An Amsterdam court has refused an Italian European Arrest Warrant after the issuing authorities did not establish that a convicted person had been properly notified of her appeal hearing or had given counsel a mandate covering that appeal. The judgment, delivered on 18 August 2026 and published on 25 August, does not decide guilt. It decides whether the Netherlands can surrender an anonymised requested person to Italy to serve a ten-year sentence. Its practical message is immediate: a checkbox saying that a person was defended by a lawyer does not replace evidence about the exact hearing, the exact notice and the exact scope of the mandate. The Dutch court recorded the short result as Overlevering geweigerd.
For a person arrested in France under an Italian warrant, the legal vocabulary would change from the Dutch Overleveringswet to the French Code of Criminal Procedure, but the evidentiary problem would remain familiar. France would have to distinguish knowledge of proceedings from knowledge of the decisive hearing, representation in one stage from representation in an appeal, and a defective file from a request that can be repaired in time. This analysis explains what the Amsterdam ruling actually found, how French judges would test an equivalent sentence warrant, which documents defence counsel should request immediately, and why a refusal of surrender is not a retrial on the merits.
I. What did the Amsterdam court refuse, and why did the Italian EAW fail?
A. What did the Amsterdam EAW decision actually decide?
The judgment of the International Legal Assistance Chamber of the District Court of Amsterdam is identified by ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2026:8272, case number 13-137910-26. The official register gives the date of the judgment as 18 August 2026, the publication date as 25 August 2026 and the subject as criminal law in a European context. The case concerned an execution European Arrest Warrant issued in Italy on 22 April 2026 by the Office of the Prosecutor General attached to the Court of Appeal of Naples, Extradition Office. The issuing authority sought the surrender of an anonymised person born in Romania in 1982 and identified in the judgment as holding only Dutch nationality. For the broader French sequence from first appearance to the surrender debate, see the existing French European Arrest Warrant procedure analysis.
This was an execution warrant, not a request to send the person to Italy for an unfinished investigation. The Italian file referred to a judgment of the Court of Torre Annunziata dated 11 April 2019, reference 933/2019, followed by a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Naples, Third Division, dated 16 September 2022, reference 13426/22. The Dutch decision records that the conviction became final on 6 July 2023 and that the sentence to be served in Italy was ten years. Those details matter because an execution warrant activates a distinct set of safeguards concerning a trial held without the person’s physical presence. A warrant for prosecution and a warrant for enforcement can both trigger arrest, but they do not present the same legal question under the EU rules on absentia judgments.
The procedural history also shows why a surrender case can turn on a narrow point. The Amsterdam proceedings began on 22 July 2026. The requested person and her lawyer did not attend that first hearing with the court’s prior permission. The court adjourned the matter while the public prosecution service waited for additional information about a possible transfer of the sentence. At a second hearing on 4 August 2026, the requested person attended with counsel. The court extended the statutory decision period by thirty days, ordered detention with suspension until judgment and continued its review of the warrant. The decision period ended on 21 August 2026, but the court delivered its judgment three days earlier.
The warrant stated that the requested person had not appeared in person at the trial leading to the decision. It also marked the field saying that she had known of the scheduled trial, had mandated a legal counsellor and had actually been defended by that counsellor. The issuing authority later stated that she knew about the proceedings, that Carmine Iannuzzi represented her and that another lawyer, Luca Brachi, had filed an appeal to the Italian Court of Cassation. The first answer did not explain how or when she had been informed about the date and place of the appellate hearing, whether a summons had been sent to an address she had supplied, or whether the mandate covered the appellate procedure.
The Dutch International Legal Assistance Centre asked the Italian authority targeted questions on 1 July and 15 July. After a reminder on 20 July, the issuing authority sent further information on 21 July. The Dutch court then repeated the questions on 30 July. No further answer arrived. The missing material was not a demand for an assessment of whether the Italian conviction was correct. It was evidence about the procedural conditions attached to the final appellate judgment: direct official notice, the date and place of the hearing, the scope of the lawyer’s power of attorney and any deliberate avoidance of notice.
The Amsterdam court concluded that a statement that the requested person knew about the proceedings was insufficient. It could not establish that she had been directly and officially informed of the date and place of the appeal hearing. It could not establish that the mandate given to the Naples lawyer extended to the appeal. It also could not establish that the person had deliberately avoided official notice or had voluntarily and unequivocally waived her right to attend. The court considered that the issuing authority had had ample opportunity to clarify the points and that the remaining decision period was too short to send more questions, receive answers, arrange a hearing and decide the case. It therefore refused surrender and lifted the suspended surrender detention.
