Since 6 August 2025, a foreign national who crosses the Channel in a small boat and reaches the United Kingdom without meeting its entry conditions may be transferred back to France, while another applicant in France is admitted to the United Kingdom in exchange. This is the mechanism of the Franco-British agreement on the prevention of dangerous crossings, signed in London on 29 July 2025 and in Paris on 30 July 2025, and published in France by decree n° 2025-798 of 11 August 2025, published in the Journal officiel de la République française. Sixteen associations, led by the Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI), asked the Conseil d’État to annul that publication decree and, in parallel, to suspend it. In a ruling published in the Recueil Lebon, the Conseil d’État, 2nd and 7th chambers sitting together, 30 December 2025, n° 508947, GISTI and others, rejected the annulment request and held that there was no longer any need to rule on the suspension.
The decision matters well beyond the litigation itself. It defines, for the first time in such clear terms, how far France’s highest administrative court will go when asked to control the decree that gives an international agreement its publicity in the French legal order. It confirms that the courts can verify whether an agreement ought to have been authorised by a statute under article 53 of the Constitution before ratification, while refusing to review, in that same case, the agreement’s conformity with the Constitution or with France’s other international commitments. For the foreign nationals actually concerned — people transferred back to France, unaccompanied minors, voluntary applicants for the British visa route — the ruling also maps which protections survive and which individual remedies remain open.
This guide, written in September 2026, reads the ruling in full and places it in its operational context: the agreement’s two mechanisms, the exact scope of the judicial review exercised over the publication decree, the practical situation of persons readmitted to France, and the developments of June 2026, when the two governments extended and adjusted the arrangement. It is aimed at foreign nationals, their families, employers and advisers who need to understand what French and British authorities may lawfully do — and what can still be challenged before a judge.
I. The Franco-British agreement and the Conseil d’État’s ruling of 30 December 2025
A. The agreement’s twin mechanisms: readmission to France and the visa route to the United Kingdom
The agreement published by the decree of 11 August 2025 rests on two distinct procedures, described by the Conseil d’État at point 4 of its ruling of 30 December 2025. Its chapter II creates « une procédure de réadmission en France de ressortissants d’Etats tiers à l’Espace économique européen ayant accosté directement au Royaume-Uni ou ayant été interceptés ou secourus en mer et amenés à terre à l’occasion d’une traversée de la Manche » — a procedure for readmission to France of third-country nationals (persons who are not nationals of a State of the European Economic Area) who landed directly in the United Kingdom, or who were intercepted or rescued at sea and brought ashore during a Channel crossing, and who do not meet, or no longer meet, the conditions for entry, presence or residence on British territory. In plain terms, the United Kingdom may ask France to take back a person who reached its shores by small boat, and France undertakes to examine that request and, where it accepts it, to organise the person’s return to French territory.
Chapter III works in the opposite direction. It allows third-country nationals who are present in France and who volunteer to apply for a visa for the United Kingdom, so that they can travel lawfully instead of attempting a dangerous crossing. The agreement adds a balance clause: the number of persons actually readmitted to France and the number of persons actually admitted to the United Kingdom under one or the other procedure must even out during the implementation period. This is the logic the press has nicknamed “one in, one out”. The scheme began operating on 6 August 2025 as a pilot. According to figures reported by the British press in June 2026, the United Kingdom had by then transferred 921 people to France under the agreement and had admitted 896 people from France in return — roughly 3.5 per cent of small-boat arrivals over the same period, which illustrates that the mechanism, while symbolically central, currently concerns a limited number of cases.
Two features of the agreement’s design are legally decisive for everything that follows. First, the readmission obligation only governs entry into France: it says nothing about what happens to the person afterwards, and in particular it does not regulate the exercise of rights such as the right to family life or the right to seek asylum. Second, the agreement expressly anticipates judicial control of individual decisions: point 4 of its article 9, as quoted by the Conseil d’État at point 11 of the ruling, provides that where a court annuls a transfer decision or orders the return of the person concerned, « les Parties coopèrent et prennent toutes les mesures raisonnables afin d’organiser le retour de cette personne sur le territoire de l’autre Partie » — the parties cooperate and take all reasonable measures to organise that person’s return to the territory of the other party. A treaty that itself assumes its implementing decisions can be annulled by judges is a treaty whose beneficiaries retain access to the courts, a point the Conseil d’État used to dismiss one of the associations’ arguments and which, conversely, defines the real battleground for individual litigants.
