On 21 August 2026, France and partner governments issued an unusually direct warning after the Israeli government published construction tenders connected with the E1 settlement project in the West Bank. The joint statement describes the project as unacceptable, says that E1 would damage the territorial continuity of the Palestinian territories, and tells businesses not to consider bidding. It also identifies legal and reputational consequences, including the risk that a business could become involved in serious breaches of international law. The official statement is available in English from France Diplomatie.
That warning is politically significant, but it is not, by itself, a criminal indictment, an EU sanctions designation, a French court ruling, or an automatic prohibition that turns every commercial contact with the project into an offence. The legal question for a French or European bidder is more precise: what exactly would the company supply, who would receive the benefit, what facts would the company know, and would its contribution materially facilitate conduct that competent authorities could characterise as unlawful?
The answer cannot be found in the tender notice alone. It requires a documented analysis of the site, the public and private actors behind the project, the payment chain, the proposed works, the company’s knowledge, and the jurisdictional links to France. A board that treats the E1 warning as a public-relations issue only may miss criminal, civil, banking, procurement and disclosure exposure. A board that treats the warning as an automatic ban may also make an unsupported legal conclusion. The practical task is to build a defensible record before a bid is submitted.
I. What do the E1 settlement tenders mean for a French or EU bidder?
A. Why an official warning matters even before a court rules
The first mistake would be to read the joint statement as a symbolic diplomatic text with no operational effect. The second would be to read it as a final judgment. It is neither. It is an official risk signal issued at the moment when companies may be deciding whether to enter a tender process. Its value lies in what it does to the knowledge file of a potential bidder.
The statement records three propositions. First, the participating governments regard Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal under international law. Secondly, they regard E1 as capable of dividing the West Bank and undermining the possibility of a two-state solution. Thirdly, they expressly put businesses on notice that participation may carry legal and reputational consequences. A company that bids after receiving that warning cannot later describe the legal controversy as unforeseeable. That does not establish criminal intent, but it makes the quality of the company’s investigation and advice much more important.
The international-law background is also specific. Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court identifies, as a war crime in an international armed conflict, “The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory”. The text concerns the conduct of natural persons before the ICC and does not mean that a construction company is automatically an ICC defendant. It does mean that a project linked to population transfer can present a serious international criminal-law context, especially where a company’s contribution is close to the project’s implementation.
The distance between the international-law concern and a company’s liability must be analysed rather than skipped. A bidder may be asked to design roads, provide engineering, supply prefabricated units, install water or electricity systems, finance a project, provide software, transport materials, supply surveillance equipment or manage a subcontractor. Those activities do not all have the same legal meaning. A service that is remote, generic and genuinely separable from the project may present a different risk from work that makes the settlement physically possible or expands its civilian infrastructure.
The warning also has consequences outside criminal law. Banks may ask for enhanced information before processing payments. Insurers may revisit exclusions or disclosure obligations. Export-control and sanctions teams may require a new review of counterparties, end users and beneficial owners. A listed company may need to examine whether its public human-rights commitments, risk disclosures and internal controls accurately describe the project. A future purchaser, lender, auditor, regulator or civil claimant may ask when the company first knew of the E1 controversy and what it did with that knowledge.
None of those consequences proves that a particular tender is unlawful. They explain why a written legal opinion should be obtained before the commercial team submits a bid, not after the contract is signed. The decision should identify which propositions are established facts, which are official positions, which are disputed legal characterisations, and which depend on facts that the tender documents do not yet reveal.
The same distinction matters for sanctions. A government warning is not the same thing as an entry on an EU, UN or national restrictive-measures list. A company must still check the applicable regulations, designated persons, ownership and control, banking route, goods classification, and any procurement or export restriction. A clean sanctions-screening result does not answer the separate question whether the project creates complicity, civil-liability or reputational risk. Conversely, the presence of political condemnation does not prove that a transaction is prohibited by a sanctions regulation. The compliance record should keep those questions separate.
The current event is therefore best understood as a notice of heightened foreseeable risk. It changes the company’s information environment. It can also change the evidential landscape in a later dispute: tender documents, board papers, outside advice, emails, risk registers and payment approvals may show whether the company understood the project and whether it addressed the warnings seriously.
B. When can a tender become a complicity problem rather than ordinary commerce?
French criminal law starts from a demanding requirement. Article 121-7 of the Penal Code provides, in the official text: « Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation. » The English meaning is direct: complicity requires knowing assistance that facilitates the preparation or commission of a crime or offence. A tender submission alone is not enough. Investigators would need to examine the principal offence, the contribution, the knowledge and the causal or facilitative relationship between them.