That conclusion is narrower than a finding that Italy never provides a fair trial. It is also narrower than a finding that the conviction was void. It is a decision about the information supplied for one warrant, one final appellate judgment and one requested person. Yet the method is important for every cross-border defence: a mutual-recognition system still needs a reliable record. The issuing State must identify the procedural event that matters; the executing court must be able to test the statutory exception; and the timetable cannot be used to convert unanswered factual questions into an automatic surrender.
The official judgment uses a compact Dutch formulation: De rechtbank kan niet vaststellen dat de machtiging van de advocaat ook gold voor de procedure in hoger beroep.
It also says that the information did not show direct official notice of the date and place of the appeal hearing. For an international reader, the translation is not that every lawyer’s involvement was irrelevant. The point is that the court could not identify the legal authority by which counsel represented the person at the particular stage that produced the enforceable sentence. That distinction is precisely where a French challenge would begin.
B. Why did the absentia guarantee fail despite an appeal lawyer?
French law starts from the same conceptual separation. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the European Arrest Warrant as a judicial decision issued by one EU Member State for arrest and surrender by another. The official text describes it as une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne
. That definition explains the speed of the mechanism, but it does not erase the conditions in the executing State. The requested person is not being retried in France; the French judicial authority must decide whether the foreign request satisfies the conditions for surrender.
For a warrant issued to enforce a custodial sentence, Article 695-22-1 is the central French provision on a person who did not appear in person. The current Légifrance text says that where the warrant is issued to execute a custodial sentence or security measure, execution may be refused when l’intéressé n’a pas comparu en personne lors du procès
, subject to specified exceptions. The trigger is therefore factual and procedural. The question is not whether the foreign State calls a lawyer “appointed counsel” or whether an appeal existed in theory. The question is whether one of the statutory safeguards is demonstrated by the warrant and the supporting material.
The first route is timely, effective and unambiguous information about the date and place of the trial, together with information that a decision could be issued if the person did not appear. The exact French text refers to being informed dans les formes légales et effectivement, de manière non équivoque, en temps utile
. This is more demanding than a general assertion that the defendant knew that a case was pending. An international file should show the summons, the address used, the method of service, the date of receipt or the legally sufficient alternative, and the content of the warning about non-appearance.
The second route concerns representation. The person must have known the date and place of the trial and have been defended there by counsel appointed by the person or by public authority, with a mandate to act at that trial. The third route concerns the post-judgment stage: the person must have received the decision and been expressly informed of a remedy allowing a new examination of the merits in her presence, then either expressly stated that she would not challenge the decision or failed to exercise the remedy within the applicable time. Each route is specific. Counsel at first instance does not automatically prove a mandate for an appeal; an appeal lodged by a lawyer does not automatically prove that the person understood the hearing or authorised the appellate defence; and awareness that an investigation exists does not prove notice of a final trial date.
The wording of the French rule is linked to the EU framework and must be read in that context. The Court of Justice’s judgment of 21 May 2026 in Case C-95/24, Khuzdar, ECLI:EU:C:2026:416, arose from an Italian court and addressed absentia safeguards in the mutual-recognition system. The same day, the Court’s judgment in Case C-447/24, Höldermann, ECLI:EU:C:2026:417, examined the evidentiary value of a mandate, notice of the trial and a voluntary and unequivocal waiver. These judgments do not turn every surrender hearing into a full appeal. They do require the executing authority to identify which exception is relied upon and whether its factual conditions are actually satisfied.
That is why the Amsterdam ruling is not contradicted by the issuing authority’s assertion that Italian law does not require physical presence. The official judgment records the assertion in English: The Italian legal system does not mandate the physical presence of the accused
. That may answer one question about Italian procedure. It does not answer whether this requested person received direct official notice of the appellate hearing, whether the counsel’s authority extended to that hearing or whether she voluntarily waived personal attendance. A legal system may permit a trial in absence while the executing court still refuses surrender when the warrant’s evidence does not prove the applicable exception.
The distinction also protects the boundary between surrender review and merits review. France would not ordinarily decide whether the Italian court correctly evaluated witnesses, whether the sentence was proportionate under Italian law or whether the requested person was guilty. It would, however, examine the formal and procedural facts that control execution. Article 695-13 requires the warrant to contain identity and nationality, the issuing judicial authority, the enforceable judgment or warrant, the legal nature and classification of the offence, the date, place and circumstances of the alleged conduct, the degree of participation and the sentence or statutory penalty. The official provision begins: Tout mandat d’arrêt européen contient les renseignements suivants
. A vague reference to a lawyer or a generic description of proceedings cannot replace those required particulars when they determine a refusal ground.
