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Vanuatu Drags France Before the World Court Over Matthew and Hunter Islands: Consent, Sovereignty and 350,000 km2 of Pacific Ocean

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Vanuatu Drags France Before the World Court Over Matthew and Hunter Islands: Consent, Sovereignty and 350,000 km2 of Pacific Ocean

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On 1 September 2026, the Republic of Vanuatu filed an application before the International Court of Justice in The Hague asking the Court to settle a sovereignty dispute with France over two uninhabited volcanic islands in the South Pacific, Matthew and Hunter, and to draw one maritime boundary covering both the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of the two States off New Caledonia. The case is remarkable for one procedural reason: Vanuatu does not claim that France has already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. It expressly invites France to accept it now, under the forum prorogatum procedure of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. The Registry transmitted the application to Paris and confirmed that no step will be taken, and the case will not even enter the General List, unless France consents. Paris has acknowledged receipt and says it will answer on jurisdiction and on the merits, while reaffirming its sovereignty at the Pacific Islands Forum in Palau. Behind two rocks of less than one square kilometre lies an exclusive economic zone of 350,000 square kilometres, a rivalry between the United States and China for influence in the Pacific, an unfinished round of bilateral talks, and a newly assertive small island State that already changed international law once, when it carried the climate advisory opinion to the Court. For shipowners, fishing operators and lawyers working with New Caledonia, the dispute is not academic: it determines who licenses fishing, who prosecutes offences at sea, and which courts decide. This article explains the consent mechanism Vanuatu has triggered, the fallback through the United Nations General Assembly, how the Court approaches sovereignty over remote islands, and what the coming maritime boundary would change in practice.

I. Can Vanuatu Force France Into Court Without Paris Saying Yes?

A. Why Vanuatu Had to Ask for Consent First: Article 38, Paragraph 5, and the Djibouti Precedent

Vanuatu puts sovereignty first and delimitation second, because without sovereignty over the islands there is no French maritime entitlement to delimit against, and without French consent there is no case at all. The Registry recalls the mechanics of Article 38, paragraph 5: the application is transmitted to the respondent State, it is not entered in the General List, and no action is taken in the proceedings unless and until that State consents to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purposes of the case. The consequence for Vanuatu is binary. Either Paris says yes, in whole or in part, and a case begins; or Paris stays silent or refuses, and the file sleeps in the Registry.

This mechanism, called forum prorogatum, is the only door still open when the respondent has given no advance consent. The leading precedent also involves France. In the case concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Djibouti filed against France in August 2006 by invoking Article 38, paragraph 5, France accepted, and the Court delivered its judgment on the merits in June 2008. That judgment remains the clearest exposition of the procedure. The Court explained that consent is the foundation of its jurisdiction, that consent may be deduced from certain conduct under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, and that for forum prorogatum the consent must be explicit or clearly deducible from the conduct of the State concerned. It recalled that the 1978 provision lets an applicant file its claims and invite the respondent to consent, without prejudice to the sound administration of justice. It stressed the other side of the coin: the requested State is entirely free to answer as it sees fit, and may, when consenting, define the parts of the dispute it agrees to submit. The judgment also notes its own historic character as the first merits decision on an application filed under Article 38, paragraph 5. Vanuatu against France would be only the second.

France therefore holds every card on procedure. It may consent to the whole dispute, consent only to delimitation and not to sovereignty, attach conditions, or refuse outright. It may also simply stay silent, in which case nothing happens. Paris has so far chosen a middle posture. Speaking at the Pacific Islands Forum hosted by Palau in early September 2026, the head of the French delegation, the junior minister for the French-speaking world, described the French stance as clear and firm, open to dialogue, and above all a reaffirmation of French sovereignty over the two islands. France acknowledges Vanuatu filing and will respond on jurisdiction and on the substance. For a respondent, that formula keeps all options open: contest jurisdiction first, defend the merits in the alternative, and continue bilateral talks in parallel. The minister added the political red line: France is ready to discuss, negotiate and seek solutions, but relinquishing sovereignty was never on the table. Anyone advising a client with interests in the area should read that sentence as the frame of everything that follows: France will talk boundaries, it will not bargain sovereignty.

