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Dutch Courts Refuse to Send Detainees Back to France: French Prisons Fail the European Arrest Warrant Test

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Dutch Courts Refuse to Send Detainees Back to France: French Prisons Fail the European Arrest Warrant Test

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On 31 July 2026, a Dutch court refused to hand a 22-year-old man back to France. The young man was supposed to stand trial on appeal for a violent assault committed three years earlier in Colombes, near Paris, and on 2 September the Versailles Court of Appeal adjourned his case to 28 October because the defendant’s bench sat empty. He is detained in the Netherlands on a French arrest warrant, and the Dutch judges ruled that French detention conditions are incompatible with human rights. Ten days later the story repeated itself in a different courtroom: on 10 September 2026, the Amsterdam surrender chamber suspended a second surrender to France, this time on a prosecution warrant issued by the Paris public prosecutor on 17 December 2025, because France could not guarantee that the requested person would not end up in an overcrowded cell at the Paris-La Santé prison. Two Dutch decisions, six weeks apart, both telling France the same thing: your prisons do not meet the European standard, so we will not send people back. This article explains the legal machinery behind those refusals, the Strasbourg and Luxembourg case law that makes them possible, and, from a Paris extradition lawyer’s vantage point, what France must now guarantee if it wants its fugitives back.

I. Can a European Arrest Warrant Fail Because of French Prison Conditions

A. How Amsterdam Tests a French Surrender Request Before Saying Yes

The first case surfaced through the French press rather than a published judgment. According to Le Parisien, which revealed the story on 9 September 2026, the 22-year-old was due to be tried on appeal for a violent assault committed in Colombes in the Hauts-de-Seine, and his absence forced the Versailles Court of Appeal to send the case back to 28 October. The man is currently detained in the Netherlands on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by France, and on 31 July the Dutch justice system refused to surrender him to the French authorities, precisely because of detention conditions in France, which it considered incompatible with human rights. The report adds that, had he been returned, the young man could have been held at Nanterre on remand pending his trial, and it recalls the figures published that same summer: nearly 89,000 detainees for some 63,000 prison places, with the French prison ombudsman denouncing the State’s inaction in the face of overcrowding. The terminology of the press report deserves one correction that matters to lawyers: between European Union Member States there is no extradition in the classical sense, only surrender under a European Arrest Warrant, a judicial decision issued by one Member State with a view to arrest and surrender by another Member State of a person wanted for criminal prosecution or for execution of a custodial sentence. That is the definition codified in French law at Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” The Dutch refusal therefore operates inside the surrender system, not outside it, and it follows a test that the Court of Justice of the European Union has imposed on every executing judge in Europe.

The second case is fully documented, because the Amsterdam District Court published its ruling. By interim decision of 10 September 2026, case number 13-352218-25, reference ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2026:9102, the International Legal Assistance Chamber in Amsterdam dealt with a prosecution warrant issued on 17 December 2025 by the Paris public prosecutor. The court’s own headnote summarises the outcome as a “Tussenuitspraak inzake vervolgings-EAB uit Frankrijk” – an interim ruling on a French prosecution warrant – adding that France is given a reasonable time to show a change of circumstances within the meaning of Article 11 of the Dutch Surrender Act, as reported on rechtspraak.nl. In plain English: The reasoning shows how methodically Amsterdam now treats French detention. The court recalls two of its own rulings of 5 August 2025, in which it recognised an “algemeen gevaar van schending van grondrechten” – a general danger of fundamental-rights violations – for persons detained on a men’s wing of a French maison d’arrêt, the short-stay remand prisons where pre-trial detainees and short-sentence prisoners are held. That general danger, the court explains, concerns the structural problem of overcrowding, creating a real risk that detainees are placed in a multi-person cell with less than three square metres of personal space per person, excluding sanitary facilities. Men serving a remaining sentence of under two years are held in such remand prisons, so the requested person could fall squarely within the danger zone.

Having established the general risk, the chamber moved to the individual examination, exactly as Luxembourg requires. Citing the ML judgment of the Court of Justice, the court held that it must examine only the detention conditions in the prison or prisons where the requested person, on the information available, will in all likelihood actually be detained, including on a temporary basis. Supplementary information dated 17 July 2026 showed that, after surrender, the person would in principle be held at Paris-La Santé, within the jurisdiction of the Paris Court of Appeal. France then supplied further information on 1 August 2026, but it did not close the gap. The court found that it could not determine how much personal cell space would actually be guaranteed to the requested person after surrender, and it refused to compute its own estimate from cell dimensions combined with occupancy rates, because it does not know how overcrowding affects the allocation of cells or with how many people the requested person would share a cell. An estimated calculation, the court wrote, is no guarantee that the person will actually receive that space, since the French authorities never promised it. The decisive passage follows: the court notes that it knows from other surrender cases that the French authorities have sometimes guaranteed placement in a single cell, which removes all uncertainty, but, as the court put it, the issuing authority could not provide “een dergelijke garantie” – such a guarantee – in this case. The court therefore found an individual danger of a fundamental-rights violation at Paris-La Santé if surrender were authorised.

