The European Union has opened a new front in the sanctions conflict with Russia: the fight over the judgment itself. On 23 July 2026, the Council adopted its 21st package of restrictive measures. Alongside new bank, crypto, energy and shadow-fleet restrictions, the package added a legal shield for Union operators facing Russian proceedings connected with EU sanctions. The Council’s later statement describes the change as allowing EU courts and Member States not to recognise or enforce court decisions obtained in proceedings lodged in Russian courts. The official announcement is available in the Council statement of 18 August 2026.
This is not a general declaration that every Russian judgment is worthless in Europe. It is a targeted answer to a recurring litigation pattern: a contract, asset or transaction is affected by an EU restrictive measure; a Russian claimant then uses Russian jurisdiction, including the special rules in Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code, to obtain a judgment against a Union operator; the claimant seeks to turn that judgment into pressure on assets, accounts or counterparties outside Russia. For a French company, the practical question is no longer only whether a Russian court was competent under Russian law. The company must also preserve the sanctions record, prevent accidental performance, and build a French and European non-recognition strategy before the Russian order reaches an EU asset.
I. What did the EU’s new anti-recognition rule change for Russian court judgments?
A. Can a Russian court judgment still be enforced in France?
The short answer is yes in some situations, but no longer where the new Union conditions are met. The distinction matters because the EU measure is not a political press release replacing French procedure. It is a set of directly applicable provisions inserted into the sanctions regulations that French courts and authorities must read together with the ordinary rules on foreign judgments.
The legislative core is split between two instruments. Council Regulation (EU) 2026/1844, adopted on 23 July 2026, amended Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 and inserted Article 11c. Council Regulation (EU) 2026/1848 amended Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and inserted a parallel Article 11c, together with Article 11ca. The two regulations address different sanctions frameworks and different cross-references, so a file must be mapped to the correct instrument rather than described loosely as “the EU Russia sanctions rule”.
Article 509 of the French Code of Civil Procedure remains the starting point for a French enforcement application. The current text states: Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.
The provision is available on Légifrance, Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not make a foreign judgment automatically enforceable. It directs the court to the conditions imposed by French law, international instruments and, now, applicable Union sanctions law.
In the absence of a treaty that governs the particular judgment, the traditional French test examines three matters: indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court, compliance with international public policy in substance and procedure, and absence of fraud. The Cour de cassation reproduced that test in First Civil Chamber, 24 June 2020, no. 19-11.962, concerning an attempted exequatur of a Russian judgment. The decision records the rule in these terms: l’exequatur d’un jugement étranger, en l’absence de convention internationale, est soumis à la triple condition de la compétence indirecte du juge étranger fondée sur le rattachement du litige au juge saisi, de la conformité à l’ordre public international de fond et de procédure, et enfin de l’absence de fraude
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The new Article 11c rule adds a decisive statutory prohibition to that analysis. Where its conditions are satisfied, a Russian judgment, order, injunction, relief or equivalent administrative decision must not be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State. The text is deliberately broad: it is not limited to a final judgment for a fixed sum, and it can reach a decision that creates a claim, right or alleged obligation in a restructuring, insolvency or comparable procedure. The words “given effect” are particularly important for a company that is not yet facing a French exequatur application. A bank, buyer, insurer, insolvency practitioner or commercial counterparty may still need to know that an order cannot lawfully be used as a practical shortcut around EU restrictions.
That prohibition is not unlimited. The operative provisions refer to a person in the relevant categories of the sanctions regulation and to a contract or transaction whose performance has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by EU restrictive measures. The facts therefore need to be connected, not merely described with the words “Russia” and “sanctions”. A Russian commercial dispute about an ordinary pre-sanctions debt may remain governed by the usual recognition analysis. A claim created because a Union company stopped a payment, froze an asset, refused a prohibited service or exited a sanctioned relationship is materially different.
French procedure also protects against overclaiming. In First Civil Chamber, 26 November 2025, no. 23-21.764, the Cour de cassation explained the purpose of exequatur: La procédure d’exequatur a pour objet de déclarer exécutoire en France un jugement étranger, après en avoir vérifié la régularité internationale.
