On 8 September 2026, the International Criminal Court held a hearing on reparations in the case of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, the former Janjaweed leader known as Ali Kushayb, less than a year after his conviction for atrocities committed in Darfur, Sudan. The sequence is historic: on 6 October 2025, Trial Chamber I found Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman guilty of 27 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, in Darfur, Sudan, between August 2003 and April 2004, and on 9 December, Trial Chamber I sentenced Mr Abd-Al-Rahman to 20 years of imprisonment. The time spent in detention, from 9 June 2020 onwards, will be deducted from his sentence. It is the first ICC conviction for the Darfur situation, which the United Nations Security Council referred to the Court in 2005, and the reparations phase now opening will decide what thousands of victims can concretely obtain. For an international audience, and for anyone with a case touching France, the decisive questions are practical: what does an ICC reparations hearing actually award, who pays when the convicted person is indigent, and what would France examine before arresting, surrendering or compensating in a comparable file. This article answers those questions from the verified record of the case and from the French cooperation framework that would apply on French soil.
Three warnings structure everything that follows. First, neither the conviction nor the sentence is final: on 6 November 2025, the Defence of Mr Abd-Al-Rahman filed its notice of appeal against the judgment in the case, and both parties appealed the sentence in January 2026, so the Appeals Chamber still has the last word. Second, reparations at the ICC are a judicial award against the convicted person, implemented with the Trust Fund for Victims, not a state compensation fund and not an automatic payout to every victim of the Darfur conflict. Third, France has its own demanding procedure for ICC cooperation, written in articles 627 to 627-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which surrender to The Hague is ordered by judges, not by the government, and compensation passes through French enforcement courts. Readers who follow the Court closely may also want our analysis of the other ICC trial reaching its decisive phase this month, the Said verdict expected on 23 September 2026 in the Central African Republic situation, and our broader review of the wave of ICC withdrawals and what it changes for cooperation with France.
I. What the ICC Abd-Al-Rahman Conviction Decides for Darfur Victims
A. Why the 6 October 2025 Guilty Verdict and the 20-Year Sentence Matter
The Abd-Al-Rahman file is more than twenty years old, and that duration is part of its legal significance. Arrest warrants: 27 April 2007 and 11 June 2020: the first warrant was issued under the name Ali Kushayb when the suspect was described as an alleged leader of the Militia/Janjaweed at the time of the warrant, and he remained at large for thirteen years. The case moved only when the suspect gave himself up: Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman was transferred to the ICC’s custody on 9 June 2020, after surrendering himself voluntarily in the Central African Republic. The initial appearance of Mr Abd-Al-Rahman before the ICC took place on 15 June 2020. That voluntary surrender later became a sentencing argument, and its limited weight is itself a lesson for defence teams: giving yourself up helps, but it does not erase the gravity of the findings.
The charges as confirmed covered 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed between August 2003 and at least April 2004 in Darfur, with the confirmation hearing held from 24 to 26 May 2021. The trial in the case opened before Trial Chamber I on 5 April 2022. The scale of the trial explains why it lasted more than three years: 56 witnesses appeared for the prosecution, the common legal representatives of victims made an opening statement on 5 June 2023 and were authorised to call one witness and participating victims to present their views, the defence called 18 witnesses, and closing statements took place on 11 to 13 December 2024. When Trial Chamber I convicted on 27 of the 31 counts on 6 October 2025, it produced the first Darfur conviction in the Court’s history, An outcome widely reported as the ICC’s first judgment on crimes committed in Darfur, a region now suffering renewed horrors from the current war.
The sentencing judgment of 9 December 2025 deserves close reading because it shows how the Court calibrates punishment for mass atrocity. The Chamber imposed a sentence of 20 years of imprisonment. Pursuant to Article 78(2) of the Rome Statute, the period of Abd-Al-Rahman’s detention since June 9, 2020, was ordered to be deducted from the total sentence. The gap between the parties’ positions was wide: The Prosecution sought a joint sentence of life imprisonment, while the Defense requested a finite and proportionate term of imprisonment or a fine. The defence put forward numerous mitigating factors, including the convicted person’s age and health, family circumstances, lack of prior convictions, conduct in detention, voluntary surrender and alleged peace-promoting activities. The Chamber acknowledged his advanced age, 76 years, and his good conduct in detention, but it accorded these factors limited weight and found that they did not substantially diminish Ali Kushayb’s culpability. The factors that carried real weight were the gravity of the crimes, the degree of participation and intent, the harm suffered by victims, the abuse of authority and the multiplicity and vulnerability of victims. For practitioners, the message is clear: at the ICC, mitigation centred on the person of the accused rarely moves the sentence where the Chamber finds large-scale victimisation and abuse of a leadership position.