B. What Happens If France Says No: the General Assembly Advisory-Opinion Road

If Paris refuses consent, the contentious case dies before birth. Vanuatu has already named its second arrow. Its environment minister told the Palau forum that if France does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court, Vanuatu can seek an advisory opinion through a majority vote in the United Nations General Assembly. The statement deserves attention because the Assembly holds its high-level week in New York in this very month of September 2026, and Vanuatu knows the advisory route works: it was the State that carried the request for the climate advisory opinion, and it watched Mauritius walk the same path in the Chagos case. An advisory opinion does not bind France the way a judgment would, but it declares the law, and a declaration of the law by the principal judicial organ of the United Nations reshapes every negotiation that follows.

The Chagos advisory opinion of 25 February 2019 is the template. Asked about the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, the Court agreed to answer by twelve votes to two. On the substance, the opinion gave self-determination its full contemporary force. The Court treated the 1960 decolonization declaration of the General Assembly, resolution 1514, as the defining moment in the consolidation of decolonization practice, and as declaratory of self-determination as a customary rule given its content and the conditions of its adoption. The operative consequence was that the administering Power had to end its administration of the archipelago as rapidly as possible and that all Member States had to cooperate with the United Nations to complete the decolonization of Mauritius. The administering Power did not leave the day after, but the opinion transformed the dispute: Mauritius ultimately recovered the archipelago by agreement, the opinion is cited in every decolonization argument since, and no administering Power can treat it as a dead letter. Vanuatu message to Paris is transparent: a refusal of contentious jurisdiction does not end the story, it moves it to New York, where France would have to oppose a resolution, count votes, and then live with an opinion that, on the Chagos model, would likely frame the islands through decolonization and self-determination.

Three features make the threat credible. First, Vanuatu has already demonstrated that it can assemble a General Assembly majority on a legal question, which is exactly what the climate campaign proved. Second, the decolonization argument writes itself: France and the United Kingdom jointly administered the New Hebrides condominium, Vanuatu became independent in 1980 and has claimed the islands ever since, and France kept them. Third, the timing coincides with a Court whose docket is visibly centred on occupation, self-determination and State responsibility: in early September 2026 the Court closed four days of public hearings in the case brought by Nicaragua against Germany concerning alleged breaches of obligations in the occupied Palestinian territory, and on 22 September 2026 it recorded the withdrawal by Colombia of its intervention in the genocide case brought by South Africa against Israel over Gaza. A Vanuatu request for an advisory opinion would arrive before judges and diplomats already immersed in these questions. France best defence against that scenario is not silence but engagement: negotiate seriously enough that a majority sees no need for an opinion, or consent to a tightly framed contentious case that keeps the questions, the timetable and the remedies inside the courtroom rather than in the Assembly hall.

II. What Is Really at Stake: Two Volcanic Rocks and a Maritime Fortune Off New Caledonia

A. How the Court Decides Who Owns a Remote Island: Paper Titles, Effectivites and Self-Determination After Chagos

The geography is modest and the economics are not. Matthew and Hunter are uninhabited volcanic islands lying several hundred kilometres east of New Caledonia. Vanuatu has claimed them since independence in 1980. Their combined area is less than one square kilometre, yet they generate for France an exclusive economic zone of 350,000 square kilometres in waters where the United States and China compete for influence, where fisheries are policed and where seabed resources will one day be licensed. That ratio, a speck of land commanding an ocean, explains why neither side will yield and why the legal argument will be fought on three levels: inherited titles, physical acts of administration, and the decolonization lens through which the Court now reads such disputes.

The inherited-titles level turns on the colonial record. The New Hebrides were governed as an Anglo-French condominium, and the question is what each colonial Power did with Matthew and Hunter before 1980 and what Vanuatu inherited at independence. France points to continuous administration; Vanuatu answers that the islands were never lawfully detached from the territory that became independent. The Court method in island cases is well settled: it weighs competing paper titles, then weighs the concrete display of State authority, the effectivites, such as legislation, naval visits, weather stations, rescue operations and the policing of foreign fishermen, and it discounts acts performed after the dispute crystallised. Neither party has published its memorial, because there is no case yet, but the French file can already be sketched: decades of control, inclusion of the islands in French administrative and maritime practice, and a 2025 bilateral negotiation on maritime boundaries that presupposes, in the French view, two good-faith neighbours delimiting rather than one occupant denying. Vanuatu file, as sketched by its ministers, rests on succession: the islands belonged to the colonial territory, the people that became independent never consented to their separation, and administration by France since 1980 cannot cure a defect of title. In May 2026, the Vanuatu prime minister gave the political version of that argument when he accused France of colonialism and warned that his country would use every diplomatic and international legal avenue if talks broke down. The September application is the execution of that warning.

