On 9 September 2026, the EU General Court in Luxembourg dismissed yet another attempt by Russian businessman Roman Abramovich to escape European Union sanctions. Five days later, on 14 September, EU ambassadors in Brussels admitted they could not agree on the routine six-month renewal of the bloc’s individual Russia listings and pushed the expiry back by seven days, to midnight on Tuesday 22 September. The two events belong to the same story: a sanctions regime covering thousands of names that must be renewed by unanimity every six months, and a court that keeps telling listed oligarchs that relisting is lawful even as member states quarrel over individual files. France sits at the centre of the current quarrel, having joined Slovakia in asking for fellow billionaire Alisher Usmanov to be removed from the list on national security grounds, according to EU diplomats quoted by Reuters. For anyone with frozen bank accounts, a villa on the French Riviera or business interests touching France, the week of 9 to 16 September 2026 therefore matters twice over. It confirms how hard it is to win an annulment action in Luxembourg, and it opens a narrow window in which listings, delistings and asset freezes can move. This analysis explains what the judges decided, why rights-based arguments keep failing, and what a listed person or their family can concretely do in France while the Council negotiates.
I. Why did the EU General Court keep Roman Abramovich on the sanctions list?
A. What did the General Court decide on 9 September 2026 in Abramovich v Council?
According to EU Today’s report of 9 September 2026, the General Court dismissed another attempt by Roman Abramovich to overturn the sanctions imposed on him after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The judgment was delivered in case T-358/25, Abramovich v Council, and it concerned the Council decision adopted on 14 March 2025 which extended the restrictive measures against him as part of the EU regime targeting people considered responsible for, associated with or benefiting from actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The court dismissed his attempt to have annulled the EU measures keeping his name on the sanctions list.
The measures themselves are severe and automatic in effect. Listed individuals face an asset freeze and restrictions on entering or transiting through EU territory, while EU citizens and companies are prohibited from making funds or other economic resources available to them. Abramovich had asked the court not only to annul the March 2025 measures as they applied to him and to declare parts of the underlying sanctions framework unlawful, but also to award him money: He had also claimed 1 million euros in provisional compensation for alleged non-material harm. His arguments, the report notes, his pleas covered alleged errors in the Council’s assessment, breaches of proportionality and fundamental rights, and objections to the criteria used for leading Russian business figures. The court rejected the action in its entirety.
This was not his first defeat, and that history is part of the legal lesson. Abramovich has been subject to EU restrictive measures since March 2022, when the Council added him to the sanctions list on 15 March 2022, less than three weeks after the full-scale invasion, describing him as a prominent businessman in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian government, at a time when he was the majority shareholder in the parent company of Evraz, a major steel and mining group, under the legal act imposing the measures. in December 2023 the General Court dismissed his first action against the sanctions in case T-313/22, rejecting pleas based on property rights, the freedom to conduct a business, private life and rights linked to his Portuguese citizenship, and holding that the Council had not erred in applying the listing criteria and that the restrictions were proportionate to the EU’s objectives. A second case ended the same way on 10 September 2025, when in case T-1105/23 the General Court upheld the subsequent decisions maintaining him on the list. The 9 September 2026 ruling in T-358/25 is therefore the third judicial confirmation that his listing and relisting rest on a lawful basis.
Crucially, the judgment does not close the file. In March 2026, the Council extended its individual Russia-related sanctions for another six months, until 15 September 2026, with the measures then covering about 2,600 individuals and entities. Abramovich filed a new action against that extension on 26 May, and that case, T-337/26, remains pending before the General Court. Each six-month renewal is a separate legal act, so each renewal can be challenged separately, within the strict two-month time limit for annulment actions. The practical message for listed persons is double-edged: losing three times does not prove the fourth renewal is unassailable, but it shows the exacting standard the court applies, which any new application must be built to meet.
The political background makes that standard even more relevant this month. As Reuters reported on 14 September 2026, EU envoys pushed back the expiry of the individual Russia listings by seven days, to 22 September, after failing to agree on a six-month renewal of designations covering nearly 3,000 companies and individuals subject to asset freezes and travel bans, which had been due to lapse on 15 September. At issue, the agency explained, is whether to remove Russian-Uzbek billionaire Alisher Usmanov from the list, with France joining Slovakia in seeking his delisting on national security grounds; a French diplomatic source told Reuters that France remains among the countries most committed to pressuring the Russian war machine and supporting Ukraine, but faces a specific national security issue on the Usmanov file and wishes to respond positively to international partners that approached it. Because EU sanctions require unanimous approval by all 27 member states and must be renewed every six months, one government’s objection can force this kind of last-minute rollover, with Coreper agreeing to extend the regime for 7 days, until midnight on Tuesday 22 September, to give member states more time to examine the renewal proposals.