Two procedural consequences flow directly from the verdict and sentence. First, the appeals suspend finality: the defence appealed the conviction on 6 November 2025, and both sides appealed the sentence on 8 and 9 January 2026, with the Appeals Chamber to rule in due course. Victims, journalists and states should therefore describe Abd-Al-Rahman as convicted and sentenced but appealing, not as finally convicted. Second, the trial judgment unlocked the reparations phase: on 9 December 2025, Trial Chamber I issued an order for submissions on reparations, with the relevant timeline and guidance for this process in this case. That order set the track that led to the hearing of 8 September 2026, held under the practical arrangements published by the Court for victims, counsel and the press. Understanding what that hearing can and cannot produce is the next step.
B. What the 8 September 2026 Reparations Hearing Must Settle for Victims
The hearing of 8 September 2026 on reparations in the Abd-Al-Rahman case is not a retrial and not a sentencing review. It is the opening of the third act of an ICC case: after the verdict on guilt and the decision on punishment comes the decision on what the convicted person owes the victims. At the ICC, reparations are ordered against the convicted person and can take the form of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, implemented individually or collectively. The Chamber first settles the principles, the categories of harm recognised, the standard of proof for victim status and causation, and the modalities of implementation, often with the Trust Fund for Victims charged with designing and carrying out collective programmes. The 8 September hearing served that purpose: hearing the prosecution, the defence, the legal representatives of victims, the Registry and the Trust Fund for Victims on how reparations should be shaped in this file before the Chamber issues its reparations order.
Victims and their counsel should keep four technical points in mind, because each of them determines who receives what. First, only victims of the crimes of conviction qualify: the reparations order attaches to the 27 counts of conviction for crimes committed between August 2003 and April 2004, not to the Darfur conflict as a whole and not to the separate atrocities of the war that reignited in 2023. A person who suffered in Darfur at another time or in another place may be a victim in the human sense and still fall outside this reparations order. Second, each applicant must establish victim status and a causal link between the harm suffered and a crime of conviction, under the evidentiary standard the Chamber sets, which is lower than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt but still requires documentation, testimony or corroboration. Families of victims of the Counts of conviction, survivors of attacks, and persons who suffered sexual and gender-based violence within the convicted conduct all belong to the eligible population in principle, but each file must still be proved. Third, the Chamber chooses between individual awards, collective awards and a combination of both. In mass-victim cases reaching thousands of eligible persons, the Court has favoured collective rehabilitation programmes, schools, clinics, memorialisation, livelihood support, combined with individual compensation where identification is feasible. The Darfur file, with victims dispersed across Sudan and refugee camps in Chad, points toward a strong collective component for practical reasons of reach and security. Fourth, the convicted person’s indigence does not end the process: where the convicted person has no seizable assets, the Trust Fund for Victims can complement the award with its own resources for collective measures, while the legal liability remains recorded against him, including for future assets.
The pending appeals add a layer of complexity that victims’ lawyers must explain honestly. An appeal against the conviction, if successful in whole or in part, can remove counts from the reparations base; an appeal against the sentence does not directly affect reparations, but the Appeals Chamber’s timetable governs when the reparations order becomes enforceable in full. The Chamber may nevertheless advance the reparations design work, as it did with the December 2025 submissions order and the September 2026 hearing, so that implementation can move quickly once the appeals are decided. For victims, the practical advice is therefore to file and document now rather than wait for the appeal outcome: applications lodged early enter the mapping of eligible victims, while late applications risk missing the evidentiary windows the Chamber sets. Associations assisting Darfuri refugees should collect identity documents, proof of presence at the relevant places between August 2003 and April 2004, medical and psychosocial records, and witness contacts, and should channel them through counsel authorised before the Court rather than through informal lists that the Registry cannot process.
