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Gino’s European Arrest Warrant: Can Germany Become a Route to Hungary After France’s 2026 Decision?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Gino’s European Arrest Warrant: Can Germany Become a Route to Hungary After France’s 2026 Decision?

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France has now taken the second step in the European arrest warrant case of Albanian activist Rexhino Abazaj, known as “Gino”. On 19 August 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal ordered his surrender to Germany over alleged violence connected with a neo-Nazi demonstration in Budapest in February 2023. The public reporting on the decision says that Germany relies on German victims and on its own criminal investigation. That matters because France had refused to surrender Abazaj to Hungary in April 2025, citing a risk to fundamental rights, including detention conditions and the prospect of a fair trial. His defence has announced an appeal to the Court of Cassation. The current report by Le Monde with AFP describes the decision and the pending appeal; its earlier report on the Hungarian request records why the first surrender route failed.

The central question is not whether Germany is formally entitled to issue a European arrest warrant. It is whether a German warrant based on a distinct German investigation can lawfully produce a surrender where France has already found that sending the same person to Hungary would expose him to unacceptable risks. In French procedure, surrender to Germany is not extradition to Hungary, and a German prosecution is not automatically a disguised Hungarian prosecution. Yet the earlier French findings cannot become irrelevant merely because the requesting state has changed. The court must examine the warrant, the factual basis, the individual guarantees and the legal consequences of any later transfer with precision.

I. What did the Paris decision change in Gino’s European arrest warrant case?

A. Why the German warrant is not the same request as Hungary’s

A European arrest warrant is a judicial cooperation instrument, not a diplomatic request for discretionary extradition. Article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure defines it as a judicial decision issued by a Member State of the European Union for the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a person sought for prosecution or for the execution of a custodial sentence. The French text is available in the official Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The executing court therefore starts with mutual recognition, but mutual recognition is structured by conditions, grounds for refusal and fundamental-rights review.

That starting point explains why the Paris court could refuse Hungary in 2025 and still order surrender to Germany in 2026. The two warrants must be assessed on their own legal documents. The issuing state, the issuing judicial authority, the prosecution theory, the alleged victims, the evidence relied upon, the potential sentence and the detention plan may all be different. The new warrant cannot be rejected simply because it follows a failed Hungarian request. Conversely, the new warrant cannot be accepted simply because Germany is an EU Member State with a generally recognised judicial system.

The first practical document is the warrant itself. Article 695-13 requires information about the identity and nationality of the requested person, the issuing judicial authority, the existence of an enforceable judicial decision, the legal classification of the offence, the circumstances of the offence, including the date, place and degree of participation, and the sentence or penalty involved. These requirements are set out in Article 695-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A defence must compare those fields in the German warrant with the fields in the Hungarian warrant rather than rely on a general description of the Budapest events.

The comparison can reveal a genuinely separate German case, or it can reveal a relabelling of the same prosecution. German nationality of alleged victims may give Germany a jurisdictional basis under its domestic law. It does not answer every European cooperation question. The court still needs to know what Germany is prosecuting, what evidence Germany has gathered independently, whether German prosecutors intend to interview or rely on Hungarian witnesses, whether Hungary seeks access to the defendant, and what Germany will do if a Hungarian request is made after the German proceedings.

The penalty threshold also matters. Under Article 695-12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a warrant for prosecution generally requires an offence punishable in the issuing state by a maximum custodial sentence of at least one year. A warrant for enforcement generally requires a final custodial sentence of at least four months. The public accounts of the Gino case refer to materially different maximum penalties in Hungary and Germany. That difference is legally relevant, but it does not by itself prove that one warrant is genuine and the other is abusive.

For ordinary offences, the court may have to examine double criminality. Article 695-23 provides an optional refusal where the conduct is not an offence under French law, subject to the listed-offence exception for categories punishable by at least three years in the issuing state. The text is available at Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Allegations of violence will normally create a substantial French-law correspondence, but the exact conduct, participation theory and aggravating circumstances still need to be identified. A label such as “political violence” or “anti-fascist activism” cannot replace the factual analysis.

Political motivation is a separate issue. Article 695-22 lists mandatory refusal grounds, including a request made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person because of political opinions, or where the person’s position may be aggravated for that reason. The official text is Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is not a broad licence to decide whether the requested person’s cause is legitimate. It is a legal test directed at the purpose and discriminatory effect of the request, supported by objective material.

The 2025 refusal to surrender Abazaj to Hungary is therefore neither an acquittal nor a declaration that no Member State may prosecute the alleged Budapest conduct. It is an important factual and legal record. It may contain findings about the Hungarian system, the treatment of a comparable defendant, the classification of the charges, the proportionality of the penalty, or the relationship between the prosecution and political speech. Those findings can inform the German review, especially if Germany’s case depends on the same evidence or anticipates a transfer to Hungary. They do not automatically determine the result.