For readers in France, the connection between the courtroom and the negotiating room is direct. The same week that judges confirmed the Council enjoys wide latitude to keep a name on the list, diplomats confirmed that names can still come off the list through the political channel when a member state insists. Litigation in Luxembourg and negotiation in Brussels are two parallel tracks, and a serious defence strategy uses both: challenge the evidence and reasoning before the court, while documenting delisting arguments that a government can carry into the Council. Our companion coverage of the renewal crisis and the Usmanov file, EU Russia sanctions expiry and the Usmanov delisting question in France, and of the wider restrictive-measures landscape, EU 21st sanctions package and Russian court decisions in France, set out that political track in detail.
B. Why do proportionality and fundamental rights arguments keep failing against EU sanctions?
The Abramovich rulings look puzzling to non-specialists: how can freezing all of a person’s EU assets, banning his travel and cutting him off from any EU economic partner be called proportionate? The answer lies in the method EU courts use to review sanctions, a method built over two decades from cases such as Kadi and Al Barakaat, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, judgment of 3 September 2008, in which the Court of Justice held that even UN-mandated sanctions must respect EU fundamental rights, while accepting that the Council enjoys broad discretion in defining the political objectives. Since Kadi, the case law has settled into a stable three-step test that explains the Abramovich defeats: the court verifies that the listing criterion exists in the legal act and covers the applicant’s situation, that the statement of reasons identifies specific facts rather than slogans, and that the evidence, even if partly confidential, supports those facts without manifest error. Proportionality is then assessed against the objective, which is to exert maximum pressure on Russia to end the aggression, not to punish one individual according to his personal guilt.
Applied to Abramovich, that test produced the same result three times. The criterion for leading businesspersons operating in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian government plainly covered the former Evraz-linked shareholder described in the 2022 listing. The Council supplied reasons tied to his economic role rather than to personal participation in military decisions, which the legal framework does not require. And the restrictions, however painful, were judged to serve a legitimate objective of fundamental public interest, to be limited in the sense that they freeze rather than confiscate assets, to be reviewed every six months, and to be accompanied by the possibility of authorisations for basic needs and legal fees. Property rights, the freedom to conduct a business, private life and even EU citizenship derived from Portuguese nationality were all weighed and all set aside in favour of the Union’s foreign policy objective. The 1 million euro damages claim failed with the annulment claim, because EU non-contractual liability requires an unlawful act, and none was found.
French courts reason in the same direction when they handle the domestic side of EU sanctions, which is why the Luxembourg rulings predict outcomes in Paris. In Conseil d’Etat, 9th and 10th chambers combined, 7 April 2023, No. 465879, three property companies owning prestigious addresses, including in Saint-Tropez, asked the court “d’annuler pour excès de pouvoir le décret n° 2022-815 du 16 mai 2022 relatif à la publication de la liste des personnes morales propriétaires des biens immobiliers faisant l’objet des mesures de gel prises en application du règlement UE n° 269/2014 du Conseil du 17 mars 2014”, the EU regulation at the heart of the individual listings regime, adopted alongside Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014. The Conseil d’Etat noted that the decree merely organised publication of the list and did not itself designate anyone, held the pleas inoperative, and closed with the formula: “Article 1er : La requête de la société 33 rue de l’Université et autres est rejetée.” Deference to the EU measure, review limited to the national implementing act, rejection on the merits: the same architecture as in Luxembourg.
The most recent French rulings confirm the trend and extend it beyond villas. On 24 February 2026, in Conseil d’Etat, 9th and 10th chambers combined, 24 February 2026, No. 505079, the court dealt with companies including VH Antibes that had sought emergency suspension of their addition to the Treasury lists of frozen entities and frozen properties. The outcome illustrates how demanding interim relief is: “Article 1er : L’ordonnance n° 2512286 de la juge des référés du tribunal administratif de Paris du 27 mai 2025 est annulée.” yet “Article 2 : La demande présentée par la société CDA Investment et autres au tribunal administratif de Paris sous le n° 2512286 est rejetée.” The lower court’s order was quashed and the suspension refused anyway. Then, on 15 July 2026, in Conseil d’Etat, 5th and 6th chambers combined, 15 July 2026, No. 509579, the court rejected Cloudflare’s challenge to an Arcom order blocking online services that disseminated content from persons targeted by Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 and Regulation (EU) 269/2014 of 17 March 2014: “Article 1er : La requête de la société Cloudflare est rejetée.” Sanctions, property freezes, media bans: before the French supreme administrative court, as before the General Court, the measures survive unless the applicant demonstrates a precise illegality, not merely hardship.
