On Tuesday 8 September 2026, the Bank of Russia announced that it had sued the European Union in the General Court in Luxembourg over the indefinite freeze of roughly 230 billion dollars of Moscow’s sovereign reserves, as reported by Courthouse News on 13 September 2026. The claim, filed the previous Friday, attacks the Council’s vote of 12 December 2025 that immobilised the assets until the war in Ukraine ends and Russia pays reparations. For the first time, the central bank of a major state asks an EU court to annul the legal architecture of the freeze itself, rather than seeking a personal delisting like the sanctioned businessmen who usually appear before the Luxembourg judges. The case raises three questions that matter far beyond Moscow: on what legal basis the Union can freeze a foreign central bank’s reserves by majority vote, whether sovereign immunity protects those reserves, and what a Russian victory would concretely change for the custodians, banks and courts in France that apply the freeze every day. This analysis answers them from the texts themselves, read in full: the EU regulation, the French immunity case law and the procedural rules of the annulment action.
The stakes explain the virality of the story. Most of the frozen funds sit at Euroclear in Belgium, but the enforcement chain runs through every Member State, including France, where banks, custodians and enforcement judges implement EU restrictive measures daily. Moscow pairs its Luxembourg action with a parallel suit against Euroclear before the Moscow Arbitration Court, where it claims around 232 billion dollars including lost returns, and it openly threatens retaliatory measures against Western assets in Russia. The European Commission says it is fully confident in the legality of the freeze. Between these two certainties, the General Court will have to decide points of law that no EU court has ever ruled on: the validity of an indefinite immobilisation of third-state sovereign reserves adopted under the emergency clause of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. For companies holding frozen funds, for banks managing them and for lawyers advising on enforcement, the judgment will set the reference.
I. Why Russia’s Central Bank Sued in Luxembourg and What It Must Prove to Annul the Freeze
A. Which EU Decision of December 2025 Ordered the Indefinite Freeze of 230 Billion Dollars of Reserves
The contested act is Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 on emergency measures addressing the serious economic difficulties caused by Russia’s actions in the context of the war of aggression against Ukraine (OJ L 2025/2600), published in OJ L 2025/2600 on 13 December 2025. Its operative core is a prohibition drafted in absolute terms: it bans any direct or indirect transfer of the assets or reserves of the Central Bank of Russia and of any legal person, entity or body acting on its behalf or at its direction, expressly including the Russian National Wealth Fund. The recitals explain the purpose in equally blunt language: as a temporary measure, no direct or indirect transfer of the assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia and related entities should occur, so that those resources can never be moved to or for the benefit of the bank and ultimately Russia.
Three features of the regulation shape the whole dispute. First, the freeze is open-ended: the measures last as long as making significant resources available to Russia poses or threatens serious economic difficulties within the Union, and they are discontinued only where Russia ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine, provides reparations to Ukraine to the extent necessary to allow for reconstruction without economic and financial consequences for the Union, and the serious risk to the Union economy has objectively ceased. Moscow reads this as an indefinite confiscation in all but name, since the release conditions depend on political events entirely outside any judicial control. Second, the legal basis is unusual. The visa cites the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular its Article 122(1), together with the Commission proposal. Article 122 allows the Council, on a Commission proposal and in a spirit of solidarity between the Member States, to decide measures appropriate to the economic situation, particularly where serious difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably energy. The Union therefore acted by qualified majority under an emergency economic clause, not under the sanctions clause of Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which requires a prior Common Foreign and Security Policy decision adopted by unanimity. Russia’s central bank argues, according to its public statement, that the 27 national leaders violated EU law by passing the resolution by majority vote and bypassing the usual unanimity requirement. That procedural plea will likely be the first ground of the annulment action, because it targets the competence of the author and the lawfulness of the procedure rather than the political merits of the freeze.
Third, the regulation anticipates the property-rights objection and answers it in advance. It states that the measures fully respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular the right to property read together with the proportionality clause, because they are justified by and proportionate to the objectives pursued. And it draws a sharp line around what counts as sovereign property: the cash balances accumulating on the balance sheets of the holding financial institutions as a result of the transfer prohibition do not belong to the Central Bank of Russia and do not constitute sovereign assets. The same recital insists that the transfer prohibition stays temporary, reversible and subject to periodic review. In other words, Brussels concedes nothing on ownership of the principal but denies that the windfall profits accumulating at Euroclear belong to Moscow at all, which is the legal foundation of the windfall-profits transfer schemes. A French-speaking reader should note the vocabulary: the Union prohibits transfers rather than ordering confiscation, and every paragraph insists on the temporary and reversible character of the regime. The General Court will test whether that drafting survives the Bank of Russia’s claim that a freeze with no foreseeable end is, in substance, an expropriation.
