On Friday 18 September 2026, the King of Malaysia agreed to let the country’s most famous prisoner finish his sentence at home. Najib Razak, prime minister from 2009 to 2018 and the central convicted figure of the 1MDB affair, the multi-billion-dollar looting of a sovereign wealth fund that investigators say siphoned as much as 4.5 billion dollars across at least six countries, will serve the remainder of his term under house arrest until 23 August 2028. The decision, announced by the prime minister’s legal department, is a conditional pardon, the second royal pardon Najib has received, and it comes with a price tag: a 50-million-ringgit fine, roughly 12.27 million dollars, that his lawyers said on Sunday 20 September they were working to pay before he can leave Kajang prison. The Prisons Department confirmed it was waiting for the written order, and explained that the home affairs minister has the power to gazette any premises as a prison, which is how a private residence legally becomes a place of detention. For readers outside Malaysia the episode looks like pure politics, and politics is certainly part of it: the pardon strains the multi-party coalition of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, delights Najib’s UMNO party, which has opened a public collection fund, and lands eighteen months before a general election that must be held by early 2028. But for a French criminal lawyer the file is something else: a live test of three questions Paris courts answer every week. What legal effect does a pardon have on the sentence, the guilt and the victims? Can a custodial sentence be served at home, and under whose control? And when billions have crossed borders, who gets the money back? France answered the first of those questions nine days before the King’s decision, on 9 September 2026, when the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled on the effect of a foreign pardon. This article reconstructs what Kuala Lumpur decided, traces where the missing billions went, and sets out, point by point, what France would do with the same file.
I. What did the King of Malaysia actually decide on 18 September 2026?
A. “Why was Najib moved from prison to house arrest?” Inside the second royal pardon
The starting point is the sentence Najib was serving. In July 2020, the Kuala Lumpur High Court found him guilty of criminal breach of trust, abuse of power and money laundering for illegally receiving about 10 million dollars from SRC International, a former subsidiary of the 1MDB state fund, and sentenced him to twelve years in prison plus a fine of 210 million ringgit. The Court of Appeal upheld the verdict in 2021, the Federal Court confirmed it in August 2022, and Najib went to Kajang prison that month, the first former Malaysian prime minister ever jailed. In February 2024, a pardons board chaired by the previous king halved the twelve-year term to six years and cut the fine to 50 million ringgit. That was the first pardon. The second came on 18 September 2026, when King Sultan Ibrahim, who appoints and chairs the Federal Territories pardons board in his constitutional role, consented to a conditional pardon allowing Najib to serve what remains of that six-year term under house arrest until 23 August 2028, the date the reduced sentence, with the usual remission for good behaviour, is calculated to expire.
Three features of the Malaysian mechanism deserve attention because each has a precise French equivalent, examined in Part II. First, the pardon is conditional, not free. The 50-million-ringgit fine must actually be paid, and as of Sunday 20 September Najib remained in prison while his lawyers, in their words, worked to fulfil the conditions. UMNO’s president announced a collection fund among party members and supporters, and local media reported almost one million ringgit raised by Saturday noon. Readers should pause on this point: a pardon conditioned on payment of a fine keeps the financial penalty alive even as the prison gates open, which is exactly how French law treats the pardon, as will be seen. Second, the legal technique for the transfer is administrative designation. The Prisons Department said on 20 September that it and the home ministry were waiting for official written confirmation before moving anyone, adding that the home affairs minister may by law gazette any premises as a prison. In other words, the house becomes a prison by ministerial order, and the detainee never stops being a detainee. France knows this technique well: a person under electronic surveillance at home remains, in law, a person serving a custodial sentence, not a free person. Third, the pardon settles only one file. In December 2025, Najib was convicted in a separate, far larger trial, the main 1MDB case in which he had been charged back in 2019 with four counts of abuse of power and twenty-one counts of money laundering, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison plus a fine of 2.8 billion dollars. He has lodged an appeal in that case, and that appeal continues regardless of the house arrest. A pardon for the SRC sentence changes nothing in the 1MDB sentence, just as in France a pardon for one sentence leaves concurrent sentences untouched.