The second sentence of the same article covers a person who, by a gift, promise, threat, order or abuse of authority or power, provokes an offence or gives instructions for committing it. That wording illustrates why a company’s role must be mapped in detail. A company does not need to be the principal actor to face scrutiny. A financing instruction, a knowingly adapted logistics plan, a payment routed through a controlled intermediary, or a technical service designed to overcome a known obstacle may become relevant if the other elements are present.
The knowledge question is central. Knowledge is not established merely because a newspaper article exists or because a foreign government rejects the project. It may, however, be inferred from repeated warnings, contractual documents, internal reports, correspondence with public authorities, legal advice, payment descriptions, risk escalations and the company’s own representations. A decision-maker who receives a credible warning and suppresses the issue from the approval file creates a very different evidential situation from a decision-maker who commissions an independent review, asks for primary documents, records uncertainty and refuses to proceed when the risk cannot be controlled.
The project contribution must be described with equal precision. A bidder should ask whether its work would:
- create or expand housing, access roads, utilities or public facilities that support the settlement footprint;
- enable the movement, relocation or permanent presence of a population in the occupied territory;
- provide security, surveillance or data systems to authorities or contractors involved in the project;
- finance, insure, guarantee or materially reduce the cost of the construction;
- provide the transport, land preparation, engineering or project management without which the tender could not be performed;
- benefit from land, permits, tax treatment or administrative decisions whose legal origin is contested; or
- transfer the most sensitive part of the work to a subcontractor while retaining control of the commercial and payment chain.
This is not a checklist for declaring guilt. It is a method for distinguishing a distant commercial relationship from practical assistance. The more a service is integrated into the project’s implementation, the more important it becomes to test the purpose and foreseeable use of that service. The company should record alternative uses, separability, the identity of the end user and whether its contribution would continue if the project were moved outside the disputed area.
Article 121-3 of the Penal Code also matters. Its opening rule is: « Il n’y a point de crime ou de délit sans intention de le commettre. » The same provision addresses deliberate endangerment and, where the law provides, negligence or a failure to take required precautions. The practical lesson is not that every missed warning creates a crime. It is that a decision file should show what the responsible persons knew, what precautions were available, what advice they requested and why they chose to proceed.
Article 121-2 extends criminal responsibility to legal persons, other than the State, for offences committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives. The official text states: « Les personnes morales, à l’exclusion de l’Etat, sont responsables pénalement, selon les distinctions des articles 121-4 à 121-7, des infractions commises, pour leur compte, par leurs organes ou représentants. » This rule does not erase the need to identify a principal offence or the required mental element. It does mean that the company and the individuals who acted for it may have to be analysed separately.
The Court of Cassation’s Lafarge ruling is a useful French reference point, but it must not be turned into an allegation about E1. In its criminal chamber decision of 7 September 2021, no. 19-87.367, concerning alleged payments and activity linked to a cement plant in Syria, the Court wrote: « Dès lors que l’article 121-7 du code pénal ne distingue ni selon la nature de l’infraction principale, ni selon la qualité du complice, cette analyse a vocation à s’appliquer aux personnes morales comme aux personnes physiques. » In English, the Court held that the Article 121-7 analysis is capable of applying to legal persons as well as natural persons because the provision does not distinguish by the nature of the principal offence or the status of the accomplice.
That holding is important for corporate risk assessment: a company cannot assume that complicity analysis is reserved for an individual employee. It is not a finding that every company working in a contested territory is criminally liable. Lafarge involved a distinct factual record, a different armed-conflict context and procedural issues that cannot be copied into an E1 tender. The relevant point is narrower: corporate form is not, by itself, a safe harbour when the elements of an offence and knowing assistance are alleged.
II. How can French jurisdiction and corporate exposure be triggered?
A. Which French jurisdictional links should the company test first?
The first jurisdictional link is the place where assistance occurs. Article 113-5 of the Penal Code provides that French criminal law applies to a person who, on French territory, is complicit in a crime or offence committed abroad, subject to the conditions stated in the provision. The official text refers to a crime or offence punishable under both French and foreign law and to a final foreign decision, while also addressing certain acts of complicity under the second paragraph of Article 121-7 concerning crimes in Book II. The current text is available on Légifrance, Article 113-5.