It is equally important to understand what the agreement is not. It is not an asylum procedure, and it does not deprive anyone of the possibility of asking for international protection. Once readmitted to France, a person who fears persecution may lodge an asylum application with the Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA, the French refugee office) under the ordinary rules of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA, the code governing the entry and residence of foreign nationals and the right of asylum). Nor is the agreement a returns directive in disguise: it organises transfers between two States, while the legality of each individual transfer decision — its grounds, its procedure, its proportionality — remains governed by French and European law and can be tested before the administrative courts.
B. The scope of judicial review over a publication decree: article 53 of the Constitution and the limits drawn by the Conseil d’État
The associations’ annulment action raised a constitutional question in procedural disguise. Under article 53 of the Constitution, treaties or agreements that “modify provisions of a legislative nature” or that relate to the status of persons, among other categories, may only be ratified or approved by virtue of a statute. Under article 55 of the Constitution, treaties or agreements regularly ratified or approved have, from their publication, an authority superior to that of statutes, subject to application by the other party. The associations argued that the Franco-British agreement fell within article 53 — because its provisions differed from legislative rules and touched matters reserved to Parliament — and that, ratified without statutory authorisation, it could not be regarded as regularly ratified; the publication decree should therefore be annulled.
The Conseil d’État accepted the premise and clarified the framework. At point 3 of the ruling, it held: « les traités ou accords relevant de l’article 53 de la Constitution et dont la ratification ou l’approbation est intervenue sans avoir été autorisée par la loi ne peuvent être regardés comme régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés au sens de l’article 55 précité. » Treaties or agreements falling within article 53 whose ratification or approval took place without statutory authorisation cannot be regarded as regularly ratified or approved within the meaning of article 55. The court confirmed that, on an action for misuse of powers against a decree publishing a treaty, it may examine both defects specific to the decree and the argument that the ratification ought to have been authorised by statute. And it gave a two-limb definition of an agreement “modifying provisions of a legislative nature”: an international engagement « dont les stipulations touchent à des matières réservées à la loi par la Constitution ou énoncent des règles qui diffèrent de celles posées par des dispositions de forme législative » — whose provisions touch matters the Constitution reserves to statute, or which lay down rules that differ from those set by provisions of legislative form.
But the court drew the boundary just as firmly. It is not for the Conseil d’État, ruling in this litigation, to decide whether the treaty conforms to the Constitution, nor whether it conforms to France’s other international commitments. At point 14, the arguments built on the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the regulation (EU) 2016/399 (the Schengen Borders Code) were therefore dismissed as inoperative — not examined on the merits. This distinction is the doctrinal core of the ruling: the administrative court polices the boundary between the treaty-making power and Parliament, but it does not turn an annulment action against a publication decree into a general review of the treaty’s substantive conformity with higher norms. For practitioners, the practical consequence is that constitutional and convention-based arguments must be deployed elsewhere — against the individual implementing decisions, before the judge of those decisions, or through the procedures specifically designed for constitutional review.
Applying its two-limb test, the court found that the agreement did not modify any legislative provision. The associations relied first on article L. 311-1 of the CESEDA, which lists the documents a foreign national must hold to enter France — visas required by international conventions and by article 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Schengen Borders Code, proof of accommodation, means of subsistence and repatriation guarantees — and on article L. 332-1 of the CESEDA, under which a foreign national who does not satisfy the admission conditions may be refused entry. Allowing the entry of persons who hold none of those documents, they argued, departed from legislative rules. The Conseil d’État answered at point 5 of the ruling that those provisions « doivent être regardées comme réservant au pouvoir réglementaire compétence pour déroger aux conditions qu’elles posent pour autoriser l’entrée des étrangers en France » — they must be regarded as reserving to the regulatory power the competence to derogate from the conditions they set for authorising entry into France. Since the executive could itself derogate by regulation, the agreement’s article 4, which permits the entry of readmitted persons without the usual documents, laid down no rule differing from legislative provisions.