The political frame cannot be ignored, because it explains why the decision landed when it did and why it matters beyond one man’s address. Anwar Ibrahim governs through a coalition that includes both his own reformist alliance, historically opposed to any leniency for Najib, and UMNO, Najib’s party, which never stopped demanding it. UMNO’s president publicly thanked the King and called the pardon a victory of patience; Anwar called on the public to accept the King’s will graciously while insisting his government would not relent in fighting graft and would not, in his words, submit to thieves and corruption. A political scientist at the International Islamic University Malaysia told Reuters the pardon was bad news for Anwar and a boon for UMNO ahead of the next election, and Anwar himself has said he might call a snap poll if coalition rifts deepen. None of this changes the legal analysis, but it explains the timing pressure that French readers, accustomed to pardons granted quietly by decree in the Journal officiel, may find unfamiliar: in Malaysia the pardon power is royal, exercised on ministerial advice through a pardons board, and its use on a former prime minister eighteen months before an election is inevitably read as a political act with legal form. France concentrates the same power in one pair of hands, the President of the Republic, and French history shows the same temptation to read politics into it, which is why French courts have spent two centuries drawing a hard line between what a pardon does and what it does not do.
B. “Where did the missing 1MDB billions go?” The global money trail France would have to follow
1Malaysia Development Berhad was set up in 2009 as a sovereign development fund with the help of the financier Jho Low, while Najib, then prime minister, co-founded it and chaired its advisory board until 2016. According to United States investigators, as much as 4.5 billion dollars was siphoned from the fund through a globe-spanning scheme of bond issues, offshore shell companies and round-tripping investments, and more than one billion dollars allegedly flowed into accounts linked to Najib himself, who says he was made the scapegoat of a complex fraud and has consistently denied wrongdoing. The American Department of Justice never named him as a defendant, referring instead in its filings to “Malaysian Official 1”, identified by Malaysian and American sources as Najib. The alleged architect, Jho Low, is a fugitive charged in both Malaysia and the United States who denies wrongdoing and whose whereabouts remain unknown; Malaysia has said he is in China, which Beijing denies. At least six countries, including the United States, Singapore and Switzerland, opened criminal or financial-misconduct investigations, a concerted probe that implicated banks and officials on three continents.
The recoveries so far show what international asset tracing can achieve when it works, and they set the benchmark against which any French reader should measure the RM50-million fine. In 2020, Goldman Sachs agreed to pay 3.9 billion dollars to settle investigations into its role in underwriting 6.5 billion dollars in bond sales for 1MDB, though the settlement later unravelled into a dispute after Anwar’s government renegotiated the agreement and the bank sued. Two former Goldman bankers, Roger Ng and Tim Leissner, were convicted in the United States for bribery and money laundering connected to the scheme. Malaysia itself reports having recovered about 31.3 billion ringgit, roughly 7.67 billion dollars, representing nearly three-quarters of all identified 1MDB-linked assets. Set beside those figures, the 50 million ringgit Najib must now pay looks less like punishment pricing and more like the outstanding balance of the reduced 2024 fine, a condition to unlock the door rather than a measure of the harm. And the 2.8-billion-dollar fine attached to the December 2025 conviction, now under appeal, dwarfs everything else in the file: if it survives appeal, it will define the financial endgame of the affair far more than the house arrest does.
For a French lawyer, the cross-border dimension is the most instructive part of the story. Money that transits through Singapore, Switzerland, the United States and Luxembourg can only come home through mutual legal assistance, foreign confiscation orders recognized by domestic courts, and settlements with banks that no single prosecutor controls. France built exactly this machinery over the last fifteen years: a national agency that manages seized and confiscated assets, confiscation as an automatic additional penalty for serious economic crime, and investigating judges who send and receive assistance requests across the world every day. The Malaysian file therefore reads, to Paris eyes, like a stress test of tools France already owns. Before comparing the toolboxes, though, the prior question must be settled: what does a pardon actually do to a sentence? On that point France spoke with unusual clarity twelve days ago, in a ruling that involved another foreign pardon, granted by Madagascar, and that every practitioner commenting on the Najib affair should read first.
II. What would France do with the same file?
A. “Would a French court free a prisoner pardoned by a foreign head of state?” The pardon and its limits
The most striking French authority on the Najib affair is nine days older than the King’s decision. On 9 September 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation gave ruling number 25-85.087, published under reference ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR00970, in a case that could hardly be closer to Kuala Lumpur: a man serving a French sentence had been pardoned by a foreign head of state, the Malagasy authorities, and released on 12 October 2025, and the question was what became of the pending French proceedings on the adjustment of his sentence. The Court’s answer is one sentence long and worth quoting in full: “M. [N] [R] ayant été gracié par les autorités malgaches et remis en liberté le 12 octobre 2025, ainsi qu’il ressort de sa fiche pénale, le pourvoi contre la décision relative à l’aménagement de la peine est devenu sans objet.” (Mr [N] [R] having been pardoned by the Malagasy authorities and released on 12 October 2025, as shown by his prison record, the appeal against the decision on the adjustment of the sentence has become moot.) The operative part follows: “Dit n’y avoir lieu à statuer sur le pourvoi.” (There is no need to rule on the appeal.) In plain terms: the foreign pardon emptied the French sentence-adjustment dispute of its object, and the Court simply closed the file.
