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EAW Refused Over Prison Conditions? France Must Enforce Your Sentence at Home (CJEU, 4 June 2026)

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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EAW Refused Over Prison Conditions? France Must Enforce Your Sentence at Home (CJEU, 4 June 2026)

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On 4 June 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union answered a question that changes the ending of every European Arrest Warrant case fought on prison conditions. In joined cases C-722/23 Rugu and C-91/24 Aucroix, two Belgian courts asked what an executing state is supposed to do after it refuses to surrender a convicted person because sending him back would expose him to inhuman or degrading detention. May it simply keep him and order him to serve the foreign sentence on its own soil under the familiar nationality-and-residence clause of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision? The Court said no. And then it imposed something stricter: the executing state must, on its own initiative, ask the issuing state to send the judgment and the certificate, and enforce the sentence at home through the mutual-recognition machinery of Framework Decision 2008/909. Refusal to surrender no longer means walking free, and it no longer means improvising a domestic enforcement order out of the wrong legal basis. For anyone facing a European Arrest Warrant in France, and for every Paris practitioner who pleads detention conditions before the chambre de l’instruction, the ruling redraws the whole second half of the file: win the refusal, and a second procedure starts the same day, in France, to make you serve the sentence here. This article explains the new rule, how French courts already apply its first half, and what the second half will now require from the requested person, the prosecutor and the issuing state.

I. Will France refuse to surrender you because of prison conditions abroad?

A. What proof of inhuman detention must you put before the Paris judges?

Surrender under a European Arrest Warrant remains the principle, and mutual trust the starting point: every Member State is presumed to respect fundamental rights. But that presumption is rebuttable, and French courts rebut it every month. The method comes from Luxembourg, in the Aranyosi and Caldararu line: first, objective, reliable, specific and up-to-date material showing systemic or generalised deficiencies in the detention conditions of the issuing state, drawn typically from judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and reports of Council of Europe bodies such as the Committee for the Prevention of Torture; second, precise reasons to believe that the requested person himself will face a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the facility where he would actually be held. General overcrowding statistics alone do not suffice, and neither do press cuttings; the chambre de l’instruction wants named establishments, measured cell space, and a personal destination.

French case law enforces this two-step test as a duty to investigate, not a favour to the defence. On 26 March 2019, in appeal no. 19-81.731 concerning a warrant from Slovenia, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation quashed a Paris surrender order precisely because the judges had brushed aside defence material drawn from European Court of Human Rights judgments and Council of Europe documents describing a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the issuing state’s prisons, appeal no. 19-81.731. The Court held that where the information in the warrant is too thin to decide surrender consistently with fundamental rights, the chamber is bound to seek more: « lorsque les informations contenues dans le mandat d’arrêt sont insuffisantes pour permettre à la chambre de l’instruction de statuer sur la remise de la personne recherchée dans le respect de ses droits fondamentaux, cette juridiction est tenue de les solliciter auprès des autorités de l’Etat d’émission ». The procedural tool for that request is article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the chamber to demand supplementary information from the issuing judicial authority, with a maximum of ten days for receipt. In practice, Paris counsel should therefore arrive with the Strasbourg and CPT material already translated and tabulated, identify the exact prison, and invite the court in writing to request individualised guarantees: cell allocation, personal space per detainee, access to healthcare, and a named remedy if the guarantees fail. A chamber that refuses surrender without asking anything risks reversal; a chamber that asks and receives credible individual guarantees will usually surrender.

B. When must the French court refuse surrender rather than postpone it?

French statute books do not name detention conditions among the express grounds for refusing a European Arrest Warrant. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the mandatory bars: amnesty extinguishing a prosecution that French courts could have heard, a final decision for the same facts in France or in another Member State with the sentence served or unenforceable, minority under thirteen, and prosecution for political opinions. Prison conditions appear nowhere in that list. The refusal nevertheless happens, because directly-effective Union law outranks the national list: Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read with Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, absolutely prohibits surrender where there are serious and established reasons to believe the person would face inhuman or degrading treatment, as Luxembourg recalled at length in Rugu and Aucroix. The French judge applies that prohibition as a mandatory ground, independent of nationality or residence, and refusal on that basis brings the surrender procedure to a definitive end rather than suspending it.

Before reaching refusal, the court must exhaust dialogue. The Luxembourg method requires the executing judge to request supplementary information and, where needed, individualised assurances, and to postpone the surrender decision while awaiting them; only if the risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable time does postponement harden into refusal. Defence strategy in Paris therefore runs in two movements. First, force the dialogue: file the systemic material early, designate the establishments, demand that the chamber use article 695-33 and set the ten-day clock running, and contest vague state replies that promise compliance in general terms without assigning the person to an identified, Convention-compatible cell. Second, prepare the endgame: if the issuing authority cannot dispel the risk, invite a definitive refusal with full reasoning, because only a reasoned refusal triggers the new second act that the Grand Chamber has now written. A bare adjournment leaves the client in pre-surrender detention limbo; a reasoned refusal closes surrender and opens enforcement in France. That is the hinge of the 4 June 2026 ruling, and it is where most defence files used to stop. They can no longer stop there.

