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MBS in Paris, Khashoggi Inquiry in France: What the French Judge Can Actually Do

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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MBS in Paris, Khashoggi Inquiry in France: What the French Judge Can Actually Do

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Mohammed bin Salman’s return to Paris has put an old criminal complaint back in the news at exactly the moment when French procedure has become more consequential. A French investigating judge is now examining complaints accusing the Saudi crown prince of complicity in torture and enforced disappearance in connection with Jamal Khashoggi’s killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. The legal question is not whether a diplomatic visit creates an automatic arrest power. It is whether French courts can investigate alleged international crimes committed abroad, what presence in France changes, and how immunity applies to a senior foreign official. The Paris Court of Appeal’s May 2026 ruling opened the investigative route after years of resistance from the prosecution. The current visit gives the case visibility and potentially evidence, but it does not amount to a charge, a finding of responsibility, or a warrant. French law creates a demanding sequence: establish a jurisdictional gateway, test the complaint, gather admissible evidence across several countries, and resolve any immunity obstacle before coercive measures are considered. For international observers, the sharp issue is therefore practical: what can a French judge do now, and which legal barrier could stop the case later?

I. Can France investigate MBS over Khashoggi while he is in Paris?

A. What the May 2026 judicial turn actually changes

The immediate change is procedural, not a declaration of guilt. On 16 May 2026, the French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office confirmed that an investigating judge from the crimes against humanity unit would examine the complaint after a 11 May ruling by the Paris Court of Appeal. The complaint was filed by Trial International and Reporters Without Borders. It alleges complicity in torture and enforced disappearance; Mohammed bin Salman has denied ordering the killing and has described the event as having occurred under his watch. The Associated Press account of the PNAT announcement correctly stresses that opening a judicial inquiry does not mean that the prince has been charged or that a French judge has found him responsible.

The renewed attention comes from the timing of his current visit. Le Monde’s report on the 24 August Paris visit records the return of commercial and diplomatic normality while noting that the Khashoggi complaint remains under investigation. That juxtaposition matters legally because the original complaint was filed during an earlier visit to France. It does not, however, turn political proximity into territorial jurisdiction by itself. The relevant questions are the offence alleged, the treaty or statute that gives France jurisdiction, the suspect’s presence or connection with France, and the procedural status of the complaint.

French criminal procedure gives victims and qualifying organisations more than one way to bring facts to prosecutors and judges. Article 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that a person claiming to have been harmed by a crime or misdemeanour may file a complaint and become a civil party before the competent investigating judge. The same provision normally requires a prior complaint to the prosecutor and either a decision not to prosecute or the expiry of three months. It expressly removes that waiting condition for a crime. That matters in a case framed around torture, enforced disappearance, and possible crimes against humanity: the admissibility gateway is not the same as proof of every allegation.

The next procedural step is governed by Articles 85 and 86 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 86 requires the investigating judge to communicate the complaint to the prosecutor for submissions. It permits the prosecutor to seek time for further investigation, to challenge a complaint that is insufficiently supported, or to request a refusal to investigate where the facts cannot legally amount to an offence. The judge may continue despite a prosecution request for a refusal, but must give reasons. The practical result is an investigation capable of testing evidence, not a ceremonial registration of a press allegation.

That distinction also explains why the Paris Court of Appeal’s approach is important. The court reportedly considered that the possibility of a crime against humanity could not be excluded before investigation, including the question whether the killing formed part of a concerted plan or a broader systematic attack on civilians. It did not decide that MBS committed torture, disappearance, or murder. It decided that the procedural door should not be closed before the investigative facts were gathered. The fact that the PNAT maintained its own view of the associations’ ability to act shows that admissibility remains contested even after the inquiry is opened.

If the prosecutor later classifies the matter as a case that should be closed, Article 40-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a review route for a person who reported facts and challenges a decision to dismiss without prosecution. Its wording allows a review before the prosecutor general and says that the prosecutor general may order the prosecutor to initiate proceedings under the statutory conditions. This is not a guarantee of trial. It is a mechanism that keeps a contested decision within a reasoned procedural chain.

For the international audience, the critical message is simple: the French case has moved from a dispute over whether the complaint could trigger an investigation to an evidence-gathering phase. The inquiry can identify witnesses, seek records, test the proposed legal characterisation, and determine whether the alleged conduct can be linked to a person who may be prosecuted in France. It still must respect the presumption of innocence, the rights of a person under investigation, diplomatic obligations, and any immunity recognised by international law.