A second document is the German assurance, if any, about the course of proceedings. The court should ask whether Germany will prosecute the alleged German victims’ claims itself, whether the investigation is already active, where pre-trial detention would occur, what access to counsel will be available, and whether the German authorities have made any commitment concerning transfer to another state. The distinction between an independent German proceeding and a promise to facilitate a Hungarian proceeding is central. The former may answer the jurisdictional concern; the latter would raise a new rights question.

The risk of a “route to Hungary” must therefore be framed as a legal issue rather than a slogan. A German surrender can be lawful even though a Hungarian surrender would not have been. It can also require closer scrutiny if the German warrant is only a procedural bridge to the same custody, witnesses, charges or trial that caused the Paris court’s earlier concern. The court’s task is not to protect the reputation of mutual recognition by ignoring that distinction. It is to identify the actual prosecution that Germany intends to conduct and the actual protection that will follow surrender.

B. Why the ten-day surrender timetable has not yet closed the case

News reports often make a surrender order sound final on the day it is delivered. French European arrest warrant procedure is more precise. Where the requested person does not consent to surrender, the investigating chamber rules within the statutory framework, and the decision may be challenged before the Court of Cassation. Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure addresses the non-consenting person and expressly connects the decision to the cassation provisions. The announcement of a forthcoming appeal therefore matters to the legal status of the order.

The appeal is not an ordinary second factual hearing. It is a control of legal reasoning, procedure and the application of the European cooperation rules. Article 574-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets the framework for the criminal chamber’s determination of the cassation appeal, including the forty-day period referred to in the text. In Criminal Chamber, 14 June 2022, no. 22-90.007, the Court of Cassation discussed this timetable in the context of the European arrest warrant procedure and the interaction between the appeal and the execution of the surrender decision.

The time limit for physical surrender comes later. Article 695-37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, after the chamber’s final decision, surrender must take place no later than ten days after that decision, subject to the statutory arrangements. A ten-day period after a final decision is not a ten-day period running from the first press report. Lawyers must identify the date of notification, the date of the appeal, the date on which the decision becomes final and any later administrative or humanitarian obstacle.

The record must also be complete. Article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the chamber to request supplementary information from the issuing authority when the information supplied is insufficient. The statutory timetable makes the request operationally urgent. In a case involving two warrants, separate investigations and concerns about onward transfer, a request for the German indictment, the evidence map, detention guarantees and transfer policy is not a delaying tactic. It is the means by which the executing court can decide the case on the warrant that actually exists.

Release is another live procedural question. Article 695-34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the requested person to seek release at any time, with a decision governed by the statutory time limit. The court can assess flight risk, the seriousness of the allegations, the person’s links to France, reporting duties and other safeguards. The existence of a surrender order does not turn every request for interim liberty into a challenge to the merits of the German prosecution.

The documents should also show whether the German warrant is for prosecution or sentence enforcement. That distinction changes the required information, the relevant threshold and the practical risk of detention. A person sought for trial needs access to the accusation and the factual basis; a person sought to serve a final sentence raises questions about the judgment, notice, appeal rights and conditions of detention. A court should not allow the vocabulary of “remise” to conceal which of these two situations is before it.

French law contains a humanitarian safety valve, but it is narrow. Article 695-38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a temporary deferral of surrender for serious humanitarian reasons and provides a framework for a new date. That provision does not replace the fundamental-rights analysis. It can prevent an immediate transfer where a serious individual circumstance makes the scheduled surrender unsafe, while the underlying legal position remains under review.

The defence strategy should therefore separate four arguments: an error in the warrant or its supporting documents; a statutory ground for refusal; a failure to investigate the specific fundamental-rights risk; and an interim argument about custody or surrender timing. Combining all four into a general objection to Germany would weaken the appeal. The strongest case is likely to identify precisely what the Paris court previously found about Hungary, what Germany now asserts, what evidence connects the two cases and what the chamber failed to ask.

The public record does not yet disclose every paragraph of the Paris order or the complete German warrant. It would be unsafe to invent a case number, a precise German detention facility or a finding that the French court has not published. The legally sound conclusion at this stage is narrower: the order changes the immediate executing state from Hungary to Germany, but the announced cassation appeal and the consequences of the earlier Hungarian refusal keep the rights analysis open.

