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EU 21st Sanctions Package: Why Russian Court Decisions Are Now Unenforceable in France

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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EU 21st Sanctions Package: Why Russian Court Decisions Are Now Unenforceable in France

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On 10 September 2026, the German law firm Luther published a detailed analysis of a quiet revolution in European sanctions law: the recast of the rule that decides whether a Russian court decision can ever produce effects inside the European Union. Six weeks earlier, on 23 July 2026, the Council of the European Union had adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia, and the legal acts entered into force the next day, on 24 July 2026. Beyond the headlines on energy, financial services and crypto, the package rebuilt the procedural shield that protects European companies against Russian retaliatory litigation. Its centrepiece is the new Article 11c of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, replaced by Regulation (EU) 2026/1848, mirrored by an identical prohibition inserted as a new Article 11c into Regulation (EU) 269/2014 by Regulation (EU) 2026/1844. The practical question is simple and urgent: your company respected EU sanctions, refused to perform a contract with a Russian partner, and now a Moscow arbitrazh court has condemned you to pay damages in direct breach of your Paris arbitration clause. The Russian claimant has found assets in France and asks the Paris enforcement judge to seize them. Will the French court enforce the Moscow judgment? This article explains why the answer is now, more clearly than ever, no. It describes first how Moscow manufactures these judgments and what the 21st package changed, then shows that Paris was already a graveyard for Russian titles long before Brussels acted, and finally sets out the counter-weapons now available from France: court orders to stop the Russian proceedings, damages claims, and the French asset-freeze machinery.

I. Moscow Condemns, Paris Refuses: What the 21st Package Blocks at the French Border

A. How can a Russian court condemn you even though your contract chooses Paris arbitration?

Since 2020, Russian law has offered sanction-hit Russian companies a powerful procedural weapon: Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Arbitrazh Procedure Code allow Russian courts to claim exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from Western sanctions, to override the forum or arbitration clause the parties had agreed, and to back disobedience with severe financial penalties. A European supplier that suspends deliveries to comply with EU sanctions is therefore sued in Moscow, condemned in Moscow, and threatened with a penalty if it dares to continue the arbitration in Paris or Geneva. The judgment looks perfectly regular on paper, bears the seal of a court, and arrives in France with a request for enforcement against French bank accounts, shares or real estate.

The European Union first answered with the 15th sanctions package. Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 of 16 December 2024 inserted Article 11c into Regulation 833/2014: no recognition, no legal effect and no enforcement within the Union for decisions taken under Article 248 of the Russian Arbitrazh Procedure Code or equivalent legislation. The connecting factor was purely formal. An enforcement judge did not need to examine the substance of the Russian case; if the decision derived from Article 248, it was dead on arrival. That formal simplicity was also the limit of the rule: Russian courts quickly learned to condemn European companies on other legal bases, through ordinary civil judgments that overrode the consequences of sanctions without expressly invoking Article 248.

The 21st package closes that escape route and changes the nature of the test. Regulation (EU) 2026/1848 replaces Article 11c(1), and the prohibition now covers the recognition, the production of legal effects and the enforcement of any injunction, order, relief, judgment or other court or administrative decision coming from Russia that holds a European person liable in connection with a contract or transaction affected by the EU sanctions against Russia. Decisions taken under Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Arbitrazh Procedure Code are expressly mentioned, but the list is not exhaustive: any Russian legal basis is caught, including ordinary civil judgments and decisions rendered in insolvency, bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings. In parallel, Regulation (EU) 2026/1844 inserts the same prohibition into Regulation 269/2014, which covers the individual designations. The Council itself summarises the reform as a strengthening of the legal protection of EU operators in litigation stemming from restrictive measures, by allowing EU courts and Member States not to recognise or enforce court decisions obtained in proceedings lodged in Russian courts.