B. The decisive route is treaty-based presence, not a simple “global arrest” power

France does not claim a general power to try every offence committed anywhere merely because the story has global importance. The starting point is Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides that authors or accomplices of offences committed outside the Republic may be prosecuted and tried by French courts when French law applies or when an international convention or a European Union instrument gives French courts jurisdiction. The article’s operative language is “peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises”: jurisdiction is anchored in a legal rule, not in the moral gravity of the event.

Article 689-1 then supplies the presence condition for the treaty-based offences listed in the following provisions. It says that a person who committed one of those offences outside France may be prosecuted and tried if that person is found in France. In the official wording, the provision uses the phrase “si elle se trouve en France”. That phrase is narrower than a power to arrest any visiting official on arrival, but it is also more concrete than a jurisdictional theory based solely on nationality, press coverage, or a French political interest.

For torture, the relevant gateway is Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which implements the Convention against Torture. It permits prosecution under Article 689-1 of a person who is guilty of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of that convention. The article is not a shortcut around proof. The investigator must still identify conduct that falls within the convention’s definition, establish the person’s alleged role, and satisfy the procedural and immunity rules that apply to a senior foreign official.

Enforced disappearance has a separate gateway. Article 689-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Its exact structure links prosecution to Article 689-1 and to conduct defined as an enforced disappearance under the convention. The provision also refers to complicity and to the relevant offences in the Penal Code. This is why the allegation that Khashoggi was killed and his remains concealed cannot simply be treated as a headline description: the judge must examine whether the legal elements of enforced disappearance, including the role of state-linked actors and the concealment or denial of the fate or whereabouts of the person, are established.

A third route is possible but carries a different connection requirement. Article 689-11 covers genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed abroad. Its current text requires the suspect to have a habitual residence in France, defined as a sufficient connection with France, and it requires a prosecution request from the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor. It also requires the public prosecutor to verify that no international or national court is seeking surrender or extradition. A short diplomatic visit is therefore not automatically the same thing as habitual residence for the Article 689-11 route. The distinction is central: the presence-based torture and disappearance provisions and the residence-based crimes-against-humanity provision must not be blended into one fictional universal rule.

The substantive characterisation also has to be proven. Article 212-1 of the Penal Code defines other crimes against humanity by reference to acts committed in execution of a concerted plan against a civilian population in the context of a widespread or systematic attack. The list includes intentional killing, serious deprivation of liberty, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts. Its French wording uses “en exécution d’un plan concerté” and “dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”. Those are legal filters. One killing can be part of a wider policy, but a court cannot infer that conclusion simply from the identity of the victim or the political status of the suspected organiser.

This creates two analytical tracks for the French inquiry. The first asks whether the complaint describes torture or enforced disappearance within the treaty-based provisions and whether a suspect can be prosecuted when found in France. The second asks whether the individual event can be connected to a concerted plan or a widespread or systematic attack so as to qualify as a crime against humanity. The second track may help explain the gravity and context of the alleged conduct, but it does not erase Article 689-11’s habitual-residence and prosecutorial conditions. The first track may be more immediately connected to a visit, but it still requires proof and an answer to immunity.

The absence of Khashoggi’s body makes evidence more important, not jurisdiction less real. The judge can examine the consulate setting, the circumstances of entry and exit, witness accounts, forensic and intelligence material, communications, financial or logistical links, and evidence of concealment. The legal task is to separate information that supports an investigative lead from evidence capable of supporting a later charge. France’s jurisdictional statutes provide the doorway; they do not carry the prosecution across the courtroom by themselves.

II. What can the French judge do now—and what can stop a case against MBS?

A. Which evidence and procedural acts matter next?

An investigating judge’s first practical task is to define the case without prejudging it. The complaint names alleged offences and a suspected role, but the inquiry must establish a chronology, identify the actors, and determine which facts occurred in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France, or elsewhere. It can seek testimony from complainants and witnesses, request documents, commission expert analysis, compare public reports, and ask foreign authorities for assistance through the channels available to France. The judge can also examine whether the complaint’s theory concerns a single operation, a pattern of persecution against journalists, or both.

