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Europe Wants to Use Russia’s Frozen Billions: The Reparations Loan, the Article 122 Plan and What French Judges Would Do About Seized Central-Bank Assets

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Europe Wants to Use Russia’s Frozen Billions: The Reparations Loan, the Article 122 Plan and What French Judges Would Do About Seized Central-Bank Assets

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On 10 September 2026, a cross-party group of Members of the European Parliament demanded that the European Union move Moscow’s frozen central-bank assets into a new EU custodial instrument, urgently, under Article 122(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The same week, reporting from Brussels described a Ukraine facing a $27 billion financial gap to survive the rest of the year, close to €170 billion in Russian assets parked at the Euroclear clearing house, and member states from Warsaw to Madrid asking the Commission to reopen the file everyone thought closed: using the principal, not just the profits, for Ukraine. The bitter dilemma of 2022 is back, sharper, with winter approaching and the €90 billion joint-borrowing backstop already looking insufficient.

This analysis explains what is actually on the table in September 2026, why seizing central-bank reserves is legally nothing like skimming their interest, and how the battle would play out before French authorities and French judges if assets held in France were touched. The perspective is that of a French lawyer: who freezes what in Paris, which judge authorises measures against foreign-state property, what the Cour de cassation and the Court of Justice have already decided about frozen assets, and what holders, creditors, banks and companies should do now. Confiscation makes headlines; procedure decides who keeps the money. After this week, anyone exposed to Russian sovereign assets in France needs to understand both.

I. Why Europe is back at the seizure table in September 2026

The numbers explain the political panic better than any speech. Understanding them precisely matters because each figure points to a different legal instrument, and confusing the principal with the profits is the error that sinks most commentary on this subject.

A. How much money, where it sits and what Ukraine needs right now

In 2022, the European Union decided to prohibit any transactions related to the reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia, de facto freezing about €210 billion in assets held in Europe. Close to €170 billion of that total sits at Euroclear, the Brussels clearing house, with the remainder scattered across other depositories and banks in the Union, including in France. These immobilised assets have since produced windfall profits of about €3 billion to €5 billion annually, which the EU, in line with the G7, has been transferring to Ukraine since October 2024. That mechanism survived Hungarian litigation: as our analysis of the Hungarian challenge shows, Budapest fought the allocation of those windfall profits to weapons purchases, and lost the immediacy battle while the money kept flowing.

The flow is concrete and recent. The EU disbursed a first €3.9 billion payment to Ukraine for drones and air defence in June 2026, followed by another €4.6 billion throughout July, and Kyiv has now asked Brussels to fast-track the next tranche of some €3 billion after EU capitals greenlit last week the use of such funds to buy Patriot air defence systems. Yet against these billions stands a far larger hole: on Independence Day last month, Volodymyr Zelensky told allies that Ukraine faces a financial gap of $27 billion, about €24 billion, just to survive the rest of the year, with Russia’s continuous attacks and a shortage of air defences shrinking the economy and emptying cities ahead of a difficult winter and a possible new Russian mobilisation. Some European diplomats privately question whether the money is spent efficiently or Kyiv’s needs overstated, but the structural fact is undisputed: the war grows more expensive every year, reconstruction will cost hundreds of billions, and national budgets across Europe are under strain while far-right parties surge, with France possibly no longer among Ukraine’s biggest backers in 2027 depending on its own elections.

That is why several member states, including Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden, alongside Members of the European Parliament, have in recent weeks called on the European Commission to revisit the use of the Central Bank of Russia’s assets themselves. The profits were the appetiser; the principal is the meal. And the principal is where the law gets dangerous, because everything the EU has done so far, allocating windfall profits while leaving ownership untouched, was carefully designed to avoid the confiscation question. Touching the €170 billion means answering it.

B. The three plans on the table: confiscation, reparations loan and the Article 122 custodian

Three models compete, and each carries different legal risks for Belgium, for Euroclear, for the euro itself, and for any French holder of connected assets.

The first model is outright seizure: transfer ownership of the frozen reserves to Ukraine or to a reconstruction fund. Its advocates argue that Russia’s aggression justifies countermeasures and that aggressors should pay. Its opponents, starting with Belgium, home to Euroclear, answer that confiscating another state’s central-bank reserves violates international law, would expose Euroclear to severe Russian legal retaliation and financial risk, and could undermine trust in the euro as a reserve currency. Moscow has already demonstrated the retaliation channel: a Moscow court ruled in favour of the Russian Central Bank in its lawsuit against Euroclear, ordering approximately €220 billion in compensation for the freezing of Russian assets, a judgment that hangs over every European discussion like a loaded weapon. Whatever its enforceability abroad, that ruling signals that Russia will answer seizure with seizure, targeting European assets within its reach.

