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Moscow Ordered Euroclear to Pay EUR 200 Billion and Euroclear Sued Back in Brussels: Which Judgment France Would Enforce

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Moscow Ordered Euroclear to Pay EUR 200 Billion and Euroclear Sued Back in Brussels: Which Judgment France Would Enforce

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Two courts on opposite sides of a sanctions wall have now ordered opposite things about the same pile of money, and the collision point runs straight through France. In Moscow, an arbitration court ordered the Belgian clearer Euroclear to pay the Bank of Russia the equivalent of about 200 billion euros in damages for immobilising Russian sovereign reserves, and on 16 July 2026 a Moscow court rejected Euroclear’s appeal against that ruling. In Brussels, Euroclear counter-attacked: at the end of June 2026 it sued the Bank of Russia before the Brussels commercial court to block enforcement of the Moscow judgment, with a preliminary hearing held on 25 June and further proceedings expected. The facts come from the wires themselves. Reuters reported on 16 July 2026 that a Moscow court had rejected Euroclear’s appeal against the damages ruling, echoing state agency RIA, with the award expressed as 18.2 trillion roubles, about 233 billion dollars. Euroclear’s own words, published on 18 May 2026, leave no doubt about its position: it acknowledged the Moscow judgment in favour of the Bank of Russia while calling the claim meritless And: such claims go unrecognised under EU law and jurisdiction is denied For readers in France, the question is brutally practical. Euroclear operates Euroclear France, French banks and custodians apply the same EU freeze every day, and any enforcement attempt against frozen Russian assets held in Paris would land before a French enforcement judge. This analysis explains what Moscow actually decided, what Brussels is asked to block, and which of the two judgments a French court would enforce, from the texts themselves: the Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings, the Court of Cassation’s immunity case law and the rules of exequatur.

I. Why Moscow’s 200 Billion Euro Judgment Against Euroclear Cannot Simply Cross the EU Border

The starting point is scale. Reuters estimates roughly 300 billion euros frozen abroad in 2022, about two-thirds of it in Europe and mostly at Euroclear. The Kyiv Independent, reporting Euroclear’s Brussels countersuit on 1 July 2026, gives compatible figures: around 260 billion euros frozen in total, with roughly 193 billion of that held by Euroclear in Belgium. The Associated Press, in its September 2026 coverage of the European Union’s decision to freeze the assets indefinitely so that Hungary and Slovakia cannot veto their use for Ukraine, reports a total of 210 billion euros frozen in Europe, with around 193 billion of that sitting at Euroclear, described as a Belgian financial clearing house, at the end of September. The numbers move with exchange rates and valuation dates, but the structure never changes: one Belgian clearer holds the overwhelming majority of the immobilised Russian reserves, which is why Moscow sued the clearer rather than a state.

A. What the Moscow Arbitration Court Decided and Why Euroclear Rejects Its Jurisdiction

The Moscow track began in December 2025, when the Bank of Russia lodged its claim before the Moscow Arbitration Court, at the very moment EU leaders were debating whether to seize part of the frozen assets to finance Ukraine. Brussels ultimately chose a different path: a 90 billion euro loan to Kyiv funded by EU borrowing, with the Russian assets kept frozen until Moscow pays war reparations to Ukraine, a condition Russia says it will never accept. In May 2026 the Moscow court sided with the central bank and ordered Euroclear to pay damages then estimated at around 249 billion dollars, later expressed as 18.2 trillion roubles, roughly 233 billion dollars or 200 billion euros including compensation for lost returns. The July appeal changed nothing: The July appeal left the May ruling against the Belgium-based clearing house intact, Reuters wrote on 16 July 2026. Behind closed doors in January 2026, a preliminary hearing had already set the tone: secrecy, no adversarial debate visible from outside, and a respondent that denies the court’s authority over it.

Euroclear’s jurisdictional objection is stated in plain terms on its own website: such claims go unrecognised under EU law, jurisdiction is denied, and an appeal was announced Reuters summarises the substantive defence in one sentence: Euroclear defends itself on two grounds: compliance with EU freezing law and rejection of Russian jurisdiction Both points matter for what follows in France. Compliance with directly applicable EU regulations is a complete defence on the merits inside the Union, and the absence of any contractual submission to Russian courts means the Moscow judgment is, in EU eyes, a decision by a court without jurisdiction over a Belgian defendant for acts performed under EU law in Belgium. Moscow’s own framing, as reported by Courthouse News, confirms the political dimension: the Bank of Russia claims the freeze breaches access to justice, property rights and the sovereign immunity of states and central banks, and it attacks the EU’s indefinite immobilisation, adopted by majority vote, as unlawful. The European Commission’s spokesman Balazs Ujvari answered that the Union is full confidence in the freeze’s legality under EU law. Two legal orders, two certainties, zero common judge.