The same decision states that the international-regularity review concerns the procedure leading to the foreign judgment and the judgment’s content, not the tactical conditions in which the exequatur request was filed. A French court is not a second appeal court for the Russian merits. It is a gatekeeper for international effect.
The new Union provisions make that gatekeeping sharper in sanctions-linked cases. The court must not grant effect to a covered Russian order merely because the claimant has presented a translated judgment, a certified debt calculation or a French asset. The first question becomes whether recognition itself would defeat the restrictive measure that the Union regulation is designed to make effective.
The same reasoning applies when the Russian claimant tries to move indirectly. A judgment may be presented to a foreign bank, an offshore buyer, an arbitral tribunal, a restructuring office or a parent-company counterparty rather than immediately to a French bailiff. The legal label may change, but the company should ask whether the requested step would recognise, enforce or give practical effect to a covered Russian decision. That functional analysis is often more important than the form of the document.
B. Which contracts and sanctions cases fall within Article 11c?
Article 11c is aimed at a defined litigation mechanism, not at every cross-border contract with a Russian party. The recitals to Regulation 2026/1844 explain that Russian legislation and court practice may allow proceedings against Union companies in connection with contracts or transactions affected by Union restrictive measures. The recital then connects the response to a requirement that Member States refuse recognition or enforcement of the resulting Russian decisions. The regulation’s Article 11c text covers a decision under, derived from or equivalent to the Russian special-jurisdiction rules, as well as a decision made under another Russian law.
The parallel provision in Regulation 2026/1848 goes further in practical terms. Article 11ca allows a person protected by the regulation to seek a court order in a Member State requiring the Russian claimant not to initiate or discontinue the proceedings, or not to seek to enforce, recognise or rely on any decision obtained or potentially obtained in those proceedings in any jurisdiction. Failure to respect that order can trigger financial penalties set by the court. This gives a French company an affirmative procedural tool. It is not restricted to waiting for the claimant to choose France as the enforcement forum.
The connection with a restrictive measure must be proved in a disciplined chronology. The following questions usually decide whether the new rule is engaged:
- What was the contract or transaction, and which party performed, refused, suspended or terminated it?
- Which EU regulation, decision, listing, transaction ban, asset freeze, export restriction or service prohibition affected performance?
- When did the measure take effect compared with the payment demand, termination notice, freezing instruction and Russian filing?
- Does the Russian claim seek compensation for the commercial consequence of compliance with EU sanctions?
- Does the Russian decision rely on Articles 248.1 or 248.2, an equivalent jurisdictional theory, or a separate Russian-law route designed to reach the same result?
- Which Union person, entity or body is covered by the relevant regulation, and which EU court or authority has territorial competence?
The question is not whether the company’s conduct was commercially convenient. It is whether the performance of the contract was affected by the Union restrictive measure. The European Commission and Council wording expressly includes an indirect effect and an effect that is only partial. A French operator should therefore preserve evidence even where the contract ended before the sanction was formally added to an annex, if the measure later changed the legality or economics of performance.
The package also contains a damages route. Article 11a of the amended regulations allows an eligible person to seek direct or indirect damages, including legal costs, caused by claims lodged in third-country courts in connection with an affected contract or transaction, where effective remedies are not available in the relevant jurisdiction. That is not an automatic compensation award. It requires an eligible claimant, a qualifying third-country proceeding, a causal link to the sanctions-affected transaction and proof of loss. It can nevertheless change the negotiation balance, particularly where the Russian claimant has imposed legal expenses, attachment risk or duplicated litigation costs.
The French cases show why the factual record remains central. In Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, 13 March 2024, no. 19/12258, the court partly granted exequatur of Russian decisions concerning a Russian bank’s contractual claims but refused exequatur for other judgments containing excessive penalties. The decision states: Ainsi, les deux pénalités mises à la charge de Monsieur [M] [C], lesquelles doivent être appréciées en fonction des manquements du donneur d’ordre et du préjudice du garant, faisaient peser sur ce dernier, en sa qualité de caution, une charge financière d’un montant excessif au regard des taux pratiqués de 50% et 45% sur les sommes importantes restant dues et sa réévaluation annuelle.