The backdrop in autumn 2026 shows why the hinge matters. Detention-conditions litigation around European Arrest Warrants is running at full intensity: Dutch courts have twice refused or suspended surrender to France over French prison overcrowding, and a Budapest appeal court cut a German activist’s sentence from eight years to seven on 30 September 2026 while surrender-related challenges over Hungarian detention continue, as analysed in the September 2026 Hungarian sentence ruling. Every one of those files ends, or will end, with the same question Rugu and Aucroix answered: the person stays, so who enforces the sentence?

II. After France refuses surrender, will you serve the foreign sentence in France?

A. Must France ask the issuing state for your file and jail you at home?

Yes, and it must do so on its own motion. The Grand Chamber held that once execution of a European Arrest Warrant issued for a custodial sentence has been refused under Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the executing Member State must ensure the sentence is served on its territory by requesting, of its own initiative and under Article 4(5) of Framework Decision 2008/909, that the issuing state transmit the judgment together with the standard certificate in Annex I, with a view to recognition and enforcement at home. The logic is public interest, stated bluntly: impunity for the requested person would contradict both the Framework Decision and Article 3(2) TEU, which promises citizens an area of freedom, security and justice. Social reintegration of the convict and the fight against impunity are complementary objectives, not competing ones; serving the sentence in the state of residence serves both. The issuing state is not strictly obliged to transmit, but its discretion is fenced by the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU: refusing to send the file while knowing the alternative is outright impunity would breach that duty. The sentenced person’s consent is still required in principle under Article 6 of Framework Decision 2008/909, in accordance with the law of the issuing state, which gives the defence a genuine procedural lever at the recognition stage.

In France, that recognition stage runs through article 728-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: a custodial sentence imposed by another Member State can be recognised and enforced on French territory, and refusal is possible only on the exhaustively listed grounds of articles 728-32 and 728-33, such as a missing or manifestly incomplete certificate, double jeopardy, prescription under French law, or immunity. Three practical consequences follow for a Paris file. First, the defence must prepare two battles at once: the surrender battle before the chambre de l’instruction, and the recognition battle before the sentence-enforcement judge, including the adaptation of the foreign sentence to the French scale, partial remission, and the consent requirement. Second, time matters: the French authorities should request transmission promptly after the refusal, and counsel should monitor that request, because delay leaves the client in an ambiguous status, neither surrendered nor serving. Third, the issuing state’s cooperation cannot be assumed: where it withholds the file, the file must record that refusal precisely, since only documented cooperation efforts protect the French decision from later challenge and keep pressure under the sincere-cooperation principle. The same anti-impunity logic already animates French extradition outside the Union: when France refuses to extradite, it routinely prosecutes the facts itself, as with offences committed abroad by French nationals, described in the refusal-to-extradite prosecution mechanism. Rugu and Aucroix extend that philosophy inside the mutual-recognition area: no surrender without rights, but no rights without enforcement.

B. Can France keep you under the French-nationality shortcut instead?

No, and this is the ruling’s second holding, the one practitioners are most likely to get wrong. Article 695-24, 2° of the Code of Criminal Procedure, transposing Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584, allows refusal where the person sought for a custodial sentence is a French national, has established residence in France or simply stays there, provided the foreign conviction is enforceable on French territory: « Si la personne recherchée pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privatives de liberté est de nationalité française, a établi sa résidence sur le territoire national ou demeure sur ce territoire et si la décision de condamnation est exécutoire sur le territoire français en application de l’article 728-31 ». For years, some executing courts treated that clause as a convenient safety net: refuse surrender on fundamental-rights grounds, then add the nationality undertaking on top so the sentence could be served domestically without further formalities. The Grand Chamber closes that door. Article 4(6) is, in the Court’s words, an autonomous ground for non-execution, with its own conditions and its own purpose, and it has no complementary role once surrender has already been refused under Article 1(3). Stacking the two grounds confuses two distinct regimes and misstates what each protects: Article 1(3) protects absolute rights regardless of who the person is, while Article 4(6) serves social reintegration for residents and nationals.

French courts already read article 695-24, 2° in exactly that autonomous spirit. On 7 August 2024, in appeal no. 24-81.863, the Criminal Chamber recalled the provision’s purpose in a single sentence that defence lawyers should memorise: appeal no. 24-81.863, « L’objectif de ce texte est d’accroître les chances de réinsertion sociale de la personne recherchée ». The same decision restates the hierarchy that governs every surrender file: « l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement », citing the Grand Chamber’s O.G. ruling of 6 June 2023. Two lessons follow for Paris practice. First, the nationality-and-residence ground must be raised as a self-standing plea at the surrender stage, with proof of nationality or stable residence and proof that the sentence is enforceable in France, not brandished after the fact to paper over a fundamental-rights refusal. Second, where the client is neither French nor resident, Article 4(6) was never available anyway, which makes the new Article 4(5) route under Framework Decision 2008/909 the only lawful path to domestic enforcement: consent-based, certificate-driven, and open to any requested person, whatever his passport.