The reform broadens the trigger but narrows the filter, and practitioners should measure both movements precisely. It is broader because the Russian legal basis no longer matters: every retaliatory title is caught. It is narrower because a sanctions nexus is now required: the liability must have been imposed in connection with a contract or transaction affected by the EU sanctions. A purely domestic Russian commercial judgment with no sanctions element falls outside the prohibition. The consequence is operational: any European company exposed to Russian litigation must build, contract by contract, the documentary file proving that the disputed transaction was affected by EU sanctions, because that nexus is now the key that locks the French enforcement door. Commentators also warn that the language versions of the new provision differ in their syntax, the German version expressing the sanctions-nexus requirement most clearly, so that borderline cases may require comparing several official versions. One German analysis even calls the reintroduction of the sanctions nexus an oversight, regretting the loss of the purely formal criterion that enforcement judges could apply without taking evidence. Whatever the doctrinal debate, the direction is clear: retaliatory Russian titles are caught more widely than before, and the French judge is expressly authorised to refuse them any effect.

B. Will the Paris enforcement judge recognise a rouble judgment obtained in Moscow?

Even without the European regulations, a Russian judgment has never walked into France unopposed. French law starts from a strict principle, stated in Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” In other words, a foreign judgment produces no enforcement effect in France until a French court has granted exequatur after verifying precise conditions. Requests for recognition or for a declaration of enforceability of foreign enforcement titles are brought before the judicial court, since Article 509-2 of the same Code provides that “Sont présentées au directeur de greffe du tribunal judiciaire les requêtes aux fins de reconnaissance ou de constatation de la force exécutoire, sur le territoire de la République, des titres exécutoires étrangers en application :” of the instruments it lists. The Paris judicial court even runs a specialised exequatur bench, and its 2024 and 2026 dockets show how routine this control has become.

The content of that control was restated in the clearest terms only three months ago by the highest French court. In its judgment of 17 June 2026, on appeal No. 24-16.004, the First Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation recalled that “le juge français doit, en l’absence de toute convention internationale, s’assurer que trois conditions sont remplies, à savoir la compétence indirecte du juge étranger, fondée sur le rattachement du litige au juge saisi, la conformité à l’ordre public international de fond et de procédure ainsi que l’absence de fraude. Il lui est interdit de réviser au fond le jugement.” Three conditions, no revision on the merits: indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court, compatibility with French international public policy on substance and procedure, and absence of fraud. The same June 2026 judgment adds a weapon of immediate use against Russian default-style condemnations: “Est contraire à la conception française de l’ordre public international de procédure la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère non motivée lorsque ne sont pas produits des documents de nature à servir d’équivalent à la motivation défaillante.” An unreasoned foreign decision, unsupported by equivalent documents, violates French international procedural public policy. The appeal was therefore dismissed: “REJETTE le pourvoi”. That case concerned an American jury verdict, but the three conditions apply to every foreign judgment, including Russian ones, in the absence of any Franco-Russian enforcement treaty.

Applied to Russian titles, this control has already produced spectacular refusals. On 2 June 2020, the Paris Court of Appeal, ruling on remand after cassation in case No. 18/27180, examined Russian judgments of the Petrogradsky District Court of Saint Petersburg dated 24 March 2011 and of the Saint Petersburg city court dated 4 August 2011, obtained by a Russian bank against borrowers and their guarantor. The court accepted the indirect jurisdiction of the Russian judge, found no violation of procedural public policy, but struck down the substance: “Il en résulte que les décisions russes ont violé l’ordre public international en allouant à la banque des intérêts au taux de 30 % l’an correspondant aux pénalités prévues par les contrats de prêts souscrits par M. [S] et garantis par Mme [V].” Thirty percent annual interest in penalties: contrary to the essential principles of French law, and the enforcement judge was instructed to verify concretely, not abstractly, whether the rate applied by the Russian decisions offended international public policy. The outcome, recorded in the same Paris decision, followed mechanically: “L’exequatur ne saurait donc être accordé. Le jugement est infirmé.” No exequatur, judgment reversed, and the Russian bank ordered to pay costs. That 2020 precedent carries a direct lesson for the sanctions era: French courts do not rubber-stamp Russian condemnations, they dissect the interest rate, the penalties and the reasoning, and they refuse enforcement whenever an essential principle of French law is breached.

The 21st package now adds a European padlock to this French door. Where the Paris judge previously had to conduct a fine-grained public-policy analysis, Article 11c instructs refusal wherever the Russian decision holds a European person liable in connection with a sanctions-affected contract or transaction. The two layers combine rather than compete: the European prohibition covers the sanctions-retaliation titles automatically, while the French exequatur conditions remain available for every other Russian judgment, from loan disputes to commercial condemnations. For the Russian claimant, the corridor narrows to almost nothing; for the European defendant, the defence becomes a two-line pleading, European prohibition first, French public policy second.

