On 10 September 2026, at 4.30 p.m. in the Peace Palace, the President of the International Court of Justice closed four days of public hearings in Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), the case in which Managua asks the World Court to judge Berlin’s own conduct over Gaza: arms deliveries to Israel, suspended funding for the United Nations relief agency for Palestinian refugees, and political cover maintained while, in Nicaragua’s words, the risk of genocide and grave breaches of humanitarian law was openly recognised. The Court’s press release 2026/23 of 10 September 2026 records the conclusion of the hearings held from Monday 7 to Thursday 10 September 2026 on the preliminary objections raised by Germany, with verbatim records 2026/30 through 2026/33 preserving every sitting presided over by President Iwasawa. Nothing said this week decides whether Germany violated international law. Everything said this week decides whether the Court will ever reach that question. Germany’s objections attack jurisdiction and admissibility from four sides: no genuine legal dispute existed when Nicaragua filed, claims reaching back before 2008 fall outside Germany’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, the case cannot be decided without judging Israel, which is absent, and the apartheid-related claims escape the Court’s jurisdiction altogether. The Court will now deliberate for months before ruling. If it admits even part of the claims, the case moves to the merits, and every State that licenses arms exports, including France, will read the judgment as an operating manual for its own liability. That is the French angle of this English briefing: Paris runs one of Europe’s strictest arms-export licensing regimes, prosecutes genocide and crimes against humanity under universal jurisdiction, and has just seen its highest court confirm that corporate officers can face complicity charges for crimes committed abroad. What The Hague decides about Germany’s licences will echo directly in the offices where French licences are signed, challenged and, one day, judged.
I. Can Nicaragua Put a Weapons Supplier on Trial? The Four Preliminary Battles Fought in The Hague
A. What Nicaragua Accuses Germany of: Preventing Genocide, Enforcing the Geneva Conventions, Self-Determination and Apartheid
Nicaragua filed its application on 1 March 2024, against the backdrop of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and what it described as a grave and deteriorating humanitarian situation. The application does not sue Israel. It sues Germany for Germany’s own behaviour: continued political, financial and military support to Israel, including military equipment, at a time when, Nicaragua argues, there was an internationally recognised and increasingly serious risk of genocide and widespread violations of international humanitarian law against Palestinians in the occupied territory, above all in Gaza. The legal theory is third-State responsibility. Nicaragua contends that Germany carries independent obligations of its own and cannot shelter behind the fact that the underlying acts were committed by another State. Four bodies of law are invoked. First, international humanitarian law, including the duty to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions and to take measures against serious violations. Second, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Third, the prohibition of racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid. Fourth, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, including the duty to prevent genocide, the duty to punish, and the prohibition on assisting a State in circumstances where the risk of genocide was serious and recognised. Alongside the application, Nicaragua requested provisional measures, the urgent orders meant to protect the rights at stake while the case proceeds. The Court held hearings in April 2024 and, by its order of 30 April 2024, decided that the circumstances at that stage did not require it to indicate the measures requested. That refusal was expressly not a judgment on the merits: the Court did not find that Germany had complied with international law, nor did it dismiss Nicaragua’s substantive claims as unfounded, and it kept the case on its General List so that proceedings could continue. The reasoning noted information supplied by Germany about its domestic arms-export review and licensing system and a reported significant decrease, since November 2023, in the value of military equipment licensed for Israel, while stressing that every State bears international obligations on arms transfers to parties to an armed conflict. Nicaragua then filed its Memorial on the merits in July 2025, setting out its evidence and legal argument in full. In October 2025 Germany answered with preliminary objections, suspending the merits phase under the Rules of Court, and Nicaragua replied to those objections in February 2026. The scale of the underlying arms relationship gives the dispute its weight. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Germany accounted for 31 percent of Israel’s imports of major arms over 2021 to 2025, making it Israel’s second-largest supplier after the United States. The September 2026 hearings therefore addressed procedure, but the procedure guards a dispute about real weapons, real licences and real money, which is why arms-export ministries across Europe followed the Peace Palace sittings day by day.
Beyond weapons, Nicaragua’s file targets the wider ecosystem of support. The application criticises the suspension of German funding for the United Nations agency assisting Palestinian refugees at the height of the humanitarian emergency, academic and scientific cooperation maintained with Israeli institutions where such cooperation is said to contribute to the unlawful situation, and a failure to supervise corporations under German jurisdiction whose activities allegedly touch the occupied territory, from resource exploitation to dual-use transfers. These heads of claim explain why the case matters well beyond the defence ministry: universities managing exchange programmes, public research bodies running joint laboratories, development banks disbursing funds, and compliance departments of industrial groups all feature, in Nicaragua’s theory, as links in a chain of State responsibility. The Court will not assess these allegations at the preliminary stage, but Germany’s objections already force a first answer on whether funding decisions and academic partnerships can even be pleaded as breaches of the Genocide Convention or the Geneva Conventions. For French institutions running comparable programmes, the pleadings are worth reading now, because the admissibility ruling will say which kinds of cooperation a State can be sued for, and which remain matters of foreign policy beyond the Court’s reach.
