KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: September 2026 Hearings on Preliminary Objections, Arms Exports and What France Would Have to Prove

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: September 2026 Hearings on Preliminary Objections, Arms Exports and What France Would Have to Prove

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

From 7 to 10 September 2026, the International Court of Justice held public hearings in the case concerning Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany). The hearings were devoted entirely to the preliminary objections Germany filed on 21 October 2025 against the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of some of Nicaragua’s claims. Under Article 79bis, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, those objections suspended the proceedings on the merits, so nothing about German arms deliveries or funding decisions was decided this week. What was argued instead is the gateway question that controls every case of this kind: can a State that is not itself accused of committing genocide be brought before the world court for helping another State, and can the Court even hear the case when the allegedly responsible State whose conduct sits at the centre of the file, Israel, is not a party to the proceedings. Nicaragua filed its Application on 1 March 2024, alleging that Germany breached its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, by providing political, financial and military support to Israel and by defunding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. As summarised in the Court’s press release No. 2026/21 of 31 July 2026, Nicaragua contends that every party to the Genocide Convention must do everything possible to prevent genocide, and that since October 2023 a widely recognised risk of genocide hung over the Palestinian people, above all over the population of the Gaza Strip. Germany, Nicaragua argues, facilitated the commission of genocide through that continued support and in any event failed in its duty to do everything possible to prevent it. The Court already refused provisional measures against Germany by an Order of 30 April 2024, finding that the situation as it then stood did not call for the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures. The September hearings therefore matter for a different reason: they will decide whether the case lives or dies before any judge ever examines the substance. For France, the stakes are direct. Paris runs one of the world’s most formalised arms export licensing systems, French criminal courts claim universal jurisdiction over genocide and war crimes under precise statutory conditions, and any ruling on Germany’s objections will become the template for a future claim against any other arms-supplying State. This article explains what The Hague argued about this week and what Paris would have to prove if it were ever in Berlin’s seat.

I. What The Hague Decided To Argue This Week: Germany’s Preliminary Objections Explained

The case file published by the Court shows a classical procedural sequence. Nicaragua’s Memorial was filed within the time-limit of 21 July 2025 fixed by the Order of 19 July 2024. Germany chose not to file a Counter-Memorial on the merits and instead lodged preliminary objections on 21 October 2025. The President of the Court then gave Nicaragua until 23 February 2026 to present written observations, which it did, and the Court convened oral argument from 7 to 10 September 2026. The Court will now deliberate and deliver its ruling on the objections in the coming months. If Germany wins on all points, the case ends. If Nicaragua survives, the proceedings resume on the merits with Germany’s Counter-Memorial. Four clusters of objections structured the week, and each of them corresponds to a well-known weak point of third-State litigation before the Court.

A. Can Nicaragua Even Bring Germany Before The Court: Dispute, Discrimination Claims And The 2008 Time Bar

The first cluster concerns the very existence of a dispute capable of founding jurisdiction. The Court’s Statute, whose official text recalls that contentious jurisdiction depends on State consent, allows Nicaragua to invoke two bases: the declarations by which both States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and Article IX of the Genocide Convention. But consent on paper is not enough. The Court’s settled case law requires that a genuine legal dispute existed between the two parties, on points of international law, at the date the Application was filed on 1 March 2024. Germany challenges whether Nicaragua had sufficiently crystallised such a bilateral dispute with Berlin, as opposed to a general political disagreement about the situation in Gaza expressed in multilateral forums. Nicaragua answers that its diplomatic exchanges and public positions fulfilled every requirement for establishing a dispute. For observers, the lesson is practical: States contemplating this type of claim must build a bilateral paper trail of legal claims and rejections before seizing the Court, because a press release is not a dispute and a speech at the General Assembly is addressed to the world, not to the respondent.

The second strand of the jurisdictional battle concerns the claims about racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Nicaragua alleges that Germany failed to prevent and condemn those practices, but neither the Genocide Convention nor the two optional-clause declarations self-evidently cover that subject matter, and Germany argues the Court simply has no title of jurisdiction over it. This is the quietest but potentially most consequential point of the week, because it tests how far applicants can stretch a genocide-based jurisdictional title to import the whole architecture of international humanitarian law and human rights law into a case. If the Court agrees with Germany, future applicants will have to plead each family of claims under its own jurisdictional title or lose it at the threshold.