The second model is the reparations loan, discussed by EU leaders by October 2025: use the frozen assets to fund a €140 billion loan to Ukraine for 2026 and 2027, structured so that Kyiv would only have to repay if Russia eventually pays war reparations. The design tries to avoid formal confiscation while mobilising the principal’s value. But Belgium pushed back on this too, and after EU leaders failed to agree, Plan B took over: a €90 billion fund backed by joint EU borrowing, supposed to cover both 2026 and 2027. That amount is increasingly described as an illusion as costs explode, which is precisely why the Commission is being asked to look again at the frozen stock, and why countries like Canada and Japan are being pressed to step up from 2027.

The third model emerged in August 2026, when three former senior officials proposed transferring the frozen Russian assets from Euroclear to the European Union while shielding Belgium from legal liability, a plan presented as legally possible. On Thursday 10 September 2026, a cross-party group of MEPs endorsed the logic publicly: the immobilised Russian accounts should be transferred to a new EU instrument acting as custodian and shouldering all legal obligations toward the Central Bank of Russia, as a decision that can be taken under Article 122(1) TFEU and must be considered urgently. Article 122 allows the Council, on a Commission proposal, to decide measures appropriate to the economic situation in a spirit of solidarity in case of severe difficulties, notably in energy supply. Stretching that emergency-weather-and-gas provision to cover the custodial transfer of a foreign central bank’s reserves would be the boldest use of Article 122 in EU history, and its judicial review before the Court of Justice would be the litigation event of the decade.

Hovering over all three models is Washington. Under a 28-point peace plan developed in 2025 without Ukrainian or European allies, Donald Trump proposed that $100 billion of the frozen assets be invested in Ukraine’s reconstruction under American control, with half of the profits going to America and the rest funding Russian-American projects, and he recently suggested Europeans should repay all American aid granted under the previous administration. Using the assets now would give Ukraine a lifeline but would also ensure that neither Washington nor Moscow can later use them as leverage. The window for a European decision is therefore political as well as legal: act while unity lasts, or watch the stock become someone else’s bargaining chip.

II. Could France seize or be forced to release? The legal locks as a French lawyer reads them

Headlines discuss seizure as if a Council decision sufficed. Litigators count locks: EU law locks, international-law locks, and French locks. Each must be opened, and each has a judge guarding it. This part inventories them from the French end of the chain, because whatever Brussels decides will land on the desk of a Paris bank compliance officer, a Treasury official and, soon after, a Paris judge.

A. What EU and international law currently allow: freeze yes, spend the profits maybe, take the principal not yet

Start with what is settled. Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 (OJ L 78) freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons and entities, and the 2022 measures against the Central Bank of Russia prohibit transactions related to its reserves. A freeze immobilises; it does not transfer ownership. That distinction is the load-bearing wall of the entire regime, and every court that has touched the subject has reinforced it. When the General Court dismissed Roman Abramovich’s third challenge on 9 September 2026 in Case T-358/25, it confirmed listings and freezes, not confiscations. When the Court of Justice held on 21 May 2026 in Case C-483/23 (EU:C:2026:408) and Joined Cases C-428/24 and C-476/24 (EU:C:2026:409) that trust-held assets may be frozen where the designated person keeps de facto power over them, it extended the freeze’s reach, not its nature. The windfall-profits mechanism itself rests on the same logic: extraordinary revenues generated after immobilisation can be skimmed without expropriating the underlying stock, which is why the Hungarian challenge targeted the destination of the profits rather than the freeze, as detailed here.

The Central Bank of Russia is not standing still. On 3 March 2026 it announced an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union against its designation, returning central-bank sanctions to Luxembourg’s docket, and parallel Russian proceedings produced the €220 billion Moscow judgment against Euroclear. Any EU move from freeze to use will therefore be litigated on at least three fronts simultaneously: Luxembourg, where listed persons and now a central bank plead illegality, breach of property rights and misuse of legal basis; Brussels and national capitals, where Belgium demands guarantees against liability; and Moscow, where retaliation judgments create a mirror-image threat over European assets. Counsel advising holders should assume that an EU custodial-transfer decision under Article 122 would be challenged within its two-month window by every interested party with standing, and that interim suspension applications would accompany the main actions from day one.

International law adds the heaviest lock: central-bank reserves enjoy sovereign immunity, and confiscating them as a sanction, outside a UN Security Council mandate or a recognised countermeasure framework accepted by courts, is something no Western jurisdiction has done to a major central bank. Belgium’s objection is not political theatre; it reflects advice that outright seizure would breach international law and trigger state responsibility. The reparations-loan and custodian models are engineered precisely to stay on the freeze side of that line, but engineers disagree on whether they succeed: if Ukraine never repays because Russia never pays reparations, a loan that functions economically as a grant walks and talks like confiscation, and judges in Luxembourg, and potentially in Strasbourg under the protection-of-property case law confirmed on 3 September 2026 in Vallée v. France, would examine substance over label. Formidable litigation risk does not mean the plan is unlawful; it means the plan’s survival depends on drafting, guarantees and judicial strategy, not on press releases.