The lesson of this first part is therefore a hard one, but a useful one. Rights-based rhetoric does not win sanctions cases; evidence-based attacks on the statement of reasons sometimes do. The Council must show, with documents, why this person meets the criterion at the date of each renewal, and the applicant must show the file is empty, outdated or copied from press cuttings without verification. Usmanov’s lawyers have made exactly that press-sources argument part of their European litigation, as Reuters noted when reporting that in some of his lawsuits, his lawyers challenged press statements relied upon as grounds for the sanctions. Whether that line succeeds in the pending cases will be one of the stories to watch after 22 September. For now, T-358/25 stands as the authoritative reminder that the court will not substitute its own foreign policy for the Council’s.
II. How can a listed person still fight an EU listing and protect assets held in France?
A. How does an annulment action before the General Court work after T-358/25?
An action for annulment is brought under Articles 263 and 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union against each Council act that maintains the listing, within two months of its publication in the Official Journal, extended by the standard distance period. The applicant receives the statement of reasons, requests access to the file, and pleads illegality: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties, or misuse of powers. In sanctions practice, the decisive pleas are the duty to state reasons, the rights of the defence and effective judicial protection, manifest error of assessment, and proportionality. Interim measures suspending the listing pending judgment are theoretically available but almost never granted in sanctions matters, because the court considers that the balance of interests favours maintaining pressure and that frozen funds are preserved rather than lost. Damages claims, like Abramovich’s 1 million euro demand, are routinely attached but succeed only if unlawfulness is first established, which explains their systematic rejection alongside the annulment claim.
T-358/25 refines the litigation checklist rather than closing the door. First, attack the renewal, not the original 2022 listing alone: the Council must justify the maintenance at each six-month review with current material, and a file frozen in time since 2022 is vulnerable. Second, demand the evidence behind each factual assertion and test whether media articles were verified or simply pasted into the file; the Usmanov litigation shows this argument is live. Third, document every material change, sale of shareholdings, resignation from boards, loss of control, relocation, verified by registries and auditors, because the leading-businessperson criterion turns on present economic weight, not past status. Fourth, exhaust the administrative review: write to the Council, request reconsideration, and build the paper trail that demonstrates the review was formal rather than real. Fifth, coordinate timing with the renewal calendar: an action filed against the March 2026 renewal, like T-337/26 filed on 26 May, keeps pressure on the Council precisely while diplomats debate the next rollover, and a judgment annulling one renewal can force the Council to adopt a better-reasoned relisting or drop the name.
Appeal lies to the Court of Justice on points of law within two months of the General Court’s judgment, and Abramovich may yet take T-358/25 there. Appeals rarely succeed in sanctions cases, but they suspend nothing and cost little relative to the stakes, so they are routinely lodged to preserve the record while the parallel challenge to the next renewal proceeds. Families and corporate groups should also map the perimeter: EU prohibitions on making funds available catch spouses, holding companies and service providers, and national authorities in France pursue circumvention criminally. A litigation strategy that ignores the perimeter invites fresh listings of relatives and entities, which is how one case becomes five. Conversely, clean separation, genuinely independent management, transparent filings and no concealed control are both a compliance shield and the factual basis of tomorrow’s delisting request.
Finally, watch the damages frontier. The General Court’s settled position is that lawful sanctions cannot generate compensation even for heavy losses, and T-358/25 applies it once more. Only a finding of unlawfulness, for example an annulment for insufficient reasons, opens the way to a credible damages claim, and even then causation and quantification are fiercely litigated. Applicants should therefore treat damages as a secondary head of claim that preserves rights rather than as the economic objective, which remains delisting and the unfreezing that follows it automatically under EU law once the name leaves Annex I of Regulation 269/2014.