The enforcement horizon that Moscow sketches is deliberately extraterritorial. Reuters notes the decision is partly symbolic given the absence of Russian jurisdiction inside the Union, while Moscow could pursue Euroclear assets in friendlier countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates or Kazakhstan. Euroclear itself says it faces more than one hundred claims in Russia, according to Courthouse News, and Russian private investors caught in the freeze reportedly hope to join the central bank’s case. A bipartisan group of United States senators added a transatlantic layer on 18 June 2026 by introducing legislation to let frozen Russian assets under American control buy military equipment for Ukraine. Every one of these moves raises the temperature, but none of them creates an enforcement title inside France. A Moscow judgment needs a French exequatur to bite in Paris, and a seizure of Euroclear assets in a third country needs that country’s courts. The Brussels countersuit exists precisely to make sure the Moscow paper never becomes enforceable where Euroclear actually holds value.

B. What Euroclear’s Brussels Countersuit Asks a Belgian Court to Block

Euroclear’s response was to sue at home. As the Kyiv Independent reported on 1 July 2026, the Belgian clearer had sued the Bank of Russia in the Brussels commercial court over the Moscow damages ruling of about 200 billion euros. The pleading, as relayed by the press, combines three thrusts: no jurisdiction for the Russian court, proceedings held behind closed doors and characterised as unfair, and Belgium as the proper forum. The timetable is already running: A preliminary hearing in the Belgian case took place on 25 June, with further proceedings expected. Reuters confirms the object of the action: blocking enforcement of the Russian ruling against the clearer. In procedural terms, this is a defensive declaratory and injunctive strategy: obtain from the natural judge of the defendant-clearer a ruling that the Moscow judgment cannot be enforced against it, so that any enforcement judge elsewhere sees a conflicting decision from the courts of the place where the assets sit.

Inside the European Union, Euroclear starts with powerful tailwinds. First, EU sanctions regulations apply directly in every Member State, and a clearer that immobilises listed reserves is performing a legal duty, not committing a wrong; the Court of Justice confirmed the breadth of that duty as recently as 12 March 2026, when it held that governance rights attached to frozen instruments, such as attending and voting at meetings, count as a use of frozen funds. Second, since April 2024, Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on criminal penalties for sanctions violations requires Member States to criminalise intentional breaches of asset-freezing obligations, which makes any Belgian court order facilitating payment to Moscow extraordinarily unlikely. Third, the funds at Euroclear Bank remain, in Euroclear’s words, «immobilised, in line with the international sanctions», so there is nothing to seize in Brussels even if a foreign title were recognised. The deeper question is what happens outside Belgium: in Paris, where Euroclear France settles French securities daily, and where Russian claimants could theoretically present the Moscow judgment for exequatur or attempt a seizure. That is where French procedure takes over, and French procedure is unforgiving toward foreign judgments rendered without jurisdiction and without due process.

September 2026 raised the stakes on both sides. The Associated Press headline captures the Union’s move: the Union’s indefinite freeze designed to stop Hungary and Slovakia vetoing the use of the assets for Ukraine An indefinite freeze adopted to neutralise future vetoes hardens Moscow’s narrative of confiscation and multiplies the damages arithmetic in Russian courts, while in the Union it hardens the opposite narrative: the assets stay put until reparations are paid. Between these two positions sits every bank, custodian and enforcement judge in France, bound by EU law on one side and potentially faced with Russian enforcement titles on the other. The rest of this analysis shows how a French judge would resolve that conflict, step by step.

II. What France Would Enforce If the Enforcement Battle Reaches Paris

France is not a neutral spectator in this dispute. French banks, insurers and custodians are among the institutions bound to apply EU freezes «sans délai» and to report to the Minister for the Economy, and Euroclear France is a central securities depository embedded in the French market. If the Bank of Russia, or any holder of the Moscow judgment, tried to enforce it in France, or if a creditor tried to seize Russian sovereign assets held in Paris, the case would go before the enforcement judge of the Paris judicial court. French law answers both scenarios with unusual clarity: a closed-door foreign judgment against a party that never accepted the court’s jurisdiction has almost no path to exequatur, and sovereign reserves used for public, non-commercial purposes cannot be seized without an express and special waiver. The four authorities below, all verifiable in full on the official legal databases, draw the map.