The political context, documented by Courthouse News, completes the picture. The Union froze Russia’s sovereign funds shortly after the invasion of February 2022, most of them held at the Belgium-based Euroclear depository. Before the December 2025 vote, EU leaders considered channelling the frozen funds to Ukraine as a loan, then retreated over Belgium’s fears that seizure would be deemed unlawful, settling instead on a 90-billion-euro loan package to Ukraine backed by EU funds. The Bank of Russia’s suit was not yet visible on the General Court register when the story broke, which is normal: registration and the assignment of a case number take days or weeks. Alongside Luxembourg, Moscow sues Euroclear in the Moscow Arbitration Court, seeking around 232 billion dollars covering the assets and compensation for lost returns, after a closed-door preliminary hearing in January 2026. Euroclear says it faces more than 100 claims in Russia, and Russian private investors caught in the freeze reportedly hope to join the central bank’s case. A Moscow judgment, however, would not be enforceable in the Union given the sanctions in place since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, a point the lawyers quoted in the press do not dispute. The Luxembourg action is therefore the only one that can bite, because only the General Court can annul the EU act at its source.
B. How an Annulment Action Before the General Court Works and What Moscow Must Prove
The procedural vehicle is the action for annulment of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Court of Justice of the European Union reviews the legality of legislative acts and of acts of the Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, as well as acts of the European Parliament and the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Any natural or legal person may challenge an act addressed to it or of direct and individual concern to it, as well as a regulatory act of direct concern that entails no implementing measures. The Bank of Russia, though an organ of a third state, is a legal person whose reserves are named by the regulation, so admissibility looks plausible: the freeze designates its assets directly and no national implementing measure is needed, since EU regulations apply directly in every Member State. The hard deadline is two months from publication of the act, its notification to the applicant or, failing that, the day the applicant learned of it. Published on 13 December 2025, the regulation would long be time-barred for a December challenge, but the Bank of Russia states it filed in September 2026, which suggests it relies on a later amending or prolonging act, on the theory of a continuing measure confirmed by periodic review, or on knowledge acquired later. Expect the Council to open its defence with a plea of inadmissibility based on delay, and expect Moscow to answer that each renewal of an indefinite freeze reopens the clock. That preliminary battle alone could take a year.
On the merits, four pleas are foreseeable, mirroring the standard grammar of EU sanctions litigation. Lack of competence and misuse of legal basis: the Council used the emergency economic clause when, Moscow will argue, only the sanctions procedure with unanimous foreign-policy backing could immobilise third-state reserves, so the choice of Article 122 circumvents the veto that Belgium, Hungary or Slovakia could otherwise exercise. Infringement of essential procedural requirements: adoption by qualified majority where unanimity was allegedly required. Infringement of the treaties and of any rule of law relating to their application: violation of the right to property under Article 17 of the Charter, of proportionality, and of the customary international law of state immunity, which Moscow will present as a rule binding the Union. And misuse of powers cannot be excluded if the Bank of Russia can show the emergency justification masks a punitive confiscation. The standard of review matters enormously here. In sanctions cases the EU courts grant the Council broad discretion for complex economic and political assessments but exercise full review of procedural guarantees, statement of reasons and manifest errors. The regulation carries a long statement of reasons, including the airspace violations over Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania and Latvia invoked to show a pattern of hybrid pressure, and the figures on Union defence spending rising to 270 billion euros in 2024. A French practitioner should read this as a classic asymmetry: the Council’s economics will be hard to overturn, while the legal-basis and competence points are pure questions of law where the Court shows no deference.
Two practical points complete the procedural map. First, interim relief: the Bank of Russia could seek suspension of the freeze pending judgment, but suspension requires urgency and a prima facie case, and the judge balances the applicant’s harm against the Union’s interest. Given the sums and the war context, suspension looks unlikely, though the request itself would force the Council to disclose parts of its file early. Second, appeal lies to the Court of Justice on points of law, and the whole cycle from filing to final judgment typically spans two to four years, during which the freeze keeps producing effects. The Commission publicly states its full confidence in the legality of the regulation and its compatibility with EU law, signalling no willingness to settle. For observers in Paris, the timeline means French custodians and debtors will live under the current regime for years whatever happens in Luxembourg, and every French enforcement file touching Russian sovereign money must be built to survive both outcomes.
