Swiss voters will decide on 27 September 2026 whether to constitutionalise a much stricter version of the country’s neutrality. The vote has immediate cross-border significance. The proposal would restrict military cooperation, bar participation in conflicts between third countries and, subject to United Nations and anti-circumvention exceptions, prevent Switzerland from imposing sanctions on warring parties. The current position is different: Switzerland has a statutory framework that allows the Federal Council to adopt international sanctions, including most European Union measures against Russia, on a case-by-case basis. The Federal Council’s official explanation says that the initiative could force Switzerland to abandon measures already adopted. The news trigger is therefore not a new Swiss loophole, but a legal choice that could change the relationship between Swiss policy and European sanctions architecture.
For a French group, the practical question is not whether a Swiss affiliate would vote for or against the initiative. It is whether French nationality, a French parent, an EU transaction, a branch, a regulated payment chain, a listed beneficial owner or a French litigation step keeps the operation inside another mandatory regime. French anti-money-laundering rules expressly reach relevant activities abroad through branches. EU sanctions rules also contain territorial, nationality, incorporation and business-activity hooks. French evidence law can restrict informal responses to foreign discovery or regulatory requests. This article explains how to test the risk before the referendum, how to avoid a false “Swiss safe haven” assumption, and what a French company should document if Swiss law and European law begin to diverge.
I. What the Swiss neutrality referendum would change for sanctions
A. Is the 2026 neutrality initiative already changing Swiss law?
No. The referendum is scheduled for 27 September 2026, and the current rules remain applicable unless and until the Swiss constitutional and legislative process produces a change. The Swiss Federal Council’s official presentation states that neutrality has been constitutionally recognised since 1848, while its modern practice permits Switzerland to participate in certain sanctions regimes. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs describes the present system in functional terms: the Federal Council can decide whether adopting a particular sanctions regime serves Swiss interests. Its published explanation states that “the Federal Council decides on a case-by-case basis whether adopting the sanctions is in Switzerland’s interests.”
That distinction matters for companies negotiating a contract today. A Swiss company is not currently entitled to disregard a Swiss ordinance because a future constitutional initiative may be accepted. The existing Swiss Federal Act on the Implementation of International Sanctions, commonly called the Embargo Act, remains the legislative framework. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs’ explanation of the legal basis describes the Act as the framework under which the Confederation implements international sanctions through specific ordinances. Compliance therefore begins with the ordinance applicable to the person, goods, service, payment, asset or transaction, not with a political prediction about the referendum.
The initiative would alter that framework at constitutional level. The official explanatory materials describe a permanent and armed neutrality, a prohibition on military alliances or cooperation except in the event of an attack or an imminent attack, and a prohibition on participating in armed conflicts between third countries. The proposed sanctions wording is especially important: “Switzerland shall not take part in armed conflicts between third countries and shall not impose sanctions against warring parties. Exceptions are made for sanctions decided by the United Nations (UN) and measures to prevent the circumvention of sanctions.” The full proposal and its official explanation are available through the Federal Council’s voting brochure.
“Warring parties” is not a routine commercial definition. It would require authorities, courts and businesses to determine whether a target falls within the constitutional prohibition, whether the United Nations exception applies, whether a measure prevents circumvention, and how an existing ordinance should be treated during the transition. The Federal Council’s brochure presents the consequence in concrete terms: Switzerland might no longer be able to apply the European Union’s Russia sanctions and could have to lift sanctions that it has already adopted. That is an official assessment of the proposal’s potential effect, not a statement that the result is automatic on the day of the vote.
There are at least four reasons why a French company should treat the referendum as a monitoring event rather than as a compliance switch.
First, acceptance of a popular initiative normally requires implementation. The constitutional wording would have to be interpreted, existing ordinances would have to be reviewed, and the competent authorities would have to address conflicts between the new rule and international obligations. Second, a future Swiss restriction would not repeal French legislation or EU regulations. Third, the same commercial group can be subject to several regimes at once. Fourth, contracts, bank accounts, security interests and investigations move on different timelines. A bank may block a payment before a court decides whether a new Swiss rule applies; a parent company may need to preserve an audit trail even where its affiliate believes Swiss law permits the transaction.
The safest operational assumption before the vote is therefore continuity under current Swiss law, followed by scenario planning. Companies should identify which sanctions ordinances currently apply, which licences or authorisations have been granted, which assets are frozen, and which contractual obligations depend on Swiss participation in European measures. They should then prepare a second legal map for the possibility that Switzerland narrows or withdraws from a sanctions regime. Neither map should be described internally as a route around French or EU restrictions.