For states and for France in particular, the reparations phase triggers concrete cooperation duties that are often overlooked. Identifying, tracing, freezing and seizing assets of the convicted person for the benefit of victims requires national enforcement measures, and France is one of the jurisdictions whose courts can execute ICC fines and forfeiture decisions, as Part II explains. Non-governmental organisations holding funds or documentation relevant to victim identification may also be asked to cooperate, and banks served with ICC-related freezing requests must understand that an ICC reparations order implemented through French courts has the same enforceability as a domestic judgment once the French enforcement judge has authorised it. The 8 September hearing is therefore not only a moment of justice for Darfuri victims; it is the starting signal for the asset-tracing work that will decide whether the future reparations order is a paper victory or money and programmes that actually reach the victims.
II. How France Would Handle an ICC Arrest, Surrender and Compensation Case
A. Can France Arrest and Surrender a Suspect to the ICC?
The short answer is yes, and the procedure is entirely judicial, which distinguishes ICC surrender sharply from classic extradition. The French framework opens with a principle of full cooperation: Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. The same provision defines the personal scope: Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre. Anyone present on French territory and sought by the ICC for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes therefore falls within a dedicated surrender track before the Paris courts, with no government decree and no ministerial discretion of the kind that governs extradition to third states. Readers familiar with French extradition practice will recognise the contrast with the classic decree procedure, which we have analysed separately for persons facing a signed extradition decree and its challenge before the Council of State.
When the ICC issues an arrest and surrender request, the request travels through a short, centralised chain. Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut, and the French authorities, after verifying formal regularity, transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal while executing them across the whole territory of the Republic: the provision states that they act after checking formal regularity and then put the request into execution throughout the national territory, expressly les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République. In urgent cases the request can be sent directly and by any means. Once arrested, the person is brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent public prosecutor: Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent. Within that deadline the custody safeguards of articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply, and after verifying identity the prosecutor informs the person, in a language she understands, that an ICC arrest request has been issued against her.
The decision on surrender belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, ruling within fifteen days of the person’s appearance, with a deliberately narrow review. Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. The phrase error evidente, manifest error, is the whole of the defence battleground at this stage: the chamber does not retry the ICC case, does not assess guilt and does not second-guess The Hague on the evidence. Defence counsel must therefore concentrate on identity errors, on a warrant that manifestly does not concern the person arrested, on procedural defects in the transmission, and on questions of competing French prosecution, since any other question raised before the chamber is referred to the ICC itself for appropriate action. A further appeal lies to the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation, and counsel should prepare it from the first hearing because the fifteen-day rhythm leaves no time for improvisation.
Two refinements matter for real files. First, surrender to the ICC is available even where France is itself prosecuting or has convicted the person for different charges: Les dispositions des articles 627-4 à 627-10 sont également applicables si la personne réclamée est poursuivie ou condamnée en France pour d’autres chefs que ceux visés par la demande de la Cour pénale internationale. In that configuration, however, release pending surrender is restricted and the French proceedings suspend the ordinary limitation periods, so a client already facing French charges cannot use the ICC request as a lever for release. Second, mutual legal assistance to the Court runs on its own fast track: Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Les demandes d’entraide sont exécutées, selon les cas, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste ou par le juge d’instruction de Paris, acting across the entire national territory, if necessary in the presence of the ICC prosecutor or the persons named in the request. Searches, seizures, witness examinations and asset-tracing measures requested by The Hague are therefore executed in France by the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s office or a Paris investigating judge, and the resulting reports are transmitted to the Court by the French authorities. For a Darfur-type file with assets, witnesses or documents in France, this is the channel through which the ICC would act.
B. How French Courts Punish Darfur-Type Crimes and Enforce Victims’ Compensation
France does not only surrender suspects to The Hague; it can also prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes itself, under definitions deliberately aligned with the Rome Statute. The starting point is genocide: French law provides that the crime is committed en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, through killing, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to destructive conditions of existence, measures to prevent births or forcible transfer of children, and Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité. Alongside it, the Code punishes other crimes against humanity: Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique, followed by a list running from wilful killing and extermination to torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance and apartheid-type acts. Conviction carries more than imprisonment: Les personnes physiques coupables des infractions prévues par le présent sous-titre encourent également les peines suivantes, including loss of civic rights for up to fifteen years, professional disqualification, residence bans and confiscation of property. A Darfur-type pattern of village attacks against a civilian population, as established in the Abd-Al-Rahman conviction, fits these French definitions without strain, which is precisely why double criminality would never be an obstacle in a Franco-ICC file.