The consequence is neither an immediate refusal nor a surrender, but the middle path that Dutch law provides. Both the defence and, remarkably, the Dutch prosecutor agreed that the detention guarantee was insufficient to remove the danger, and the prosecutor asked for a reasonable time under Article 11(2) of the Surrender Act because a visit by the Dutch prosecution service to the French authorities was imminent and might change the circumstances. The court considered it conceivable that such a change could occur within the foreseeable future, so it reopened and suspended the examination, kept the surrender decision pending, extended the decision deadline by sixty days to 19 November 2026, extended the suspended surrender detention by the same period, and, in the court’s words, “HEROPENT en SCHORST het onderzoek” – it reopened and suspended the examination – scheduling the continuation between 9 October and 4 November 2026, as the published ruling records. For the requested person, that means two more months in Dutch surrender detention while Paris is given a last chance to offer what Amsterdam demands. For France, the message is institutional: a foreign prosecution service is coming to inspect, and the next hearing will measure whether anything has changed.

B. What Strasbourg and Luxembourg Already Decided About Overcrowding in French Prisons

Amsterdam did not invent the three-square-metre rule or the finding that French prisons are structurally overcrowded. Both come from Strasbourg. On 30 January 2020, in the case of J.M.B. and Others v. France, application number 9671/15 and thirty-one others, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, the right to an effective remedy, and a violation of Article 3, the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment. The thirty-two cases concerned poor detention conditions in the prisons of Ducos in Martinique, Faa’a Nuutania in French Polynesia, Baie-Mahault in Guadeloupe, Nîmes, Nice and Fresnes, as well as the broader issue of overcrowding and the effectiveness of the remedies available to prisoners. The Court found that the applicants had not enjoyed the minimum standard of three square metres of personal space throughout their detention, a situation aggravated by the lack of privacy in using the toilets, and that the prisons concerned did not generally provide decent conditions or sufficient freedom of movement and activities outside the cell. Then, under Article 46 of the Convention, the Court went further than individual redress: it found that occupancy rates disclosed the “existence of a structural problem” and recommended general measures to eliminate overcrowding and improve material detention conditions, alongside an effective preventive remedy, as recorded in the Council of Europe’s execution file. A structural problem, general measures, an effective preventive remedy: six years later, the Amsterdam chamber’s finding of a general danger in French remand prisons is the direct enforcement of that Strasbourg warning inside the surrender system. Any lawyer who defends a surrender to France in another Member State now starts with J.M.B. in the file, and any French prosecutor who issues a warrant must reckon with it.

Luxembourg supplies the procedure that turns that Strasbourg finding into a refusal or a suspension. The leading judgment is Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, decided on 5 April 2016, available at EUR-Lex 62015CJ0404. The Court first draws a line that executing judges must respect, as the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment holds: general detention conditions alone “cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal” to execute a European Arrest Warrant. General overcrowding alone never suffices. Instead, a two-step assessment is mandatory: even where systemic deficiencies are shown, the executing judge must make a further “specific and precise” assessment of whether there are “substantial grounds to believe” that this individual will face that risk in the issuing State. Systemic evidence, the Court adds, does not necessarily imply that the specific person will suffer inhuman treatment if surrendered. Where the evidence of deficiencies is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated, the executing authority must determine whether there are substantial grounds to believe that this person, following surrender, will run a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. To that end, the executing authority must request “all necessary supplementary information” from the issuing judicial authority “as a matter of urgency” on the envisaged conditions of detention, under Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision listed by the Court. It may set a time limit adjusted to the case, and it may also ask about monitoring mechanisms such as prison visits. That is precisely the dialogue Amsterdam conducted with Paris through the July and August 2026 exchanges, and the dialogue Paris failed to conclude with a guarantee.

Two later judgments refined the framework in ways that matter directly for France. In ML, case C-220/18 PPU, decided on 25 July 2018 and available at EUR-Lex 62018CJ0220, the Court limited the inquiry: the executing judge examines only the facilities where the requested person will in all likelihood actually be detained, which is why Amsterdam focused exclusively on Paris-La Santé rather than the French prison estate as a whole. In E.D.L., case C-699/21, decided on 18 April 2023 and available at EUR-Lex 62021CJ0699, the Court addressed seriously ill persons: where the executing authority finds serious and proven reasons to believe that surrender would expose the person to a real risk of a significant reduction in life expectancy or of a rapid, significant and irremediable deterioration of health, it must postpone surrender under Article 23(4) of the Framework Decision and request information on the conditions of detention and their possible adaptation, refusing only if the risk cannot be removed within a reasonable time. France itself applied that very rulebook this summer, as the second part of this article shows. The foundation of the whole system remains Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, whose Article 1(3) preserves fundamental rights and whose Article 23(4) organises postponement. Mutual trust, in other words, is a presumption with a verification procedure attached, and Amsterdam has now run that procedure against France twice in six weeks.

