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Seizing Libya’s Frozen Assets in Paris After Cass. 1 October 2026: the Treasury Pre-Authorisation Lock

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Seizing Libya’s Frozen Assets in Paris After Cass. 1 October 2026: the Treasury Pre-Authorisation Lock

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On 1 October 2026, the Second Civil Chamber of the French Court of Cassation delivered a ruling that every holder of an arbitral award against a sanctioned state should read before touching assets in France. In Mohamed Abdel Moshen Al-Kharafi and Sons v Libyan Investment Authority, appeal no. 24-10.958, the Court rejected the creditor’s appeal and confirmed that a third-party attachment carried out in Paris in August 2013 against the accounts of Libya’s sovereign wealth fund was void. The award itself dated from 22 March 2013 and had been declared enforceable in France by an order that had become final. None of that was enough. The funds were frozen under the European Union’s Libya sanctions, and the creditor had never obtained the prior authorisation of the French Treasury. The judgment also settles a sharp procedural point: denouncing the attachment to the Libyan State did not start the time limit for the fund itself to challenge the seizure, because the fund is a distinct legal person with its own right to be heard. Two locks, one substantive and one procedural, and both must be opened in the right order. This analysis explains each of them, with the exact passages of the ruling, and sets out the sequence that award creditors must follow in Paris.

I. Can an arbitral award creditor seize frozen Libyan assets held in France?

A. EU frozen funds cannot be seized without the prior authorisation of the French Treasury

The Libyan Investment Authority is a designated entity under Council Regulation (EU) 2016/44 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, and its funds held in France since 16 September 2011 are frozen. That freeze is not a decorative detail. It is the decisive obstacle. The Court of Cassation recalls the mechanism of the regulation: the competent national authority may authorise the release of frozen funds or economic resources where defined conditions are met, including a finding that payment does not breach the prohibitions and does not benefit a listed entity, and prior notification of the intention to the sanctions committee ten working days in advance. For France, the competent authority is the Directorate General of the Treasury, as listed in Annex IV to the regulation.

The controlling reasoning is stated in paragraph 25 of the ruling, and it deserves to be read in full. The Court holds that it follows from the provisions of Regulation No 2016/44, whose objective is the prevention of, in the words of its second recital,

la menace que représentent les personnes et entités qui possèdent ou contrôlent des fonds publics libyens détournés sous l’ancien régime de [R] [G], susceptibles d’être utilisés pour mettre en danger la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité en Libye, ou pour entraver ou compromettre la réussite de sa transition politique,

that no enforcement measure may be pursued against frozen funds or economic resources which would have the effect not only of removing them from the debtor’s estate but also of conferring on the pursuing creditor a mere right of preference, without prior authorisation from the Director of the Treasury, the national authority designated pursuant to Article 11(2) of the regulation. In the Court’s own words:

que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement.

This is not a new invention. The ruling expressly builds on two judgments of 7 September 2022, led by the First Civil Chamber ruling no. 19-25.108 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2022:C100614), in which the Court had already held that no enforcement measure conferring even a simple preference could proceed on frozen assets without the Treasury director’s prior authorisation, a reading described as indispensable to the effectiveness of restrictive measures, whatever its effects on creditors unconnected with the diversions of public funds under the former Libyan regime. Those twin rulings had themselves followed the answer given by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Bank Sepah case, decided on the identically worded Iranian freeze instruments, including Regulation (EU) No 267/2012. The Luxembourg Court held that concepts as broad as the freezing of funds and of economic resources preclude preventive attachments made without prior authorisation from the competent national authority, even where the measure does not remove the assets from the debtor’s estate, because granting a priority right to be paid changes the destination of frozen resources. The full Bank Sepah decision is available on the Curia database. Readers who follow the sanctions-and-arbitration intersection may also compare the recent Luxembourg-centred analysis in our account of the DNO Yemen sanctions and arbitration-award litigation, which turns on annulment actions before the EU courts rather than on enforcement in Paris, and the broader freeze landscape described in our guide to the extended EU Russia freeze and how listings are challenged from France.