The second limb — matters the Constitution reserves to statute — was examined argument by argument. The transfer of readmitted persons, the court held at point 9 of the ruling, entails no deprivation of individual liberty on French territory while the British readmission request is examined or during the transfer itself, so the agreement did not touch the constitutional guarantee of individual freedom. At point 8, the readmission obligation « se bornent à permettre l’entrée en France d’étrangers, sans régir les conditions d’exercice de leurs droits ou libertés de valeur constitutionnelle » — is confined to allowing the entry of foreign nationals into France, without governing the exercise of their rights or freedoms of constitutional value, such as the right to a normal family life or the right to seek asylum; the provisions therefore did not lay down rules concerning the fundamental guarantees granted to public freedoms. And at point 12, the court noted that readmitted persons return by air and may be accompanied by British officers who « ne sont pas autorisés à faire usage de la force en France » — are not authorised to use force in France — so no coercive power on French soil was conferred on foreign agents. None of the agreement’s provisions, the court concluded, fell within the domain reserved to Parliament; ratification without a statute was therefore regular; and the publication decree stood. The suspension request, brought on the basis of article L. 521-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice (the urgent suspension procedure), had become moot once the annulment was rejected, and the claim for costs under article L. 761-1 of the same code was rejected with the main action.
II. Practical consequences for foreign nationals after the ruling and the June 2026 developments
A. Persons transferred back to France: arrival checks, unaccompanied minors and remedies against transfer decisions
For a person whom the United Kingdom proposes to transfer, the ruling confirms several concrete protections. The first concerns where the checks happen. The associations had argued that the agreement allowed the entry controls provided for by article L. 331-2 of the CESEDA — which submits cross-border movements at external borders to the checks required by the Schengen Borders Code — to be carried out from British territory alone. The Conseil d’État read point 3 of article 9 of the agreement and held, at point 6 of the ruling, that it provides for those checks to be carried out on arrival in France. A readmitted person is therefore not surrendered to a legal vacuum at the border: the entry control takes place on French soil, under French authority, with the procedural environment that French law attaches to it, including the possibility of a refus d’entrée (refusal of entry) decision under article L. 332-1 being examined for its own legality.
The second protection concerns children. Point 2 of article 4 of the agreement states that the readmission obligation « ne s’applique pas aux mineurs non accompagnés » — does not apply to unaccompanied minors — and the Conseil d’État stressed at point 10 that no provision of the agreement organises the assessment of the age of persons present on French territory. This matters in practice: disputes about whether a young person is a minor or an adult are decided under the ordinary French rules, surrounded by the legal safeguards that the best interests of the child require, and not under any streamlined treaty procedure. An unaccompanied minor who is the object of a proposed transfer under the agreement has a direct textual argument that the readmission obligation does not cover them at all.
The third and most important protection is procedural. Because article 9(4) of the agreement expressly contemplates that a court may annul a transfer decision or order a person’s return, the individual decision directing a specific person’s transfer to France — or, symmetrically, any French decision concerning a person readmitted — remains an administrative act open to challenge. The standard routes apply: an action for annulment before the competent administrative tribunal, which must in principle be lodged within two months of the contested decision’s notification, and, where urgency and a serious doubt as to legality coexist, an application to the juge des référés (interim applications judge) under article L. 521-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice for suspension of the decision’s execution. The GISTI litigation was directed at the publication decree — a general act — and failed on the treaty-law grounds examined above; nothing in the ruling closes the door to challenges against individual implementing decisions on grounds the court never reviewed, including the person’s individual circumstances, family life, health, or a pending asylum claim. An immigration lawyer in Paris can assess, file and argue such a challenge within the short deadlines that transfer cases impose.
Finally, readmission under the agreement does not extinguish substantive rights in France. The person transferred may claim asylum with the OFPRA; may invoke the right to respect for family life where family members reside lawfully in France; and benefits from the general principle that no measure of removal or refusal of stay may be taken without an individual, motivated and notified decision open to judicial review. The Conseil d’État itself underlined the boundary at point 8: the agreement allows entry, nothing more. Everything that French law attaches to presence on the territory — protection procedures, residence-permit applications, litigation before the administrative courts — remains fully available to the readmitted person.
B. The June 2026 extension, the “returnee” adjustment and the remedies available in France
The pilot arrangement was initially due to end on 11 June 2026. Instead, the two governments extended it: the French government announced in early June 2026 that the mechanism would continue until the beginning of October 2026, and a ministerial declaration relating to the Franco-British agreement on the prevention of dangerous crossings (declaration D-2025-6) was published in the Journal officiel, adjusting the arrangement. According to reporting by the Guardian on 22 June 2026, the adjustment responds to a loophole: several persons transferred to France under the scheme had re-entered the United Kingdom clandestinely, concealed in lorries, and the two home ministers agreed that such “returnee cases” — persons previously transferred who return to the United Kingdom by any illegal means — may be transferred back to France again. For anyone advising affected persons, the practical reading is that a first transfer to France is no longer necessarily the end of the matter for the British authorities; a second attempt at clandestine re-entry can trigger a renewed application of the agreement.