The third strand is temporal. Germany accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction only for disputes arising from situations or facts subsequent to 2008, and it argues that this reservation bites on parts of Nicaragua’s case, which necessarily reaches back into the history of the occupation and of German support policies. Nicaragua replies that Germany confuses the background of the case with the claims themselves, which concern German conduct after October 2023. Reservations to optional-clause declarations are interpreted strictly but literally, and the Court will have to draw a line between historical context, which it may always recall, and the facts generating the dispute, which must postdate 2008. Any State that framed its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction with a temporal reservation, and several European States have done exactly that, should read this part of the coming ruling with particular attention, because it will fix the price of that drafting choice.

Taken together, these three jurisdictional objections show the price of suing a third State rather than the principal actor. Every mile between the respondent and the battlefield becomes a jurisdictional argument: no direct dispute, no matching title, no timely facts. Applicants who understand this will plead narrowly, document bilaterally and date precisely. Those who do not will spend two years reaching a courtroom only to be told there is no door.

B. Can The Court Judge Germany Without Judging Israel: The Monetary Gold Absent Third State Problem

The admissibility cluster is dominated by one doctrine whose name every international lawyer knows: Monetary Gold. Germany argues that Nicaragua’s claims cannot be decided without first determining whether Israel itself committed genocide or grave breaches of humanitarian law, findings that would establish the legal responsibility of a State that is absent from these proceedings. Under the Monetary Gold principle, in the words of the commentary that framed this week’s debate, the Court cannot decide a dispute where ruling would necessarily determine the legal responsibility of a State absent from the proceedings. Nicaragua rejects that characterisation and insists the case concerns Germany’s own obligations and Germany’s own conduct: the duty to prevent, the prohibition of complicity, and the duty to ensure respect for humanitarian law exist independently, and a court can assess whether Berlin did everything possible without pronouncing on Jerusalem’s responsibility.

This is the doctrinal heart of the case and the point on which the coming ruling will be most closely read. The Court has applied Monetary Gold sparingly. In cases about shared responsibility, it has often held that assessing one State’s conduct does not require ruling on another’s, particularly where obligations are framed as duties of conduct, such as prevention and due diligence, rather than as attribution of the principal wrong. Nicaragua’s pleading was drafted with that distinction in mind: “facilitating the commission of genocide” and failing “to do everything possible to prevent” it are framed as breaches of Germany’s own duties, triggered by a recognised risk rather than conditional on a prior judicial finding that genocide occurred. Germany’s answer is that the distinction collapses the moment the Court must decide whether the risk was real, whether the transferred equipment could contribute to the alleged acts, and whether suspending support would have changed anything, because each of those findings passes through an assessment of Israel’s operations. Both positions are coherent, and that is precisely why third-State cases are so hard: the law of State responsibility separates obligations cleanly on paper, while facts weld them together on the ground.

The admissibility debate also covers the claims linked to the defunding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, where questions of mootness arise if funding policies changed after the filing, and the general requirement that claims be sufficiently connected to the jurisdictional titles invoked. Here the Court’s ruling will operate as a drafting manual for the next decade: which claims survive, in which wording, and under which title. Practitioners should watch not only the outcome but the reasoning, because a dismissal “as presently formulated” invites a refiled case, while a dismissal on Monetary Gold grounds closes the third-State route for as long as the principal actor stays outside the courtroom.

One procedural fact colours the whole week. The Court already declined provisional measures against Germany in April 2024, while in the parallel case brought by South Africa against Israel itself, documented on the Court’s docket for that case, it did indicate such measures. The contrast does not prejudge the objections ruling, since provisional measures turn on urgency and prima facie jurisdiction at a snapshot in time, whereas objections require a full jurisdictional analysis. But it signals the Court’s instinctive hierarchy: claims against the State whose forces operate on the ground are treated as the natural forum, and claims against supporting States face a longer and steeper path. Germany’s lawyers knew this, and the architecture of their objections, dispute, title, time and absent party, exploits every metre of that slope.

II. What This Means For France: Arms Exports, Criminal Courts And Practical Exposure

France is not a party to Nicaragua v. Germany, but it is arguably the European State with the most to learn from it. Three features combine on French territory: a major arms export industry governed by one of the most detailed licensing regimes in Europe, criminal statutes that define genocide and crimes against humanity in directly applicable terms, and courts that the legislature has expressly authorised to try foreigners for atrocities committed abroad. If the Court keeps Nicaragua’s case alive, every one of those features becomes a potential pressure point. If it kills the case, the reasoning will show Paris exactly which shield worked. This is the French lawyer’s insider view that the international audience usually misses, and it starts with the licensing desk.

