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Duterte Back Before the ICC on 16 September 2026: Fitness to Stand Trial and What France Would Test Before Any Surrender

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Duterte Back Before the ICC on 16 September 2026: Fitness to Stand Trial and What France Would Test Before Any Surrender

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On 16 September 2026, Rodrigo Roa Duterte is expected back before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. At eighty-one years old, detained in Scheveningen for more than a year, the former Philippine president sits at the center of the most closely watched fitness dispute in the Court’s history: his lawyers already tried once to halt the case indefinitely on medical grounds, the judges ordered three independent experts to examine him, and the next status conference will show whether the trial can move forward at all. For readers facing an ICC warrant, an extradition request, or a European Arrest Warrant with a medical dimension, the Duterte sequence is a live masterclass in how international judges handle age, illness, and the right to be fit enough to stand trial. And for anyone who could be arrested in France on an ICC arrest-and-surrender request, the French procedure adds a second, exacting filter that this article explains step by step, with the statutes and the latest Cour de cassation rulings quoted word for word.

I. Duterte back before the ICC on 16 September: what the judges must decide

A. From the 7 March 2025 arrest warrant to confirmed crimes-against-humanity charges: the road to trial

The Duterte case moved with a speed that surprised even seasoned ICC observers. On 10 February 2025, the Office of the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against Mr Duterte for the crimes against humanity of murder, torture and rape. Pre-Trial Chamber I assessed the material submitted by the Prosecution and found reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Duterte is individually responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for the crime against humanity of murder, allegedly committed in the Philippines between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019. The official ICC case page records the decisive sequence as follows: the Chamber issued the warrant of arrest under seal on 7 March 2025, reclassified it as public on 11 March 2025, and Philippine authorities arrested Mr Duterte and surrendered him to the Court on 12 March 2025, acting under that warrant.

Three features of that surrender deserve attention from any lawyer who advises on cross-border arrest risk. First, the Philippines is no longer a State Party to the Rome Statute, having withdrawn effective 17 March 2019, yet the Court retained jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed while membership was in force, namely between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019. Withdrawal does not wipe the slate clean for past conduct, and clients who assume that leaving a treaty ends exposure are making a dangerous mistake. Second, the arrest was executed by Philippine national authorities and followed by a transfer to The Hague within roughly twenty-four hours, which shows how fast an ICC warrant can turn into a plane ride once the requested state cooperates. Third, the man concerned was eighty years old at the time of surrender, born on 28 March 1945, and described by the Court as the former President of the Philippines, Mayor of Davao City, Vice Mayor of Davao City, and allegedly the founder and head of the Davao Death Squad (DDS). Age and former office did not slow the machinery by a single day.

His initial appearance took place on 14 March 2025, with Mr Duterte appearing by video link as authorised by the Chamber. That video link already signaled what would become the dominant theme of the case: health. An eighty-year-old detainee appearing by video, a defence team openly building a medical record, and a detention unit in Scheveningen holding a former head of state combined into a procedural knot that took months to untangle. International media often present ICC detention as a political story; in practice it is first a medical and logistical file, with expert panels, confidential health reports, and scheduling orders that determine whether the criminal case can physically proceed.

The next milestone confirmed that the case would indeed proceed, at least on paper. The confirmation of charges hearing ran from 23 to 27 February 2026: the Prosecutor, the common legal representatives of the victims and the Defence presented oral submissions and closing statements, while the suspect himself stayed away after the Chamber granted his request to waive attendance. Then came the decision that fixed the trial perimeter: On 23 April 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all three crimes-against-humanity counts brought by the Prosecutor against Rodrigo Roa Duterte and committed him to trial before a Trial Chamber. The judges concluded, in the formula that now frames everything, that substantial grounds existed to believe Mr Duterte responsible for the crimes against humanity of murder and attempted murder under article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Court founding treaty, allegedly committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population in the Philippines between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 during the war on drugs campaign.