This evolution makes the remedies on the French side more, not less, important. A person readmitted to France who wishes to stabilise their situation has several legal paths, each with its own conditions and deadlines. The asylum application remains the principal protection route where persecution or serious harm is feared: under article L. 531-1 of the CESEDA, the OFPRA rules on the asylum applications brought before it, and under article L. 532-1 of the same code, its decisions may be challenged before the Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA, the national asylum court) within the short statutory deadline running from notification. Where family or private-life ties exist in France — a spouse, a child, long residence — an application for a titre de séjour (residence permit) may be lodged with the préfecture (the local administrative authority) under the CESEDA, and a refusal is open to an administrative appeal and then to judicial review. And any removal measure that the French authorities might themselves adopt against a readmitted person — for instance an OQTF (order to leave French territory), issued in the cases listed by article L. 611-1 of the CESEDA and normally accompanied by a thirty-day voluntary-departure period under article L. 612-1 of the same code — can be contested before the administrative tribunal: within one month of notification in the standard procedure (article L. 614-1 and article R. 911-1 of the CESEDA), within seven days when the person is assigned to residence, the court then ruling within fifteen days (article L. 614-2 and article L. 921-1 of the CESEDA), and under an even tighter timetable when the person is held in administrative detention, the court ruling within ninety-six hours of the appeal deadline’s expiry (article L. 921-2 of the CESEDA); a suspension application under article L. 521-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice remains available in urgent situations.
The ruling of 30 December 2025 also teaches a strategic lesson about where to fight. The associations’ frontal attack on the publication decree failed because the Conseil d’État confined its review to the boundary between the treaty power and Parliament, and declined to examine the agreement’s conformity with the Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights or European Union law. Those substantive arguments are not dead; they must simply be raised in the right forum. Against an individual transfer decision, a person’s Convention-based rights — family life under article 8 of the ECHR, the rights of the child, the procedural guarantees of EU law — can be invoked directly before the administrative judge, who reviews individual decisions for conformity with all applicable higher norms, including international commitments regularly introduced into the French legal order. The decree-level litigation tested the treaty in the abstract; the decision-level litigation tests its application to a human being, and that is where proportionality, vulnerability and individual guarantees carry their full weight.
Three practical precautions follow for persons concerned and their advisers. First, preserve every document: the transfer decision, its notification, any record of the crossing or interception, identity and age evidence, proof of family ties, medical certificates and any prior asylum file — deadlines run from notification, and reconstructing the paper trail afterwards is difficult. Second, act within days, not weeks: transfer and removal files move quickly, the two-month annulment deadline is unforgiving, and a suspension application under article L. 521-1 loses much of its point once the transfer has been executed, even though the agreement’s article 9(4) provides for cooperation to organise the return of a person whose transfer a court annuls. Third, coordinate both sides of the Channel: British judicial review of the United Kingdom’s own transfer decision and French remedies concerning the person’s situation after readmission proceed in parallel, and a coherent strategy on both sides — for which a firm practising French immigration law before the Paris administrative courts, such as the team presented on the cabinet’s immigration law page, is structured — avoids contradictions between the two files.
Conclusion
The ruling of the Conseil d’État of 30 December 2025, published in the Recueil Lebon, settles the institutional question: the Franco-British agreement on the prevention of dangerous Channel crossings did not require authorisation by statute, because its provisions neither differ from legislative rules nor touch matters the Constitution reserves to Parliament, and the decree publishing it therefore stands. At the same time, the court fixed a clear limit on this type of litigation — no review of the treaty’s conformity with the Constitution or with other international commitments on an action against the publication decree — and confirmed the protections that matter on the ground: entry checks on arrival in France, the exclusion of unaccompanied minors from the readmission obligation, the prohibition on any use of force by accompanying British officers on French soil, and the agreement’s own acknowledgement that courts may annul transfer decisions. With the scheme extended and adjusted in June 2026 to cover “returnee cases”, the number of persons affected is set to grow. For each of them, the legal reality is individual: the transfer decision, the deadlines, the asylum or residence options in France, and the judge who can be seized in urgency. Those are the levers that the ruling leaves intact — and they are the ones worth activating without delay.