II. Can Sovereign Immunity and Property Rights Defeat the Freeze and What Would Change in France
A. Does Sovereign Immunity Shield Central Bank Reserves From a European Asset Freeze
Sovereign immunity is the Bank of Russia’s most intuitive argument and, paradoxically, its most fragile before an EU court. In French law, the protection of foreign state property is exceptionally strong, and the Cour de cassation has refined it through a decade of litigation between the Republic of Congo and its creditors. The starting point for central bank money is Article L. 153-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, which provides: “Ne peuvent être saisis les biens de toute nature, notamment les avoirs de réserves de change, que les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères détiennent ou gèrent pour leur compte ou celui de l’Etat ou des Etats étrangers dont elles relèvent. Par exception aux dispositions du premier alinéa, le créancier muni d’un titre exécutoire constatant une créance liquide et exigible peut solliciter du juge de l’exécution l’autorisation de poursuivre l’exécution forcée dans les conditions prévues par la partie législative du code des procédures civiles d’exécution s’il établit que les biens détenus ou gérés pour son propre compte par la banque centrale ou l’autorité monétaire étrangère font partie d’un patrimoine qu’elle affecte à une activité principale relevant du droit privé.” On 12 May 2021, the First Civil Chamber upheld this shield in Commisimpex v Republic of Congo, pourvoi No. 19-13.853, holding that the non-seizability of central bank assets exists by reason of the nature of the property, to guarantee the functioning of monetary institutions, independently of the immunity from execution recognised to foreign states: “L’insaisissabilité prévue à l’alinéa 1 de l’article L. 153-1 du code monétaire et financier est instituée, en raison de la nature des biens concernés, afin de garantir le fonctionnement de ces banques et autorités monétaires, indépendamment de l’immunité d’exécution reconnue aux Etats étrangers.” The Court added that although the shield interferes with the creditor’s right to enforcement and property, it pursues a legitimate aim, preserving institutions that contribute to monetary policy and preventing a blockage of foreign-exchange reserves placed in France, and it is proportionate because it covers only assets held in France by foreign central banks, not the whole patrimony of the state: “Si cette insaisissabilité constitue une ingérence dans l’exercice du droit à l’exécution et du droit de propriété du créancier, elle poursuit un but légitime en ce qu’elle vise à préserver le fonctionnement d’institutions qui concourent à la définition et à la mise en oeuvre de la politique monétaire et à prévenir un blocage des réserves de change placées en France. Elle se trouve proportionnée, dès lors qu’elle ne s’applique qu’aux valeurs ou biens détenus en France par les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères et non à l’ensemble du patrimoine de l’Etat ou des Etats étrangers dont elles relèvent.” The appeal was therefore rejected: “REJETTE le pourvoi.”
The general regime confirms the pattern. Article L. 111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures requires prior judicial authorisation for any enforcement against foreign state property: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.” Article L. 111-1-2 of the same code then lists the only three doors: express consent of the state, earmarking of the asset for the claim, or a judgment or arbitral award against the state plus an asset specifically used for non-public commercial purposes with a link to the entity sued: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie : 1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure ; 2° L’Etat concerné a réservé ou affecté ce bien à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de la procédure ; 3° Lorsqu’un jugement ou une sentence arbitrale a été rendu contre l’Etat concerné et que le bien en question est spécifiquement utilisé ou destiné à être utilisé par ledit Etat autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales et entretient un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée.” Diplomatic property enjoys near-absolute protection under Article L. 111-1-3: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.” The case law applies these texts strictly. On 3 February 2021, in Commisimpex v Republic of Congo, pourvoi No. 19-10.669, the Court recalled that under customary international law, foreign diplomatic missions enjoy immunity from execution, waivable only expressly and specially: “Selon le droit international coutumier, les missions diplomatiques des Etats étrangers bénéficient, pour le fonctionnement de la représentation de l’Etat accréditaire, d’une immunité d’exécution à laquelle il ne peut être renoncé que de façon expresse et spéciale (1re Civ., 28 septembre 2011, pourvoi n° 09-72.057, Bull. 2011, I, n° 153 ; 1re Civ., 28 mars 2013, pourvois n° 10-25.938, n° 11-10.450 et n° 11-13.323, Bull. 2013, I, n° 62 à 64 ; 1re Civ., 10 janvier 2018, pourvoi n° 16-22.494, Bull. 2018, I, n° 2).” That immunity extends to mission bank accounts, presumed assigned to sovereign needs: “Cette immunité s’étend, notamment, aux fonds déposés sur les comptes bancaires des missions diplomatiques, lesquels sont présumés être affectés aux besoins de la mission de souveraineté de l’Etat accréditaire.” The presumption yields only to contrary proof by any means, and the creditor in that case proved nothing. On 13 March 2024, in Republic of Congo v Commisimpex, pourvoi No. 