French courts can hear such cases even for acts committed abroad, under a universal-jurisdiction provision built for Rome Statute crimes. The Code of Criminal Procedure states that, apart from cases already covered by the ICC cooperation title, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes, namely genocide, other crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Penal Code. The gateway condition is territorial anchoring: La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, with habitual residence assessed through a sufficient connecting link, including the current or foreseeable duration of presence. In practice the Paris specialised war-crimes unit applies additional subsidiarity filters developed in the case law, giving priority to the ICC or to the courts of the territorial state where they are genuinely acting, but the existence of an ICC conviction such as Abd-Al-Rahman’s does not prevent French proceedings for distinct French charges, and it strongly supports any French investigation into the French-based ramifications of the same criminal network, financing, logistics, travel or assets.
For victims, the French enforcement machinery is the bridge between a Hague reparations order and money actually recovered. Two provisions do the heavy lifting. First, protective measures: L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans., renewable at the ICC’s request before expiry. In plain terms, when The Hague asks France to freeze accounts, seize property or preserve assets, the anti-terrorism prosecutor orders it under French procedural forms, at Treasury-advanced cost, for up to two years at a time. Victims’ counsel in a Darfur-type file should therefore press early for ICC protective requests targeting any assets traceable to France, before dissipation. Second, the execution of ICC fines and forfeiture: once the Paris criminal court authorises enforcement, L’autorisation d’exécution rendue par le tribunal correctionnel en vertu de l’article précédent entraîne, selon la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, transfert du produit des amendes et des biens confisqués ou du produit de leur vente à la cour ou au fonds en faveur des victimes. The proceeds of fines and confiscated property, or of their sale, are transferred to the Court or to the fund for victims, and they can also be attributed directly to victims where the Court has so decided and designated them. This is the legal pipeline through which an Abd-Al-Rahman-type reparations order, backed by French-seized assets, would flow to the Trust Fund for Victims and onward to Darfuri survivors.
Victims present in France have a parallel domestic route that should not be neglected while the ICC reparations phase runs its course. A victim of crimes against humanity with a French connecting factor can file a criminal complaint with constitution de partie civile before the Paris investigating judge, triggering a French investigation and preserving a domestic compensation claim independent of the Hague timetable. French civil-party status gives access to the file, the right to request investigative acts and, at trial, a damages award enforceable against seized assets in France. The two tracks are complementary rather than exclusive: the ICC order addresses the convicted person’s liability for the counts of conviction, while a French action can capture distinct French-based defendants, accomplices or assets, and can move faster for urgent protective measures. Counsel handling a Darfur-linked file from Paris should therefore run both clocks at once, mapping ICC deadlines from the December 2025 submissions order and the September 2026 hearing while opening and feeding the French file without delay.
Conclusion
The 8 September 2026 reparations hearing closes a twenty-year arc that began with the Darfur referral and the 2007 arrest warrant, passed through a voluntary surrender in the Central African Republic in June 2020, a three-year trial with more than seventy witnesses, a guilty verdict on 27 counts on 6 October 2025 and a 20-year sentence on 9 December 2025, and now enters the phase that matters most to survivors: turning criminal responsibility into repair. The hearing will not write cheques on the spot; it will fix the principles, the eligible harms, the proof required and the balance between individual awards and collective programmes, with the Trust Fund for Victims as implementer and the pending appeals as the outstanding condition on finality. For victims, the instruction is to document and file now. For states, it is to prepare the asset-tracing cooperation that makes reparations real. For France, the file is a demonstration case for a cooperation framework that works: judicial surrender without executive interference, Paris judges executing ICC investigative requests, anti-terrorism prosecutors freezing assets at Treasury cost, and criminal courts transferring confiscated proceeds to the victims’ fund. Darfur’s survivors waited two decades for a conviction; the reparations order must not take another twenty years to reach them, and every jurisdiction holding evidence, witnesses or assets, France included, now has a defined part to play.