On 1 September 2026, the International Court of Justice announced that Vanuatu had filed an application against France over two uninhabited volcanic rocks in the South Pacific, Matthew Island and Hunter Island, known in Vanuatu as Umaenupne and Umaeneg/Leka. The claim, described in Press Release No. 2026/22, covers sovereignty over Umaenupne (Matthew) and Umaeneg/Leka (Hunter) and a single maritime boundary between the Vanuatu and French, that is New Caledonian, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. There is a catch, and it is decisive: as Le Monde, with AFP, reported, the case can only proceed if France accepts the judges’ jurisdiction, since no procedural step will be taken unless and until Paris consents. Vanuatu has therefore not opened a case so much as sent Paris an invitation that Paris is free to decline. That invitation matters anyway. It revives a sovereignty dispute running since Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, it puts a potentially vast exclusive economic zone with fishing grounds and seabed resources on the table, and it lands in the middle of a French domestic row in which the far right accuses President Emmanuel Macron of preparing to give away French territory, a charge Paris denies. This analysis explains, from a French and EU procedure standpoint, why France cannot be forced into the Peace Palace, when France has nevertheless said yes in the past, what the Court would examine if it ever heard the dispute, and why the maritime boundary may count for more than the two rocks themselves.
I. Can Vanuatu bring France before the ICJ without French consent
A. Forum prorogatum: an application that waits for a yes
Vanuatu seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the mechanism lawyers call forum prorogatum. The rule means an application invoking a consent still to be given is transmitted to the respondent State but is not entered in the General List, and no step is taken in the proceedings until that State consents for the purposes of the case. The Registry therefore transmitted Vanuatu’s application to France, and the file now sits in a procedural limbo that is entirely normal: no General List entry, no time limits, no hearings, unless Paris signs the invitation. The Court’s own press release states the consequence plainly: nothing will move unless and until France consents.
The reason France starts from a refusal position is structural. Under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, the so-called optional clause, a State may declare in advance that it accepts the Court’s jurisdiction against any other State accepting the same obligation. France holds no such declaration today: it figures nowhere among the optional-clause declarations currently listed in the Registry’s declarations database. France therefore accepts the Court’s jurisdiction only case by case, by special agreement or by ad hoc consent, and each consent is negotiated politically as much as legally. Under the Constitution, negotiating and ratifying treaties belongs to the President of the Republic, so the decision to accept Vanuatu’s invitation belongs at the highest level of the French executive, with Parliament entering the picture only for the categories of international engagements that require a statute. Consenting to jurisdiction is therefore a sovereign political act, not a routine procedural step, and everything in the French record suggests Paris weighs each invitation against its wider interests: the precedent it would set, the domestic cost, and the odds on the merits.
That political reading is reinforced by the present context. Le Monde, with AFP, reports that the file is politically sensitive in France, where the far right accuses President Macron of preparing to surrender overseas territories, while the Foreign Ministry stated in December that the matter is a “long-standing dispute” and that there is no question of ceding sovereignty over the islands. Earlier this year, Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Jotham Napat had accused France of colonialism over the dispute and warned that Vanuatu would use every diplomatic and international legal avenue if talks collapsed, after successive rounds of bilateral talks at ministerial and leadership level reached an impasse. In that configuration, a French consent in the coming weeks would look like a concession extracted under pressure, which is exactly why Paris will most likely let the application sleep while keeping the negotiation channel formally open. But “most likely” is not “always”, because France has twice accepted this exact invitation, and the two precedents shape everything about what a French yes could look like.
B. France has said yes twice: the Congo and Djibouti precedents
The first precedent is Certain Criminal Proceedings in France, brought by the Republic of the Congo in 2002 after French investigating judges in Meaux opened cases against Congolese officials including President Denis Sassou Nguesso. The Congo’s application frankly gambled on French goodwill: as the Court’s own overview of the case records, the Congo sought to found jurisdiction under Article 38, paragraph 5, gambling that French consent would certainly be given. Paris played along: by a letter dated 8 April 2003, France consented to jurisdiction over the application, and the case entered the Court’s List. The Court underlines the historic character of that letter: since Article 38, paragraph 5, was adopted in 1978, no State had ever accepted another State’s invitation to recognise jurisdiction over a case against it. France consented because the case let it defend the conduct of its own judges on the world stage, with limited territorial stakes and a strong jurisdictional counter-narrative about universal jurisdiction over torture allegations. The lesson for Vanuatu is that France says yes when appearing serves French interests better than silence.