The lesson is not that every Russian bank claim fails. It is that the French court can separate the enforceable and non-enforceable consequences when the legal and factual structure permits it.
There is another limit. A Russian judgment does not become unenforceable in France simply because its result is unpopular or politically sensitive. In Assembly Plenary, 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028, the Cour de cassation reaffirmed that the exequatur judge cannot revise the foreign decision on the merits. It stated: Il résulte de ce texte, d’une part, que le juge de l’exequatur, lorsqu’il se prononce sur la régularité internationale de la décision étrangère, ne peut procéder à la révision au fond de celle-ci
. For a sanctions file, the strongest argument is therefore not “the Russian judge got the contract wrong”. It is “the requested EU effect is prohibited by a directly applicable Union measure, or the foreign process fails the international-regularity test”.
The distinction is also visible in First Civil Chamber, 28 May 2025, nos. 21-13.519 and 21-13.520, where the Cour de cassation applied the public-policy exception in the context of cross-border enforcement under the former Brussels I framework. The decision recalls: une décision n’est pas reconnue si la reconnaissance est manifestement contraire à l’ordre public de l’État membre requis.
That case concerned freedom of the press, not Russia sanctions, but its analytical value is direct: a refusal of recognition is an exception grounded in a defined legal conflict, not a free-standing review of the foreign court’s commercial reasoning.
II. What should a French company do after a Russian sanctions lawsuit?
A. How should a French company preserve evidence and stop enforcement?
The first response should be operational, not rhetorical. A company that receives a Russian claim, interim order, judgment or demand based on a sanctions-affected contract should assume that the document may be shown to a bank or counterparty within hours. It should preserve the evidence and place a controlled hold on any payment or transfer that could give effect to the Russian decision until sanctions counsel and the relevant financial institution have completed the analysis.
The internal response should have a named owner and a short written decision trail. The file should identify the contract, the entities, the assets, the payment route, the requested act and the next procedural date. It should also separate three issues that are often mixed together: whether the original contract debt exists, whether EU sanctions prohibit performance, and whether the Russian decision can have effect in the EU. A company can owe a commercial amount and still be prohibited from paying it. Conversely, a company can have a strong sanctions defence but lose it in practice if it fails to answer a French enforcement application on time.
The French monetary and financial code makes the compliance side concrete. Article L. 562-4 requires covered persons to apply freeze measures and prohibitions without delay and to inform the Minister responsible for the economy. The official Article L. 562-4 of the Code monétaire et financier begins: Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation
. Article L. 562-5 adds that the persons covered by Article L. 562-4 may not make funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of a person whose funds or resources are frozen; see Article L. 562-5.
Those provisions mean that a Russian judgment cannot be treated as a normal debt-collection instruction. A French bank may need to refuse a transfer, freeze an account or request clarification from the competent authority. The company should send the bank a concise legal packet rather than a long argument: the EU regulation and relevant annex, the Russian pleading or judgment, the contract and sanctions chronology, the proposed French court application, and a statement of the precise act that must not be performed. The bank should not have to infer the legal risk from a collection letter.
The criminal exposure should also be assessed. Article L. 574-3 of the Code monétaire et financier provides that evading the resulting obligations or obstructing their implementation is punished by the penalties referred to in Article 459(1) of the Customs Code. The official Article L. 574-3 states: Est puni des peines prévues au 1 de l’article 459 du code des douanes le fait […] de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre.
The ellipsis in this quotation is editorial in the article; the linked text must be read in full before any compliance decision.