B. Why a Swiss affiliate does not erase French and EU jurisdiction
French law creates its own perimeter. Article L. 562-4 of the French Monetary and Financial Code requires the persons within its scope to apply without delay asset-freezing measures and prohibitions on making frozen funds or economic resources available. The provision expressly covers people in France and French legal persons or other entities carrying on operations in France. Its corporate reach includes French entities for activities conducted abroad, including branches and other forms of establishment. The current text is available on Légifrance, Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
The group-level rule is even more significant for a French parent. Article L. 562-4-1 requires regulated entities to establish internal organisation and procedures for implementing asset freezes and European restrictive measures, and states that “Elles veillent à l’application de ces dispositions dans leurs succursales établies en dehors du territoire national.” The same provision requires a French parent company of a group to define organisation and procedures at group level. A Swiss subsidiary is not automatically identical to its French parent for every legal purpose, but the French parent cannot treat the subsidiary as an ungoverned legal island where the French rules require group controls or branch oversight. See Légifrance, Article L. 562-4-1.
That analysis depends on the legal form and the facts. A Swiss company that is independently incorporated, independently managed and outside the relevant French regulated perimeter may not be subject to every French operational obligation merely because a French group owns shares. Conversely, a branch, a French decision-maker, a French bank, a French service, a French payment instruction or a French group compliance system may create a direct connection. The first task is to map those connections rather than to label the structure “Swiss.”
Control must also be assessed rather than assumed. Article L. 233-3 of the French Commercial Code identifies control through voting rights, agreements, the power to appoint or remove the majority of management or supervisory bodies, or actual decisive influence; it also creates a presumption in certain circumstances where more than 40% of voting rights are held. The official text is on Légifrance, Article L. 233-3 of the Commercial Code. This matters when a sanctions-screening policy, delegated authority matrix or beneficial-ownership analysis asks whether the Swiss entity is a controlled company, a branch-like operation in practice, or an unrelated counterparty.
EU law supplies a separate perimeter. Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 applies within the territory of the Union, to aircraft and vessels under Member State jurisdiction, to nationals wherever located, to legal persons incorporated under a Member State’s law wherever they operate, and to business done in whole or in part within the Union. The current official text is available in the EUR-Lex consolidated Regulation 833/2014. Article 12 of that Regulation separately prohibits knowingly and intentionally participating in activities whose object or effect is to circumvent the restrictions. A French parent cannot convert a prohibited EU-linked operation into a lawful one merely by routing paperwork through a Swiss entity.
Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 creates a comparable framework for asset freezes and restrictive measures concerning listed persons and entities. Its territorial and personal reach must be read from the applicable consolidated text and the relevant listing, not from the location of one bank account. The official instrument is available at EUR-Lex, Regulation 269/2014. French groups should also check whether a transaction involves an EU-incorporated entity, EU personnel, EU financial infrastructure, goods leaving the Union, or a business partly carried on in the Union.
The result is not that every Swiss affiliate is automatically bound by every French or EU measure. The result is that the location of the affiliate is only one data point. A sanctions memo that stops at the registered office is incomplete. The analysis must connect entity, ownership, control, staff, goods, services, decision, payment, bank, customer, beneficiary and purpose. If one of those links leads to France or the European Union, a Swiss constitutional change cannot be used as a universal jurisdictional defence.
This is also why the referendum should not be framed as a competition between “Swiss law” and “European law.” The same transaction may require compliance with current Swiss ordinances, French anti-money-laundering rules, EU restrictive measures, export-control rules, a bank’s internal policy and a contract’s sanctions clause. These instruments can be cumulative. A company that is permitted to make a payment under one regime can still be prohibited from making it under another.
II. What French companies should do before and after the vote
A. How to test payments, frozen assets and group operations
The highest-risk mistake is to treat a Swiss account as a neutral transit point. Article L. 562-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code prohibits the persons identified by Article L. 562-4 from making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, or using them for the benefit of a person whose funds or resources are frozen. The operative French text is on Légifrance, Article L. 562-5. The word “indirectly” is decisive in a multi-entity structure: an intercompany loan, guarantee, dividend, service fee, debt repayment or asset transfer cannot be cleared simply because an intermediary is Swiss.
Article L. 562-6 adds an anti-circumvention prohibition. It is forbidden for the relevant persons to “participer, sciemment et volontairement, à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner” the freezing measures. See Légifrance, Article L. 562-6. A post-referendum payment redesign should therefore be documented by purpose and substance. The file should show why the payment is commercially necessary, who ultimately receives value, which rules were checked, whether an authorisation exists, and why the structure is not designed to defeat a restriction.