The second precedent is closer in time and in structure. On 9 January 2006, Djibouti filed an application against France over the refusal of French authorities to execute a letter rogatory in the investigation into the death of Bernard Borrel, invoking Article 38, paragraph 5, exactly as Vanuatu does today. This time France consented with a carefully fenced letter, and the Court’s overview of the Djibouti case records a fenced consent: by a letter dated 25 July 2006, France accepted jurisdiction for the purposes of that case only, for the dispute in the application and strictly within the claims as formulated. The case went to judgment on 4 June 2008, and France largely prevailed on the interpretation of the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. For a French government lawyer, the Djibouti file is the template: consent narrowly, fence the claims, fight on the merits, and use the proceedings to restate your reading of the bilateral instruments. Applied to Vanuatu, that template suggests that if Paris ever consented, it would ring-fence sovereignty from maritime delimitation, exclude any claim touching New Caledonia’s status, and insist that the stalled bilateral negotiations remain the primary track.
None of this makes French consent likely in 2026, and honesty requires saying so. In the Congo and Djibouti cases, France faced allegations about the behaviour of its judges and investigators, where refusing the Court would have looked like an admission. Here France is asked to litigate the ownership of territory it administers and the maritime space around it, with a domestic audience primed to read any concession as surrender. The realistic scenarios are therefore threefold: prolonged silence, which leaves the application dormant indefinitely; a polite declinature coupled with a renewed offer of bilateral talks, which is the standard French posture in sovereignty disputes; or, least likely but not unthinkable, a Djibouti-style limited consent if Paris concludes that a controlled courtroom loss on a minor point costs less than years of “colonialism” headlines across the Pacific. Readers watching this file should ignore commentary about the merits and watch a single indicator instead: whether the Quai d’Orsay starts describing the dispute as suitable for third-party settlement. Until that sentence is uttered, there is no case, only an invitation.
II. If the Court ever heard it: sovereignty over the rocks, then the sea around them
A. Who owns Matthew and Hunter: title, administration, and the Court’s method
The material facts are narrow and undisputed. Matthew and Hunter are uninhabited volcanic islands, each less than a square kilometre, lying about 300 kilometres east of New Caledonia and south-east of Vanuatu. Le Monde, with AFP, describes volcanic islands lying several hundred kilometres east of New Caledonia and claimed by Vanuatu, independent since 1980 after joint British and French rule. France claims sovereignty over the islets and attaches their maritime space to New Caledonia, which places them inside the institutional framework built by the 1998 constitutional law and the 1999 organic law on New Caledonia. Vanuatu answers with history and culture: Le Monde reports that Vanuatu has grounded its claim in culture and history, pointing to the long-standing ties of southern Vanuatu communities with the islets, and presents French control as an arrangement made without consulting the Indigenous population, a control Vanuatu denounces as a colonial leftover.
Before an international court, that clash would be resolved by a familiar method, and French counsel know it well. The Court first looks for a legal title: treaties, colonial boundary instruments, and the administrative acts of the pre-independence period, read in light of the law as it stood at the critical date. The condominium of the New Hebrides, jointly administered by London and Paris until 1980, complicates both narratives, because acts performed by one administering power without the other, and claims first formulated at or after independence, carry limited weight against continuous prior administration. The Court then weighs effectivites, the concrete displays of State authority: visits, mapping, maintenance of sovereignty markers, search-and-rescue responsibility, and the integration of the islets into the administration of New Caledonia. France’s continuous administration of the islets is its strongest card, while Vanuatu’s decades of diplomatic protest preserve its claim from extinction without creating title by themselves. None of this turns on sympathy for decolonisation in the abstract: the Court applies the law of territorial acquisition, where a long, peaceful and public display of authority generally defeats a historical or cultural claim unaccompanied by administration, unless the original taking itself violated a peremptory rule in force at the time.