21-17.599, concerning the seizure of an aircraft, the Court restated that under customary principles reflected in the United Nations Convention of 2 December 2004 on state immunities, express waiver of immunity from execution suffices for any state asset, with no additional special waiver required: “Selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale.” But it immediately fenced off diplomatic assets under Article 22(3) of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961, and ordered strict reading of Article L. 111-1-3: “Toutefois, selon l’article 22, § 3 de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961, les locaux de la mission, leur ameublement et les autres objets qui s’y trouvent, ainsi que les moyens de transport de la mission, ne peuvent faire l’objet d’aucune saisie ou mesure d’exécution.” And on 12 June 2025, the Second Civil Chamber in Republic of Congo v Orange and Commisimpex, pourvois No. 21-11.991, rejected the Congolese appeals against real-estate seizures by grounding its analysis in the Vienna Convention, whose preamble recalls that immunities exist not to benefit individuals but to ensure the effective performance of diplomatic functions, and whose Article 22 makes mission premises inviolable: “Les locaux de la mission sont inviolables.” The line is now stable: French judges protect diplomatic and central-bank property fiercely, demand express waivers, and let the rest be seized only through the narrow doors of the statute.
Transposed to Luxembourg, this French shield helps Moscow less than it seems. The EU freeze is not a French saisie-attribution authorised by an enforcement judge; it is a directly applicable Union prohibition addressed to all holders of the reserves. State immunity from execution, as construed in Paris, binds courts ordering seizures, not legislators prohibiting transfers, and the Union will argue that immobilising reserves for foreign-policy and emergency-economic reasons is an act of public authority falling outside any creditor-debtor enforcement logic. The 2004 United Nations Convention on state immunities, which Moscow invokes, has not gathered enough ratifications to enter into force as a treaty, a weakness the press coverage itself flags, though France applies its substance as customary law. Russia also invokes a 1989 investment-protection agreement concluded by the Soviet Union with Belgium and Luxembourg, arguing the freeze breaches it, but a bilateral investment treaty protects investors against expropriation, not a central bank against macro-financial emergency measures, and the Union is not even a party to that agreement. The strongest immunity-flavoured argument is therefore the property one under the Charter and Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, whose first article guarantees everyone respect for their possessions, permits deprivation only in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided by law and the general principles of international law, and preserves the right of states to regulate the use of property in the general interest. Whether an indefinite, condition-laden freeze amounts to a deprivation of property or a mere regulation of use, and whether war, reparations clauses and periodic review make it proportionate, will be the doctrinal heart of the judgment. The Commisimpex proportionality reasoning shows how a court can accept a severe interference where the aim is legitimate and the scope bounded; Luxembourg may well reason the same way about Union economic security, or distinguish a private creditor’s enforcement from a state’s war-linked immobilisation.
B. What a Russian Victory in Luxembourg Would Change in France, From Euroclear to Enforcement
Assume the General Court annuls Regulation 2025/2600, in whole or in the transfer prohibition. The effect would be immediate and Union-wide: an annulled act disappears retroactively, and every holder of frozen reserves, from Euroclear in Brussels to French custodian banks, would lose the legal basis for refusing transfers, unless the Court suspends the effects of its judgment pending appeal or replacement legislation. The Council would almost certainly appeal to the Court of Justice and request that the effects be maintained, and it could re-adopt equivalent measures on a corrected legal basis, possibly the sanctions route with unanimity, within months. For France, the practical sequence would run through three layers. First, the regulatory layer: EU regulations apply directly, so French banks would adjust the day the judgment becomes operative, under instructions from the Treasury’s freeze unit and their compliance departments, with no French statute needed. Second, the contractual layer: loan, custody and collateral agreements referencing the frozen status would need renegotiation, and parties that suffered losses from the freeze, from coupon streams to failed settlements, would quantify damages against custodians who had merely obeyed Union law. Third, the judicial layer: French enforcement judges, who today must refuse any transfer of the reserves, would face applications to release funds, each requiring the prior judicial authorisation of Article L. 111-1-1 and proof that one of the three doors of Article L. 111-1-2 is open. A Luxembourg annulment removes the European padlock but does not open the French door: the immunity statutes and the Commisimpex case law would still govern every saisie in Paris, and Russia would still need express waivers or commercial-use proof for each asset. That distinction, between the end of the freeze and the availability of the money to creditors, is the point most commentaries miss.