B. What should you do in Paris when your bank account or villa is frozen under Regulation 269/2014?
France applies EU sanctions directly, and French law adds a dense national enforcement layer that anyone with assets in Paris and the Ile-de-France must understand. The cornerstone for nationally ordered freezes is Article L.562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, under which “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes”, with controlled entities caught by the second paragraph. Alongside it, Article L.562-2 of the same Code allows the economy and interior ministers jointly to order, “pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” against persons involved in terrorism, a parallel regime worth knowing because banks apply identical operational reflexes to both. The operational bite comes from Article L.562-4: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre”, a duty imposed on “Toute personne physique, ressortissante nationale ou ressortissante étrangère se trouvant sur le territoire national” and on banks, companies and public bodies operating in France, including for activities abroad. In practice, this is why a Paris bank freezes first and asks questions later: the statute orders immediate application and immediate notification to the minister, and non-compliance exposes the institution.
Real estate has its own publicity mechanism, which explains the Riviera headlines. Under Article L.562-8 of the Monetary and Financial Code, freeze decisions “peuvent, à la demande du ministre chargé de l’économie, être publiées au fichier immobilier ou au livre foncier dont dépend le bien immobilier appartenant à la personne dont les fonds et ressources économiques sont gelés”, and vehicle registrations can be blocked as well. The Directorate General of the Treasury publishes the lists of frozen entities and frozen properties on its website, and the two Conseil d’Etat rulings discussed above arose precisely from challenges to those publications and to the decrees behind them, Decree No. 2022-815 of 16 May 2022 on legal persons and Decree No. 2022-515 of 8 April 2022 on properties. If a Paris apartment held through a French SCI appears on those lists, the owner learns it from the bank, the notary or the land registry, often all three in the same week.
Paris and the Ile-de-France concentrate every decision point, which is an advantage for organising the defence. The Treasury’s sanctions unit sits in Paris and administers authorisations for the release of frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees and extraordinary expenses under the EU regulations. The Administrative Tribunal of Paris hears emergency applications, and the route is the référé-suspension of Article L.521-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice: “le juge des référés, saisi d’une demande en ce sens, peut ordonner la suspension de l’exécution de cette décision, ou de certains de ses effets, lorsque l’urgence le justifie et qu’il est fait état d’un moyen propre à créer, en l’état de l’instruction, un doute sérieux quant à la légalité de la décision.” But CE No. 505079 of 24 February 2026 shows how steep that path is: urgency plus serious doubt must both be demonstrated, and the companies seeking suspension of their Treasury listings lost despite obtaining quashing of the lower order. Competent counsel in Paris therefore prepares the interim application together with the main annulment action, the Council delisting request in Brussels, and the Treasury authorisation requests, so that each filing strengthens the others instead of contradicting them.
Concretely, a frozen person with Paris connections should move on five fronts within days. First, secure the evidence of the freeze: bank letters, registry extracts, Treasury list screenshots with dates, and the exact legal basis cited, because time limits run from notification or knowledge. Second, file targeted Treasury authorisation requests for living expenses, legal fees, salaries of French employees and building charges, which keeps life and assets intact while the listing lasts. Third, commission an independent audit of control chains over French companies and properties, since French authorities look past nominal ownership to effective control, as the SCI cases demonstrate. Fourth, lodge the delisting request with the Council with fresh documents, and file the annulment action in Luxembourg within the two-month window of the renewal that concerns you, without missing the parallel French deadlines. Fifth, freeze circumvention risks: no informal transfers, no opacity, no use of intermediaries to route funds, because circumvention creates criminal exposure and supplies the Council with new reasons to keep the name listed. Each step must be documented in writing, in French and English, because the file built in Paris today becomes the evidence filed in Luxembourg tomorrow.
Conclusion
The week of 9 September 2026 will be remembered as the week the sanctions regime bent but did not break. The General Court’s dismissal in T-358/25 confirmed that the Council’s relisting practice survives proportionality and rights review when reasons are stated and evidence exists. The Coreper rollover to 22 September confirmed that unanimity makes every renewal a political cliffhanger, with France’s position on the Usmanov file now the variable to watch. For listed persons, the rational response is not despair and not defiance, but method: challenge each renewal in Luxembourg on evidence and reasons, pursue delisting in Brussels with documents rather than declarations, and manage the French layer, Treasury authorisations, Paris interim relief, control audits, with disciplined paperwork. T-337/26, the pending challenge to the March 2026 renewal, will be the next judicial milestone. The 22 September renewal decision will be the next political one. Between Luxembourg, Brussels and Paris, the venues are three, the calendar is counted in days, and the files that win will be those prepared as if all three venues read them at once.