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Five States Are Walking Out of the ICC: What the Withdrawal Wave Changes and What France Must Still Do

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Five States Are Walking Out of the ICC: What the Withdrawal Wave Changes and What France Must Still Do

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On 11 September 2026, the American public broadcaster PBS reported that the departures of Venezuela and Chad had brought to five the number of states leaving the Court over the past year, alongside Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. PBS linked the surge to hostility from Washington and to the leadership crisis that followed the removal of the chief prosecutor. Two days later, this is the sharpest cross-border legal story in the world: five states leaving the International Criminal Court within twelve months, a declared American campaign to dismantle the institution piece by piece, sanctions on the Court’s own president and staff, and a vacancy at the top of the prosecution. For an international audience watching from London, New York, Beirut or Abidjan, the French angle is the one that clarifies everything. France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, a permanent member of the Security Council, and a country whose Code of criminal procedure contains a full cooperation title ordering its prosecutors and judges to work with The Hague. Withdrawals do not freeze cases, American sanctions do not bind French courts, and Paris keeps the same duties it had before anyone left. This analysis explains which departures count and when they take effect, why the Venezuela and Philippines investigations survive them, and what France must still do while the Court is under attack: arrest and surrender, freeze and protect, receive evidence, and shield the people who cooperate.

I. Five farewells that do not close a single case

A. Who is really leaving the ICC, on what timetable, and who already came back

The count of five is exact, and each departure has its own date and mechanism. In September 2025, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the three members of the Alliance of Sahel States, announced their intention to withdraw from the ICC, accusing the Court of selective prosecution against the Global South. The trio accused the institution of acting as a tool of neocolonial repression serving imperialist interests, as PBS and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court both record. They formally notified United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres of their withdrawal in June 2026. On 24 July 2026, Venezuela announced that it had notified the Secretary-General of its withdrawal. Three days later, on 27 July, Chad followed. The Chadian decision, as RFI reported, was linked to an American request to review its membership: in a phone call with a United States official on 23 July, the American side had voiced concern about how the institution works and asked Chad to reconsider its membership, according to Chadian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Sabre Fadoul. Four days after that call, Chad said it would leave.

The American pressure is not denied. A spokesperson for the United States State Department told the Associated Press that five countries had so far announced withdrawal plans and that Washington would welcome more. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said he will press the Court’s 125 member states to withdraw, punish organizations that work with it, and bar its staff from travelling to the United States. The State Department launched in July 2026 a campaign to dismantle the Court piece by piece in order to block any investigation or prosecution of American nationals and their allies, including Israel. The administration has already sanctioned around a dozen ICC staff in retaliation for the warrants issued for senior Israeli officials over the Gaza war and for investigations touching American personnel in Afghanistan, and it sanctioned Francesca Albanese, the United Nations special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, over what the State Department described as efforts to prompt ICC action against Israeli officials. On 4 September 2026, the current and former heads of the Court’s governing body answered publicly: pressure on the Court threatens international law itself, and joining treaties and institutions is an exercise of sovereignty, not a surrender of it.

The wave is therefore political before it is legal, and it is reversible. Hungary proves the point. Budapest announced it would quit the Court in 2025, but after the election of a new government the Hungarian parliament voted to stay. On 1 June 2026 the Court itself announced the outcome: Hungary would remain a State Party to the Rome Statute. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, together with 136 non-governmental organizations, now urges Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Venezuela and Chad to do exactly what Hungary did and revoke their withdrawal notifications before the one-year period under Article 127 of the Rome Statute expires. That one-year period is the whole legal story, and it is where most commentary goes wrong.

B. Article 127 of the Rome Statute: the one-year clock, and why the cases survive the farewell

Withdrawal from the Rome Statute is governed by a single provision, Article 127, and its wording leaves no room for a hasty exit. The Rome Statute provides that withdrawal happens by written notification to the United Nations Secretary-General and takes effect one year after receipt, unless the notification sets a later date. The Coalition confirms the mechanics in plain terms for the five current cases: each withdrawal takes effect one year after its notification reaches the United Nations. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which notified in June 2026, therefore remain States Parties until June 2027. Venezuela, which notified on 24 July 2026, remains bound until late July 2027. Chad, which followed on 27 July, remains bound until late July 2027. A press release is not an exit; only the calendar makes one.

The second paragraph of Article 127 is the one governments sometimes discover too late. Under its terms, a withdrawing state stays bound by the obligations that arose while it was a party, including accrued financial ones, and its exit leaves untouched both cooperation in investigations and proceedings already begun and the continued handling of any matter already before the Court. In short, everything opened before the exit date keeps running, and the duty to cooperate on those files survives the farewell.