The criminal risk is not theoretical. Article L. 574-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code refers violations of the freezing obligations to the penalties provided by Article 459(1) of the Customs Code and covers conduct by the persons subject to Article L. 562-4, their managers and employees. The official provision is Légifrance, Article L. 574-3. In Cass. crim., 29 November 2023, No. 22-85.867, the Criminal Division addressed the evasion of an asset-freezing measure and held, on the facts before it, that opening a foreign account after a freeze in order to use that account during a further freeze could constitute evasion; the court did not require a separate concealment manoeuvre. That decision concerned a terrorism-related freeze, so its precise statutory setting must be respected, but it is a warning against using a new jurisdiction as an automatic escape route.
Frozen assets also need careful characterisation. A freeze is generally a restriction on disposal or use, not an automatic transfer of ownership to the State. The Swiss SECO FAQ on sanctions describes an asset freeze as administrative and preventive, normally suspending the ability to dispose of assets while leaving ownership in place. French case law likewise treats the legal effects of a freeze with precision. In the consolidated decision of Ass. plén., 29 April 2022, Nos. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, the French Supreme Court considered the effect of frozen Iranian assets and the need for prior authorisation before carrying out a conservatory measure over them. The lesson is operational: do not sell, pledge, net, transfer or distribute a frozen asset while waiting for a political answer about Switzerland. Identify the competent authority and obtain the relevant licence or release first.
Payments should be reviewed at three levels. At the first level, screen the named customer, supplier, lender and recipient against the Swiss, EU, UN and French lists that apply to the transaction. At the second, screen beneficial owners and persons exercising control. At the third, test the underlying economic purpose, goods, services, vessel, bank, correspondent, route and destination. A clean result for the name on an invoice is not a clean result for the transaction if the invoice conceals a listed beneficial owner or a prohibited end use.
French customer-due-diligence duties support this approach. Article L. 561-5 requires covered persons to identify the customer and, where applicable, the beneficial owner and verify identity using reliable documents; see Légifrance, Article L. 561-5. Article L. 561-5-1 requires information about the purpose and nature of the business relationship and its updating throughout the relationship; see Légifrance, Article L. 561-5-1. If a suspicion arises within the statutory scope, Article L. 561-15 provides the suspicious-transaction reporting framework; see Légifrance, Article L. 561-15.
A French company should create a written Swiss-transition file containing at least the following items:
1. An entity chart showing the French parent, Swiss subsidiaries, branches, agents, directors, signatories and actual decision-makers.
2. A payment map identifying currencies, banks, correspondents, clearing locations, guarantees, intercompany balances and any payment routed through an EU institution.
3. A beneficial-ownership and control analysis that records the source documents and the date of each check.
4. A list of current Swiss ordinances, EU regulations, French measures, licences, waivers and contractual sanctions clauses relevant to each business line.
5. A freeze-response protocol that stops value transfer, preserves evidence and escalates a possible match to counsel and the competent authority.
6. A transition plan that does not use shell companies, nominee directors, unexplained payment rerouting or rapid disposal of assets as a substitute for a legal authorisation.
That record is useful whether the initiative is rejected or accepted. If Switzerland maintains its present approach, it supports ordinary audit and bank inquiries. If Swiss rules narrow, it shows that the French group identified the divergence and did not confuse a change in Swiss policy with a licence under French or EU law.
Money-laundering exposure must be kept separate from sanctions exposure but analysed alongside it. Article 324-1 of the French Penal Code defines laundering through acts that facilitate a false justification of the origin of assets or assistance in placing, concealing or converting the proceeds of an offence. The official text is available at Légifrance, Article 324-1 of the Penal Code. A transaction can therefore create risk even where the sanctions question is unresolved, particularly if a company cannot explain why value was moved through a jurisdiction whose rules differ from those of the parent’s home country.
B. How to respond to foreign evidence requests and disputes
The referendum also matters for investigations. A foreign regulator, prosecutor, claimant or arbitral party may ask a Swiss affiliate or a French parent for documents concerning a sanctioned counterparty, a bank transfer or the ownership of an asset. The answer should not be improvised from the place where the documents happen to be stored. France has a blocking statute that can restrict the direct communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical information to foreign authorities and the collection of information for foreign proceedings.
Article 1 of Law No. 68-678 of 26 July 1968, in its current form, prohibits the persons within its scope from communicating such information to foreign public authorities where the communication may harm French sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public order, subject to treaties and international agreements. The text is available on Légifrance, Law No. 68-678 of 26 July 1968. Article 1 bis addresses information requested for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings and covers information “tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives étrangères”. Article 2 requires the relevant person to inform the competent minister without delay when receiving a request of that kind. Article 3 provides for “un emprisonnement de six mois et d’une amende de 18000 euros” or one of those penalties; see also the direct text of Article 3 of Law No. 68-678 on Légifrance.
