provision is available on Légifrance, Article 66-5 of Law no. 71-1130. The rule does not mean that a bank must be denied every compliance fact. It means that a request should be narrowed to the identity, purpose, amount, source and destination of a payment whenever that is enough to assess risk.
The Cour de cassation has repeatedly treated the lawyer’s correspondence and file as a protected professional space. In the Social Chamber’s judgment of 12 May 2017, nos. 15-28.943 and 15-29.129, the Court dealt with the confidentiality of consultations, correspondence, notes and file documents; the official decision is on Légifrance. In the Commercial Chamber’s judgment of 6 December 2016, no. 15-14.554, the Court considered documents attached to correspondence with a lawyer and the scope of professional secrecy; the official decision is on Légifrance. The lesson for a sanctions file is practical: the lawyer must separate a factual compliance certificate from legal advice and from the strategy of the victim’s case.
Searches and seizures require an additional distinction. Article 56-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a special framework for a search at a lawyer’s office or home, involving the competent magistrate and the bâtonnier and protecting documents covered by professional secrecy, subject to the statutory procedure. A sanctions investigation conducted by a foreign authority does not erase this French framework. Nor does it mean that the lawyer can refuse every lawful request from a French authority or the ICC. The correct response is controlled disclosure: identify the requester, the instrument, the purpose, the scope and the review available to the client or the lawyer.
This is especially important for victim representation because the victim is not simply an information source. The lawyer may be responsible for a participation application, protective measures, observations on disclosure, reparations submissions or a request to be heard. The ICC’s Registry supports counsel for victims and defence, and France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs explains that the Registry has a role in supporting lawyers. That institutional support does not replace a lawyer’s own duty to protect the file. It does show that counsel for victims forms part of the ordinary architecture of the Court, rather than an external lobbying activity automatically captured by sanctions against Court personnel.
Professional secrecy also changes the way a lawyer should respond to a bank questionnaire. A useful answer may say that the firm acts for a client in an international judicial proceeding, identify the client and payer after consent, state that the payment is for legal services, provide the invoice and explain that the underlying legal advice and victim evidence are confidential. A poor answer sends the complete case file, names vulnerable witnesses without necessity or copies draft submissions to a compliance mailbox. The sanctions crisis raises the pressure to over-disclose; French secrecy requires the lawyer to resist that pressure while remaining transparent about the transaction itself.
The same approach applies to digital tools. A U.S.-linked email, videoconference platform or cloud storage provider can create a real exposure even when the underlying mandate is lawful. The lawyer should map where data is stored, who can administer the account, which sub-processors are involved, and whether the client’s informed consent covers that risk. Encryption, access logging, separate matter folders and a prohibition on copying sensitive witness material into a general-purpose compliance system are not cosmetic measures. They help demonstrate that the firm has protected the mandate and has not used the sanctions as a reason to abandon the client.
II. How should a French counsel protect the mandate, evidence and payment route?
A. What to preserve, disclose and contest in France
The most common mistake is to treat every blocked or delayed payment as proof that French law prohibits the representation. French financial law uses its own designation mechanisms. Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code covers measures implementing United Nations Security Council resolutions and European Union acts that require a freeze or prohibition. Article L. 562-4 requires covered persons to apply without delay the freezes and prohibitions imposed under the relevant French or European provisions. Article L. 562-4-1 requires internal procedures and controls for implementing those measures and preventing circumvention.
The practical conclusion is narrow but important: a U.S. designation is not automatically an EU or French designation. A French bank must examine the applicable European and French lists, the identity of the person or entity, the ownership or control chain and the transaction. If the relevant person is covered by a French or EU freeze, the bank’s duties are immediate. Article L. 562-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code prohibits making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to persons whose assets are frozen under the relevant rules. Article L. 562-10 makes the effects of a freeze opposable to third parties holding rights over the frozen property. A lawyer must never use a different payment route to defeat a genuine French or EU freeze.
Client onboarding remains part of the solution. Article L. 561-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code addresses identification and verification of the client and beneficial owner. Article L. 561-6 requires continuing vigilance and examination of transactions in light of updated knowledge. Where the risk is high, Article L. 561-10-1 requires enhanced vigilance. These provisions do not authorise indiscriminate disclosure of a victim file. They do require a firm to know who is paying, for whom the lawyer is acting, whether an intermediary is involved and whether the payment is consistent with the matter.