That rule makes the Paris office, the French procurement team, the French treasury function and the French legal approval process relevant even if the building site is abroad. A payment instruction, technical design, negotiation, procurement decision or instruction to a subcontractor may be an act performed in France. The place of the physical project is therefore only one part of the analysis. A company should map where each material decision, communication and transfer of value took place.
A second link concerns French nationals acting abroad. Article 113-6 states that French criminal law applies to crimes committed abroad by French nationals and to certain offences committed abroad by French nationals when the double-criminality condition is met. The official Légifrance record for Article 113-6 currently carries a warning that its abrogation is scheduled for 1 January 2029. The date of the alleged conduct and the version of the law in force at that time must therefore be checked in any real case. A legal memo should never cite this provision without recording that temporal issue.
The Court of Cassation addressed the cross-border complicity question in an Assembly Plenary decision of 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.071. The Court stated: « les dispositions combinées des articles 689 du code de procédure pénale, 113-6 et 121-6 du code pénal permettent de retenir la compétence des juridictions françaises pour connaître d’actes de complicité, commis à l’étranger, par une personne de nationalité française, même si l’infraction a été commise à l’étranger par un auteur principal étranger. » The case does not turn every foreign project into a French case. It confirms, however, that the nationality of the principal offender does not necessarily prevent French jurisdiction over foreign acts of complicity by a French national.
Article 121-6 of the Penal Code supplies the corresponding principle that the accomplice is punished as the principal offender. Its short official text is: « Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction, au sens de l’article 121-7. » This does not make the accomplice the same factual actor. It explains the potential seriousness of a qualifying contribution and why a director cannot treat an approval signature as an administrative formality.
Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a general gateway for foreign offences where French law or an international instrument gives French courts jurisdiction. The official text says: « Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. » Like Article 113-6, the Légifrance record warns of a scheduled abrogation on 1 January 2029, so the applicable version must be verified by date.
The route for international crimes is narrower and has additional conditions. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure covers genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in the circumstances set out by the provision, including a habitual-residence link to France and prosecutorial conditions. The official provision is available at Légifrance, Article 689-11, which also carries a scheduled-abrogation warning for 1 January 2029.
The Court of Cassation’s decision of 24 November 2021, no. 21-81.344, shows why the international-crime route cannot be reduced to a label. In that case the Court stated: « Dès lors, l’exigence posée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, selon laquelle les faits doivent être punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis, inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté. » The passage shows that a French court will examine the legal elements and double-criminality requirement. It does not allow a claimant to replace proof with a political description of the project.
Finally, Article 113-7 may matter in a different factual pattern, because it applies French criminal law to certain offences committed abroad when the victim is French at the time of the offence. The official text is available at Légifrance, Article 113-7. It is not a general E1 rule and should not be used as a shortcut. It is one example of why the identity of affected persons and the location of each act belong in the first factual map.
French precedent also warns against treating local authorisation or commercial custom as a complete legal defence. In a 10 March 2021 criminal chamber decision, no. 19-82.929, concerning concealed surcharges connected with the United Nations Oil-for-Food framework, the Court held that « les commissions occultes, dont le versement était sollicité par les agents de l’Etat irakien, en marge du marché réglementé par la Résolution n° 986 du 14 avril 1995 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, n’étaient ni permises ni requises par la loi ou la réglementation écrites de l’Etat irakien ». The analogy is limited: an E1 tender is not the Oil-for-Food case. The broader compliance lesson is sound. A document issued by a local authority, a tender award or a contractual clause does not automatically neutralise a superior rule of French criminal law or an international restriction. The company must ask what the authorisation actually authorises, who issued it, under which legal order, and whether it conflicts with another applicable rule.
B. What should a French company document before it bids?
The most useful pre-bid document is not a generic “high-risk country” form. It is a project-specific legal and factual file that a prosecutor, judge, lender, insurer or board member could read without needing the commercial team to reconstruct events from memory. The file should be updated when the tender changes, when a subcontractor is added or when a public authority issues a new statement.
First, freeze the project identity. Record the precise E1 site, parcel references, planning documents, tender number, issuing body, contracting authority, expected beneficiaries and connection with existing or planned settlement infrastructure. Attach maps and the original tender documents. Do not rely on a marketing description such as “regional infrastructure” if the engineering drawings show that the work serves a defined settlement expansion. The question is not only what the project is called. It is what the project does on the ground.