Readers should not mistake this elegant economy for indifference. The ruling works because French law gives the pardon a narrowly defined effect, stated in a single article of the Criminal Code that every French law student learns by heart: Article 133-7 of the Criminal Code provides that “La grâce emporte seulement dispense d’exécuter la peine.” (The pardon entails only exemption from serving the sentence.) Three words carry the whole doctrine. “Seulement” (only): the pardon remits the sentence to be served, in whole or in part, conditionally or not, but it does nothing else. It does not quash the conviction, which remains on the criminal record. It does not erase guilt, unlike an amnesty law, which wipes out the offence itself and, with it, the conviction. And it does not extinguish the civil consequences: the victim’s right to compensation survives the pardon intact, because damages are not a penalty the head of state can remit. Applied to Najib, the French reading of the Malaysian pardon would therefore be exactly threefold: the man may go home, the conviction stands, and anyone owed money still gets to collect. That is also why the December 2025 fifteen-year sentence and its 2.8-billion-dollar fine are, in French doctrinal terms, simply unaffected: a pardon granted in one file cannot, by definition, remit a sentence imposed in another.
The comparison also clarifies who may pardon and how. In France the power belongs to the President of the Republic alone, exercised by individual decree, historically countersigned and published, and modern practice has confined it almost entirely to individual, often humanitarian or end-of-life cases since collective pardons were abandoned. In Malaysia the power belongs to the King, or to the sultans in the states, acting on the advice of a pardons board that examines each petition. The institutional clothing differs; the legal substance is the same act of clemency by the head of state, and French courts have never refused, as a matter of principle, to give effect to a foreign pardon when the sentence was being served in France under a transfer or cooperation arrangement. The 9 September ruling is the latest illustration: the Court did not re-examine the Malagasy pardon, did not test it against French public policy, and did not ask whether Antananarivo had been wise. It took the prison record at face value and drew the procedural consequence. A Paris sentence-enforcement judge faced with a Kuala Lumpur pardon order concerning a sentence being served in France would reason the same way: verify the foreign act, check that it covers the sentence at issue, and close or adjust the enforcement file accordingly, no more and no less.
One further French distinction matters for the many commentators who describe Najib as now “free”. He is not free; he is serving his sentence at home. French law draws this line with particular care, because confusing house arrest with liberty is the most common error in press coverage of sentence adjustments. The Malaysian technique, gazetting the residence as a prison, makes the point crudely but correctly: the legal status remains detention, only the walls have changed. France reaches the identical result through a different instrument, detention at home under electronic surveillance, and the conditions under which a French judge may order it are stricter, more judicial, and more protective of the convict than most foreign observers assume. That is the subject of the second question.
B. “Could a French convict serve his sentence at home with an ankle bracelet?” House arrest, French style
Yes, and France does it every day, but never by royal favour: only a judge may decide, and the judge must follow rules that leave little room for discretion. The general framework sits in Article 132-25 of the Criminal Code, which provides that where the trial court imposes a prison term of six months or less, “elle doit, sauf impossibilité résultant de la personnalité ou de la situation du condamné, ordonner que la peine sera exécutée en totalité sous le régime de la détention à domicile sous surveillance électronique, de la semi-liberté ou du placement à l’extérieur.” (it must, unless impossible given the personality or situation of the convicted person, order that the sentence be served in full under home detention with electronic surveillance, semi-liberty or outside placement.) For terms between six months and one year, the court must consider the same home-based execution whenever the personality and situation of the convict allow it. The place of execution is therefore, for short sentences, a right subject only to a characterized impossibility, not a favour to be requested.