A written bank refusal is therefore essential. The lawyer should ask whether the refusal is based on a binding freeze, a U.S. nexus, a correspondent-bank policy, an internal risk appetite decision, an incomplete KYC file or a technical problem. Those categories have different consequences. A binding freeze may require a licence, an administrative clarification or a court strategy. A correspondent-bank refusal may be challenged through the bank’s complaint process or addressed with another lawful euro-denominated institution. An incomplete KYC file may be solved by supplying a corporate chart and a limited-purpose engagement letter. Without the bank’s reason, the client and lawyer cannot tell a legal prohibition from private de-risking.
The European Blocking Statute must also be handled without overclaiming. Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 contains a mechanism for certain extraterritorial laws identified in its Annex. Article 5 generally prevents persons covered by Article 11 from complying directly or indirectly with requirements based on those listed laws, unless authorised by the Commission where non-compliance would seriously damage their interests. The official EUR-Lex text of Regulation No 2271/96 must be checked against the current Annex and the specific U.S. measure. The regulation is not a universal shield for every lawyer, bank or ICC-related transaction.
The Court of Justice’s judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland, Case C-124/20, ECLI:EU:C:2021:1035, is the central caution. The official EUR-Lex judgment interprets the prohibition on “prohibiting persons referred to in Article 11” from complying with the requirements or prohibitions in the laws specified in the Annex. The decision addresses the legal effect of the Blocking Statute in its defined field; it does not decide that all U.S. sanctions against ICC personnel fall within that field. A French counsel should identify the listed U.S. measure, the date, the person subject to it, the relevant service and the parties’ EU nexus before advising that the regulation protects or restrains a transaction.
The same discipline applies to evidence. A counsel should divide the material into at least four groups: public ICC filings; factual documents supplied by the victim; confidential communications and legal work product; and operational data whose disclosure may create a security risk. Each group needs a different disclosure rule. A public filing can usually be linked without exposing a witness. A victim document may need redaction of addresses and medical details. A legal memorandum may be protected by Article 66-5. Operational data may require a secure transfer plan approved by the client and the Court. A compliance team that asks for “the case file” should receive the smallest package that answers its lawful question.
If a French authority becomes involved, the lawyer should preserve the procedural record: the request, the legal basis, the date, the documents identified, the objections raised, the decision-maker and the remedy. Article 56-1 is not merely a rule for dramatic searches; it illustrates the broader principle that a lawyer’s file has a protected legal status. If the ICC itself requests assistance, Articles 627-1 and 627-4 identify the French channel. If the request comes from a bank or a U.S. agency, it is a different event and should not be presented to the client as though it were an ICC procedural order.
B. Which continuity plan can survive both legal systems?
The mandate should be treated as a living compliance document rather than a single engagement letter signed at the beginning of the case. Under Articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, a contract lawfully formed binds the parties and must be negotiated, formed and performed in good faith. Article 1217 of the Civil Code lists remedies available when a contractual party fails to perform. These provisions do not guarantee that a bank or technology provider will remain available. They do support a clear allocation of responsibilities between the client and counsel when sanctions create a new execution risk.
A defensible continuity plan should begin with an updated sanctions and identity map. The map should name the victim, any legal representative, the payer, the beneficial owner of the paying entity, the receiving law firm, the ICC department involved, external experts and the financial institutions in the payment chain. It should record nationality, residence, incorporation, currency, bank location and any U.S. person or U.S.-dollar touchpoint. The map is not an invitation to search for a loophole. It is a way to identify the exact nexus that a bank, regulator or Court may ask about.
Second, the firm should preserve an independent euro payment route. Fees should be invoiced to the client or authorised payer named in the engagement letter. The invoice should identify legal services and the relevant procedural matter without revealing confidential strategy. The firm should not accept an unexplained payment from a third party, split an invoice to hide a sanctioned person, use a nominee account or route money through a jurisdiction chosen only to defeat a freeze. If a U.S. licence or written authorisation is needed, the lawyer should seek it through the appropriate channel and keep the request in the file. A euro account can reduce exposure to U.S. infrastructure, but it cannot legalise a transaction prohibited by French, European or ICC rules.