B. Germany’s Four Shields: No Dispute, the Post-2008 Time Bar, the Absent Israel and the Apartheid Jurisdiction Fight
Germany’s preliminary objections, argued from 7 to 10 September 2026, ask the Court to stop the case before the merits. Four lines of defence emerged, each with consequences far beyond this dispute. First, Germany contests that a genuine legal dispute between Nicaragua and Germany, capable of founding jurisdiction, existed when proceedings were instituted. The Court’s jurisdiction is consensual: without a crystallised disagreement on international law between the two parties, there is nothing to adjudicate. Nicaragua answers that it completed every step needed to establish such a dispute. How the Court calibrates that threshold will matter for every future applicant tempted to manufacture jurisdiction through diplomatic correspondence. Second, Germany invokes the temporal limit of its own acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, which covers only situations or facts arising after 2008. Germany argues that this limitation bites on Nicaragua’s claims, while Nicaragua replies that Berlin confuses the historical background of the case with the claims actually pleaded, which concern German conduct in 2023 and after. Third comes the heaviest weapon, the indispensable-third-party rule associated with the Monetary Gold precedent: Germany argues that Nicaragua’s claims necessarily require findings on Israel’s own conduct, including whether Israel violated the Genocide Convention or humanitarian law, yet Israel is not a party and has not consented. Under that rule, in certain circumstances the Court cannot decide a dispute where doing so would necessarily require it to determine the legal responsibility of an absent third State. Nicaragua rejects the characterisation entirely, insisting the case targets Germany’s own obligations and Germany’s own acts and omissions, which the Court can assess without pronouncing on Israel’s responsibility. Fourth, Germany challenges jurisdiction over the claims alleging failure to prevent and condemn racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid. If the Court upholds any of these objections in full, the corresponding claims disappear; if it rejects them, the case proceeds to the merits and the Court will, for the first time at this level, spell out when a supplying State’s licences, funding decisions and political support cross the line into internationally wrongful conduct. Observers should also note what the 2024 provisional-measures phase already revealed about Germany’s litigation posture: detailed reliance on the domestic licensing apparatus and on declining licence values. That defence previews the merits battle to come, because it invites the Court to measure a national export-control system against international standards, exactly the exercise French lawyers know from challenges to French licences. The coming order, expected in the following months, will therefore be read in Paris as closely as in Berlin: it will fix the jurisdiction test for supplier-State cases, the temporal reach of optional-clause declarations, and the true scope of the absent-party shield.
II. If France Sat in Germany’s Chair: Export Licences, Criminal Courts and Corporate Liability
A. Who Signs the Licence in Paris: Prior Authorisation, Three Licence Types and Emergency Suspension by the Administrative Judge
France subjects war material to one of the tightest prior-authorisation regimes in Europe, and any French lawyer asked whether Paris could face a Nicaragua-style claim starts with the Code de la défense. Article L2335-2 of that Code provides: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” Export without prior authorisation is prohibited, and the administration defines both the listed material and the derogations. Article L2335-3 then builds the licensing architecture in three tiers: general export licences by order, global licences notified to an exporter established in France for identified recipients over a fixed period without quantity or amount limits, and individual licences, of which the Code says: “Des licences individuelles d’exportation, faisant l’objet d’une notification, autorisant, à sa demande, un exportateur établi en France à expédier, en une ou plusieurs fois, un ou plusieurs matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés à un destinataire situé dans un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne ainsi que dans les territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne.” Licences may carry end-use conditions and restrictions. Above the Code sits the European Union Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports, whose human-rights and international-humanitarian-law criteria the French licensing authorities apply when they assess each destination, and whose official text is published on EUR-Lex for any exporter or litigant to consult. The decisive French feature, and the sharpest contrast with systems where licensing is treated as an unreviewable act of government, is judicial review. Export licences are administrative decisions, and administrative decisions can be challenged before the administrative courts. Article L521-1 of the Code of administrative justice gives the interim-relief judge the power to suspend: “le juge des référés, saisi d’une demande en ce sens, peut ordonner la suspension de l’exécution de cette décision, ou de certains de ses effets, lorsque l’urgence le justifie et qu’il est fait état d’un moyen propre à créer, en l’état de l’instruction, un doute sérieux quant à la légalité de la décision.” Associations have already used this route to attack French licences for Gulf destinations, forcing the judge to weigh urgency against a serious doubt on legality, including compliance with international commitments. A Nicaragua-style applicant against France would therefore find a domestic forum that Germany’s critics say they lacked: the Paris administrative judge can freeze a licence within weeks, long before The Hague reaches the merits. For companies, the lesson of this week’s hearings is operational. Map every licence by destination, value and end-use certificate, because the 2024 phase showed that aggregate licence values become exhibits. Keep the paper trail of the administration’s human-rights assessment, because a future court will ask what the authority knew and when. Draft suspension contingencies into supply contracts, because an interim order does not wait for delivery schedules. And monitor the coming ICJ order on the preliminary objections: if the Court admits claims built on licence data, every pending French licence file becomes potential evidence in a future interstate case, and exporters will need their compliance files to meet an international standard, not merely a ministerial countersignature.