The mirror scenario matters just as much: if Moscow loses, or while the case drags on for years, France remains a front line of enforcement. The regulation itself arms French judges with a striking procedural weapon: in any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the burden of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited falls on the person seeking enforcement. Any claimant seeking to enforce against Russian-linked funds before the Paris enforcement court must therefore prove a negative, that payment would not violate the transfer prohibition, which in practice means tracing the beneficial ownership and the custody chain document by document. Lawyers bringing exequatur proceedings for arbitral awards against Russia in Paris should build that proof from day one, because the burden reversal applies in any enforcement proceedings without exception. Meanwhile the parallel Moscow track changes nothing in France: a Russian judgment condemning Euroclear to pay 232 billion dollars cannot be declared enforceable by a French court while Union law prohibits the transfer and while recognition would manifestly clash with French international public policy. The lawyers quoted in the American press concede the equivalent point for the Union. As for retaliation, Moscow’s threats against Western assets in Russia concern Russian domestic law and Russian courts; they create leverage in negotiations but no defence before the General Court, which judges only the legality of the EU act. The often-cited 1989 Soviet-era agreement with Belgium and Luxembourg would at most support a state-to-state claim, not an annulment, and the Union will answer that emergency economic measures in wartime are a textbook exercise of public authority, not an expropriation of a protected investment.
For companies and counsel operating in Paris, the file yields five operational lessons pending judgment. First, calendar the Luxembourg docket: registration, defence, reply, hearing and judgment, then the appeal window, because each step moves the probability of release and the pricing of frozen-asset risk. Second, map every French touchpoint now: accounts, securities, coupons and collateral chains passing through French custodians, since any future release or enforcement will be litigated asset by asset before the Paris enforcement judge under Articles L. 111-1-1 to L. 111-1-3. Third, keep the two tracks separate: the fate of the EU prohibition in Luxembourg and the immunity analysis in Paris obey different statutes, different judges and different burdens of proof, and winning one does not win the other. Fourth, document ownership negatively: any enforcement application should already contain the paper trail proving the funds are not Central Bank of Russia reserves, given the reversed burden of proof. Fifth, watch the re-adoption risk: even a total annulment on the Article 122 legal-basis ground would likely be followed within months by a unanimous sanctions-based replacement, so commercial planning should treat a Russian victory as a window, not a new normal. The firms that prepare both branches, release and renewed freeze, will be the ones able to move money the day the law moves.
Conclusion
The Bank of Russia’s Luxembourg gamble is the most serious legal attack ever mounted against the European frozen-assets regime, and its interest lies less in the probable outcome than in the questions the General Court can no longer avoid. Can an indefinite immobilisation of a third state’s central-bank reserves rest on an emergency economic vote taken by majority, bypassing the unanimity rule of foreign policy? Is a freeze without foreseeable end a temporary reversible measure or a disguised expropriation of sovereign property? Do the windfall profits sitting on Euroclear’s balance sheet belong to Moscow, to no one, or to Ukraine’s reconstruction? The regulation answers each question in advance, with unusual candour, and the Court will now verify whether those answers hold. French law, through the Commisimpex saga and its strict immunity statutes, shows how judges can protect sovereign money while letting creditors through narrow, proof-heavy doors, and that balance will shape every Parisian consequence of the Luxembourg ruling. Whatever the judgment, years away, the method for practitioners is fixed: track the annulment pleas in Luxembourg, prepare the enforcement proof in Paris, and never confuse the end of a freeze with the seizure of the funds. Readers facing a frozen-assets file should take advice before moving a single euro, because under the current regulation the burden of proving legality already rests on the claimant.