II. How should French courts test the risk of a German route to Hungary?

A. What evidence can turn an onward-transfer concern into a legal objection?

Fundamental-rights review in European arrest warrant cases requires more than a political argument and less than proof that a future violation is certain. The Court of Justice established the two-stage method in the joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Its official press material states: “The execution of a European arrest warrant must be deferred if there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment because of the conditions of detention of the person concerned in the Member State where the warrant was issued.” The executing court must first identify general or systemic deficiencies, then determine whether the individual would face a real and personal risk.

The Court of Justice applied a comparable method to judicial independence in C-216/18 PPU, LM. The official press release explains that “A judicial authority called upon to execute a European arrest warrant must refrain from giving effect to it if it considers that there is a real risk” of a breach of the requested person’s fundamental right to an independent tribunal, after the court has examined the general situation and the individual exposure. The legal question in Gino’s case is not limited to prison conditions. It may include the reality of a fair trial, judicial independence and the effect of political pressure on the specific prosecution.

A German route to Hungary would require evidence at both levels. At the general level, counsel may rely on the Paris court’s 2025 findings, European institutional material and the treatment of a comparable defendant. At the individual level, counsel must connect that material to Abazaj: the charges he faces, the evidence expected to be used, the likely place of detention, the treatment of his political identity, and the procedural safeguards available in Germany. General criticism of Hungary, without an individual connection, will not answer the legal test. The absence of any inquiry into the earlier French findings would also be problematic.

The French Court of Cassation has described the evidentiary discipline required for that analysis. In Criminal Chamber, 26 March 2019, no. 19-81.731, it required an assessment based on objective, reliable, precise and properly updated material concerning a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, with supplementary information sought from the issuing state where necessary. That is a useful safeguard against both extremes: the court cannot accept a bare assurance without examining the risk, but it also cannot stop at an abstract allegation without testing its sources and personal relevance.

The German warrant creates a particularly important evidentiary fork. If Germany will hold and try Abazaj in Germany, the court should examine German detention and trial guarantees first. If the German authorities acknowledge that the same evidence is being collected for eventual use in Hungary, the court should ask what legal mechanism would permit that use and what protection would attach. If no transfer is planned, that answer should be recorded clearly. If a transfer is possible, the court should not treat it as a remote political theory; it should identify the statutory consent and specialty rules that would govern it.

The mandatory refusal grounds also matter. Article 695-22 includes the political-purpose and discriminatory-prosecution protections, while Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains additional optional refusal grounds, including situations connected with proceedings in France or facts committed on French territory. The court must distinguish the legal route for each argument. A complaint about political targeting is not the same as a complaint about territorial jurisdiction, and a complaint about a German trial is not automatically a complaint about Hungarian prison conditions.

The Court of Cassation’s recent approach also warns against treating supplemental information as automatic relief. In Criminal Chamber, 7 August 2024, no. 24-81.863, the court addressed the conditions under which an optional refusal ground and a request for additional information must be examined. The lesson for the defence is practical: invoke the precise statutory ground, identify the missing information and explain why the gap affects the decision. The lesson for the executing court is equally practical: a technically complete form does not eliminate the duty to deal with a concrete rights issue properly raised.

The same-facts question must be handled with care. Article 695-22 includes a refusal where the person has been finally judged for the same acts. A prior refusal to surrender is not a final judgment on guilt or innocence, so it does not automatically trigger that rule. Yet the factual overlap between the Hungarian and German requests may affect the credibility of the German independence claim, the adequacy of the warrant’s description and the possibility of an eventual second prosecution. The court should obtain the procedural history instead of assuming either total identity or total separation.

Evidence of an onward route could include a German request for Hungarian evidence, a formal cooperation plan, a Hungarian request to attend interviews, a statement that the German case exists only because Hungary cannot obtain surrender, or a proposed transfer after German proceedings. None of those facts is conclusive in isolation. Together, they could show that the German case is not merely a prosecution concerning German victims but a mechanism intended to achieve the result that France previously rejected. The legal response would then focus on the applicable refusal and specialty rules, the risk to the individual and the court’s duty to obtain guarantees.

The defence should not overstate the point. Germany may have a legitimate independent interest in prosecuting violence against its nationals, and an EU judicial authority is entitled to pursue a case within its jurisdiction. The question is whether that interest is being exercised within the safeguards of mutual recognition. A court that acknowledges both propositions can protect fundamental rights without converting every cross-border prosecution into a political dispute.

B. What protection remains if Germany later seeks to send him elsewhere?

Surrender to Germany does not give Germany unlimited authority over every earlier allegation. The principle of specialty generally protects a person from being prosecuted, sentenced or deprived of liberty for an offence committed before surrender that is different from the offence for which surrender was granted, subject to defined exceptions. The French procedure contains a specific mechanism for later consent. Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs, among other matters, consent to prosecution or execution for earlier acts and consent to surrender to another Member State for an earlier offence.