II. Counter-Attacking From Paris: Stop Orders, Damages and Frozen Money

A. Can you ask a French court to order the Russian claimant to abandon the Moscow case?

Blocking the Russian judgment at the enforcement stage is only half of the strategy. The 21st package also gives European operators offensive weapons to stop the Russian proceedings themselves, and these weapons work from Paris. The recast Article 11ca of Regulation 833/2014 reinforces the anti-suit mechanism and adds a new anti-enforcement remedy. Where a Russian-court claimant sues a European person over a sanctions-affected contract, the operator can already obtain from a Member State court an order requiring the claimant not to initiate, or to discontinue, those Russian proceedings. The amendment adds a second limb: an order requiring the claimant not to seek to enforce, recognise or rely upon, in any jurisdiction, any decision obtained in those proceedings. The trigger is widened at the same time: the order is now available not only for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration clause, but where the Russian proceedings are brought abusively under Article 248.1 or 248.2 of the Arbitrazh Procedure Code, under any other Russian law, or in frustration of EU measures.

For a French litigator, this is a genuine innovation to handle with care. French courts have traditionally been hostile to Anglo-American style anti-suit injunctions addressed to foreign proceedings, viewing them as intrusions into the jurisdiction of foreign courts. But an order granted under Article 11ca is not a common-law injunction imported by judicial creativity: it is a remedy commanded by a European regulation that is directly applicable in France and binding on the Paris judge. The doctrinal objection falls away because the authority comes from Union law itself, which primes any contrary national reluctance. In practice, the French operator will therefore seize the Paris judicial court or the arbitral tribunal’s supporting judge, produce the arbitration clause, demonstrate the sanctions nexus of the disputed contract, and request both limbs: discontinuation of the Moscow proceedings and a prohibition on relying anywhere on whatever the Moscow court may still decide. Combined with Article 11c, the mechanism creates a complete seal: the Russian title cannot be born without violating a French court order, and even if born, it cannot live in France.

French jurisdictional law supports this offensive posture. Two venerable provisions of the Civil Code give French courts a long arm over cross-border disputes. Article 14 provides: “L’étranger, même non résidant en France, pourra être cité devant les tribunaux français, pour l’exécution des obligations par lui contractées en France avec un Français ; il pourra être traduit devant les tribunaux de France, pour les obligations par lui contractées en pays étranger envers des Français.” Article 15 adds, symmetrically: “Un Français pourra être traduit devant un tribunal de France, pour des obligations par lui contractées en pays étranger, même avec un étranger.” These nationality-based heads of jurisdiction, however controversial in international doctrine, mean that a French company can in many configurations bring the dispute home to Paris rather than suffering it in Moscow. They do not replace the arbitration clause, which remains the primary shield and must be drafted, preserved and invoked at every step, but they guarantee that a French judge will always be available to hear the French operator’s protective claims.

The practical checklist follows directly. First, audit every contract involving a Russian counterparty and map which transactions were affected by EU sanctions, preserving export-licence refusals, bank compliance notices and internal sanctions memos: this file is the sanctions nexus without which Article 11c and Article 11ca cannot be triggered. Second, never let the arbitration clause lapse: contest the jurisdiction of the Russian court in writing, continue the arbitration, and seek interim measures from the arbitral tribunal. Third, at the first sign of Russian proceedings, apply in Paris for an Article 11ca order covering both discontinuation and non-reliance, so that any subsequent Russian judgment arrives in France already carrying the mark of disobedience to a French court order. Fourth, if assets are at stake in several Member States, coordinate the protective orders, because the regulation applies Union-wide and a Lithuanian, German or Dutch judge grants the same remedies on the same conditions.