The ruling also clarifies what surrender, when it does happen, can and cannot produce afterwards. Under the specialty rule, a person surrendered to France may not be prosecuted, convicted or detained for a different pre-surrender offence without the executing state’s consent or a waiver, per article 695-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: « celle-ci ne peut être poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue en vue de l’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté pour un fait quelconque antérieur à la remise et autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure », with waiver mechanics in article 695-19. On 5 October 2021, in appeal no. 21-84.194, the Criminal Chamber quashed proceedings where the file contained no surrender decision at all yet the courts had brushed aside the specialty plea, appeal no. 21-84.194: without the written surrender decision, nobody can verify which facts the issuing state authorised France to prosecute. The parallel with Rugu and Aucroix is instructive. In both configurations, the written instrument governs everything: no surrender decision, no prosecution beyond the warrant; no transmitted judgment and certificate, no domestic enforcement after a refusal. Paper first, liberty analysis second. Counsel should therefore treat the post-refusal phase as a documents recovery operation from day one: the foreign judgment in full, the Annex I certificate, the consent record, and the French recognition order, each checked against the refusal grounds of articles 728-32 and 728-33.

One contrast sharpens the picture. Outside the European Arrest Warrant, where a third state seeks the extradition from France of a Union citizen who is not French, France must first inform the citizen’s home Member State and, if that state requests it, surrender him there under the warrant procedure rather than extraditing him outward, the Petruhhin mechanism applied by the Criminal Chamber on 11 October 2022 in the American extradition case, appeal no. 22-80.654. Inside the warrant system after Rugu and Aucroix, the philosophy converges from the opposite direction: the executing state that will not send the person back must take charge of the sentence itself. In both settings, the person does not evaporate between jurisdictions. He is either surrendered with guarantees, surrendered to his home state, prosecuted in France, or made to serve the foreign sentence in France. Disappearance from all four tracks is precisely the impunity the Grand Chamber refused to bless.

Two further mechanics decide whether enforcement at home actually works in a Paris file. The first is consent and adaptation at the recognition stage. Under Article 6 of Framework Decision 2008/909, the judgment and certificate can in principle only be forwarded with the sentenced person’s consent, given in accordance with the law of the issuing state, and the French enforcement judge then fits the foreign penalty into the French scale without aggravating it. Defence counsel should therefore treat consent as a negotiated instrument rather than a formality: it can be timed, conditioned on identified enforcement conditions, and coordinated with applications for sentence adjustment, while the prosecution will press for swift recognition precisely to close the impunity gap the Grand Chamber identified. The second mechanic sits one step earlier and is often missed. Many European Arrest Warrant files in France begin with a provisional arrest on an Interpol red notice, days before the warrant itself arrives, and the thirty-day logic of that first detention shapes everything that follows, as explained in the red-notice detention and release framework. A client arrested that way needs counsel who synchronises three clocks from the first police-custody interview: the red-notice detention clock, the surrender clock before the chambre de l’instruction, and now the recognition clock that starts on refusal. Finally, detention conditions are not the only fundamental-rights plea that can end surrender proceedings: where private and family life rooted in France is at stake, the French judge must examine the argument and give a reasoned answer, following the September 2026 quashing analysed in the family-life surrender challenge. A refusal on that ground leads to the same second act: no surrender, then enforcement in France through recognition. Whatever door closes surrender, the corridor beyond it is now the same.

Conclusion

The 4 June 2026 Grand Chamber ruling replaces a comfortable misunderstanding with a demanding procedure. Refusing surrender because of inhuman detention conditions is now only half the case. The executing state must then, on its own initiative, request the foreign judgment and certificate and enforce the sentence on its territory, and it may not substitute the nationality-and-residence shortcut for that machinery. For a requested person in France, the practical checklist runs as follows. Challenge surrender with dated, establishment-specific Strasbourg and CPT material plus proof of personal destination, and compel the chambre de l’instruction to seek supplementary information within the ten-day channel of article 695-33 before any refusal. If refusal comes, demand that it be fully reasoned, since the refusal decision is the gateway to domestic enforcement. Prepare immediately for recognition under article 728-31: verify the certificate, assert the consent requirement, contest adaptation of the sentence, and document every request for transmission so that a silent issuing state cannot quietly convert a rights victory into an unenforced sentence. Raise article 695-24, 2° only as an autonomous plea where nationality or residence genuinely supports reintegration in France, never as an afterthought to a fundamental-rights refusal. And keep the specialty shield in mind for the cases where surrender does proceed: without the written surrender decision in the file, no prosecution beyond the warrant. A refusal that ends in impunity helped nobody, neither the person, who lived under a warrant that never dies, nor the justice system that issued it. Luxembourg has now said so in binding terms, and Paris courts, which already investigate detention conditions more rigorously than most, will be the first to feel the second half of the rule. The files that win from now on are the files prepared in two halves from the first hearing.

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