The Court of Cassation policed that rule this spring in terms every defence lawyer in Paris now cites. On 5 May 2026, in ruling number 25-87.653, the Criminal Chamber quashed a Reims appeal judgment that had imposed four months of firm imprisonment without any adjustment. The Court recalled the governing principle: “Il résulte de ces textes que si la peine d’emprisonnement ferme est inférieure ou égale à six mois” (It follows from these provisions that where the firm prison term is six months or less), “son aménagement est obligatoire et ce n’est qu’en cas d’impossibilité résultant de la personnalité ou de la situation du condamné que le juge peut l’écarter.” (adjustment is mandatory and only impossibility arising from the personality or situation of the convict allows the judge to set it aside.) “Dans ce cas, le juge doit motiver spécialement sa décision, de façon précise et circonstanciée, au regard des faits de l’espèce, de la personnalité et de la situation matérielle, familiale et sociale du condamné.” (In that case, the judge must give specific reasons, precisely and in detail, in light of the facts, the personality and the material, family and social situation of the convict.) And the Court added the point trial judges dislike most: “Il s’ensuit que le juge ne peut refuser d’aménager la peine au motif qu’il ne serait pas en possession d’éléments lui permettant d’apprécier la mesure d’aménagement adaptée ; dans ce cas, il doit ordonner, d’une part, l’aménagement de la peine, d’autre part, la convocation du prévenu devant le juge de l’application des peines qui déterminera cette mesure, en application de l’article 464-2, I, 1° et 2°, du code de procédure pénale.” (It follows that the judge may not refuse adjustment on the ground that he lacks the material to choose the right measure; in that case he must order adjustment and summon the defendant before the sentence-enforcement judge, who will fix the measure.) Lack of information is therefore never a lawful reason to send someone to prison when the statute commands adjustment: the judge orders first and investigates after.
For longer sentences, the path home runs through the sentence-enforcement judge rather than the trial court. Article 723-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows that judge to order home detention under electronic surveillance, defined by Article 132-26 of the Criminal Code, under which “Le condamné placé sous détention à domicile sous surveillance électronique est soumis aux obligations prévues aux deuxième et troisième alinéas de l’article 131-4-1.” (A person placed under home detention with electronic surveillance is subject to the obligations set out in the second and third paragraphs of Article 131-4-1.), either where the total sentence does not exceed two years or where the time left to serve does not exceed two years: “soit en cas de condamnation à une ou plusieurs peines privatives de liberté dont la durée totale n’excède pas deux ans, soit lorsqu’il reste à subir par le condamné une ou plusieurs peines privatives de liberté dont la durée totale n’excède pas deux ans.” (The sentence-enforcement judge may provide for the sentence to be served under home detention with electronic surveillance either for sentences totalling no more than two years or where the time left to serve totals no more than two years.) The parallel with Najib is concrete rather than decorative: with the remainder of his reduced term running to August 2028, the time left to serve is roughly two years, exactly the window in which a French enforcement judge would have jurisdiction to consider the same measure, on medical, family, professional or reintegration grounds, with an electronic bracelet, curfew hours and the consent of the household.
French judges who refuse adjustment must also explain themselves, and the Court of Cassation checks the homework. On 28 January 2026, in ruling number 25-83.823, the Criminal Chamber quashed a Cayenne sentence-enforcement appeal ruling that had declared a sentence-adjustment request inadmissible and, in the alternative, dismissed the subsidiary requests for semi-liberty or outside placement without saying why. The appeal alleged “la violation des articles 593 et 723-1 du code de procédure pénale” (violation of Articles 593 and 723-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), complaining that the lower court had ruled “par des motifs insuffisants” (on insufficient grounds), and the Court agreed: a request for semi-liberty or outside placement cannot be swept aside in silence. The lesson for the Najib file is procedural but real. In France, the decision to keep a man in prison when the law offers a door home must be reasoned, reviewable and appealable; a pardon board’s silence or a minister’s designation order would not survive French judicial review unless a judge had verified the conditions. Malaysia’s gazette mechanism reaches a similar practical result, but through executive rather than judicial hands, which is precisely the difference a French lawyer would stress before any international audience.
Two further French instruments complete the mirror. First, conditional release. Article 729 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states its purpose upfront: “La libération conditionnelle tend à la réinsertion des condamnés et à la prévention de la récidive.” (Conditional release serves the reintegration of convicts and the prevention of reoffending.) It is available to prisoners who show serious reintegration efforts and justify work, family life, medical treatment, compensation of victims or another serious plan, and, as a rule, “la libération conditionnelle peut être accordée lorsque la durée de la peine accomplie par le condamné est au moins égale à la durée de la peine lui restant à subir.” (it may be granted once the time served at least equals the time remaining.) Najib, more than four years into custody with about two years left, would mathematically sit inside the French eligibility window, though French practice would weigh reintegration efforts and victim compensation far more heavily than public collections to pay a fine. Note also the safety valve in Article 132-23 of the Criminal Code: “En cas de condamnation à une peine privative de liberté, non assortie du sursis, dont la durée est égale ou supérieure à dix ans” (for unsuspended prison terms of ten years or more), a security period can bar adjustment measures entirely, a reminder that French law is indulgent toward short remainders and severe toward long ones, which is why the fifteen-year December 2025 sentence would, in a French courtroom, belong to a different universe from the SRC remainder.