The practical consequence is blunt. The creditor in Al-Kharafi argued that the national authority’s authorisation was only required at the payment stage, after the attachment. The Court rejected that sequencing in paragraph 29: the company could not validly maintain that the authorisation of the competent national authority is provided for by the regulation only at the payment stage, that is after the seizure, whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union, ruling on the interpretation to be given to the Iranian freeze regulation drafted in the same terms, had said on the contrary that this authorisation had to be prior to the seizure. In French:

la société Al-Kharafi ne saurait valablement soutenir que l’autorisation de l’autorité nationale compétente n’est prévue par le règlement qu’au stade du paiement, c’est-à-dire postérieurement à la saisie, alors que la Cour de justice de l’union européenne, statuant sur l’interprétation à donner au règlement de gel iranien rédigé dans les mêmes termes, a dit au contraire que cette autorisation devait être préalable à la saisie.

Authorisation after the event cures nothing. It must come first.

B. Why a third-party attachment on frozen funds is void, and why the enforcement judge cannot save it

A saisie-attribution is the most muscular enforcement tool in French civil procedure: up to the sums for which it is carried out, it immediately transfers to the seizing creditor the attached claim available in the hands of the third party, with its accessories. That immediate attributive effect is precisely what makes it incompatible with a freeze imposed by an EU regulation. The Court states the consequence in paragraph 26, again worth quoting exactly:

Il en découle qu’à défaut d’autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, aucune mesure de saisie-attribution, laquelle emporte, à concurrence des sommes pour lesquelles elle est pratiquée, attribution immédiate au profit du saisissant de la créance saisie disponible entre les mains du tiers et de ses accessoires, ne peut être autorisée ou validée par le juge de l’exécution, saisi sur requête en application de l’article L. 111-1-1 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, sur des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel des avoirs en exécution du règlement n° 2016/44.

Three points in that passage matter for practice. First, the prohibition is addressed to the enforcement judge himself: seized on petition under Article L. 111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, which provides that protective measures or forced enforcement against property belonging to a foreign state may only be implemented with the prior authorisation of the judge ruling on petition, the judge can neither authorise nor validate the attachment on frozen funds without the Treasury’s prior clearance. The statutory text is short and absolute: Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête. Against a sanctioned sovereign fund, the creditor therefore faces a double lock, judicial and administrative, and the keys must be turned in order: Treasury first, judge second. Second, the sanction is nullity, not a mere stay. The Paris Court of Appeal had held the 13 August 2013 attachment void for lack of Treasury authorisation, and the Court of Cassation approved that outcome in paragraph 30: En l’état de ces constatations et énonciations, la cour d’appel a exactement décidé qu’en l’absence d’autorisation délivrée par la direction générale du Trésor, la saisie-attribution était nulle. A void attachment cannot be regularised afterwards; the creditor must start again with the authorisation in hand. Third, the reasoning closes the clever argument that a seizure creating only a preference, without moving money, should escape the freeze. Both the Luxembourg Court and now twice the Paris enforcement courts treat the grant of a priority right as a change in the destination of frozen resources, caught by the deliberately broad definitions of freezing funds and freezing economic resources.

Creditors sometimes ask whether the sovereign-immunity gateways in Article L. 111-1-2 of the same code offer an alternative route, since that provision lists the narrow cases in which the judge may authorise measures against foreign-state property. The Al-Kharafi ruling gives a clear implicit answer: those gateways govern the relationship between the creditor and the foreign state under immunity law, while the EU freeze operates as an independent, higher-ranking prohibition grounded in the effectiveness of restrictive measures. Even a creditor holding a final award, with an irrevocable French enforcement order duly served on the state, recovers nothing in Paris on frozen assets without the Treasury’s prior green light. The award opens the door of the enforcement judge; only the Treasury opens the door of the frozen account.