The evidence hold should include at least the following material:
- the signed contract, amendments, governing-law clause, jurisdiction clause and arbitration clause;
- invoices, payment instructions, bank messages, shipping or service records, and the documents showing how performance was affected;
- the EU decision and regulation in force on each critical date, including the relevant annex entry and any derogation or licence;
- the Russian statement of claim, court notices, interim measures, judgment, appeal papers and enforcement demand;
- proof of service, translations, hearing dates, representation and opportunities to challenge jurisdiction or the measure;
- the identity and ownership or control of every claimant, bank, intermediary and asset in the payment chain;
- all communications showing that a refusal or suspension was caused by legal compliance rather than an opportunistic commercial default.
The last item is often decisive. A company that simply writes “we do not want to pay Russia” creates an evidentiary problem. A company that records the specific EU prohibition, the blocked bank or asset, the legal advice received and the alternative steps considered can demonstrate that the contract’s performance was affected by a Union measure. That chronology supports both the Article 11c non-recognition position and any later claim for costs or damages.
The company should then decide whether it needs immediate French relief. Possible objectives include preventing recognition or enforcement, stopping a threatened transfer, protecting confidential information, preserving the position under an arbitration clause, or obtaining an order directed at the Russian claimant. The choice depends on the location of assets and counterparties. A French filing should not be drafted as if a declaration alone will automatically bind a bank in another jurisdiction. The relief sought must be matched to the asset, the actor and the enforcement step.
French counsel should also test the foreign process itself. In the Russian case reviewed by the Cour de cassation in no. 19-11.962, the court refused exequatur because the defendant had not received sufficient information and time to organise a defence. That is a concrete procedural record, not a general accusation against the foreign judiciary. Service, translation, notice, representation and the ability to appeal should be documented from the first day.
Finally, the company should avoid creating a second violation while responding to the first. It should not transfer frozen funds to a Russian account “under protest”, sign a side letter that disguises the payment route, or instruct an intermediary to pay on its behalf without a documented legal basis. The prohibition on indirect making available in Article L. 562-5 makes the payment chain part of the legal analysis.
B. Can the company recover costs, damages and contractual losses?
A French company has several possible recovery theories, but they should be pleaded in layers. The new Union damages mechanism may cover legal costs and other direct or indirect loss caused by a qualifying third-country claim. The company may also rely on the contract, French law, an arbitration agreement, insurance, a guarantee or a separate claim for abusive conduct. None of these routes should be assumed to produce the same remedy or the same limitation period.
Start with the contract. Article 1103 of the Civil Code provides: Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits.
The current text is available on Légifrance, Article 1103 of the Civil Code. A governing-law clause, an exclusive jurisdiction clause, a sanctions representation, a force-majeure provision, a hardship mechanism, a termination right or a compliance warranty may determine the first contractual response. The clause does not override an EU prohibition, but it can allocate the consequences of a lawful suspension, termination or cooperation duty.
Article 1217 of the Civil Code provides the remedial menu for non-performance: refusal or suspension of reciprocal performance, specific performance, price reduction, termination and damages, with compatible remedies capable of being combined. The official Article 1217 lists these options and states that damages may always be added. In a sanctions dispute, the company should identify which remedy follows from the contract and which loss follows from the Russian proceeding. A cancelled shipment, a blocked escrow account, duplicate legal costs and a lost sale are different heads of loss and need different evidence.
The Article 11a damages route is particularly useful when the Russian claimant has chosen a third-country procedure precisely because an EU court would not give effect to the underlying sanctions-affected claim. The company will need to show the qualifying connection, the absence or inadequacy of effective remedies in the relevant jurisdiction, causation and quantum. Legal invoices should be separated by task: Russian defence, French emergency application, bank or licence work, translation, asset tracing and commercial mitigation. A global invoice makes a recoverable-loss argument harder.
Article 11ca creates a forward-looking option. If the Russian proceeding is pending or the claimant threatens to rely on the decision elsewhere, the company can ask the competent court of a Member State for an order requiring the claimant to stop or not to pursue the proceeding, and not to seek recognition, enforcement or reliance on the resulting decision in any jurisdiction. The court may attach financial penalties to non-compliance. This is valuable where the company has no Russian asset to defend but has European bank accounts, shares, receivables or customers that could be pressured.