B. Who Faces the Criminal Judge in Paris: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Complicity and Universal Jurisdiction
Parallel to State responsibility in The Hague runs individual and corporate criminal liability in Paris, and here French law is unusually well armed. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code defines genocide: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, followed by the listed acts, and adds: “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” Article 212-1 covers crimes against humanity: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, with a list that extends to persecution and institutionalised segregation. War crimes against persons protected by the laws and customs of war fall under Article 461-2: “Sont passibles des aggravations de peines prévues à l’article 462-1 les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité physique ou psychique de la personne ainsi que l’enlèvement et la séquestration, définis par le livre II du présent code et commis à l’encontre d’une personne protégée par le droit international des conflits armés en vertu des lois et coutumes de guerre et du droit international humanitaire.” Complicity reaches the facilitator: Article 121-7 states: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.” These definitions apply beyond French borders through universal jurisdiction. Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” For the gravest crimes, Article 689-11 goes further: “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, namely genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes, with three locks: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, prosecution lies only at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and only “si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne”, the prosecutor verifying that the International Criminal Court, whose judges and cooperation framework our newsroom examined when Washington sanctioned ICC judges and tested French cooperation, is not already seised. Readers should note that a recodification of criminal procedure is scheduled with deferred effect toward 2029, but these provisions are in force today. The case law proves they are not theoretical. In Cass. crim., 24 November 2021, No. 21-81.344, the Criminal Chamber ruled on universal jurisdiction over Syrian facts: “Le 15 février 2019, le procureur de la République de Paris a ouvert une information contre M. [R] [S], ressortissant syrien, des chefs d’actes de torture et de barbarie, crimes contre l’humanité, et pour complicité de ces crimes, pour des faits commis en Syrie entre mars 2011 et fin août 2013.” The full decision is published at Cour de cassation, 24 November 2021, No. 21-81.344. Four years later, the Court’s highest formation confirmed that corporate channels do not escape complicity scrutiny: Assemblée plénière, 25 July 2025, appeal No. C 24-84.071, concerning “l’information suivie contre lui des chefs de complicité de crimes contre l’humanité et de crimes de guerre, blanchiment aggravé et associations de malfaiteurs”, published at Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 25 July 2025, No. 24-84.071. The message for executives, brokers, carriers and financiers in the arms chain is direct: where the ICJ case tests the State that licensed, French criminal courts can test the persons who supplied, financed or facilitated, provided the suspect is present or habitually resident and no international court claims priority. Anyone exposed should therefore treat The Hague and Paris as two fronts of one risk: preserve licence files for the interstate forum, and audit personal exposure under complicity and universal-jurisdiction rules for the domestic forum, before either court calls.
For general counsel and compliance officers, the waiting period before the Court’s order is the moment to act. Commission an independent mapping of all licences, brokering authorisations, financing lines and maintenance contracts touching high-risk destinations, and reconcile them with end-use monitoring reports. Test each file against the licensing criteria the administration claims to apply, and record dissenting assessments rather than burying them, because a reviewing court rewards documented diligence and punishes after-the-fact reconstruction. Review travel and residence patterns of exposed personnel against the habitual-residence threshold of Article 689-11, and align whistleblowing channels so that concerns about a destination reach the board before they reach a prosecutor. Finally, diary the ICJ order alongside limitation and disclosure calendars: an admissibility ruling that endorses licence-based claims would shorten the path from Peace Palace pleadings to Paris search warrants, and the companies that prepared during the quiet months will be the ones able to answer on both fronts.
Conclusion
The hearings that closed on 10 September 2026 decided nothing about Germany’s guilt and everything about the future shape of supplier-State litigation. If the Court admits the claims, it will then define, on the merits, when arms licences, funding decisions and political support provided amid a recognised risk of genocide or grave humanitarian-law violations engage the supplier’s own responsibility, and that definition will bind the reasoning of every foreign ministry legal department in Europe. If it declines jurisdiction, it will still have clarified the dispute threshold, the reach of post-2008 temporal reservations, and the true blocking power of the absent-party rule, which is itself a litigation asset for respondent States. Either way, the order will land on desks in Paris where licences are signed under Articles L2335-2 and L2335-3, challenged under Article L521-1, and shadowed by criminal provisions that punish genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes up to life imprisonment and reach facilitators through Article 121-7 and universal jurisdiction under Articles 689-1 and 689-11, as the 2021 Syrian ruling and the 2025 Assemblée plénière decision demonstrate. France is not a party to the Hague case, and this briefing accuses no French authority of anything; it maps the questions Paris would have to answer if it ever stood where Berlin stands this week. Exporters should use the months before the Court’s order to harden their files, litigators should prepare both the administrative suspension track and the criminal complicity track, and observers should watch the Peace Palace docket rather than the headlines, because the next decisive act in Nicaragua v. Germany will be a reasoned order, not a speech. When it arrives, this newsroom will analyse it the same day, through the same French-procedure lens.