Third, the client should receive a written explanation of the difference between three situations: the mandate is lawful and payment is available; the mandate is lawful but a bank has refused service; or a rule prohibits a specific payment or service. The lawyer should explain what can continue in each situation. Legal analysis, preparation of submissions and protected communication may continue even while a transfer is reviewed. A particular payment may need to pause. A witness interview may need to move to a secure platform. A client should never learn about these distinctions from an automated account closure.
Fourth, evidence handling should be resilient. Keep a complete, encrypted matter archive under the firm’s control, with a second lawful backup that has been checked for jurisdiction and access rights. Record the provenance of each document, the consent or legal basis for each transfer, the redactions made and the person who approved the disclosure. Use separate credentials for the ICC portal, the firm’s document system and any external platform. Do not place a victim’s identity or medical record in a bank’s transaction description. Do not send a complete witness list to a payment provider merely because its questionnaire uses the word “beneficiary”.
Fifth, the firm should plan for interruption without treating interruption as termination. A backup counsel or co-counsel can be identified in the engagement letter, subject to the client’s consent and the ICC’s applicable requirements. The file should contain a current procedural calendar, a list of urgent protective measures, the status of every submission and an explanation of deadlines. If the primary bank freezes a payment, the client should know who will communicate with the bank, who will request a licence or clarification, and which work can proceed while the dispute is reviewed. Continuity is part of representation, particularly where a victim may be exposed to retaliation or the loss of evidence.
Sixth, communications with the ICC should be separated from communications with commercial providers. The lawyer may need to tell the Registry that a U.S. designation has affected a payment or a platform. That notification should identify the operational consequence, not disclose unnecessary legal advice or witness data. The firm may also ask the Registry for an approved channel, a secure upload route or guidance on a procedural deadline. A bank’s risk department is not the right recipient for that request. Each institution should receive only the information needed for its own decision.
Seventh, a refusal should be contested proportionately. Begin with the bank’s internal review and a request for the legal instrument relied on. If the bank identifies a French or EU freeze, obtain advice on the relevant authority, possible authorisation and the client’s remedies. If it identifies only a U.S. policy, ask whether a non-U.S. correspondent, a different currency or an alternative payment method is available lawfully. If the bank refuses to explain, preserve the refusal and assess the contractual and regulatory consequences. The aim is not to pressure a compliance officer into ignoring sanctions. The aim is to obtain a reasoned decision that the client can challenge or work around within the law.
Finally, the lawyer should test independence. The U.S. sanctions may create political pressure, threats to reputation or a commercial incentive to leave a difficult file. A French lawyer must ask whether continuing to act remains professionally possible, whether the client understands the financial and technological risks, and whether the firm can protect the client’s interests without allowing a bank’s policy to dictate legal advice. If the answer is no, withdrawal must be handled in a way that protects the client from procedural prejudice, preserves the file and gives reasonable notice, subject to the rules governing the ICC proceeding.
The French institutional response is relevant but not a substitute for a file analysis. The French Government’s written answer to National Assembly question no. 14332 records France’s support for the ICC, its objection to the sanctions and its work with European partners. France Diplomatie also describes the ICC as a permanent international criminal court and the French commitment to judicial cooperation. That political position helps explain why a French mandate is not automatically unlawful. It does not decide whether a particular bank may process a particular payment or whether a particular cloud provider will maintain a particular account. Those questions still require the names, documents and transaction chain to be examined.
The direct answer can now be stated without ambiguity. French counsel can, in principle, represent ICC victims after the August 2026 U.S. sanctions. The lawyer must not assume that contact with a sanctioned official is itself prohibited, and must not assume that France or the European Union has automatically recognised the U.S. measure. At the same time, the lawyer must not ignore a French or European designation, a U.S. nexus in the payment chain, a contractual restriction or a real risk to a victim’s safety. The durable approach is a documented mandate, narrow disclosure, exact sanctions screening, lawful payment planning and a procedural backup.
Conclusion
The sanctions create pressure on the practical infrastructure of international justice, not an automatic cancellation of French legal representation. The decisive work is to identify the applicable rule at each point: who is designated, whose property is affected, which bank is involved, what data is requested, which authority is acting and what procedural remedy is available. French professional secrecy, the Rome Statute cooperation framework and the client’s mandate remain meaningful protections, but they must be implemented through a disciplined file and a transparent continuity plan.