A. Could the Moscow Judgment Obtain Exequatur in France

The gateway rule has not changed since 2005. Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: «Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.» Exequatur is therefore never automatic; it is granted only where the law allows, after judicial review. The Court of Cassation restated the review on 11 December 2024 (Cass., 1st civ., 11 Dec. 2024, No. 23-15.672): «Pour accorder l’exequatur, le juge français doit, en l’absence de toute convention internationale, s’assurer que trois conditions sont remplies, à savoir la compétence indirecte du juge étranger, fondée sur le rattachement du litige au juge saisi, la conformité à l’ordre public international de fond et de procédure ainsi que l’absence de fraude. Il lui est interdit de réviser au fond le jugement.» Three conditions, no revision on the merits: indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court based on a genuine link between the dispute and that court, compliance with international public policy in substance and procedure, and absence of fraud.

Applied to the Moscow judgment against Euroclear, each condition poses a near-fatal problem. Indirect jurisdiction requires a real connecting factor between the dispute and the Russian courts: here the defendant is Belgian, the frozen assets sit in Belgium, and the conduct complained of, immobilising reserves, was performed in Belgium under directly applicable EU law. Euroclear’s consistent position, its rejection of Russian jurisdiction, would be the starting point of any French analysis, and the Brussels commercial court, already seized since June 2026, embodies the competing natural forum. Procedural international public policy is the second wall. French courts treat the rights of the defence, adversarial proceedings and reasoned decisions as core components of procedural public policy; a judgment rendered behind closed doors, described by the defendant as «unfair and fictitious», invites exactly the scrutiny the Court of Cassation demands. The 11 December 2024 ruling (same ruling) recalls the standard in sharp terms: «Est contraire à la conception française de l’ordre public international la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère non motivée lorsque ne sont pas produits des documents de nature à servir d’équivalent à la motivation défaillante. Il incombe au demandeur de produire ces documents.» A claimant relying on a secretive Moscow file would carry that burden before the Paris judge.

Substantive international public policy is the third wall, and in France it is partly made of EU law itself. Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code lays down the domestic enforcement chain: «Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie» all persons operating on national territory, including banks and their foreign branches. The defined terms are deliberately wide: Article L. 562-1 of the same Code defines «Fonds» as «les actifs financiers et les avantages économiques de toute nature», from cash and deposits to securities and claims. A French judge asked to declare enforceable a judgment ordering a clearer to pay 200 billion euros to the Bank of Russia for having obeyed an EU freeze would therefore be asked to give executory force, in France, to a decision whose very premise is that compliance with EU and French freezing duties was unlawful. That collides head-on with international public policy as understood in Paris, where directly applicable EU restrictive measures function as overriding mandatory rules. Fraud, the third condition, would complete the picture if the judgment appeared designed to circumvent EU sanctions rather than to resolve a genuine private dispute.

Timing does not save the Moscow title either. French exequatur litigation moves slowly, and the Court of Cassation keeps hearing these cases years after the foreign decision: on 26 November 2025 it ruled (Cass., 1st civ., 26 Nov. 2025, No. 23-21.764) on an exequatur action brought in 2020 for a Casablanca commercial appeal court decision of 21 January 2010, confirmed by Versailles on 12 September 2023. The lesson for Moscow is symmetrical: even a hypothetical exequatur application filed in Paris today would face years of review, during which the Brussels court’s rulings, the General Court’s sanctions case law and the EU’s indefinite freeze would all accumulate against recognition. And none of this reaches the deeper shield, which protects Russian sovereign assets in France regardless of who holds a judgment: immunity from execution.

B. What Immunity From Execution Still Protects When Creditors Chase Sovereign Assets in Paris

Since the Sapin II Act of 9 December 2016, France has one of the clearest statutory regimes in Europe for state immunity from execution, codified at Articles L. 111-1-2 and L. 111-1-3 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings. The first text sets the general lock: «Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie : 1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure ; 2° L’Etat concerné a réservé ou affecté ce bien à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de la procédure ; 3° Lorsqu’un jugement ou une sentence arbitrale a été rendu contre l’Etat concerné et que le bien en question est spécifiquement utilisé ou destiné à être utilisé par ledit Etat autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales et entretient un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée.» The second text builds a fortress inside the fortress for diplomatic property: «Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.» Express consent opens the general gate; only an express and special waiver opens the diplomatic gate.