The decision to open the inquiry is especially significant because the factual issues are not confined to France. The consulate is in Istanbul; the alleged organisers and many potential witnesses are connected to Saudi Arabia; some intelligence assessments were produced by the United States; and the complaint was brought before French courts by organisations operating in several jurisdictions. A French judge may need Turkish material concerning the crime scene, travel and communications records, diplomatic communications, and evidence obtained in earlier investigations. The judge may also need to test whether foreign proceedings have already addressed particular facts and what evidential value those proceedings can lawfully carry.

The theory of complicity requires a disciplined analysis of the alleged contribution. The inquiry must distinguish a person who is alleged to have ordered, encouraged, facilitated, financed, concealed, or otherwise assisted conduct from a person who is merely politically associated with those who carried it out. That distinction is central to any criminal case involving a senior official. Public intelligence assessments and the suspect’s position may justify investigative steps, but they do not replace proof of an intentional contribution to a specific crime.

The possible crime-against-humanity characterisation adds a second evidential burden. Under Article 212-1, the judge must ask whether the killing was committed as part of a concerted plan against a civilian population and whether the broader attack was widespread or systematic. Evidence about other journalists, dissidents, detention practices, threats, surveillance, or state structures could become relevant if it tends to prove a broader policy. It could also become irrelevant or inadmissible if it is too remote, unreliable, or disconnected from the alleged Khashoggi operation. The investigation therefore needs a clear theory of relevance rather than an archive of every allegation ever made about Saudi policy.

The Turkish setting creates another legal distinction. Consular premises are not a legal vacuum, and diplomatic status does not decide every question of individual criminal liability. At the same time, the Vienna Convention framework, the protection of diplomatic and consular communications, and the sovereignty of the state where the alleged offence occurred can affect how evidence is obtained. A French judge cannot simply treat a foreign consulate as an ordinary private address. Requests for assistance, evidence transfers, witness protection, and the use of material from foreign proceedings must follow their applicable rules. A refusal by Saudi Arabia or Turkey would create an evidential problem, but it would not automatically terminate every French investigative avenue.

Open-source evidence must be handled with the same care. Satellite imagery, flight records, public statements, leaked material, and reporting can help build a chronology. The judge must test authenticity, provenance, continuity, translation, and the risk of contamination. The absence of a body can make digital and testimonial evidence more important, but it also increases the need to exclude speculation. An international criminal file can be politically explosive while remaining legally fragile if the chain from source to fact is not demonstrated.

The parties can also shape the investigation. A civil party may request investigative acts, challenge procedural decisions, and seek access to the file within the limits of French criminal procedure. The prosecution can ask for additional time or argue that the legal conditions are not met. The person named or implicated can challenge acts, raise jurisdictional objections, contest the legal characterisation, and invoke immunity. The judge must maintain an independent evidential record rather than treating the opening decision as a verdict.

The judge’s likely near-term output is therefore not an arrest warrant. It is a series of procedural acts: defining the facts, identifying witnesses, seeking records, assessing foreign material, and testing the route under Articles 689-2 and 689-13. The Article 689-11 route may be examined as a crime-against-humanity alternative, but the habitual-residence requirement and the PNAT’s role remain distinct. Any public statement should preserve that distinction. A file can be active, legally serious, and internationally newsworthy without having reached the stage at which a person is charged.

B. Why immunity, presence, and diplomatic politics could define the outcome

The most important obstacle is the immunity analysis. The Cour de cassation issued two plenary decisions on 25 July 2025 that must be read together. In Appeal no. 24-84.393, the Court held that the personal immunity of an incumbent head of state, head of government, or foreign minister must be examined by the national judge of its own motion. It stated that, under the state of international law considered by the Court, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not create an exception to the personal immunity of an incumbent foreign head of state. The judgment also treated immunity as a procedural obstacle to national jurisdiction, not as a finding that the conduct is lawful.

The second decision, Appeal no. 24-84.071, concerned functional immunity for an agent of a foreign state. The Court held that, subject to international conventions, functional immunity cannot be invoked against proceedings for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. That holding is highly relevant to the broader investigation because it prevents every state-linked actor from automatically relying on official functions. It does not, however, remove the separate personal immunity that the Court recognised for the small group of incumbent top officeholders in no. 24-84.393.

