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Europe Will Not Send You Into Inhuman Detention — but It Will Not Set You Free Either: What France Does After Refusing a European Arrest Warrant

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Europe Will Not Send You Into Inhuman Detention — but It Will Not Set You Free Either: What France Does After Refusing a European Arrest Warrant

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Three courts, one summer, one message: in the European Union, surrendering a person to face inhuman prison conditions is forbidden, but using that refusal to escape punishment is forbidden too. On 4 June 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in the joined cases Rugu (C-722/23) and HL (C-91/24) that once an executing judge refuses surrender because of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, the executing state must take the initiative and ask the issuing state to transfer the sentence so it can be served locally. Barely two months later, the French Cour de cassation applied the same discipline from the other side: on 29 July 2026 (no. 26-84.256) it quashed a Paris decision that had refused to hand a woman over to Germany without exhausting the judicial dialogue, and on 12 August 2026 (no. 26-84.481) it upheld a surrender to Latvia after finding that only the concrete prison awaiting the person matters. If you are arrested in France under a European arrest warrant and you fear the prisons of the country asking for you, these three rulings set the exact test the French judge will run, the papers your lawyer must file, and what happens to the sentence if you win the refusal.

I. How French judges test whether surrender would expose you to inhuman treatment

Under French law, Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines it as follows: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” The starting point has not changed since 2016: mutual trust between EU member states creates a presumption that every member state respects fundamental rights, and that presumption can only be rebutted through a strict two-step test laid down by the Court of Justice in Aranyosi and Căldăraru. First, the executing judge must find objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies, or deficiencies affecting certain groups or certain detention centres, in the issuing state. Second, the judge must assess specifically whether the requested person will run a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the light of the conditions in which that person will actually be detained. What the summer 2026 case law adds is operational precision: which prisons count, which evidence counts, and how far the dialogue with the issuing state must go before a French court is allowed to say no.

A. Which prison conditions in the issuing state can block a surrender from France?

The answer given by the Cour de cassation on 12 August 2026 in case no. 26-84.481 is narrower than many defence lawyers hoped, and it matters far beyond the file concerned. A stateless man wanted by Latvia for drug-trafficking charges argued that the Latvian prison system suffered from generalised failures — violence between inmates, an informal hierarchy among prisoners, insufficient healthcare — and that as a Russian speaker with a so-called non-citizen background he belonged to a group particularly exposed. The chambre de l’instruction of the Aix-en-Provence court of appeal had done its job properly at first: by a ruling of 27 May 2026 it found his arguments supported by precise material and asked the Latvian authorities for additional information about the exact prison where he would be held, the healthcare available there, and the guarantees against degrading treatment, including for Russian speakers. Latvia replied on 4 June 2026, designating the newly built Liepāja facility, describing an individual cell, concentrated reintegration staff, automated surveillance and largely unused capacity, plus access to internal and external healthcare and complaint mechanisms.

The Cour de cassation rejected the appeal and approved the surrender, and its reasoning fixes three practical rules for every future file. First, the review is strictly concrete, as the Cour de cassation puts it (no. 26-84.481, 12 August 2026): “les autorités judiciaires d’exécution sont uniquement tenues d’examiner les conditions de détention dans les établissements pénitentiaires dans lesquels, selon les informations dont elles disposent, il est concrètement envisagé que la personne recherchée soit détenue, y compris à titre temporaire ou transitoire, la conformité, au regard des droits fondamentaux, des conditions de détention existant au sein des autres établissements pénitentiaires dans lesquels ladite personne pourrait, le cas échéant, être incarcérée ultérieurement, relevant de la seule compétence des juridictions de l’État membre d’émission.” In plain terms, general reports about a country’s prisons — Council of Europe CPT reports, NGO surveys, press investigations — can open the door to step one of the test, but they cannot by themselves close it. Only the establishments where the person will concretely be held, including on a temporary or transit basis, are examined; everything later belongs to the courts of the issuing state. Second, the executing judge enjoys sovereign discretion in assessing updated material: once the issuing authority has answered with precise, current information about the designated prison, the French court is entitled to treat the risk as dispelled, and the Cour de cassation will not second-guess that assessment. Third, a group-based argument — here, Russian speakers in Latvian prisons — must be matched against concrete answers: the court accepted that general statements about equal treatment, combined with allocation criteria and the specific features of Liepāja, were enough to reduce the alleged risk, because the defence had not tied the group deficiency to the actual cell awaiting the client.

For relatives and lawyers, the lesson is direct. If your family member is detained in France under a Latvian, Romanian, Greek, Hungarian or Bulgarian warrant — the states most often discussed in French surrender litigation — do not rely on country reports alone. Instruct counsel to demand, through the chambre de l’instruction, individualised information: the exact establishment, the cell regime, the healthcare unit, the language arrangements, the complaint channels. The full text of the ruling is published on the Cour de cassation website (no. 26-84.481, 12 August 2026), and the prohibition it enforces comes from Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which bans torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in absolute terms. The framework behind the French procedure is Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002), whose Article 1(3) preserves intact the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU The classic statement of the two-step test remains the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment of 5 April 2016 (C-404/15 and C-659/15).