II. Who must be notified of the seizure when the debtor state acts through its investment fund?

A. The attachment must be denounced to the state within eight days, but the fund keeps its own separate right to challenge it

The second half of the ruling concerns time limits, and it produces a result that surprises many practitioners: an attachment carried out in 2013 could still be challenged by the fund in 2021, eight years later, because as against the fund the clock had never started. The chronology is undisputed. The Al-Kharafi company had the attachment served at Société Générale on 13 August 2013 against sums held in the name of the Libyan Investment Authority. The attachment was denounced to the Libyan State on 21 August 2013 and transmitted through diplomatic channels on 10 November 2013. It was only on 27 September 2021 that the Authority applied to the Paris enforcement judge for the attachment to be set aside and lifted. The first judge declared that challenge inadmissible in a judgment of 28 February 2022; the Paris Court of Appeal, Pôle 1, Chamber 10, reversed that outcome on 23 November 2023 and admitted the Authority’s claim. The two remaining grounds of appeal were then set aside without a specially reasoned decision under Article 1014, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, leaving the full reasoning for the two points that decide the case.

The creditor’s argument before the Court of Cassation was doctrinally elegant. Under Article R. 211-3 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, the attachment must, on pain of lapse, be denounced to the debtor within eight days: A peine de caducité, la saisie est dénoncée au débiteur par acte de commissaire de justice dans un délai de huit jours. Under Article R. 211-11 of the same code, challenges must, on pain of inadmissibility, be brought within one month of the denunciation: A peine d’irrecevabilité, les contestations relatives à la saisie sont formées dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la dénonciation de la saisie au débiteur. Since the enforceable instruments and the attachments had been duly served on the state, the creditor reasoned, they were opposable to its emanation without fresh service, and the one-month period, extended for a person residing abroad, had long expired.

The Court disentangles two different questions. First, to whom must the attachment be denounced on pain of lapse? Answer, in paragraph 10: where a third-party attachment is carried out against a foreign state on funds held by a legal person characterised as an emanation of that state, it must be denounced within eight days, on pain of lapse, to the foreign state, the debtor designated by the enforceable instrument founding the attachment. In the Court’s words:

Il résulte du premier de ces textes qu’une saisie-attribution pratiquée à l’encontre d’un Etat étranger sur des fonds détenus par une personne morale, qualifiée d’émanation d’Etat, doit être dénoncée, à peine de caducité, dans le délai de huit jours, à l’Etat étranger, débiteur désigné par le titre exécutoire fondant la saisie.

The Court adds, in paragraph 11, that this is consistent with its earlier ruling of 6 February 2007, appeals nos. 04-13.107 and 04-16.888, where it had held that instruments and attachments duly served on the state are opposable to its emanation without fresh service. But, and this is the decisive turn in paragraph 12, that is a different question from the one raised here, which concerns the Authority’s right of recourse: whether denunciation of the attachment to the Libyan State did or did not start the challenge period against the Authority.

The answer, in paragraph 13, protects the distinct entity in the strongest terms. To preserve its right of recourse, the Authority, which is an entity distinct from the debtor state and endowed with its own legal personality, must itself have knowledge of the attachment, independently of the denunciation made to the debtor state, so as to be able to challenge the seizure of the funds it holds, in particular the emanation characterisation attributed to it by the seizing creditor, or the unseizability of the seized funds by reason of an asset-freeze measure under a European regulation, all the more so, as here, where it is itself designated by that instrument. The passage is the heart of the procedural holding and should be kept whole:

Or, pour préserver son droit au recours, la LIA, qui constitue une entité distincte de l’Etat débiteur, et qui est dotée d’une personnalité juridique propre, doit elle-même avoir connaissance de la saisie pratiquée, indépendamment de la dénonciation faite à l’Etat débiteur, pour être en mesure de contester la saisie portant sur les fonds qu’elle détient, notamment la qualification d’émanation qui lui est attribuée par le créancier saisissant, ou encore l’insaisissabilité des fonds saisis en raison d’une mesure de gel des avoirs prévue par un règlement européen, d’autant plus, comme en l’espèce, lorsqu’elle est une entité désignée par ce texte.