There is precedent, and it is directly on point for the two most sensitive files of the moment. The Philippines under then-President Rodrigo Duterte left the Court in 2019 and became only the second state ever to do so, while an investigation was active. PBS recalls the result: withdrawal is not retroactive, so the investigation continued. That investigation has since produced the arrest of Duterte himself, proceedings now before the Court, and a confirmation-of-charges hearing scheduled to open on 23 February 2026. The same logic applies to Venezuela today. An investigation into possible crimes committed by Venezuelan security forces under former President Nicolas Maduro was already open, and PBS states plainly that it will continue even though the country announced last month that it would leave the ICC. A withdrawal announced on television changes nothing for the judges; only a revocation of the notification, Hungarian-style, changes the membership.

The Court, meanwhile, keeps working through the storm. On 16 July 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all 17 charges against Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, including war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed at the Mitiga prison in Tripoli, finding substantial grounds to believe that El Hishri, a senior figure in the powerful Libyan formation formerly known as the Special Deterrence Forces, is responsible for torture, rape and other sexual violence, murder, enslavement, persecution, imprisonment and other inhumane acts against detainees. Human rights organizations called it the opening of the road to the first trial ever to arise from the Court’s fifteen-year Libya investigation. A reparations hearing in the Darfur case against Abd-Al-Rahman was held on 8 September 2026. The confirmation hearing in the Duterte case opens on 23 February 2026, and a trial judgment in the Said case from the Central African Republic situation is expected on 23 September 2026. None of these steps depends on whether five capitals keep their membership cards. They depend on the remaining States Parties doing their part, starting with France.

II. While Washington squeezes the Court, Paris still has to deliver

A. How France cooperates with the ICC: what the Code of criminal procedure orders prosecutors and judges to do

France gave itself a complete legal machine for ICC cooperation a quarter of a century ago, and none of the current departures switch it off. The Law No. 2002-268 of 26 February 2002 on cooperation with the International Criminal Court built the bridge between the Rome Statute and the French courts, and the cooperation title of the Code of criminal procedure still runs it. Article 627 states the principle without ambiguity: for the application of the ICC Statute signed on 18 July 1998, France takes part in punishing the offences and cooperates with the Court under the conditions set by that title of the Code. The same article defines the personal scope: the provisions apply to any person prosecuted before the Court or convicted by it for acts that constitute, within the meaning of Articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. A withdrawal by Bamako, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Caracas or N’Djamena changes nothing in that sentence.

Day to day, cooperation requests from The Hague follow a channelled path. Article 627-1 provides that mutual-assistance requests from the Court go to the competent authorities under Article 87 of the Statute, in original or certified copy with supporting documents. Those documents go to the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, who gives them their useful course, and in urgent cases they may be sent directly to that magistrate by any means. The centralization matters for foreign counsel: there is one door in Paris, one magistrate, one paper trail. Mirror-image, Article 86 of the Statute imposes the general duty of full cooperation by States Parties with the Court in investigating and prosecuting crimes within its jurisdiction. France therefore owes the Court arrest and surrender, evidence, witness protection, asset freezing, and enforcement cooperation as a matter of both treaty law and domestic statute.

Three French mechanisms deserve attention because they are the ones withdrawal noise cannot suspend. First, conservatory measures. Article 627-3 provides that conservatory measures under Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute are ordered on French territory, with Treasury advances and under Code procedures, by the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor. The maximum duration is two years, renewable on the Court’s request before expiry, and any difficulty in execution is sent back through the Article 87 channel for the consultations provided in Articles 93(3) and 97 of the Statute. Anyone holding frozen funds, seized property or preserved records linked to an ICC file in France lives under this article, not under the diplomatic weather. Second, liberty. Article 627-9 provides that release, lifting or variation of judicial supervision or electronic monitoring can be sought at any time from the investigation chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, ruling under Article 59 of the Statute and Articles 148-1 and following of the Code. The Paris investigation chamber rules in public, reasoned session by reference to Article 59(4) of the Statute. A suspect arrested in France on an ICC warrant therefore meets a French judge in Paris, under a Franco-Roman procedure, whatever five other capitals decide. Third, concurrence with French cases. Article 627-11 extends Articles 627-4 to 627-10 to cases where the wanted person is also prosecuted or convicted in France on other counts. And the same article adds a rule defence teams sometimes overlook: ICC proceedings suspend French limitation periods for prosecution and sentence for that person. An ICC file freezes French limitation clocks for the person concerned.