B. When does a serious illness block surrender from France?

Illness follows a different track from prison overcrowding, and the Cour de cassation restated it firmly on 29 July 2026 in case no. 26-84.256, published at the Cour de cassation website (no. 26-84.256, 29 July 2026). The Paris chambre de l’instruction had refused to surrender a woman to Germany, where she faced prosecution for membership of a terrorist organisation based abroad, after a court-ordered medical report concluded that her psychiatric condition called for hospitalisation in the near future and was incompatible with transfer and pre-trial detention in Germany. The German authorities had given assurances about medical care, including in prison hospitals or outside facilities, but the Paris judges dismissed them as too general, abstract and detached from the risks identified by the expert. The public prosecutor appealed, and the Cour de cassation quashed the refusal entirely.

The ruling applies the doctrine of the Court of Justice in E.D. (C-699/21, 22 June 2023): where the executing authority considers there are serious and proven grounds to believe surrender would expose a gravely ill person to a real risk of a significant reduction in life expectancy or of a rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration of health, it must first postpone surrender under Article 23(4) of the Framework Decision and ask the issuing authority for every detail about the conditions of prosecution or detention and the possibilities of adapting them to the person’s state of health. Only afterwards comes the fork, stated by the Cour de cassation (no. 26-84.256, 29 July 2026) in these terms: “Si, au regard des informations fournies par l’autorité judiciaire d’émission ainsi que de toutes les autres informations dont l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution disposerait, il apparaît que ce risque ne peut pas être écarté dans un délai raisonnable, cette dernière autorité doit refuser d’exécuter le mandat d’arrêt européen. En revanche, si ledit risque peut être écarté dans un tel délai, une nouvelle date de remise doit être convenue avec l’autorité judiciaire d’émission.” Refusal is therefore the last resort, not the opening move: dialogue first, postponement second, refusal only if the risk cannot be removed within a reasonable time.

The Paris judges failed exactly here. The Cour de cassation held (no. 26-84.256): “En se déterminant ainsi, sans établir que la remise de la personne recherchée exposerait cette dernière à un risque réel de réduction significative de son espérance de vie ou de détérioration rapide, significative et irrémédiable de son état de santé ne pouvant pas être écarté dans un délai raisonnable, la chambre de l’instruction n’a pas justifié sa décision.” Three defects were fatal: the court had not exhausted the judicial dialogue, it had not shown that the German assurances were incapable of removing the risk, and it had not characterised exceptional circumstances proving the risk would persist despite the guarantees. The case was sent back to a differently composed chambre de l’instruction in Paris. Note the starting presumption the court recalled: under mutual trust, medical care offered in member states, in prison or in open settings, is presumed adequate — but that presumption does not prevent the executing judge from demanding assurances tailored to the expert report. In practice, this means defence teams must commission a rigorous, specific medical expert report that maps each pathology onto concrete detention conditions, then force the issuing state to answer point by point; vague assurances can still be rejected, but only after the dialogue has genuinely been pushed to its end. Readers of French can consult our earlier analysis of health-based refusals at mandat d’arrêt européen et état de santé. The French statutory setting is Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which opens with the words “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants”, listing the mandatory refusal grounds.

II. Why winning the refusal in France no longer means walking free

This is the true novelty of summer 2026 and the reason this story matters to anyone watching cross-border justice. Until now, a person who obtained a fundamental-rights refusal could often hope the file would simply die: the issuing state, rebuffed, would not always pursue alternatives, and the executing state considered its task finished. The Grand Chamber closed that exit on 4 June 2026. The two cases came from Belgium: Romania sought AR, a Romanian national living in Belgium, to serve a four-year sentence for human trafficking (C-722/23), and Greece sought HL, a Belgian national, to serve a five-year sentence (C-91/24). In both files the Belgian courts refused surrender on fundamental-rights grounds, then wondered whether they could fall back on the nationality-and-residence ground to keep the person and enforce the sentence themselves. The Court answered no to the shortcut and yes to the duty: no supplementary use of Article 4(6), but a positive obligation to activate the sentence-recognition machinery of Framework Decision 2008/909. Impunity, the Court said in substance, is not an acceptable by-product of fundamental rights.

A. Why can’t France keep you and serve the foreign sentence on its own decision?

Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584 allows an executing authority to refuse surrender where the warrant seeks enforcement of a custodial sentence and the requested person is a national of, resides in or is present in the executing state, provided that state undertakes to enforce the sentence itself under its own domestic law. France transposed this logic in Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whose paragraph 2 allows refusal where “la personne recherchée pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privatives de liberté est de nationalité française, a établi sa résidence sur le territoire national ou demeure sur ce territoire et si la décision de condamnation est exécutoire sur le territoire français en application de l’article 728-31”. It is tempting to read the two refusals as combinable: first refuse on fundamental-rights grounds, then add the Article 4(6) ground so the person serves the sentence in France. The Grand Chamber forbids exactly that combination. The Article 4(6) ground, the Court holds, is an autonomous and independent ground for refusal; it cannot be deployed as a supplementary measure once surrender has already been refused under Article 1(3) on fundamental-rights grounds, because such a refusal brings the surrender procedure itself to an end. The consequences for enforcement of the sentence must then be handled through the mutual-recognition instruments designed for that purpose — Framework Decision 2008/909 — not by stretching Article 4(6) beyond its role.