The decolonization level is where Chagos bites. Before 2019, an administering Power could argue that a small detached dependency was a separate matter from the independence of the main territory. After the opinion, the presumption runs the other way: the right to self-determination crystallised as custom around the 1960 decolonization declaration, detachment without the free and genuine will of the people concerned taints the title, and every Member State must cooperate to complete decolonization. France will answer that Matthew and Hunter were never inhabited, so no population was denied a choice, and that the situation differs fundamentally from Mauritius, where an entire people lost part of its archipelago on the eve of independence. Vanuatu will answer that uninhabited does not mean unattached: the islands were part of the colonial whole, they were used by the people of the region, and self-determination protects the territorial integrity of the non-self-governing unit, not only inhabited parcels. The Court has never ruled on an uninhabited Franco-Vanuatuan dependency, which means both sides argue from analogy, and analogy favours the party that frames the question. Whoever defines the relevant unit, the condominium or the two islands in isolation, largely decides the outcome.

Domestic politics add a fourth level that lawyers ignore at their peril. In December 2025, the French government had to deny that it was preparing to cede sovereignty after the far-right leader accused the President of planning to give up overseas territories. In July 2026, a surprise alliance handed the non-independence camp control of the New Caledonian congress. The bilateral talks on maritime boundaries that began in 2025 were supposed to continue in early 2026 and were postponed to avoid colliding with the New Caledonian elections. A government that negotiates over islands in the Pacific while New Caledonia itself debates its future exposes itself at home, and Vanuatu knows it. The legal consequence is practical: any settlement touching sovereignty would pass through the French Parliament and would be tested against the constitutional requirement of popular consent for territorial changes. France negotiates boundaries with one hand and guards sovereignty with the other, exactly as its minister said in Palau.

B. The Single Maritime Boundary With New Caledonia and Why French Operators Should Care Now

The second half of Vanuatu application asks the Court to draw one boundary covering both the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of the two States. That single line is a term of art. Where zones and shelf overlap between opposite or adjacent coasts, the Court increasingly draws one line for both layers rather than two, starting from a provisional equidistance line and adjusting it for relevant circumstances such as coastal geography, proportionality and the treatment of small islands whose full effect would distort the result. The Court demonstrated the exercise recently between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, fixing single boundaries in two oceans and setting out the course of the Caribbean line by reference to precise paragraphs of its judgment. Transposed to the Coral Sea, the method opens three sub-questions: the weight given to Matthew and Hunter themselves, which generate 350,000 square kilometres if given full effect and almost nothing if enclaved or discounted; the weight of the much longer coastline of Grande Terre in New Caledonia; and the treatment of the shelf beyond 200 miles, where geology joins geography. Each answer moves the line by tens of miles, and each mile decides who licenses a fishing vessel, who taxes a catch, and who prosecutes an offence.

French domestic law already equips the State to police whatever zone results, and a very recent decision of the Court of Cassation shows how Paris judges handle the articulation between French maritime decrees and the law of the sea. On 16 June 2026, the criminal chamber, seized of appeal number 24-86.030, quashed a discharge granted by the Saint-Denis de La Reunion court of appeal to the operator of a French-flagged vessel prosecuted for maritime safety and crewing offences. The court of appeal had treated the place of the offences as uncertain, reasoning that the limits of the exclusive economic zone fixed in French domestic law by the 1978 decrees were not confirmed by international law. The Court of Cassation reasoned from two Criminal Code provisions. The first is article 111-5, under which criminal courts rule on the legality of administrative acts where the criminal outcome depends on it: “Les juridictions pénales sont compétentes pour interpréter les actes administratifs, réglementaires ou individuels et pour en apprécier la légalité lorsque, de cet examen, dépend la solution du procès pénal qui leur est soumis.” The second is article 113-3, the flag-state rule: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises à bord des navires battant un pavillon français, ou à l’encontre de tels navires ou des personnes se trouvant à bord, en quelque lieu qu’ils se trouvent.” Because the vessel flew the French flag, the uncertainty over the zone was legally irrelevant. The operative part therefore reads: “CASSE et ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt susvisé de la cour d’appel de Saint-Denis de La Réunion, en date du 22 août 2024, et pour qu’il soit à nouveau jugé, conformément à la loi ;” followed by: “RENVOIE la cause et les parties devant la cour d’appel de Saint-Denis de La Réunion, autrement composée, à ce désignée par délibération spéciale prise en chambre du conseil ;” The judgment is published on the official site of the Court of Cassation under appeal number 24-86.030 of 16 June 2026. The decrees at the heart of the debate were the two texts of 3 February 1978 taken under the 1976 economic-zone statute: “les décrets n° 78-146 et 78-149 du 3 février 1978 pris en application de la loi n° 76-655 du 16 juillet 1976, relatifs à la zone économique exclusive au large des côtes du territoire de la République”. The lesson for operators around New Caledonia is direct: do not speculate on the future boundary to escape French prosecution, because for French-flagged vessels France prosecutes everywhere.