The practical lesson is simple but often missed under arrest pressure. The defence should ask: Which judgment is the basis of the warrant? Was it rendered after a trial in absentia? Was the relevant proceeding the first instance hearing or the appeal? Who appointed counsel? Was the authority written, dated and valid for that stage? Was the defendant told the date and place? Was a final decision served? Did the defendant receive information about a new merits hearing? Did the person expressly waive the right to appear, or is the issuing authority inferring waiver from silence? The answer to each question should be supported by a document, not by a label copied into a form.
II. What would a French defence challenge, and what happens next?
A. Which documents and deadlines matter before a French surrender hearing?
A person arrested in France under an Italian European Arrest Warrant should first secure the complete warrant, every annex, the judgment or arrest decision on which it relies and the correspondence exchanged after the warrant was issued. Article 695-14 requires a warrant sent to another Member State to be translated into an official language accepted by that State. The wording is direct: it doit être traduit dans la langue officielle
of the executing State, or in an accepted EU institutional language. A translation is not cosmetic. It can reveal whether the issuing authority has translated a legal category, a summons, a finality statement or a representation guarantee with enough precision to support the exception in Article 695-22-1.
The transmission trail also matters. Under Article 695-15, the warrant may be sent directly to the executing judicial authority when the person’s location is known, or through the Schengen Information System, the secure judicial network, Interpol or another traceable method. The statute states that Un signalement dans le système d’information Schengen, accompagné des informations prévues à l’article 695-13, vaut mandat d’arrêt européen
. That does not mean that a Schengen alert contains every answer to an absentia question. It means the defence must determine which information was present when the alert was used and which additional documents arrived later. A late narrative should be tested against the original warrant and the issuing court’s records.
Next, classify the warrant. Article 695-12 permits issuance for conduct punishable under the issuing State’s law by at least one year of imprisonment, or for a sentence of at least four months where a conviction has already occurred. The distinction between prosecution and enforcement affects the applicable questions. If the request concerns a person awaiting trial, an absentia execution rule may not be the exact route. If it concerns a final custodial sentence, Article 695-22-1 should be read immediately and the relevant part of the warrant should be scrutinised line by line.
Timing begins before the merits of the surrender question are argued. Article 695-29 provides that the requested person appears before the investigating chamber within five working days of presentation to the procureur général. The official text says dans un délai de cinq jours ouvrables
. At that appearance, Article 695-30 directs the chamber to establish identity and record statements; its exact phrase is constate son identité et recueille ses déclarations
. The hearing is not the place to improvise a complete foreign-law appeal. It is the moment to preserve objections, obtain counsel, request an interpreter if necessary and ensure that consent or refusal is recorded accurately.
The choice about consent is consequential. Under Article 695-31, if the person consents, the chamber must explain the legal consequences and the irrevocable nature of consent; the statute expressly refers to son caractère irrévocable
. The chamber normally decides within seven days of the appearance where consent is maintained. If the person does not consent, the ordinary decision period is twenty days from the appearance, subject to a supplementary-information procedure. A person who does not understand the warrant, the sentence, the absentia issue or the specialty consequences should not treat a rapid consent as an administrative formality. The first hearing is narrow, but the decision can remove the opportunity to contest surrender.
The document request should be precise. It should ask for the original Italian judgment and the appellate judgment; proof of service or summons for each relevant hearing; the address supplied by the defendant; postal or electronic service records; any record of personal service; the appointment of Italian counsel; the power of attorney and its scope; the document authorising appeal; the minutes or docket showing counsel’s participation; proof that the final decision was served; and the terms of any remedy allowing a new examination in the person’s presence. If the issuing authority says the person was “aware of the proceedings,” ask what event that sentence describes. If it says counsel “represented” the person, ask whether that representation was for trial, appeal, cassation or all stages. If it says an appeal was filed, ask who instructed it and whether filing the appeal proves a mandate for the underlying hearing.
Article 695-33 gives the French chamber a route to request more information where the warrant does not permit a decision. The official text refers to information that sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise
and provides a maximum period of ten days for receipt of the necessary additional information. The provision is a tool, not a guarantee that an incomplete foreign file will be cured indefinitely. The Amsterdam judgment shows the operational limit: repeated, targeted questions may remain unanswered while the legal decision period closes. Defence counsel should therefore put the missing facts before the chamber at the first useful hearing and explain why each fact maps to a statutory exception.