A. Could France Face The Same Claim Over Its Own Arms Licences: The Licensing Machine And Its Emergency Brake

French law prohibits any export of war materials without prior State authorisation. Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code states the rule bluntly: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée”, with the administrative authority defining both the controlled list and the exemptions. The licences themselves come in three forms under Article L2335-3 of the same Code: general export licences that authorise any established exporter meeting defined conditions to ship listed equipment to categories of recipients, global licences notified to an identified exporter for specific equipment to identified recipients for a fixed period without quantity or amount limits, and individual licences notified for one or several shipments to a single recipient. These licences may carry conditions or restrictions on end use, and the preliminary operations, including sharing information during contract negotiation, accepting an order or signing a contract, are themselves covered by the authorisation. This architecture matters for any future Nicaragua-style claim, because it means French support for a foreign belligerent, if it exists, always takes the form of identifiable, dated, signed administrative acts. A claimant would not need to prove a vague policy of support. It would only need to exhibit the licences.

The same Code provides the emergency brake. Article L2335-4 of the Defence Code allows the administrative authority to act “à tout moment”, at any time, to suspend, modify, repeal or withdraw export licences already granted, “pour des raisons de respect des engagements internationaux de la France, de protection des intérêts essentiels de sécurité, d’ordre public ou de sécurité publique ou pour non-respect des conditions spécifiées dans la licence”. Respect for France’s international commitments is listed first among the grounds, and the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and the European Union’s arms export rules all belong to those commitments. In litigation terms, this provision cuts both ways. For the State, it proves the system is capable of reacting to a recognised risk of atrocity, which is exactly what the duty to prevent requires. For a claimant, it proves the State always retained the legal power to stop deliveries, so continuing them after the risk crystallised looks like a choice rather than inertia. Any French Government facing a future claim would be asked one question above all others: on which date did you consider that the risk threshold was reached, and which licences did you suspend the next morning.

Above national law sits the European framework. The European Union’s Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment obliges Member States to deny licences where there is a clear risk the equipment might be used for serious violations of international humanitarian law or human rights law, and to exercise special caution where the recipient’s human rights record is seriously questioned. France transposed this logic into its licensing practice years ago, and officials routinely insist that every application is examined case by case against these criteria. A Nicaragua-style applicant would test that assertion file by file, asking the Court to compare the criteria on paper with the licences signed in practice during the period of recognised risk. Germany is going through exactly that exercise now, with its own national system under the microscope. The French interministerial licensing process, centred on an advisory commission whose opinions inform decisions taken at the highest level of the executive, produces minutes, opinions and individual authorisations that a determined claimant could seek to have the Court request. Transparency, usually France’s pride in this field, becomes discoverability.

The Geneva Conventions add a second layer of exposure that has nothing to do with weapons lists. Common Article 1 of the four Conventions of 1949, whose official case file maintained by the International Court of Justice, requires the High Contracting Parties to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. Nicaragua invokes precisely this external dimension: a State party must use its influence, including its arms transfer decisions and its funding choices, to press belligerents toward compliance. The scope of that external obligation is one of the most debated questions in contemporary humanitarian law, and Germany argued during the merits-adjacent exchanges that it cannot bear the weight Nicaragua puts on it. France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, a nuclear-weapon State and one of the depositaries of humanitarian diplomacy, would find it harder than most to argue that it has no influence worth exercising. Influence is the currency in which the duty to ensure respect is paid, and Paris holds large reserves of it.

Concretely, what should a French exporter, official or counsel do while the Court deliberates on Germany’s objections. First, calendar the risk assessments: every licence decision taken after a plausible-risk finding by a competent international court should carry a written, contemporaneous justification addressing atrocity risk expressly, because post hoc rationalisations do not survive disclosure. Second, use the L2335-4 brake visibly: suspensions and end-use restrictions imposed during the crisis are evidence of prevention in action, while an untouched licensing flow during the same period is an exhibit for the other side. Third, track the coming ruling’s treatment of the 2008-style temporal reservations and the dispute-formation requirement, since France’s own declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2, carries its own reservations and any future claimant against Paris would have to navigate them exactly as Nicaragua navigated Germany’s. The week in The Hague was about Germany. The manual it produces will be read in Paris.