French courts have already mapped part of this terrain. In its plenary-assembly ruling on an Iranian bank, the Cour de cassation held that an asset freeze imposed because of the targeted entity’s own activities cannot be invoked by that entity as force majeure to escape its obligations: Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités. In English: for the targeted person itself, such a freeze is not an unforeseeable, irresistible outside event. The decision is Assemblée plénière, 10 July 2020, Nos 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, Bank Sepah. The same ruling referred to the Court of Justice the question whether protective measures without attributive effect over frozen assets, such as French judicial securities or conservatory seizures, may proceed without prior authorisation from the national competent authority. That reference is directly on point for today’s debate: even creditors with valid claims cannot simply help themselves to frozen stock, and any use of immobilised Russian assets, by the EU or by private creditors, passes through authorisation gates that judges control.

B. The French locks: who freezes in Paris, which judge guards foreign-state property, and what to do now

In France, EU freezing regulations apply directly, and the national enforcement chain is codified in the Monetary and Financial Code. Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code anchors the chapter’s concepts in the EU restrictive-measures instruments. Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code then orders everyone present on national territory, and in particular banks and regulated professions, to apply freezes and prohibitions on making funds available without delay and to inform the Minister for the Economy immediately. This is why French banks freeze first and ask questions later, and why any EU decision touching the Russian stock would bite in Paris within hours through compliance desks, not after a parliamentary debate. Alongside European freezes, French ministers hold autonomous national powers: Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code allows joint six-month renewable freezes for terrorism-related targets, Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code extends the tool to UN-mandated designations, Article L562-9 of the Monetary and Financial Code makes ministerial decisions enforceable from Official Journal publication, and Article L562-3-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code organises the national register of frozen persons. The readings to take away are simple: identify within forty-eight hours which layer froze you, because an EU designation is fought in Luxembourg while a French ministerial order goes to the administrative judge.

Then comes the specifically French fortress around foreign-state property. Article L111-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures states the principle bluntly: forced execution and protective measures do not apply to persons enjoying immunity from execution. Article L111-1-1 of the same Code adds that no protective or enforcement measure may touch property belonging to a foreign state without the prior authorisation of a judge ruling by order on petition. Article L111-1-2 allows that authorisation only in three cases: the state expressly consented, the state earmarked the property for the claim at issue, or a judgment or arbitral award was rendered against the state and the targeted property is specifically used or intended for other than non-commercial public purposes with a link to the entity concerned. And Article R111-1 concentrates jurisdiction exclusively in the enforcement judge of the Paris Judicial Court. In plain terms: even if Europe built a custodian and a loan, any creditor dreaming of attaching Russian state property in France, and any debtor fearing it, will meet the Paris enforcement judge, who applies these three conditions strictly. Russia has consented to nothing, has earmarked nothing, and central-bank reserves held for monetary sovereignty are the textbook example of property used for non-commercial public purposes. The French lock is therefore shut today, and only a new statute, a new treaty, or a qualifying judgment could turn its key.

Criminal confiscation, the second French layer, does not open that lock either. Article 131-21 of the Criminal Code provides confiscation as a complementary penalty, automatic for felonies and serious misdemeanours, and Article 706-141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure organises special seizures to guarantee it. But confiscation punishes convicted persons for defined offences; it does not transfer a foreign central bank’s reserves to a war-torn neighbour. The Strasbourg ruling of 3 September 2026 confirms the discipline: confiscating jointly owned property after an embezzlement conviction, in proceedings against the husband alone, disclosed no violation of property protection precisely because the legal basis, the legitimate aim and judicial review were present. A European seizure of Russian reserves would be tested against the same three requirements, at a scale Strasbourg has never validated.

The operational checklist follows. Holders and banks in France should map every exposure to Russian sovereign assets now, diarise each EU renewal and each Luxembourg deadline, and file derogation and authorisation requests in writing at the first sign of a status change, because paper trails win interim relief. Creditors tempted by the Moscow-Euroclear mirror game should seek advice before petitioning the Paris enforcement judge, since an unauthorised measure against immune property fails and can cost damages. Companies near Russian capital should run the 21 May 2026 trusts test on their own structures, asking who really uses, benefits from and decides over each asset, as examined in our companion analysis of the Inter Rao Lietuva discipline of proof. And everyone should watch the Article 122 proposal: if the Commission tables it, the two-month challenge window will be the most consequential litigation deadline of the decade for sovereign-asset holders in Europe.

Conclusion

September 2026 has reopened the frozen-assets file because the money is running out while the stock sits still: $27 billion needed by Kyiv, €170 billion immobilised at Euroclear, a €90 billion backstop already overtaken by events, and a cross-party demand to move the reserves into an EU custodian under Article 122. The politics now favour action, but the law has not moved: a freeze is not a confiscation, windfall profits are not the principal, and central-bank reserves are guarded by immunity, by the EU Treaties’ allocation of competences, and in France by a Paris judge applying three strict statutory conditions. The reparations loan and the custodian are serious engineering attempts to square the circle, yet each will face Luxembourg within two months, Strasbourg in time, Moscow immediately, and markets continuously. For holders, creditors and banks in France, the conclusion is practical rather than ideological: map exposures, meet deadlines, document economic reality, and never touch immune property without a judge’s prior order. The billions will move, if they move, through procedure, and procedure rewards the prepared.

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