For practitioners, the lesson of this first phase is blunt. An ICC suspect who hopes that age, a waiver of attendance, or a video-link appearance will pause the case is mistaken: the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed every count and sent the file to a Trial Chamber. The only lever that ever seriously slowed the Duterte proceedings was the fitness challenge, and that is exactly what the 16 September 2026 conference is about. Anyone advising a client named in an ICC investigation file should therefore prepare the medical and procedural record early, with independent experts and documented observations, rather than betting on absence or delay tactics that the judges have already brushed aside once.

B. Fitness to stand trial on 16 September: medical reports, defence observations and the adjournment test

The fitness battle is the true engine of the Duterte calendar. On 8 September 2025, Pre-Trial Chamber I postponed the start of the confirmation hearing, initially scheduled for 23 September 2025. The reason, stated officially, was the defence request for an indefinite adjournment on the ground that Mr Duterte was not fit to stand trial; the majority of the Chamber answered with only a limited postponement, keeping enough time to decide the request and related matters. Note the vocabulary carefully. The defence did not ask for a short delay; it asked for an indefinite adjournment, meaning a suspension with no fixed end date, grounded on the claim that the suspect could not meaningfully take part in his own trial. The majority granted only a limited postponement, keeping control of the timetable while the medical question was examined.

That examination followed the standard international template: an independent expert panel, written reports, and adversarial observations. At the second status conference on 23 June 2026, Trial Chamber III presiding Judge Joanna Korner set the stakes for the autumn in open court. Addressing defence counsel Peter Haynes, she signalled that the 7 September session would likely be an important one now that the expert reports were in, and that she expected Mr Duterte to attend in person absent a documented medical reason. The timetable behind that expectation was fixed: the expert panel examining Mr Duterte was to submit its reports by 18 August, with the parties and participants filing observations by 31 August. In other words, the September hearings were designed as the moment when medicine meets procedure: reports filed, parties heard, suspect present unless a documented medical reason prevents it, and the Chamber in a position to rule.

The earlier ruling on fitness explains why the judges handle this file with such caution and such firmness at the same time. On 26 January 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I found Mr Rodrigo Roa Duterte fit to take part in the pre-trial proceedings and rejected the indefinite-adjournment request. Weighing the applicable legal principles, the assessment of three independent medical experts and all relevant circumstances, the Chamber held itself satisfied that Mr Duterte could exercise his procedural rights effectively, so that the pre-trial proceedings resumed. The test applied is functional, not diagnostic: the question is not whether the suspect is ill, it is whether he can exercise his procedural rights effectively. An eighty-one-year-old man can suffer from multiple conditions and still be found fit, provided he understands the proceedings, can instruct counsel, and can follow the evidence. Conversely, a younger suspect with a cognitive or psychiatric impairment that destroys those capacities can be found unfit. Families and supporters often misunderstand this point; general frailty does not equal unfitness, and the ICC requires proof tied to procedural capacity, assessed by independent experts, not by press statements.

What happens on and after 16 September 2026 therefore follows a narrow set of branches. If the Trial Chamber confirms, on the basis of the August expert reports and the parties’ observations, that Mr Duterte remains fit, the trial preparation continues and the defence’s remaining medical arguments shrink to case-management requests such as sitting hours, video-link attendance, or medical breaks. If new medical material raises a genuine doubt, the Chamber can order a fresh expert assessment and adjust the calendar while keeping the confirmed charges intact; confirmation of charges, once pronounced on 23 April 2026, is not undone by a later health development. Only a finding of genuine, lasting inability to exercise procedural rights could freeze the trial phase, and even then the Chamber would revisit the question periodically rather than closing the case. The Philippine News Agency reported that the next status conference after the September session was moved to 16 September, which keeps the file on a tight leash: roughly weekly judicial control, no drift, no indefinite adjournment through the back door. For defence teams in similar cases, the practical message is that fitness litigation buys structured time, measured in expert deadlines and observation rounds, never an open-ended halt.