The leading warning for companies is Cass. crim., 12 December 2007, No. 07-83.228. The Criminal Division treated démarches made in France by a person corresponding with a party’s foreign lawyer, for the purpose of finding information about a French company’s decision to acquire a foreign company, as research tending to constitute evidence for a foreign proceeding. The conviction and fine followed because the information-gathering route did not use an authorised mechanism under the Hague Evidence Convention. The case does not prohibit every international exchange. It demonstrates why a French group should route a foreign evidence request through counsel, the appropriate treaty or judicial-assistance channel, and the required ministerial notification process where the blocking statute applies.
The statute is not a universal answer against foreign oversight either. In Cass. com., 14 October 2020, No. 18-20.746, the Commercial Division examined the blocking statute in an AMF-related context. The decision explains that the statute does not protect generally “les renseignements relatifs aux marchés financiers”; the protection concerns information whose communication may harm the interests identified by the statute. The correct response is a calibrated analysis of the request, the authority, the information, the proceeding and the applicable treaty—not a reflexive refusal and not an informal disclosure.
The same discipline applies in French litigation. A French court may have to characterise the effect of European or United Nations restrictive measures on a contract, a security interest, an enforcement action or a claim for payment. The Paris Court of Appeal has considered that certain EU and UN sanctions, once integrated into French law, can have a public-policy dimension, while unilateral third-country measures do not automatically have the same status. One official decision is Paris Court of Appeal, RG No. 19/07261. A Swiss affiliate’s contractual argument must therefore distinguish the source of the measure: Swiss ordinance, EU regulation, UN resolution, French statute, or a foreign unilateral measure. Calling all of them “sanctions” is not enough.
Contracts should be read with the post-referendum scenarios in mind. A sanctions clause may incorporate EU lists, Swiss ordinances, UN measures, a bank’s policy or a broad compliance representation. An applicable-law clause may place the dispute in a French court even if performance is organised in Switzerland. Article 1104 of the French Civil Code provides that contracts “must be negotiated, formed and performed in good faith”; the official text is on Légifrance, Article 1104. That does not create a sanctions licence, but it reinforces the need to disclose a material compliance obstacle, preserve the parties’ audit rights and avoid a payment workaround that contradicts the agreed risk allocation.
Before answering a foreign request or a counterparty’s demand for payment, the legal team should ask seven questions.
First, who is requesting the information or payment, and under what formal authority? Second, is the request directed to a French person, French entity, French branch, French employee or French adviser? Third, does the information concern a French company’s economic interests or evidence for a foreign proceeding? Fourth, which treaty, judicial-assistance mechanism or regulator-to-regulator route is available? Fifth, is any listed person, frozen asset or controlled entity involved? Sixth, would disclosure or performance breach a Swiss, EU or French rule even if another regime permits it? Seventh, what precise written record supports the conclusion, and who approved it?
There is a practical reason to insist on written answers. Sanctions controls are often challenged months after the payment or disclosure, when the employee who approved the transaction has changed roles and the bank’s screening result is no longer visible. A short file that preserves the list versions, ownership documents, legal analysis, licence, escalation decision and payment purpose is more valuable than a generic policy stating that the group “complies with all applicable sanctions.”
The 27 September vote should trigger a calendar, not a panic. Companies should monitor the official Swiss Federal Council, FDFA and SECO publications; identify the implementing measures if the initiative passes; review whether current Russia-related or other ordinances remain in force; and confirm with banks how they will handle conflicting instructions. They should also keep EU and French controls active throughout the transition. A Swiss change can affect the availability of a local licence or the conduct of a Swiss bank, but it cannot by itself authorise a French manager to make funds available to a listed person, circumvent an EU restriction, disclose protected evidence or move a frozen asset.
Conclusion
The Swiss neutrality referendum is a genuine cross-border compliance event, but it is not a safe-haven event. Until the law changes, Swiss sanctions ordinances continue to matter. If the initiative is accepted, implementation questions may create uncertainty and Switzerland may reconsider participation in some European measures. That uncertainty increases the need for a documented, multi-regime analysis; it does not reduce French or EU obligations.
For a French company, the decisive facts are the group structure, the branch and personnel footprint, the payment chain, the beneficial owner, the applicable goods or services, the bank, the evidence request and the source of the restrictive measure. Map those facts, screen the whole transaction, stop and escalate possible freezes, use lawful evidence channels, and treat any Swiss transition rule as one element of the analysis. A Swiss address is not a legal answer to a French or European sanctions problem.