B. Can French Courts Prosecute Genocide And War Crimes Committed Abroad: The Universal Jurisdiction Toolkit

Parallel to any inter-State case at The Hague, French criminal courts offer a second forum that foreign victims and non-governmental organisations already know well. French substantive law defines the core international crimes in the Penal Code itself. Article 211-1 of the Penal Code provides that genocide consists, “en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”, of committing against members of that group acts including wilful attacks on life, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to conditions of existence likely to bring about the group’s total or partial destruction, measures intended to prevent births, and forcible transfer of children, and it adds that “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité”. Article 212-1 of the same Code defines crimes against humanity in equally operational terms, listing wilful killing, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid-style segregation and other comparable inhumane acts committed pursuant to a concerted plan against a civilian population in the context of a widespread or systematic attack. Article 461-2 of the Penal Code extends aggravated punishment to wilful attacks on life and physical or mental integrity, as well as abduction and unlawful confinement, when committed against persons protected by the international law of armed conflict. A Paris prosecutor or an investigating judge therefore works with definitions that mirror the international instruments, and defence arguments about vagueness or non-incorporation find little room.

Jurisdiction over extraterritorial facts is expressly granted. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that perpetrators of or accomplices in offences committed outside French territory may be prosecuted and tried by French courts either where French law applies under the Penal Code or another statute, or where an international convention or an act adopted under the European Communities treaty gives French courts competence. The dedicated universal jurisdiction regime goes further. Article 689-11 of the same Code provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, namely genocide as defined in the Penal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes defined in Articles 461-1 to 461-31. Three filters then apply, and each of them is the product of hard parliamentary compromise. The suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link such as the duration and conditions of presence, the reasons for it, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution can only be initiated at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor, and only if no international court and no other State requests surrender or extradition, with the prosecution service verifying the absence of proceedings before the International Criminal Court and of any competing request. Finally, victims who report facts and face a dismissal decision may challenge it before the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal, who must hear them if they so request and must give a reasoned written decision if the appeal is rejected.

These filters explain both the promise and the limits of the French forum for facts connected to Gaza or to any comparable theatre. The habitual residence condition excludes surprise complaints against transient visitors and concentrates cases on suspects genuinely anchored in France, which answers the historical criticism of abusive forum shopping while preserving a real remedy for diaspora victims who encounter their alleged tormentor in a French city. The prosecutorial monopoly and the subsidiarity check toward The Hague and toward extradition requests prevent parallel-proceedings chaos but place the calendar in the hands of a dedicated prosecution service whose prioritisation choices are themselves subject to judicial review through the Paris appeal mechanism.

For counsel advising victims, the practical sequence is therefore a criminal complaint with detailed factual annexes demonstrating both the international crime and the French connecting link, followed if necessary by the reasoned appeal to the Prosecutor General, with extradition and ICC complementarity arguments prepared from day one. For counsel advising officials, executives or military personnel who travel to France, the message is symmetrical: habitual residence is assessed on facts, not on formal status, and the list of connecting factors in Article 689-11 is expressly non-exhaustive, so a long posting, a family home or stable professional activity in Paris can suffice to anchor jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court in The Hague and the French courts in Paris are complementary, not alternative, and a suspect who falls through the cracks of one may land in the docket of the other. Germany’s week before the Court does not change any of this, but it advertises it: the same factual pattern that feeds an inter-State claim about arms transfers also feeds individual complaints about the underlying crimes, and France offers a courtroom for the second even while the first is still being argued.

Conclusion

The hearings of 7 to 10 September 2026 decided nothing about German arms deliveries, UNRWA funding or the situation in Gaza, and that is exactly why they matter. Preliminary objections are the filter through which every third-State case must pass, and Germany asked the Court to close four gates at once: no actionable bilateral dispute, no jurisdictional title for the discrimination claims, no timely facts under the 2008 reservation, and no judgment without the absent principal actor. Nicaragua answered each gate with the same key: its claims target Germany’s own duties of prevention, non-complicity and vigilance, which exist independently of any finding against Israel. The Court’s ruling, expected in the coming months and announced through the United Nations documentation of the hearings and the Court’s own channels, will either end the case or send it back to the merits with Germany’s Counter-Memorial. Either way it will become the reference for the next claim against the next arms-supplying State. Readers who want the hearings-week news framing of the same case can also consult our companion report Will the Gaza Arms Case Survive the 7-10 September 2026 Hearings, published ahead of the oral arguments. France should read it as a stress test of its own system: licences that are signed, dated and reasoned survive scrutiny, while silent licensing flows do not; an emergency brake that is used proves prevention, while one that rusts proves indifference; and criminal courts that are open to victims abroad complete a picture of a State that takes its international commitments seriously. The week in The Hague was Germany’s examination. The grading scheme it produces will apply to everyone, Paris included.

📄 Official circular