B. Who pays for the Russian detour: damages, legal costs and frozen assets?

Procedural shields are valuable; money is better. The 21st package extends the damages claim of Article 11a of Regulation 833/2014, allowing the European operator to recover the loss caused by the Russian retaliatory litigation, including legal costs, from the claimants or from whoever owns or controls them, provided the operator has no effective access to remedies in the relevant jurisdiction. Concretely, the fees paid to Moscow counsel to defend a case that should never have existed, the penalty imposed by the Russian court for pursuing the Paris arbitration, and the business loss from frozen deliveries become recoverable against the Russian claimant and, where the corporate veil permits, against its owners or controllers. This is a reversal of the economics of harassment: the party that weaponises Article 248 now prices in a European damages award enforceable against any of its assets located in the Union.

Those assets, in many cases, are already immobilised in France by the domestic freezing machinery, which operates alongside the European regulations. Article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code allows the Minister for the Economy and the Minister of the Interior to decide jointly, for six months renewable, to freeze funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance terrorism, incite it or participate in it, and the chapter extends the same logic to sanctions implementation: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques :” belonging to the designated categories. Article L. 562-4 then conscripts the entire French economy into enforcement: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie :” all natural persons on national territory, the institutions listed in Article L. 561-2, and every legal person constituted under national law or carrying out an operation on national territory. Banks, insurers, notaries and companies have no discretion: they freeze immediately and report immediately. The definitions in Article L. 562-1 anchor the chapter to the European counter-terrorism and sanctions instruments, confirming that the French freeze is the national arm of the European decision.

Paris is therefore both the fortress and the battlefield: the place where Russian titles die and where Russian assets wait. The Court of Cassation illustrated the intensity of this role in the Oschadbank saga. After a Paris arbitral tribunal condemned the Russian Federation to compensate the Ukrainian state savings bank for Crimean expropriations in its award of 26 November 2018, the Paris Court of Appeal annulled the award on 30 March 2021, and the First Civil Chamber quashed that annulment on 7 December 2022, on appeal No. 21-15.390: “CASSE ET ANNULE, sauf en ce qu’il rejette la fin de non-recevoir soulevée par la société par actions Joint Stock Company « State Savings Bank of Ukraine » sur le moyen tiré de l’incompétence temporelle du tribunal arbitral, l’arrêt rendu le 30 mars 2021, entre les parties, par la cour d’appel de Paris ;” The case turned on state immunity and the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal, and its lesson is twofold for sanctions litigants: Paris genuinely enforces against Russian state interests, but sovereign immunity from enforcement remains a demanding, fact-specific obstacle that must be litigated asset by asset, account by account. Private Russian claimants enjoy no such immunity, which makes Article 11a damages against them all the more attractive.

For companies whose own funds are caught by a freeze, the same Paris machinery offers a legal exit that must be distinguished from the Russian claimant’s dead end. A European operator whose bank has frozen an account as a sanctions precaution can apply to the Directorate General of the Treasury in Paris for a partial release authorisation covering rent, counsel fees and maintenance, and can challenge an excessive freeze before the administrative courts. The route is documentary and procedural: designation lists, licence applications, evidence of basic-needs or legal-fee grounds, and strict compliance with reporting duties. Every step taken in that procedure also feeds the sanctions-nexus file that protects the company against Russian retaliation claims, so that defensive compliance and offensive litigation reinforce each other instead of competing for management time.

Conclusion

The 21st sanctions package, adopted on 23 July 2026 and in force since 24 July 2026, has transformed the position of any European company facing Russian retaliatory justice. What was a formal filter limited to Article 248 decisions has become a substantive shield covering every Russian court or administrative decision that holds a European person liable in connection with a sanctions-affected contract or transaction, backed by mirror provisions in both Regulation 833/2014 and Regulation 269/2014, by court orders to discontinue the Russian proceedings and to rely on nothing they produce, and by damages claims reaching the owners and controllers of the harassing claimant. France adds its own triple lock: exequatur is never automatic under Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of Cassation verified as recently as 17 June 2026 that the three Cornelissen conditions still govern every foreign judgment, and the Paris Court of Appeal demonstrated in June 2020 that Russian condemnations carrying excessive penalties are refused enforcement as violations of international public policy. The operational message for general counsel is therefore straightforward: preserve the arbitration clauses, build the sanctions-nexus file contract by contract, seek the Paris protective order at the first Moscow summons, and treat frozen assets as both a compliance duty and a future recovery fund. Moscow can still condemn on paper; it can no longer collect in Paris.

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