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Paris Refused to Surrender Her to Germany on Health Grounds: What the 29 July 2026 Cassation Ruling Means for European Arrest Warrants

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Paris Refused to Surrender Her to Germany on Health Grounds: What the 29 July 2026 Cassation Ruling Means for European Arrest Warrants

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On 29 July 2026, the criminal chamber of the French Cour de cassation quashed a Paris decision that had refused to surrender a woman to Germany under a European Arrest Warrant issued for membership of a terrorist organisation based abroad. The Paris judges had relied on a medical report calling for near-future psychiatric hospitalisation, allegedly incompatible with transfer and remand detention, and on German assurances they deemed too general to remove a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. In decision No. 26-84.256, the supreme court recalled that a European Arrest Warrant may only be refused on the grounds provided by Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, and that serious illness triggers the two-step dialogue imposed by the Court of Justice in E.D.L. (C-699/21, 18 April 2023): suspend surrender, ask the issuing authority for detailed information on detention conditions and adaptations, and refuse only if the risk cannot be ruled out within a reasonable time. For anyone arrested in France on a European warrant — and for their families — this ruling redraws the map: ill health can still block surrender, but only at the end of a demanding judicial dialogue with the issuing state. This analysis explains the Paris refusal of 17 June 2026, the quashing of 29 July 2026, and what the person sought and their lawyer must concretely do when health becomes central to a surrender case.

I. Can France Refuse a German European Arrest Warrant on Health Grounds?

A. The German warrant for terrorist-organisation membership and the Paris refusal of 17 June 2026

On 24 January 2022, the German judicial authorities issued a European Arrest Warrant against Mrs H. T. for the purpose of criminal prosecution on a charge of membership of a terrorist organisation based abroad. She was arrested on French territory, and the warrant was formally notified to her on 13 June 2024. From that notification, the French surrender procedure applied in full: appearance before the public prosecutor, examination by the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, verification of the warrant, and a decision on surrender. Two years passed between notification and the Paris ruling — a duration that already tells something about the complexity of the file, since the Framework Decision requires surrender decisions within short time limits and treats delay as the exception. On 17 June 2026, the investigating chamber refused to surrender her to the German authorities.

The refusal rested on health, not on the substance of the German charge. A court-ordered medical expert had concluded that Mrs T.’s state of health made admission to a psychiatric hospital desirable in the near future and incompatible with a transfer to the Federal Republic of Germany and a period of provisional detention there. The Paris judges added a second pillar to their reasoning: the response obtained from the German authorities to their request for information was only a general, abstract reply, unrelated to the specific risks identified by the medical expert. From those two findings — a documented medical risk and insufficiently specific guarantees from the issuing state — the chamber drew the conclusion that surrender would expose the person sought to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, and it refused execution of the warrant.

That reasoning sits at the intersection of two bodies of rules that every surrender case in France must combine. On one side, the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (OJ L 190, 18 July 2002) on the European Arrest Warrant, which organises surrender between Member States on the principle of mutual trust, and its French transposition in Articles 695-11 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other side, the fundamental-rights safeguard: Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision itself, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights — No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment — and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states the same prohibition. The Paris chamber also relied on a correct starting point recalled by the Cour de cassation itself: although mutual trust creates a presumption that the medical care offered in the Member States, in prison or under open supervision, is adequate, that presumption does not prevent the executing court from seeking assurances from the issuing state that the person will receive appropriate treatment and care after surrender. The dispute was therefore not about whether health can ever block a surrender — it can — but about what the executing judge must do before concluding that it does.

The German dimension gives the case a resonance that goes well beyond one file. Germany is among the most active issuers of European Arrest Warrants, and its warrants have recently produced some of the sharpest confrontations in the surrender system: the Polish refusal and the Italian surrender, after two rounds before the Italian Court of Cassation, of Ukrainian nationals sought by the German Federal Prosecutor General over the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, followed by the arrest in Croatia in August 2026 of a second suspect for extradition to Germany. Our analysis of the Nord Stream German warrants explains how differently executing courts can read the same issuing decision. The present case adds the health variable to that German-French axis: a terrorism prosecution on one side, a documented psychiatric condition on the other. And terrorism changes the temperature of every surrender file. French courts examine health objections with the same legal tools whatever the underlying charge, but in terrorism cases the issuing state’s interest in prosecution weighs heavily in the proportionality assessment, and the public prosecutor’s appeal against a refusal — here, the appeal of the Paris public prosecutor that led to the 29 July 2026 quashing — is practically systematic.

Understanding the Paris refusal also requires understanding what the French investigating chamber actually does in surrender cases. It does not retry the German charge, it does not assess guilt, and it does not substitute its own view of the appropriate sentence. It verifies identity, the validity of the warrant, the applicable refusal grounds under Articles 695-22 to 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and any fundamental-rights obstacle. French statute law lists the cases in which execution of a European Arrest Warrant is refused: Article 695-22 states that L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants : 1° Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis pouvaient être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises et que l’action publique est éteinte par l’amnistie ; 2° Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen, with further cases including minority under thirteen. Article 695-23 adds that L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française, subject to the list of serious offences exempt from double-criminality review. Article 695-24 lists six optional grounds, from parallel French proceedings to limitation. None of these provisions mentions illness. Health-based obstacles come from the other side — from the fundamental-rights layer, Article 3 of the Convention and the case law of the Court of Justice — which is precisely why the method imposed by Luxembourg matters so much, and why Paris was faulted for skipping a step.