Secondly, identify the public and private actors. The review should cover the contracting authority, ministries, local bodies, state-owned entities, developers, prime contractors, security providers, lenders, insurers, beneficial owners and political decision-makers. It should identify whether any counterparty is listed, owned or controlled by a listed person, subject to procurement restrictions, or connected to an armed or security actor. Screening should be repeated immediately before bid submission, contract signature, first payment and every material change order.
Thirdly, draw the contribution and payment chain. A one-page diagram should show who pays whom, who controls the site, who imports goods, who grants access, who receives the works and who owns the resulting infrastructure. The diagram should include parent companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures, agents and subcontractors. It should also identify whether money passes through France, a French bank, a French treasury centre or a French decision-maker. Those links may be legally important even if the contract is governed by another law.
Fourthly, analyse knowledge at the level of the people who approve the bid. The file should preserve the government statements, court decisions, UN materials, internal risk alerts, outside opinions and questions raised by employees or lenders. It should explain which risks were accepted, which were rejected and why. If the company concludes that a service is too remote from the project to amount to assistance, the memo should identify the factual assumptions supporting that conclusion and require reapproval if those assumptions change.
Fifthly, separate risk controls from risk elimination. A warranty from a prime contractor may allocate contractual risk, but it does not necessarily prevent French criminal liability if the company knowingly helps a principal offence. A compliance certificate may show that a screening process was completed, but it does not establish that the project’s purpose was lawful. A clause requiring compliance with international law is useful, but it should be supported by audit rights, document access, termination rights, payment holds and a credible ability to exit.
Sixthly, examine the human-rights and civilian-impact record. The legal analysis should ask whether Palestinian land, housing, access, livelihoods, utilities or movement would be affected; whether the company has information about displacement, discriminatory access or coercion; and whether the project depends on conduct that the company could not lawfully support. A bidder should not assume that the absence of a final judgment makes all factual investigation optional. It should state what remains unknown and how that uncertainty affects the bid.
Seventhly, test the banking, insurance and disclosure consequences. A bank may reject a payment for policy reasons even where no sanctions list is triggered. An insurer may require a special warranty or exclude losses connected with a disputed territory. Public disclosures may need to explain a material risk or a departure from a human-rights policy. The legal team should coordinate with compliance, finance, procurement, insurance and investor-relations teams so that the company does not send contradictory descriptions of the project to different audiences.
Eighthly, create a board-level decision with an expiry date. The decision should identify the legal basis, the factual assumptions, the open questions, the advice received, the controls imposed, the person responsible for monitoring and the conditions that require withdrawal. A decision made before the tender should not be treated as permanent approval for later variations. If the works move closer to housing, utilities or security infrastructure, the risk analysis must restart.
There is also a civil-liability dimension. Article 1240 of the Civil Code states: « Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer. » Article 1241 adds: « Chacun est responsable du dommage qu’il a causé non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa négligence ou par son imprudence. » Those provisions do not create automatic liability from the diplomatic statement. They show why a company’s investigation, warnings, omissions and causal contribution could matter in a later claim. A claimant would still have to establish the applicable jurisdiction, a fault or negligence, damage and causation.
The company should preserve the record even if it decides not to bid. Retain the tender, maps, translations, screening results, legal advice, board minutes, refusal notice and communications with the contracting authority. If the company bids and later withdraws, document the reason and the date. If it proceeds, record the safeguards and the facts on which they depend. In a cross-border dispute, the chronology may be as important as the final legal conclusion.
The most defensible decision will often be a conditional one: no bid until the site, beneficiary and payment-chain questions are answered; no contract until sanctions and human-rights review is complete; no payment until end-use and subcontractor controls are verified; and automatic escalation if the project’s physical or political character changes. That is not a substitute for legal advice. It is a way to make the advice testable and the commercial decision accountable.
Conclusion
The 21 August 2026 E1 statement should be treated as a serious, current notice of foreseeable legal and reputational risk for businesses, not as a completed judicial finding and not as an automatic criminal prohibition. A French company that merely receives a tender is not thereby an accomplice. The risk rises when the company knowingly supplies money, infrastructure, engineering, logistics, security or project management that materially facilitates a contested settlement activity, particularly after official warnings have made the legal controversy impossible to ignore.
French jurisdiction may be engaged by acts performed in France, by the nationality of a decision-maker, by the status of a French legal person, or by the special rules for international crimes. Articles 121-2, 121-3 and 121-7 of the Penal Code, the cross-border jurisdiction rules and the Court of Cassation decisions cited above make the same practical point: the company must analyse the contribution, knowledge, actors, place of decision and causal link. A properly documented refusal can be as important as a properly documented approval.