Second, the money. France would treat the billions, not the bedroom, as the main battlefield. Article 131-21 of the Criminal Code makes confiscation automatic in serious cases: “La peine complémentaire de confiscation est encourue dans les cas prévus par la loi ou le règlement. Elle est également encourue de plein droit pour les crimes et pour les délits punis d’une peine d’emprisonnement d’une durée supérieure à un an, à l’exception des délits de presse.” (Confiscation as an additional penalty applies where the statute provides and automatically for felonies and for misdemeanours punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, except press offences.) Seized assets are managed by a dedicated national agency, since Article 706-160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts it with administration on judicial mandate: “L’agence est chargée d’assurer, sur l’ensemble du territoire et sur mandat de justice : 1° La gestion de tous les biens, quelle que soit leur nature, saisis, confisqués ou faisant l’objet d’une mesure conservatoire au cours d’une procédure pénale” (The agency manages, nationwide and on judicial mandate, all property, of whatever nature, seized, confiscated or frozen in criminal proceedings.) Malaysia’s reported recovery of 31.3 billion ringgit, nearly three-quarters of identified assets, is the product of the same logic pursued through American forfeiture, Singaporean and Swiss orders and bank settlements. And the scale of punishment available in France for the underlying corruption would surprise readers who assume French penalties are mild: Article 432-11 of the Criminal Code punishes a public official who solicits or accepts an undue advantage with “Est puni de dix ans d’emprisonnement et d’une amende de 1 000 000 €, dont le montant peut être porté au double du produit tiré de l’infraction” (ten years of imprisonment and a fine of 1,000,000 euros, which may be raised to twice the proceeds of the offence), for acting, abstaining or abusing influence “pour accomplir ou avoir accompli, pour s’abstenir ou s’être abstenue d’accomplir un acte de sa fonction, de sa mission ou de son mandat” (to perform or refrain from performing an act of office), while Article 433-1 punishes anyone who offers the bribe with the same ten years and the same million, since it covers “le fait, par quiconque, de proposer sans droit, à tout moment, directement ou indirectement, des offres, des promesses, des dons, des présents ou des avantages quelconques” (the act, by anyone, of offering without right, at any time, directly or indirectly, any offers, promises, gifts or advantages). A French court sentencing the equivalent of the SRC file would therefore start from ten years and a fine that can double the proceeds, before confiscation takes the rest. The Malaysian figures, twelve years then fifteen, plus fines in the hundreds of millions and billions, sit comfortably above the French ceiling, which tells its own story about how seriously Kuala Lumpur ultimately treated the affair.
Conclusion
The house in Kuala Lumpur where police cars parked on 18 September 2026 is, in law, a prison with a garden. That is the correct reading in both systems: the Malaysian pardon remits the remaining SRC custodial term without touching the conviction, the December 2025 fifteen-year sentence, or the appeal now running its course, and the French doctrine says exactly the same thing in one sentence of the Criminal Code: a pardon only exempts the convict from serving the sentence, nothing more. Three practical consequences follow for anyone watching the file from abroad. First, the appeal in the main 1MDB trial is now the whole case: an acquittal would transform the house arrest into a footnote, while confirmation of fifteen years and a 2.8-billion-dollar fine would send Najib back behind real walls and reopen the asset-recovery war on a new scale. Second, the money remains the measure of justice done: 31.3 billion ringgit recovered out of an estimated 4.5-billion-dollar fraud is a remarkable enforcement result by any global standard, and France’s confiscation machinery exists to produce exactly that kind of outcome when the funds transit through Paris, Geneva or Singapore. Third, procedure is what separates clemency from favour: a French judge could order the same home detention for the same two-year remainder, but only by reasoned decision, only with a bracelet and conditions, and only subject to appeal, which is why the 9 September 2026 ruling on the Malagasy pardon deserves to travel as widely as the pardon it recognized. Pardons end sentences; they do not end cases. The 1MDB case, with its fugitive financier, its convicted bankers, its billions half-recovered and its main appeal pending, is very far from ended.