Detention must be handled at the same time. Article 695-34 says that La mise en liberté peut être demandée à tout moment
. It requires at least forty-eight hours’ notice to counsel before the hearing and directs the chamber to decide as soon as possible and no later than fifteen days after receiving the request, subject to the statutory starting point where the person has not yet appeared. The application should address residence, identity, travel documents, reporting obligations, the risk of flight and the practical effect of the foreign warrant. A surrender challenge and a release application are related but distinct: winning release does not itself decide the foreign request, and losing the surrender challenge does not necessarily answer every detention question before transfer.
If the chamber eventually authorises surrender and the decision becomes final, Article 695-37 requires the prosecutor general to take the necessary measures for surrender within ten days of the final decision. The official wording is au plus tard dans les dix jours suivant la date de la décision définitive
. If France is conducting its own prosecution or the person is serving another French sentence for different facts, Article 695-39 permits the chamber, after deciding on execution, to defer surrender or arrange temporary surrender. Its text says that the chamber may différer la remise de l’intéressé
. These rules make the calendar part of the defence file from day one. A lawyer who waits for a second hearing to obtain service evidence may discover that the remaining period is too short for useful clarification.
The Amsterdam timeline gives a practical model for a French file. The Dutch court did not stop after receiving the warrant. It recorded the two hearings, the questions asked by the International Legal Assistance Centre, the answers received, the reminder and the statutory end date. That chronology made it possible to identify both the missing proof and the reason a further adjournment would not solve the problem. A French application should use the same discipline: date every request, attach every answer, distinguish a direct answer from a general assertion, and show why the unanswered point affects Article 695-22-1 rather than the merits of the foreign conviction.
B. Can France refuse, delay or limit surrender without retrying the Italian case?
Yes, but only within the refusal grounds and procedural powers provided by law. The French court does not become an Italian appeal court. It does not reweigh the evidence behind the conviction simply because the requested person denies the charge. It does examine whether the warrant is executable in France, whether mandatory or optional refusal grounds apply, whether fundamental rights objections have been substantiated and whether the issuing authority has supplied the information needed for the chamber to decide.
Article 695-22 lists mandatory refusals. In its current text, execution is refused where the relevant facts could have been prosecuted in France and the public action is extinguished by amnesty; where a final decision for the same facts has already been rendered and the sentence conditions for the rule are met; where the person was under thirteen at the time of the facts; or where the warrant was issued for discriminatory reasons or could harm the person for such a reason. The provision says, in its opening words, L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants
. None of those grounds should be conflated with the absentia issue. A defence should plead the correct ground with the facts that support it.
Article 695-22-1 is more directly connected to the Amsterdam ruling. A French chamber would ask whether the warrant is for enforcement of a sentence, whether the person appeared in person at the final trial and, if not, whether one of the three statutory safeguards is established. The answer may come from the standard form, but the chamber can seek the necessary explanation. Where the file only says that the person knew of the “proceedings,” the defence should identify the missing link to the date and place of the actual hearing. Where it names a lawyer, the defence should identify the missing link to a mandate covering the relevant stage. Where it invokes an appeal, the defence should identify the missing link to a new merits examination in the person’s presence.
Article 695-23 concerns double criminality. It allows refusal where the fact in the warrant ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française
, subject to the statutory exception for listed categories punishable at the required level in the issuing State. That question is not the same as whether the Italian judgment complied with Italian procedural law. It is a limited comparison of the conduct and the statutory conditions. The Court of Cassation’s judgment of 29 May 2024, No. 24-82.747, illustrates the care required when an authority seeks an extension of a surrender and relies on listed offences: the official analysis applies Articles 694-32, 695-23 and 695-33 and addresses the conditions for dispensing with a double-criminality check. A French defence should not let a general reference to a category replace the specific statutory test.
Article 695-24 sets out optional grounds, including French proceedings or a decision not to prosecute, French nationality in circumstances where France undertakes to enforce the sentence, territorial facts and certain extraterritorial limits. The current Légifrance text should be read directly before pleading one of these grounds: Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provision is not a general proportionality appeal against every Italian warrant. It allocates specific room for the executing authority to consider French jurisdiction, an existing French case or enforcement in France. The requested person’s family life may also matter when a substantiated and exceptional interference is alleged, but it is not a substitute for proving the absentia safeguards.
The reasoning must be explicit. Article 695-25 requires that Tout refus d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen doit être motivé
. A refusal based on an absentia defect should therefore identify the warrant’s execution purpose, the final judgment, the evidence relied upon by the issuing authority, the precise unanswered question and the statutory safeguard that has not been established. A bare statement that the foreign file is “unclear” risks obscuring the legal basis. A disciplined decision also helps the issuing authority understand whether a later request is genuinely different or merely repeats the same incomplete record.