The legal question for MBS cannot be answered by the informal label “crown prince”. The French court must identify the office held at the relevant time and determine whether it falls within the categories protected by personal immunity. It must also distinguish a personal immunity that lasts while the protected office is held from a functional immunity asserted for acts performed on behalf of a state. A person may face a stronger functional-immunity analysis after leaving office, while an incumbent head of government may benefit from personal immunity even when the allegations concern private or official conduct. The Court’s rulings make the status analysis an issue the judge must address at the outset.

That is why a visit to Paris can have two opposite legal effects. It may provide the factual presence required by Article 689-1 for a treaty-based prosecution route. It may also make immunity impossible to ignore because the person is physically within the reach of French institutions and diplomatic protection. Presence is not the same as arrestability. Before any coercive measure, the judge and the prosecution would have to identify an applicable offence, establish a sufficient evidential basis, determine the person’s procedural status, and resolve personal or functional immunity. A court cannot convert a presence condition into a warrant by skipping those steps.

The Paris Court of Appeal’s decision also has to be read alongside this immunity framework. Admitting a complaint or allowing an inquiry to proceed does not necessarily resolve an immunity defence. The court can permit evidence to be gathered while leaving a later decision on the effect of an official status. This sequencing is particularly important in an international case: an investigative judge may establish facts about other participants, preserve evidence, or clarify the alleged structure even if a later ruling limits proceedings against a particular senior official.

Competition with other jurisdictions is a further control. Article 689-11 requires the French prosecutor to check whether the International Criminal Court or another competent international court is pursuing the person and whether another state has requested surrender or extradition. A domestic French investigation cannot simply disregard an active competing request. Conversely, the existence of a foreign trial or a statement that a foreign state has dealt with the matter does not automatically answer every question of French jurisdiction, evidential reliability, or responsibility. The judge must identify the precise overlap rather than rely on diplomatic assertions.

Political consequences are real but legally secondary. A French investigation involving a visiting Saudi leader can affect diplomatic relations, investment projects, consular ties, and press-freedom debates. None of those consequences establishes an offence or extinguishes one. The legal safeguard is institutional separation: prosecutors and judges must apply the jurisdictional texts and immunity rules, while elected officials manage foreign relations. A public invitation, a business agreement, or a statement of regret cannot substitute for a judicial finding.

For a person affected by the case, the practical questions are narrower than the headlines. Is the complaint legally admissible? Which treaty offence is alleged? Is the suspect found in France, and is that presence current or historic? Does the evidence establish torture, enforced disappearance, complicity, or a broader plan? Does Article 689-11 apply, including habitual residence and the absence of a competing request? Is the person protected by personal immunity as an incumbent head of state, head of government, or foreign minister? If the answer to the last question is yes, what investigative acts remain possible against other suspects or other factual aspects of the case?

These questions also show why the French inquiry matters beyond Khashoggi. It tests the practical boundary between universal jurisdiction, treaty implementation, civil-party procedure, and the immunity of senior officials. The inquiry may produce evidence even if it never leads to a trial against MBS. It may clarify whether French judges can investigate a state-linked operation abroad, how the presence requirement works in a high-profile visit, and how the 2025 Cour de cassation decisions affect the treatment of foreign leaders and officials. Those are concrete legal consequences, not a promise of an immediate courtroom confrontation.

Conclusion

The French judge can now investigate the Khashoggi complaint because the Paris procedural barrier has been lifted sufficiently for evidence to be gathered. The strongest immediate jurisdictional analysis runs through treaty-based provisions on torture and enforced disappearance, with the presence condition of Article 689-1. The crime-against-humanity theory may explain the broader context, but Article 689-11 adds habitual residence, a PNAT request, and a check for competing international or national proceedings. Those routes must remain separate.

The inquiry can request evidence, question witnesses, test command and complicity allegations, and examine whether a concerted plan or systematic attack can be proved. It cannot treat a diplomatic visit as an automatic arrest power. The decisive barrier may be immunity. The 25 July 2025 decisions in appeals nos. 24-84.393 and 24-84.071 distinguish the personal immunity of incumbent top officeholders from functional immunity claimed by other state agents. The investigation’s future will depend on that status analysis, on the quality of cross-border evidence, and on whether the legal elements survive scrutiny after the headlines fade.

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