There is a second, under-reported dimension to the September hearings: confidentiality and courtroom discipline. Judge Korner reminded all counsel to refrain from commenting on the proceedings outside the courtroom, after the June conference dealt with protocols for handling confidential medical information. Medical fitness litigation runs on sealed reports, redacted filings, and strict protective orders; leaks or public commentary can draw judicial warnings and damage credibility. Any team preparing a fitness challenge before an international court should treat the medical file with the same secrecy as the defence strategy itself, because the Chamber does.

II. What France would test before surrendering a suspect to The Hague

A. Arrested in France on an ICC warrant: the Paris track from custody to surrender

Suppose the same ICC warrant had to be executed in France rather than in Manila. The procedure would run on a dedicated statutory track that every practitioner should know by heart, because it differs from ordinary extradition in ways that matter for the client from the first hour of custody. The starting point is the principle itself: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” That sentence is article 627 of the Code of criminal procedure, and it continues with a scope clause worth reading closely: “Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes: the exact categories charged against Mr Duterte fall squarely inside this cooperation title, and French law mirrors them domestically since article 212-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique : 1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage” and eight further categories up to 11°. Murder as part of a widespread or systematic attack is therefore punishable as a crime against humanity under French law itself, which removes at the threshold any argument that the conduct would not be criminal in France.

The transmission channel is centralized by design. “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République.” That is article 627-4 of the Code of criminal procedure, and it means one thing in practice: every ICC arrest-and-surrender request in France funnels through the Paris prosecutor general and is enforceable across the entire national territory. The same article keeps an emergency lane open: “En cas d’urgence, ces demandes peuvent aussi être adressées directement et par tout moyen au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” For the person targeted, the consequence is that there is no safe venue inside France; the warrant runs everywhere from the moment it is transmitted.

The first hours of custody follow a strict clock that defence counsel must police. “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” That twenty-four-hour presentation rule opens article 627-5 of the Code of criminal procedure, which then builds the rights package step by step: “Après avoir vérifié l’identité de cette personne, ce magistrat l’informe, dans une langue qu’elle comprend, qu’elle fait l’objet d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise et qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris.” Language the person understands, a maximum five-day horizon to Paris, and immediate access to counsel: “Le procureur de la République l’informe également qu’elle pourra être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office par le bâtonnier de l’ordre des avocats, informé sans délai et par tout moyen. Il l’avise de même qu’elle pourra s’entretenir immédiatement avec l’avocat désigné.” Detention pending the Paris appearance is not automatic either: “S’il décide de ne pas laisser en liberté la personne réclamée, le procureur de la République la présente au juge des libertés et de la détention qui ordonne son incarcération à la maison d’arrêt. Toutefois, s’il estime que sa représentation à tous les actes de la procédure est suffisamment garantie au regard des principes édictés à l’article 59 de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale signée à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, le juge des libertés et de la détention peut soumettre la personne réclamée, jusqu’à sa comparution devant la chambre de l’instruction, à une ou plusieurs des mesures prévues aux articles 138 et 142-5 . L’article 696-21 est applicable.” Judicial supervision or electronically monitored house arrest is therefore available from the start where appearance at every step is sufficiently guaranteed, a point that matters enormously for elderly or ill suspects whose detention conditions will later become the core of the file.

Release litigation stays open throughout. “La mise en liberté ou la mainlevée ou la modification du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut et à la procédure prévue aux articles 148-1 et suivants du présent code.” That is article 627-9 of the Code of criminal procedure, and the phrase “à tout moment” should be taken literally: each deterioration in health, each new expert report, each change in detention conditions can support a fresh application, decided in public hearing by reasoned judgment. Compare this with ordinary extradition, where the framework is set by article 696 of the Code of criminal procedure (“En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre”) and where a person who refuses surrender appears before the chambre de l’instruction within ten working days under article 696-15 of the Code of criminal procedure: “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure. La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de dix jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général.” The ICC track is faster at the front end, more centralized, and more tightly bound to the Rome Statute’s own detention standards, which is exactly why lawyers handling ICC-adjacent files in France prepare the medical record from day one rather than waiting for The Hague to ask. Readers who want the parallel ordinary-extradition timetable, including the forty-day provisional-arrest deadline that decides many files, can consult our analysis of France-Algeria arrest warrants and the forty-day rule.