The enforcement architecture behind that lesson is dense. Sea fishing for profession or leisure, scientific operations and underwater fishing may be subjected to authorisations under article L. 921-1 of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code, which covers “la récolte des végétaux marins, les opérations de pêche à des fins scientifiques” alongside professional and recreational sea fishing, and allows the activity to be framed “pendant des périodes, dans des zones, pour des espèces ou groupe d’espèces et, le cas échéant, avec des engins et pour des volumes déterminés”. Those authorisations serve the objectives of article L. 911-2, which commits French fisheries policy to sustainable exploitation of resources “dans ses eaux sous juridiction ou souveraineté et dans les autres eaux où elle dispose de droits de pêche en vertu d’accords internationaux ou dans les zones de haute mer”. They are issued, under article L. 921-2, “par l’autorité administrative ou sous son contrôle, pour une durée déterminée”, by reference to producer history, market orientation and economic balance. The officers empowered to detect and record infringements include, under article L. 942-1, the maritime-affairs administrators and technical officers, the “commandants, commandants en second ou officiers des bâtiments de la marine nationale”, military maritime-surveillance personnel, and customs officers, since the text provides that the listed agents “sont habilités à rechercher et à constater les infractions prévues et réprimées par le présent livre”. The Transport Code extends the net: article L. 5241-1 makes the chapter applicable to “navires battant pavillon français” as well as to foreign-flagged vessels in French territorial or inland maritime waters or calling at a French port, and article L. 5241-2 provides that “Les règles générales d’entretien et d’exploitation destinées à assurer la sécurité et la sûreté à bord des navires” are set by regulation. In the disputed area, that means French Navy patrols, customs launches and maritime-affairs inspectors already exercise real powers, and any incident, boarding, seizure of catch or detention of a vessel creates a file that a Paris or Noumea lawyer must handle under French criminal and administrative procedure while the sovereignty question remains open in The Hague or New York.

France also continues to build its maritime zones methodically, which tells operators that Paris plays a long game. By a decree of October 2012, France created an exclusive economic zone off the coasts of the Republic in the Mediterranean, showing that delimitation by unilateral act followed by negotiation is standard practice. By a decree of January 2026, France published the agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction, adopted in New York in June 2023 and signed by France in September 2023, after Parliament had authorised ratification by statute in November 2024. A State that ratifies the high-seas biodiversity treaty in January 2026 does not improvise its law of the sea. For fishing companies, charterers, insurers and counsel, the operational guidance is therefore fourfold. First, treat the waters around Matthew and Hunter as French-policed today: licences, logbooks, safety certificates and crew titles must be in order under French law, because French courts apply French law to French flags regardless of the boundary debate. Second, calendar the diplomatic sequence: France must answer on jurisdiction, bilateral talks may resume after the New Caledonian electoral cycle, and a General Assembly resolution requesting an advisory opinion could surface during the current session. Third, audit contracts for boundary-change clauses: charterparties, fishing-access agreements and insurance warranties that assume a fixed zone should allocate the risk of a line moving. Fourth, preserve evidence of peaceful activity: in island disputes, the paper trail of licences, inspections and rescues becomes, years later, the file of governmental acts that judges read.

Conclusion

Vanuatu has chosen its battlefield with care. Unable to compel France before the Court, it has invited France to come, knowing that a refusal leads to the General Assembly and an advisory opinion modelled on Chagos, and that an acceptance leads to a courtroom where decolonization now colours every title. France, for its part, holds the procedural keys and the physical control, reaffirms sovereignty in the Pacific, promises an answer on jurisdiction and merits, and negotiates boundaries while ruling out any transfer. Between those two strategies lies a maritime boundary that will decide the fate of 350,000 square kilometres of ocean, the policing of fisheries, and the legal security of every operator working off New Caledonia. The next move belongs to Paris: consent, refuse, or negotiate long enough that the question answers itself. Whatever Paris chooses, the file is now open in The Hague, it can be reopened in New York, and it will not close quietly. Operators and counsel should prepare now, under French law as it stands, for a boundary that has not yet been drawn.

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