French domestic law adds a lock that foreign commentators often miss. Even a total defeat in The Hague would not by itself transfer one square metre of French territory, because Article 53 of the Constitution requires a statute before any treaty involving cession, exchange or addition of territory can be ratified or approved, delays its effect until after ratification or approval, and closes the door firmly: no cession, exchange or addition of territory is valid without the consent of the populations concerned. An ICJ judgment delimiting sovereignty would create an international obligation to give effect to the ruling, but the cession itself would still require a statute, and the populations concerned would have to consent. With New Caledonia’s institutional future itself unsettled, that double lock makes any negotiated transfer extraordinarily heavy to operate, which in turn explains why Paris treats the file as non-negotiable in public. For Vanuatu’s lawyers, the implication is symmetrical: winning on title at The Hague would be the beginning of a French domestic procedure, not the end of the dispute.
B. The real prize: one maritime boundary, 200 miles, and Article 121
Vanuatu’s application asks for two things, and the second counts for more than the first: a single boundary for the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of Vanuatu and France off New Caledonia. Sovereignty over two barren rocks decides who projects a maritime zone into some of the richest tuna waters of the South Pacific and who controls the seabed beneath them. As Le Monde notes, the islands are uninhabited, yet sovereignty over them gives New Caledonia, and therefore France, a large exclusive economic zone. A full 200-mile exclusive economic zone generated from each islet would carve a vast French pocket out of waters Vanuatu considers its natural prolongation from its southern islands, while a finding that the features generate no zone at all would redraw the France-Vanuatu delimitation from scratch. This is why talks have been held at ministerial and leadership levels between France and Vanuatu, up to President Macron receiving Prime Minister Napat at the Elysee on 23 July 2025, and why the breakdown of those discussions pushed the file toward The Hague.
French domestic law on the maritime zones is precise, and it favours negotiated delimitation over unilateral maximalism. The historic foundation is the Law of 16 July 1976 on the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, which gave the Republic sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of seabed and subsoil resources within a zone stretching up to 188 nautical miles beyond the territorial sea. That 1976 regime has since been recast and consolidated in the Ordinance No. 2016-1687 of 8 December 2016 on maritime spaces under French sovereignty or jurisdiction, which now carries the operative rules. Its Article 11 states: “L’espace maritime situé au-delà de la mer territoriale et adjacent à celle-ci constitue la zone économique exclusive et ne peut s’étendre au-delà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base telles que définies à l’article 2.” Its Article 12 adds: “La République exerce, dans la zone économique exclusive, des droits souverains en ce qui concerne l’exploration, l’exploitation, la conservation et la gestion des ressources naturelles, biologiques ou non biologiques, des eaux surjacentes jusqu’aux fonds marins, des fonds marins et de leur sous-sol, comme en ce qui concerne les autres activités tendant à l’exploration et à l’exploitation de la zone à des fins économiques, telles que la production d’énergie.” Crucially for this dispute, Article 11 continues: “Lorsque les côtes d’autres Etats sont adjacentes ou font face aux côtes françaises, la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive est effectuée par voie d’accord conformément au droit international afin d’aboutir à une solution équitable.” The 200-mile limit runs from baselines set by Article 2 of the same ordinance. French statute law therefore commands exactly what the two States attempted in 2018, 2019 and 2025: delimitation by agreement producing an equitable solution, not a diktat of equidistance. A French court asked about these waters would start from that negotiated delimitation rule, and an international court would apply the same equitable-principles method under the Convention.