The operative part of the judgment, delivered in Luxembourg on 4 June 2026 and indexed on InfoCuria (C-722/23), states that a judicial executing authority, where it has refused to execute a European arrest warrant for the enforcement of a custodial sentence on the basis of Article 1(3), may not, in order to prevent impunity, additionally apply the optional Article 4(6) ground — while conversely, in the event of such a refusal, the executing Member State is required, in order to prevent impunity, to rely on Article 4(5) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the mutual recognition of custodial sentences (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008) by requesting, on its own initiative, that the issuing state transmit the judgment and the standard certificate with a view to enforcement on its territory. For France, the distinction is concrete. The Article 695-24(2°) route — refusal plus domestic enforcement because the person is French or resident here — remains available as a first-line, standalone ground, provided the foreign conviction is enforceable in France under Article 728-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “La reconnaissance et l’exécution sur le territoire français d’une décision de condamnation prononcée par la juridiction d’un autre Etat membre ne peuvent être refusées que dans les cas prévus aux articles 728-32 et 728-33 . La décision de refus est motivée par référence à ces mêmes articles.” But once the judge has refused on fundamental-rights grounds, that door is shut; only the recognition-request road stays open. Defence strategy must therefore choose its ground carefully and early: invoking Article 4(6) nationality or residence from the outset preserves the domestic-enforcement option, while leading with fundamental rights burns that bridge and shifts the file into the recognition track.

B. How is the foreign prison sentence actually enforced in France after a refusal?

The mechanism is Article 4(5) of Framework Decision 2008/909, and the Grand Chamber turns what looked like a mere possibility into a duty of initiative. After an Article 1(3) refusal, the executing state must, on its own motion, ask the issuing state to send the judgment imposing the custodial sentence together with the standard-form certificate in Annex I, so the sentence can be recognised and enforced on its own territory. The issuing state is not strictly obliged to transmit — Article 4(5) leaves it a discretion — but the Court frames that discretion with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU: a refusal to transmit must take due account of the fight against impunity, the social-reintegration purpose of the instrument, and the fact that surrender has already been ruled out. In practice, issuing states will almost always transmit, because the alternative is watching their final conviction evaporate.

In France, the receiving channel is the recognition procedure of Article 728-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “Une décision de condamnation prononcée par une juridiction française ou une juridiction d’un Etat membre peut être transmise, selon le cas, par l’autorité française compétente aux fins de reconnaissance et d’exécution dans l’Etat d’exécution ou à cette autorité aux fins de reconnaissance et d’exécution en France si la personne condamnée se trouve sur le territoire français ou celui de l’autre Etat membre”, followed by the eligible situations — national of the executing state with habitual residence, person subject to a removal measure, or consent-based transfers. Families should understand what this means in daily life: the person is not surrendered, but neither is the person free. The foreign sentence is converted into a French enforcement title, served in a French prison under French sentence-adjustment rules, with credit for time already spent in pre-surrender detention in France. Lawyers should therefore treat a fundamental-rights victory as half the battle and immediately prepare the recognition phase: gather proof of residence and family ties in France, line up the documents needed for sentence adjustment, and where the client is French or has lived here lawfully and without interruption for at least five years, consider asking that surrender be made conditional on return to France under Article 695-32 — “Lorsque la personne recherchée est de nationalité française ou réside régulièrement sur le territoire national de façon ininterrompue depuis au moins cinq ans, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine” — a guarantee that can defuse the fundamental-rights problem before it forces a refusal. In Paris, these files are handled by the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris court of appeal, and early contact with the French counsel, ideally within hours of the arrest and notification of the warrant, decides whether the dialogue with the issuing state is shaped or suffered.

Conclusion

The summer 2026 triangle — Luxembourg on 4 June, Paris on 29 July, the Cour de cassation again on 12 August — redraws the map of European surrender litigation in a way that is both more protective and more demanding. More protective, because a real, concrete risk of inhuman detention or of irreversible health damage still stops a surrender from France, provided the evidence targets the exact prison and the exact pathology and the judicial dialogue has been run to its end. More demanding, because the victory no longer ends the case: the executing state must chase the sentence through recognition, and the person concerned will serve it at home rather than escape it. Anyone arrested in France under a European arrest warrant should therefore prepare two files from day one — the refusal file, built on precise establishments and precise medicine, and the enforcement file, built on residence, family life and sentence adjustment — and choose between the nationality ground and the fundamental-rights ground with full knowledge that they cannot be stacked. That double preparation is now the standard of competent defence in surrender cases, and it is exactly what our firm sets up within the first forty-eight hours.

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