B. When age and illness block surrender: the French health test in extradition and European Arrest Warrant cases

France does not surrender blindly. In ordinary extradition, article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure lists the mandatory bars: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique ; 3° Lorsque les crimes ou délits ont été commis sur le territoire de la République ; 4° Lorsque les crimes ou délits, quoique commis hors du territoire de la République, y ont été poursuivis et jugés définitivement ; 5° Lorsque, d’après la loi de l’Etat requérant ou la loi française, la prescription de l’action s’est trouvée acquise antérieurement à la demande d’extradition, ou la prescription de la peine antérieurement à l’arrestation de la personne réclamée et d’une façon générale toutes les fois que l’action publique de l’Etat requérant est éteinte”. Health is not on that closed list, yet it enters through the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Cour de cassation has spent the last year drawing the boundary with unusual precision. Two rulings from the criminal chamber, both handed down within months of this article, set the test that any French judge would apply to an elderly or sick person facing surrender, and they illuminate the Duterte fitness debate from the French side.

The first ruling is the strictest statement of the European Arrest Warrant health doctrine in recent French case law. On 29 July 2026, the criminal chamber quashed a Paris investigating chamber decision that had refused to surrender a woman to Germany under a European Arrest Warrant issued for terrorism-organization prosecution, on the ground that her psychiatric condition made transfer incompatible with detention. The Cour de cassation recalled the controlling European test: where the executing judge finds serious and proven grounds to believe that surrender would expose the person to a real risk, it must first pause and seek information, and it may refuse surrender only if the risk cannot be removed within a reasonable time. In the Court’s own words, the executing authority “doit, en application de l’article 23, § 4, de la décision-cadre précitée, surseoir à ladite remise et solliciter de l’autorité judiciaire d’émission la fourniture de toute information relative aux conditions dans lesquelles il est envisagé de poursuivre ou de détenir ladite personne ainsi qu’aux possibilités d’adapter ces conditions à son état de santé afin de prévenir la réalisation d’un tel risque.” And the refusal stage is fenced just as tightly: “Si, au regard des informations fournies par l’autorité judiciaire d’émission ainsi que de toutes les autres informations dont l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution disposerait, il apparaît que ce risque ne peut pas être écarté dans un délai raisonnable, cette dernière autorité doit refuser d’exécuter le mandat d’arrêt européen. En revanche, si ledit risque peut être écarté dans un tel délai, une nouvelle date de remise doit être convenue avec l’autorité judiciaire d’émission.” The Paris judges had failed that test because they deduced a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment “sans établir que la remise de la personne recherchée exposerait cette dernière à un risque réel de réduction significative de son espérance de vie ou de détérioration rapide, significative et irrémédiable de son état de santé ne pouvant pas être écarté dans un délai raisonnable” and the decision was therefore quashed in all its provisions (Cass. crim., 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.256).