The Convention itself is part of French law. France signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 and published it domestically by decree in 1996, which gives the Convention its internal effect. The Constitution gives duly ratified and published treaties authority superior to statutes, subject to reciprocity, so the Convention’s delimitation and island-regime rules sit above French statutes in the hierarchy of norms. Both France and Vanuatu are parties to the Convention, so the reciprocity condition is satisfied and the same treaty binds both litigants. That matters because the Convention contains the provision Vanuatu will lean on most heavily and France will work hardest to neutralise: Article 121, paragraph 3, which denies any exclusive economic zone or continental shelf to rocks unable to sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own, in the authentic English text published by the United Nations. Matthew and Hunter are uninhabited, waterless volcanic cones with no economic life of their own; Vanuatu’s legal team will argue they are textbook Article 121(3) rocks, generating at most a 12-mile territorial sea and no 200-mile zone, so that the single maritime boundary must be drawn essentially between Vanuatu’s southern islands and New Caledonia, giving France only two small territorial enclaves.
France’s answer is foreseeable, because it has been rehearsed in every rocks-and-EEZ dispute of the last forty years. Paris will argue that Article 121(3) sets a high threshold, that habitability is assessed in context rather than by demanding a self-sufficient village on the rock, that State practice around remote French possessions treats comparable features as zone-generating, and above all that the equitable delimitation of a single boundary does not mechanically reduce to the status of two features: opposite New Caledonia, a vast populated territory, the relevant coasts and the proportionality of the result dominate the construction of the line. France will also recall that delimitation by agreement remains the statutory and conventional preference, and that Vanuatu walked away from the 2025 negotiating round, a fact Paris will present as premature forum-shopping rather than exhaustion of remedies. None of these arguments is decisive on paper, and each has succeeded somewhere before an international court and failed somewhere else, which is precisely why States with strong effectivites often prefer to keep rocks disputes in bilateral channels where leverage, fisheries access deals and joint development zones can substitute for binary win-or-lose rulings. The same ordinance completes the picture with the contiguous zone, the ecological protection zone and the continental shelf defined in Article 15. The economic subtext supports that reading: shared tuna management, licensed fishing revenue for Vanuatu, and French strategic presence can all be priced into a boundary agreement, whereas a judgment attributing every mile to one side leaves the loser with nothing to trade.
Two wider currents make this file larger than two rocks. First, the Pacific is the active front of maritime law: sea-level rise threatens baselines, high-seas biodiversity rules are entering into force, and small island States have learned to use international courts, with Vanuatu itself described by Le Monde as “no stranger to the ICJ”. Second, The Hague is unusually busy with cases touching the same region of international law this very month: on 10 September 2026, the Court closed four days of hearings on Germany’s preliminary objections in Nicaragua v. Germany, the case on alleged breaches of obligations toward the occupied Palestinian territory, whose record is public. A Court handling war, genocide-convention intervention and arms-transfer responsibility in the same season will not treat a Pacific boundary application as exotic paperwork. For practitioners, the Vanuatu application is therefore a case study in how forum prorogatum keeps the ICJ accessible even against States outside the optional clause, how French constitutional locks condition any territorial outcome, and how Article 121 continues to decide fortunes in square miles of ocean.
Conclusion
Vanuatu’s application of 1 September 2026 changes the legal optics of the Matthew and Hunter dispute without changing its procedural reality: until France consents, there is no case, only a well-drafted invitation grounded in Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. France’s record shows it consents when appearing serves its interests, as in 2003 against the Congo and in a fenced 2006 letter against Djibouti, and refuses or delays when territory and domestic politics are on the line, which is exactly the present configuration, with the Foreign Ministry denying any cession and the far right policing every comma. If the file ever moved, the Court would test French title and effectivites since 1975 against Vanuatu’s historical and cultural claim rooted in the 1980 independence, then draw a single EEZ and shelf boundary in which Article 121(3) and the weight of New Caledonia’s opposite coast would do most of the work, with French statutes themselves pointing toward agreement and equitable solution. The probable near future is therefore more negotiation under the shadow of the application, with the application used as leverage for fisheries access, boundary talks and political signalling across the Pacific. Watch the Quai d’Orsay’s vocabulary: the day Paris calls third-party settlement conceivable, the invitation becomes a case. Until then, the two rocks keep their seagulls, and the ocean around them keeps its lawyers busy.