Recent French case law reinforces the separation between the first appearance and the later surrender debate. In Cass. crim., 29 July 2026, No. 26-84.072, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR01161, the Criminal Chamber rejected a challenge concerning the order of procedural formalities and held that the hearing under Article 695-30 is limited to identity, observations and consent. The official analysis says that the hearing is préliminaire à tout débat
. That ruling does not decide an absentia objection, but it matters operationally: a person should make the relevant observations and protect the record at the first appearance, while understanding that the merits of surrender are decided in the later debate.
The same judgment also concerned a second Romanian warrant after a prior refusal. The Court of Cassation described the execution procedure as not being a new prosecution for the facts of the conviction and accepted that a distinct warrant could be examined where new material changed the situation. The case’s precise number is important because a defence cannot cite a vague “French precedent” to argue that every later warrant is barred. The related older judgment Cass. crim., 15 May 2012, No. 12-82.775, also held that a new surrender request could be considered when elements arising or revealed after an earlier request permitted a different assessment of the statutory conditions. In a file like Amsterdam, that principle cuts both ways: a future warrant with real, verifiable evidence may be different, but a new label on the same unanswered question is not necessarily new evidence.
French case law on absentia should also be read with attention to the version of the statute being applied. Cass. crim., 15 October 2013, No. 13-86.329, published in the Bulletin, concerned Article 695-22-1 and the conditions for executing a sentence warrant after a trial without personal appearance. Its official analysis explains that the exception depends on the information supplied by the issuing State about notification, counsel or the remedy available after service. It is useful as a structural reference, but the current wording and the date of the warrant must always be checked. A defence should never transplant an old paragraph number without verifying the current Légifrance version.
The Amsterdam decision adds a modern evidentiary warning to that case law. The Dutch court did not say that the appeal lawyer was fictitious or that Italy could never proceed without the person. It said that the record did not establish the specific conditions. The issuing authority had been asked three times for clarification; the final questions were still largely unanswered; and the time limit did not permit another cycle. In France, Article 695-33 would support a focused request for supplementary information, but the chamber would still have to manage the statutory calendar. The defence should explain what a missing answer would prove, not simply demand an open-ended inquiry.
There is also a remedy question. If the requested person refuses surrender, Article 695-31 gives the chamber twenty days from the appearance, subject to a supplementary-information order, and expressly permits a cassation appeal by the procureur général or the requested person under the stated conditions. That is different from a merits appeal in Italy. A cassation challenge in France tests the legality and reasoning of the surrender decision; it does not reopen the factual guilt determination. The distinction should be explained to the person through an interpreter where needed, especially when the foreign warrant and the French proceeding use different terms for appeal, cassation, review and re-trial.
Finally, the French court must keep the specialty and transfer consequences separate from the absentia question. If surrender is granted, the requesting State is bound by the limits of the warrant and the applicable specialty rules. If France’s own criminal process or sentence justifies a deferred or temporary surrender, Article 695-39 supplies a specific mechanism. If the person is released while the surrender case continues, conditions can be imposed. If surrender is refused because an absentia exception was not established, that does not acquit the person in Italy and does not silently invalidate the Italian judgment. It only prevents execution of that request in France on the record presented to the executing authority.
The most useful French defence file is therefore a short, indexed record: the warrant; the final judgment; the service documents; the power of attorney; the appellate docket; the issuing authority’s answers; the unanswered questions; the decision-period calculation; and any French proceedings or residence facts that engage another statutory ground. Each item should be linked to an article of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to a precise request for relief. That format is persuasive because it respects mutual recognition while insisting that recognition cannot operate on an unproven procedural assumption.
Conclusion
The Amsterdam ruling is a refusal of surrender, not a declaration that an Italian conviction is guilty or innocent. Its importance lies in the line it draws between a general awareness of proceedings and proof of notice of the decisive appeal hearing; between the presence of a lawyer’s name and proof of a mandate covering the relevant stage; and between an assertion in an EAW form and the documents needed to activate an absentia exception. The official decision, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2026:8272, records that the Italian authority had repeated opportunities to answer focused questions but left the decisive points unresolved before the statutory deadline.
In France, the same problem would be analysed under Articles 695-11 to 695-15, 695-22, 695-22-1, 695-23 to 695-25 and 695-29 to 695-39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The chamber would not retry the Italian case. It would test the warrant’s execution purpose, the final judgment, notice, representation, waiver, supplementary information, detention and the applicable calendar. The person arrested should request the full record immediately, refuse to let “knowledge of proceedings” substitute for proof of a hearing date, and preserve every objection at the first appearance. A prompt, document-led review can determine whether the case calls for refusal, further information, release, a deferred transfer or a focused cassation challenge.