The Court of Cassation gave these texts their full force in the long-running battle between the Republic of Congo and Commisimpex. On 10 January 2018 (Cass., 1st civ., 10 Jan. 2018, No. 16-22.494), the Court recalled that «la loi n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 a introduit, dans le code des procédures civiles d’exécution, deux nouvelles dispositions», that diplomatic accounts «utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique de l’Etat ou de ses postes consulaires» count as assets used for non-commercial public purposes, and that only «une renonciation expresse et spéciale» permits enforcement against them. A general contractual waiver of «toute immunité de juridiction et d’exécution», signed in 1993, was not enough for the diplomatic accounts seized at Société Générale in Paris. Result: «ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt rendu le 30 juin 2016, entre les parties, par la cour d’appel de Paris ; DIT n’y avoir lieu à renvoi», with the Nanterre judgment confirmed. The message for enforcement strategists is blunt: waivers are read narrowly, category by category, and the diplomatic category requires words that name it.

Six years later the Court drew the other half of the line. On 13 March 2024 (Cass., 1st civ., 13 Mar. 2024, No. 21-17.599), again Congo against Commisimpex, this time over an aircraft assigned to the presidency, the Court held: «Selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale.» But it immediately fenced that holding: «Il en résulte que doivent être interprétées strictement les dispositions de l’article L. 111-1-3 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution», protecting diplomatic assets. Because the seized aircraft was not among the resources made available to the diplomatic mission in France (same ruling), the Court approved enforcement on the basis of the express waiver alone, carefully distinguishing «les fonctions d’une mission diplomatique» from «l’activité diplomatique exercée par un chef d’Etat». The two Congo rulings together form a complete grammar: express waiver suffices for ordinary state assets, express and special waiver is mandatory for diplomatic assets, and the judge classifies the asset first.

Apply that grammar to Russian sovereign reserves immobilised in France, and the answer writes itself. Central-bank reserves held by a clearer are the textbook example of assets used for sovereign, non-commercial public purposes: monetary reserves are not commercial stock, and the EU regulation itself treats them as sovereign assets whose transfer is prohibited. No Russian express consent to enforcement exists; on the contrary, Moscow’s entire litigation posture denies the legality of any transfer. No asset has been earmarked for the claimants. And the third gateway, a French-recognised judgment or award against Russia over non-commercial assets, does not exist: the Moscow judgment has no exequatur, and could not obtain one for the reasons developed above. The mirror scenario, Russia enforcing its Moscow judgment against Euroclear assets in France, fails at the same three gates plus the EU freeze itself, which Article L. 562-4 obliges every French operator to apply «sans délai». Readers who want the companion perspective, the validity of the EU freeze itself before the Luxembourg courts, will find it in our analysis of the Russian central bank’s annulment action before the General Court; those facing a personal listing will find the delisting playbook in the CJEU’s September 2026 sanctions rulings and the French procedure in our guide to challenging asset freezes in France.

Conclusion

The Euroclear war now has two fronts and no common judge. In Moscow, a judgment ordering roughly 200 billion euros in damages, confirmed on appeal on 16 July 2026, with enforcement threats pointed at friendly third countries. In Brussels, a countersuit filed at the end of June 2026 asking the Belgian commercial court to declare that judgment unenforceable, with proceedings running since the 25 June preliminary hearing. In Luxembourg, a separate annulment action attacking the EU freeze at its source. And since September 2026, a Union that froze the assets indefinitely precisely so that no single veto can release them. For France, the practical conclusions are firm. First, the Moscow judgment has no realistic path to exequatur in Paris: indirect jurisdiction is missing, closed-door proceedings offend procedural public policy, and a decision punishing compliance with EU freezes offends substantive public policy. Second, Russian sovereign reserves held in France remain protected by immunity from execution under Articles L. 111-1-2 and L. 111-1-3 as interpreted by the Court of Cassation in 2018 and 2024, absent an express and where needed special waiver that does not exist. Third, French banks and custodians must keep applying the freeze «sans délai» and reporting to the authorities; a Moscow judgment changes nothing in their duties and creates no lawful ground to release a euro. The enforcement battle will therefore be fought where the assets sit, under EU law, not where the paper was signed. Holders of frozen assets should audit which forum can actually help them: delisting actions in Luxembourg within the strict time limits, derogation requests in Paris, treaty protection where available. Relying on a Moscow enforcement title inside the Union is, on the current state of French procedure, a dead end with costs attached.

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