The French court’s ordinary international-law limits still matter. In no. 23-21.764, the Cour de cassation emphasised that the international-regularity review concerns the procedure leading to the foreign judgment and the judgment’s content. In no. 24-50.028, it repeated that the exequatur judge cannot revise the merits. A French application should therefore focus on the legal effect requested in France, the sanctions regulation, the factual connection to the affected transaction, procedural fairness and the precise public-policy conflict. It should not ask the French court to recalculate every contractual issue already decided in Russia unless that is necessary to identify the prohibited effect.
The 2024 Paris decision in no. 19/12258 offers a useful practical contrast. The court recognised some Russian contractual consequences while refusing a separate set of excessive penalties and refusing partial exequatur where the operative provisions were indivisible. The approach shows why the claimant’s demand must be disassembled. If the Russian judgment contains a principal debt, interest, penalty, attachment or insolvency instruction, each element should be identified and matched to a legal basis. One prohibited element may contaminate the whole operative provision; another may be severable. The result depends on the wording of the foreign dispositif and the relief sought in France.
The company should also protect a future arbitration or court case. It should reserve rights under the contract, avoid admissions that the Russian judgment is valid, and state that any payment or non-payment is subject to mandatory EU sanctions law. If an arbitration clause exists, the company should assess whether the Russian proceedings breach it and whether an anti-suit or anti-enforcement order is available in the chosen seat. The new Article 11ca tool does not erase the arbitration clause; it strengthens the European procedural response to a sanctions-linked use of Russian jurisdiction.
A defensible damages file usually contains a simple table with six columns: event date, legal measure, affected obligation, immediate cost, mitigation step and supporting document. It should record the exchange rate and valuation method for a claim expressed in roubles, the date on which a bank blocked or rejected an instruction, the cost of replacing a supplier, the value of inventory or receivables trapped in Russia, and the legal fees attributable to each forum. The company should not inflate the loss by counting the same legal work twice under Article 11a and Article 1217.
The company must also distinguish a lawful sanctions refusal from a bad-faith refusal. If the EU measure allowed performance under a licence or derogation, the file should show why the company did or did not apply for it. If a payment could have been made to a non-designated account under a permitted channel, the company should record the legal and commercial reasons for the chosen response. That information may affect contractual damages, mitigation and the court’s view of causation even when Article 11c blocks recognition of the Russian judgment.
In practical terms, the response should move through four gates:
- freeze the decision’s practical effect while the sanctions and asset chain are mapped;
- preserve the contract, Russian file and EU chronology in a format usable before a French court;
- choose the right French or European application: non-recognition, protective relief, Article 11ca order, arbitration relief or a combination;
- quantify the recoverable loss separately from the underlying debt and reserve rights under the contract.
That sequence avoids the two common errors. The first is to treat the EU rule as a blanket immunity and ignore an ordinary exequatur application that still needs a complete defence. The second is to treat a Russian judgment as an ordinary commercial debt and make a payment that would give effect to a prohibited decision. The correct position is narrower and stronger: identify the covered transaction, identify the Union measure, identify the requested effect, and match the remedy to the asset and the forum.
Conclusion
The EU’s July 2026 sanctions package changes the litigation risk for French companies with Russian exposure. A Russian judgment tied to an EU-restricted contract or transaction may now be refused recognition, effect or enforcement in a Member State under Articles 11c of Regulations 2026/1844 and 2026/1848. Article 11ca can support a proactive order against abusive or sanctions-frustrating proceedings, while Article 11a may support recovery of qualifying losses and legal costs. Those tools work only when the company can prove the timeline and the connection to the restrictive measure.
French law remains the procedural bridge. Article 509, the international-public-policy test and the ban on revising the foreign merits still govern the ordinary recognition analysis. The new Union provisions add a mandatory sanctions filter. A company should preserve evidence before the Russian judgment is circulated, coordinate its bank and compliance response, and seek targeted relief before an asset is transferred or a counterparty treats the judgment as binding.