II. What France Must Guarantee to Get Its Fugitives Back

A. How a French Prosecutor Issues a European Arrest Warrant and What Assurances Paris Can Offer

The French side of the story starts with who signs the warrant. Under French law, the European Arrest Warrant is a prosecutorial act built on a national warrant. Article 695-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Le ministère public près la juridiction d’instruction, de jugement ou d’application des peines ayant décerné un mandat d’arrêt met celui-ci à exécution sous la forme d’un mandat d’arrêt européen soit à la demande de la juridiction, soit d’office” The same article extends the mechanism to the enforcement of custodial sentences of four months or more. The thresholds for issuing a warrant for prosecution are set by Article 695-12: “Les faits qui peuvent donner lieu à l’émission d’un mandat d’arrêt européen sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, les suivants : 1° Les faits punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à un an ou, lorsqu’une condamnation à une peine est intervenue, quand la peine prononcée est égale ou supérieure à quatre mois d’emprisonnement” A violent assault tried on appeal before a cour d’assises or a criminal court easily clears that bar, which is why the Colombes file and the Paris prosecution file both travelled to Amsterdam as routine warrants. Nothing in the issuance suggested difficulty. The difficulty appeared at the execution stage, where the issuing prosecutor discovered that signing a warrant is no longer enough: Paris must now also certify where the person will sleep.

What France can concretely offer to unblock a surrender. The Amsterdam ruling of 10 September 2026 reads like a price list. First, an individualised allocation: which prison, which wing, which cell regime, and, crucially, a guaranteed single cell. The court expressly noted that in other surrender cases the French authorities had guaranteed placement in a single cell, removing all uncertainty about personal space, whereas in the Paris-La Santé case no such guarantee could be given. A single-cell assurance for the pre-trial phase is therefore the gold standard that French prosecutors and the Ministry of Justice should prepare systematically, establishment by establishment, rather than improvising it case by case. Second, measurable figures rather than general descriptions: the court refused to do its own arithmetic from cell sizes and occupancy rates and insisted that only a commitment by the French authorities counts. Vague statements about average surface areas or recent renovations will not survive the Aranyosi dialogue; only a named facility, a named regime and a number of square metres guaranteed to this person will. Third, speed and seniority: the dialogue runs under time limits, the Dutch prosecutor is about to visit the French authorities, and the continuation hearing falls between 9 October and 4 November 2026. Assurances that arrive late or unsigned by a judicial authority carry little weight, because the executing judge assesses good faith as well as content.

French procedure also gives the issuing side one tool that avoids the detention question altogether: consent. When the requested person agrees to surrender, the French chambre de l’instruction, on the execution side, rules within days and the decision is not appealable. Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the consent scenario: “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne recherchée déclare consentir à sa remise, la chambre de l’instruction l’informe des conséquences juridiques de son consentement et de son caractère irrévocable.” No fugitive fights surrender to contest prison conditions and consents at the same time, so the point is tactical rather than theoretical: every week a requested person spends challenging detention conditions in Amsterdam is a week the French trial court waits, as Versailles learned on 2 September when it pushed the Colombes appeal to 28 October. Issuing prosecutors should therefore build the detention file before the arrest, not after the refusal, identifying the receiving facility and securing the single-cell commitment upstream, so that the first Article 15(2) request from abroad receives a complete answer within days. Our firm has already analysed the detention-based refusal case law and the enforcement of foreign sentences in France in detail, including the June 2026 Grand Chamber rulings of the Court of Justice, in our earlier analysis of EAW refusal for inhuman detention and enforcement of foreign sentences in France. The Dutch autumn of 2026 confirms that analysis from the other side of the border: surrender judges verify, they do not trust, and only concrete, individualised guarantees move them.