This means a later Hungarian request would not simply pass through the German surrender order. A new legal question would arise. The German authorities would need to identify the requested conduct, the relationship with the German case and the legal basis for any prosecution, sentence or transfer. The competent French authority may have a role where the Framework Decision and French implementing rules require consent. The point is not that France can veto every future German decision. The point is that the initial surrender is not a blank cheque.

In Criminal Chamber, 10 February 2026, no. 25-87.769, the Court of Cassation addressed the specialty principle in a European arrest warrant context. The decision underlines that, after surrender, a person cannot be subjected to restrictions of liberty for prior different conduct without the required consent, and that the surrender decision itself must be obtained when the issue is disputed. That recent authority makes the document trail decisive: the German warrant, the Paris order, any consent decision and any later transfer request must be preserved and compared.

Specialty does not solve every fundamental-rights problem. If Germany intends to prosecute the German-victim allegations in Germany, specialty may limit the use of the surrender for unrelated prior conduct, but it does not make the German detention system immune from review. If Germany seeks to transfer Abazaj to Hungary, the court must examine the transfer mechanism and the rights consequences at that time. If Germany merely shares evidence with Hungary, the court must distinguish evidence sharing from physical surrender and ask whether the sharing undermines the purpose for which France executed the German warrant.

The court should also consider the rules for multiple warrants and competing proceedings. The section containing Article 695-42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure addresses situations in which several Member States issue European arrest warrants and directs attention to factors such as the gravity of the offences, the place of commission, the dates of the warrants and whether the purpose is prosecution or enforcement. This framework prevents the first surrender decision from being read in isolation when another Member State has a competing claim.

International cooperation can also involve a third-state request, an overlapping prosecution or a request to postpone surrender. Those complications do not prove abuse. They show why a court needs a complete chronology. In Gino’s case, the chronology should include the Hungarian warrant, the April 2025 French refusal, the German warrant, the German investigative steps, the August 2026 Paris decision and the announced cassation appeal. It should then identify any request from Hungary after the German surrender and any German decision that changes the original prosecution theory.

The appeal record should focus on the reasoning that connects those events. Did the Paris court analyse the 2025 findings or treat the German request as entirely new? Did it obtain information from Germany about the German victims and the evidence? Did it ask whether Germany would permit a later Hungarian transfer? Did it apply the two-stage fundamental-rights test to the individual circumstances? Did it address the defence’s request for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, if that request was maintained? These are legal questions that can be examined on appeal without deciding the truth of the underlying violence allegations.

For families and lawyers, the practical safeguards are concrete. Obtain the full German warrant and every annex. Request the German procedural status, the detention location and the prosecutor’s account of the alleged German victims. Preserve the 2025 Paris materials, including the evidence about Hungary and any comparable defendant. Ask the executing authority to record whether Germany may seek a transfer, and under what legal procedure. If the person is surrendered, monitor every German step that could alter the charges or expose him to a second state.

The procedure also has a media dimension. Public reporting can describe a decision, but it cannot replace the operative order. Statements that Germany is a “back door” to Hungary may communicate the political concern, yet they risk obscuring the evidence the Court of Cassation needs. A stronger public and legal argument is more exact: France previously found a rights obstacle to Hungary; Germany now relies on a different warrant; the relationship between the two cases must be tested; and a later transfer would require its own legal safeguards.

That approach protects the integrity of the European arrest warrant system. Mutual recognition cannot mean mutual blindness. Nor can a previous refusal become a permanent immunity from prosecution in every Member State. The legal balance lies in a document-based assessment of jurisdiction, factual identity, fundamental rights, specialty and onward transfer. On the information currently public, the Paris order makes a German proceeding possible, but it does not decide in advance whether Germany may send Gino to Hungary or use the German case to bypass the reasons for which France refused Hungary.

Conclusion

The Gino Abazaj decision is best understood as a change of executing state, not as an automatic validation of the Hungarian prosecution. Germany may have a distinct jurisdictional basis because alleged victims are German nationals and because its authorities say they are conducting their own investigation. France nevertheless has to examine the German warrant in light of the earlier Hungarian refusal, the factual overlap, the risk to fundamental rights and the safeguards against later prosecution or transfer.

The announced appeal gives the Court of Cassation an opportunity to test whether the Paris court identified the correct legal questions and obtained the information needed to answer them. The immediate priorities are the complete German warrant, the evidentiary and detention guarantees, the 2025 findings about Hungary, and a clear record of what Germany may do after surrender. The ten-day surrender rule becomes relevant only after the decision is final; the specialty and consent rules remain relevant if another prosecution or transfer is later proposed.

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