The second ruling, dated 16 December 2025, closes the other door that defence teams often try: routing medical arguments through family life instead of through the torture and inhuman-treatment prohibition. A seventy-seven-year-old man living in France with his wife and a fifteen-year-old child, himself carrying several conditions and victim of a stroke in October 2025, opposed his surrender to Romania under a European Arrest Warrant issued to enforce a three-year-and-four-month sentence for influence trafficking and complicity in abuse of office. The Paris investigating chamber had refused surrender on Article 8 grounds, citing the couple’s fragile health and the father’s essential presence beside a schoolchild in France. The Cour de cassation quashed that refusal too, and its reasoning deserves quotation at length because it now governs every health-flavored EAW file in France. First, the closed-list principle: “la remise de la personne recherchée ne peut être refusée que pour les motifs de refus, obligatoires ou facultatifs, qui y sont limitativement énoncés. Ne constitue pas un tel motif l’atteinte à la vie privée et familiale en France que causerait à la personne recherchée l’exécution dudit mandat.” Those texts are articles 695-11 and following of the Code of criminal procedure, which define the European Arrest Warrant as a judicial decision for arrest and surrender between Member States, and articles 695-22 to 695-24, whose refusal grounds are exhaustively listed, from amnesty to ne bis in idem to the discrimination clause of article 695-22, 5°. Second, the new Article 8 test, aligned with the Bulletin-published rulings of 2 December 2025: “La Cour de cassation juge désormais (Crim., 2 décembre 2025, pourvois n° 25-87.214 et n° 25-87.216, publié au Bulletin) que lorsque la chambre de l’instruction est saisie d’un moyen qui allègue que la remise de la personne recherchée porterait atteinte à sa vie privée et familiale en France, il lui appartient de rechercher si le demandeur établit l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles permettant de faire prévaloir le droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale en France sur le but légitime poursuivi par sa remise en exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen, notamment au regard de la gravité des faits.” The chamber had examined the man’s stroke, his pathologies, and his wife’s eye surgeries only through Article 8 instead of Article 3, without establishing such exceptional circumstances against surrender for serious corruption offences, and that legal error required cassation (Cass. crim., 16 December 2025, no. 25-87.663).

Read together with the ICC’s functional fitness test, these two French rulings deliver one coherent message to elderly suspects and their families. General frailty, a stroke history, psychiatric vulnerability, or a dense family life in the requested state do not, by themselves, stop a surrender, whether to The Hague, to another EU Member State, or to a third country. What can stop it is a documented, specific, and irremediable risk: either the inability to exercise procedural rights established by independent experts, as in the ICC fitness procedure, or a real risk of a significant reduction in life expectancy or a rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration of health that cannot be removed within a reasonable time despite adapted detention conditions, as in the French EAW doctrine. Both systems also impose a dialogue duty before any refusal: the ICC through successive expert panels and observation rounds, the French EAW judge through mandatory information requests to the issuing authority and, where the risk can be managed, a new agreed surrender date rather than a refusal. A defence file built on press clippings and family certificates will therefore fail in both venues; a file built on independent medical expertise, precise detention-condition guarantees, and a showing that no adaptation can remove the risk within a reasonable time can succeed in both.

Conclusion

The 16 September 2026 status conference will not decide whether Rodrigo Duterte is guilty or innocent; it will decide something more immediate and, for future cases, more instructive: whether an eighty-one-year-old detainee, whose charges for murder and attempted murder as crimes against humanity were unanimously confirmed on 23 April 2026, remains able effectively to exercise his procedural rights and face trial. The expert reports filed by 18 August and the parties’ observations filed by 31 August now frame a binary outcome with no middle ground available to the defence: either fitness is confirmed and the trial preparation advances under tight judicial control, or a genuine, documented incapacity forces a structured pause that the judges will revisit rather than convert into the indefinite adjournment they already rejected on 26 January 2026. International justice has learned to treat age and illness as medical questions answered by independent experts, not as political arguments answered by cameras.

France applies the same discipline through its own instruments. An ICC suspect arrested on French soil enters the Paris-centered surrender track of articles 627 to 627-9 of the Code of criminal procedure, with twenty-four-hour presentation, counsel in a language the person understands, detention reviewed by the liberty and custody judge, and release applications available at any moment before the Paris investigating chamber. An EAW or extradition suspect who invokes health meets the two recent Cour de cassation rulings explained above: the Article 3 route demands proof of a real, irremediable risk to life or health that survives dialogue with the issuing state, and the Article 8 route demands exceptional circumstances capable of outweighing the legitimate aim of surrender in light of the gravity of the offences. Anyone who may one day be the subject of such a request should prepare exactly what both systems reward: contemporaneous medical evidence from independent doctors, a documented detention-conditions record, and counsel engaged within hours of arrest. If that situation is yours or that of someone close to you, the time to assemble the file is before the warrant lands, not after the plane takes off.

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