One French protection travels with the requested person and Amsterdam expressly validated it. Where a prosecution warrant targets a Dutch national or resident, surrender may be granted on condition that any custodial sentence imposed after trial will be served in the Netherlands, the return guarantee of Article 5(3) of the Framework Decision. In the 10 September 2026 ruling, the French file contained exactly such a commitment, that the person, if finally sentenced to imprisonment for the offences in the Paris warrant, would serve that sentence in the Netherlands, which the court deemed “deze garantie voldoende” – a sufficient guarantee. Defence counsel should therefore always plead the return guarantee alongside the detention challenge: even when surrender is authorised, the client may come home to serve the sentence. On the French statute book, the counterpart for enforcement warrants appears in Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut être refusée : 1° Si, pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt, la personne recherchée fait l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions françaises ou si celles-ci ont décidé de ne pas engager les poursuites ou d’y mettre fin”

B. Will French Courts Also Refuse Surrenders Over Foreign Prison Conditions

They do, and the symmetry is striking. In the very week Amsterdam refused the Colombes surrender, the French Court of Cassation quashed a Paris refusal to surrender to Germany. By judgment of 29 July 2026, number 26-84.256, published at Legifrance JURITEXT000054658346, the Criminal Chamber ruled on a German prosecution warrant issued on 24 January 2022 against a woman sought for membership of a foreign terrorist organisation, whom the Paris chambre de l’instruction had refused to surrender on 17 June 2026 over medical-care assurances it deemed too general. The Court of Cassation recalled the closed list of refusal grounds: “l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne saurait être refusée pour des motifs autres que ceux que prévoient la décision-cadre et les textes pris pour son application.” It then restated the E.D.L. rule for seriously ill persons: “lorsque l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution appelée à décider de la remise d’une personne recherchée, gravement malade, en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen, estime qu’il existe des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire que cette remise exposerait cette personne à un risque réel de réduction significative de son espérance de vie ou de détérioration rapide, significative et irrémédiable de son état de santé, elle doit, en application de l’article 23, § 4, de la décision-cadre précitée, surseoir à ladite remise et solliciter de l’autorité judiciaire d’émission la fourniture de toute information relative aux conditions dans lesquelles il est envisagé de poursuivre ou de détenir ladite personne ainsi qu’aux possibilités d’adapter ces conditions à son état de santé afin de prévenir la réalisation d’un tel risque.” Refusal comes only at the end of that road: “Si, au regard des informations fournies par l’autorité judiciaire d’émission ainsi que de toutes les autres informations dont l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution disposerait, il apparaît que ce risque ne peut pas être écarté dans un délai raisonnable, cette dernière autorité doit refuser d’exécuter le mandat d’arrêt européen.” Because the Paris chamber had refused without establishing that the risk could not be removed within a reasonable time, the Court of Cassation quashed the refusal and remanded the case to a differently composed Paris chamber. The lesson for Amsterdam is identical to the lesson for Paris: refuse too fast, without exhausting the dialogue, and the refusal will not survive review.

The mirror works in the other direction as well. Where the dialogue succeeds, French courts surrender. On 12 August 2026, in case number 26-84.481, the Criminal Chamber rejected an appeal against a surrender to Latvia on a drug-trafficking prosecution warrant, after the Aix-en-Provence chamber had sought supplementary information on the Latvian prison, the healthcare available and the guarantees for a Russian-speaking detainee, and Latvia had answered on 4 June 2026. Dialogue, verification, surrender: that is the system functioning as designed. The statutory refusal grounds that frame all of this are narrow and say nothing about prison comfort. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists mandatory refusals, amnesty, ne bis in idem, minority under thirteen, and discriminatory prosecution, while Article 695-23 organises optional refusals and the double-criminality mechanism: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.” Detention conditions enter through neither article directly, but through the Constitution-grade gateway of Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3 of the Convention, which no statute can switch off. That is why the same Paris chamber that quashed too-hasty refusals would, faced with a Latvian-style complete file from France, authorise surrender, and why, faced with an incomplete French file, Amsterdam suspends. For defence counsel in Paris, the practical conclusion is immediate: if your client is arrested abroad on a French warrant, commission prison-conditions evidence at once, demand the Article 15(2) dialogue in the executing State, and test every French assurance against the single-cell standard Amsterdam now applies. For victims waiting in France, the conclusion is harder: the Colombes appeal will not be heard before 28 October at the earliest, and each adjournment is the audible price of overcrowding.

Conclusion

The summer of 2026 will be remembered as the moment French prisons went on trial abroad. On 31 July, the Netherlands refused to return a young man to face his appeal in Versailles. On 10 September, Amsterdam gave France a final deadline, between 9 October and 4 November, to fix the Paris-La Santé file or lose a second surrender, with the decision now due by 19 November 2026. The legal basis is unassailable: Strasbourg condemned the structural overcrowding of French prisons in J.M.B., Luxembourg requires executing judges to verify individual detention conditions before surrendering anyone, and France itself enforces the same verification against Germany and Latvia. Mutual trust has not collapsed; it has grown teeth. For the international observer, the autumn hearings in Amsterdam will show whether Paris can produce the individualised guarantees, single cells, named facilities, promised square metres, that the new European standard demands. For the French lawyer, the file is already a template: document the facility, demand the dialogue, test the assurance, and never confuse a general statistic with an individual guarantee. Overcrowding built up over decades; it will now be dismantled one surrender hearing at a time, and the first hearings are already scheduled.

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