The leadership crisis in The Hague changes none of this. Prosecutor Karim Khan was removed by a vote of the Assembly of States Parties over misconduct findings linked to a sexual-abuse case he had contested for nearly two years, and his two deputies now run the Office of the Prosecutor while the Assembly has yet to publish a timetable for nominations or an election. Defence teams occasionally suggest that a headless prosecution weakens cooperation requests. French law answers that requests emanate from the Court, are channelled through Article 87 of the Statute, and are executed by French authorities under French procedure. A vacancy at the top of the Office of the Prosecutor is an institutional problem for the Assembly, which elected the Prosecutor and removed him; it is not a ground for refusing a surrender, a freeze or a search in Paris.

B. Crimes France punishes itself, sanctions France must ignore, and the European shield

France does not only cooperate with the Court; it criminalizes the same conduct at home, in terms deliberately aligned with the Statute. Article 211-1 of the Penal Code provides: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants.” Genocide carries life imprisonment. Article 212-1 adds: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, followed by eleven paragraphs from wilful killing and extermination through torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance and apartheid-style segregation to other comparable inhumane acts. Article 461-1 covers war crimes: “Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31 .” Full references: Article 627, Article 627-1, Article 627-3, Article 627-9, Article 627-11 of the Code of criminal procedure, and Article 211-1, Article 212-1, Article 461-1 of the Penal Code. The practical consequence is complementarity in action: France can prosecute these crimes itself, and it must cooperate when The Hague does.

The second half of the French position is defensive. American sanctions now target the Court’s president, trial lawyers, staff, and even organizations that work with it, plus travel bans for Court personnel. In Paris, these measures have no direct effect: an American executive order does not repeal the cooperation title, does not order a French prosecutor, and does not bind a French bank to freeze the account of a victims’ association. The European shield is Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, the EU Blocking Statute, which forbids EU operators from complying with the listed third-country sanctions, allows them to recover damages caused by them, and nullifies foreign judgments giving them effect. The Commission reactivated and updated this instrument precisely to protect European actors caught between American sanctions and European legal duties. For counsel, NGOs, witnesses and companies operating from France, the checklist is therefore concrete: keep cooperating with the Court because French statute orders it; document any American pressure or de-risking by banks and platforms in writing; invoke the Blocking Statute against compliance clauses imposed by American counterparties; route ICC-related requests through the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor rather than improvising; and treat any suspect transiting French territory as an arrest-and-surrender risk under Articles 86 to 92 of the Statute, executed through the Paris investigation chamber. Surrender to the Court is not extradition to a state: the Rome Statute gives it its own chapter, its own request contents, its own provisional-arrest rule and its own competing-requests regime, and France executes it through the articles quoted above.

Two final distinctions protect readers from the most common errors. First, withdrawal is not denunciation with immediate effect and not a pardon: the one-year clock in Article 127(1), the survival of accrued obligations, and the continuation of pending files mean the Venezuela and Sahel exits change the Assembly’s politics, not the Court’s docket. Second, American sanctions are not international law: they bind American persons and those who choose to obey them, while French persons in France remain bound by French statute and European regulation to cooperate with the Court and to refuse to enforce the sanctions. Hungary’s return shows the door stays open in both directions. The states that left can come back by revoking their notifications before the year expires, and the Court they rejoin will be the same Court, with the same pending cases, plus one more year of work.

Conclusion

Five withdrawals in twelve months is a political earthquake, not a legal shutdown. The dates decide everything: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger notified in June 2026 and stay bound until mid-2027; Venezuela notified on 24 July 2026 and Chad on 27 July, so both remain States Parties for another year; Hungary already proved that a notification can be revoked and a seat kept, with the Court publicly welcoming the reversal on 1 June 2026. Under Article 127(2), the investigations opened before each exit, from the Sahel files to the Venezuela file that mirrors the Philippines precedent, continue with undiminished cooperation duties. In Paris, the cooperation title of the Code of criminal procedure keeps ordering the same acts through the same hands: the anti-terrorism prosecutor receives and executes, the investigation chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal rules on liberty, conservatory measures run for renewable two-year periods, and French limitation periods stay suspended while the international proceedings last. American sanctions add risk and cost for the people and organizations that work with the Court, but in France they meet the Blocking Statute and a domestic cooperation duty that no foreign pressure can repeal. The practical move, for states as for private actors, is the Hungarian one: revoke, return, and keep the files alive. Victims in Darfur, Tripoli, Caracas and Manila cannot afford a year of hesitation, and neither can the governments and counsel who claim to defend them.

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