The logic is compelling once stated. The very premise of seizing the fund’s money for the state’s debt is a contested characterisation, that the fund is a mere emanation, and the very obstacle to the seizure may be a freeze instrument that designates the fund in its own name. An entity cannot be expected to defend its separate personality, or to invoke a freeze that names it, through the mailbox of the state that allegedly absorbs it. Service on the state makes the seizure opposable to the emanation; it does not silence the emanation’s own voice. For creditors, the lesson is operational: notify the state to avoid lapse, and separately inform the entity holding the funds, or live with a challenge period that never begins to run.

B. The emanation test, its European limit, and the sequence to follow in Paris

None of the procedural protection for the fund decides whether the fund really is the state’s emanation. That question is governed by a test restated only weeks earlier by the First Civil Chamber in its judgment of 17 June 2026, appeal no. 23-10.435, available on the Court’s official database. A claim against a foreign state may lead to enforcement in France against property belonging to an entity distinct from that state and endowed with its own legal personality, where that entity is not statutorily placed in sufficient functional independence to enjoy autonomy in law and in fact vis-à-vis the state, and where its assets merge with those of the state, so that it must be regarded as one of its emanations. The verified formulation is:

Si une créance contre un État étranger peut donner lieu à des mesures d’exécution en France sur un bien appartenant à une entité distincte de celui-ci et dotée d’une personnalité juridique propre, lorsque cette entité n’est pas statutairement dans une indépendance fonctionnelle suffisante pour bénéficier d’une autonomie de droit et de fait à l’égard de l’État et que son patrimoine se confond avec celui de cet État, de sorte qu’elle doit être considérée comme une de ses émanations, le recours à cette qualification doit, toutefois, être écarté s’il compromet la réalisation des objectifs poursuivis par des mesures instituées par l’Union européenne.

The final clause is the sting. Even where the fund looks, walks and talks like the state, the emanation characterisation must be set aside if it would compromise the objectives pursued by European Union measures. In Al-Kharafi the point is illustrated rather than applied to its end, because the freeze alone disposed of the case, but the direction of travel is unmistakable: European restrictive measures increasingly cap what national enforcement law can do with designated persons’ property, including through doctrines as domestic as state emanation. A creditor who proves, triumphantly, that the fund is the state may still lose to the regulation that freezes the fund in its own name.

For an award creditor mapping enforcement in Paris, the two 1 October holdings combine into a strict sequence. First, secure the French enforcement order and have it served on the state. Second, apply to the enforcement judge on petition under Article L. 111-1-1 for authorisation to proceed against the identified sovereign property. Third, before any attachment of funds designated under Regulation 2016/44 or a comparable freeze, apply to the Directorate General of the Treasury for prior authorisation to enforce, allowing time for the ten-working-day notification to the sanctions committee where the regulation requires it. Fourth, carry out the attachment and denounce it to the state within eight days to avoid lapse, while separately and identifiably informing the entity that actually holds the funds, so that its one-month challenge period runs and later satellite litigation is cut off. Fifth, expect the holder to contest both the emanation label and the freeze, and be ready to answer each on its own ground: functional autonomy and separation of assets for the first, Treasury clearance and the scope of the freeze for the second. Skipping the third step, as the Al-Kharafi creditor did in 2013, produces thirteen years of litigation ending in nullity. Skipping the separate notice to the holder produces a challenge that arrives, perfectly admissible, eight years later.

Conclusion

The 1 October 2026 ruling does not close Paris to award creditors of sanctioned states; it disciplines the order in which they must knock. The European freeze is not a background detail but a prior administrative lock that conditions everything the enforcement judge can do, including measures that merely create a preference, and its key is held in Paris by the Directorate General of the Treasury, not by the court. Alongside it, the distinct legal personality of the fund is not a fiction the creditor can brush aside with service on the state: the holder of the money is entitled to its own knowledge of the seizure and its own day before the judge, to dispute the emanation label or to invoke the freeze that designates it. The full reasoning is published on the Court of Cassation’s website under appeal no. 24-10.958. Any creditor preparing a seizure of Libyan, or by extension any EU-frozen, sovereign assets in France should read those thirty-one paragraphs before instructing a bailiff, because the Treasury application now belongs at the front of the file, and the notice to the holder belongs next to the denunciation to the state.

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