B. Ill health, inhuman treatment and the limits of mutual trust in surrender cases

Mutual trust is the engine of the European Arrest Warrant, but it has never been blind. Since the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgments on detention conditions, the Court of Justice has accepted that surrender must be postponed, and in extreme cases refused, where there are substantial grounds to believe that the person sought would face a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the issuing state. Illness entered that framework through the E.D.L. ruling of 18 April 2023 (C-699/21), which the Cour de cassation places at the centre of its 29 July 2026 decision. The logic is rigorous and deliberately narrow: a serious, proven health condition does not automatically defeat a warrant. It triggers a reinforced duty of verification on the executing court, structured as a dialogue with the issuing authority, and only an irreducible risk — one that cannot be removed within a reasonable time despite adapted conditions — justifies refusal.

That narrowness is a deliberate choice of the European system, and it has just been confirmed at the highest level for the neighbouring question of detention conditions. On 4 June 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice ruled in cases C-722/23 and C-91/24 on refusals to execute European Arrest Warrants based on a risk of fundamental-rights violations linked to the enforcement of the foreign sentence. The Belgian courts had refused surrender and the referring court asked whether Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584 then authorised — or required — the executing state to order that the foreign custodial sentence be served on its own territory instead: Where the courts of the executing Member State of a European arrest warrant have found that there is a risk, in the event of the surrender of the requested person to the issuing Member State, of a violation of that person’s fundamental rights in connection with the enforcement of the foreign sentence, such that the execution of the European arrest warrant must be refused, does Article 4[, point 6], of [Framework Decision 2002/584] authorize those courts of the executing Member State, which find that the requested person resides in that State, to subsequently decide that, in accordance with the provision transposing Article 4[, point 6,] of [that] Framework Decision, the custodial sentence imposed in the Member State that issued the European arrest warrant — which is the subject of that warrant — must be served in the executing Member State? The Grand Chamber’s answer shapes the whole architecture: refusal on fundamental-rights grounds is possible, but it is framed, conditional, and followed by the question of avoiding impunity. The same architecture governs health cases — suspend, verify, adapt, and refuse only if adaptation fails.

The French debate of summer 2026 makes this architecture painfully concrete, because France is currently on both sides of the mirror. On 9 September 2026, a Dutch court refused to surrender a man to France because of the state of French prisons — the subject of our analysis of the Dutch refusal — while French courts continue to examine, warrant by warrant, whether other Member States’ guarantees are sufficient. Mutual trust is thus tested in both directions at once, and the lesson of the 29 July 2026 ruling is symmetrical: a French court that refuses surrender to Germany on health grounds must meet exactly the same methodological standards that France expects from a Dutch court refusing surrender to France on prison-conditions grounds. General statements about a health system, like general statements about a prison system, are not enough; what counts is the individualised, documented, adversarially-tested assessment of the concrete risk for the concrete person, after a genuine exchange with the issuing authority.

For the person sought, this means that a medical file is necessary but never sufficient on its own. The Paris chamber had a medical report and it still lost before the Cour de cassation, because the report was not inserted into the full Luxembourg procedure. A defence strategy built only on exhibiting a diagnosis — however serious — misses the decisive battle, which concerns the dialogue: what precise questions were put to the issuing authority, what adapted solutions were proposed (hospital wing, external hospital, open supervision with treatment obligations, postponement of surrender to allow stabilisation), what answers arrived and when, and why each answer is concretely inadequate for this patient. The Cour de cassation’s message to investigating chambers is equally clear: refusing surrender without demonstrating that the issuing state’s responses were sought, specific and exhausted, and without establishing the precise threshold of risk, exposes the decision to quashing for insufficient reasoning under Article 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that Les arrêts de la chambre de l’instruction, ainsi que les arrêts et jugements en dernier ressort sont déclarés nuls s’ils ne contiennent pas des motifs ou si leurs motifs sont insuffisants et ne permettent pas à la Cour de cassation d’exercer son contrôle et de reconnaître si la loi a été respectée dans le dispositif. Health can stop a European Arrest Warrant in France. But after 29 July 2026, everyone — judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers — knows the exact road that must be travelled first.

II. Why the Cour de Cassation Quashed the Refusal on 29 July 2026

A. Suspend, ask Berlin, set a new date: the E.D.L. dialogue under Article 23(4) of the Framework Decision

The Cour de cassation begins by restating the principle that frames every surrender case: Sous réserve du respect des droits fondamentaux de la personne recherchée et des principes juridiques fondamentaux consacrés par l’article 6 du Traité sur l’Union européenne, garanti par l’article 1er, § 3, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative au mandat d’arrêt européen et aux procédures de remise entre États membres, telle que modifiée par la décision-cadre 2009/299/JAI du Conseil du 26 février 2009, l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne saurait être refusée pour des motifs autres que ceux que prévoient la décision-cadre et les textes pris pour son application. In other words, the list of refusal grounds is closed: the mandatory grounds of Article 695-22, the optional grounds of Articles 695-23 and 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the fundamental-rights obstacle as defined by Luxembourg — nothing else, and certainly not a free-standing judicial assessment that surrender would be undesirable. A French-language commentary of this line of cases is available in our French analysis of health-based EAW refusals.

The Court then sets out, by reference to E.D.L., what the executing court must do when it considers that there are substantial and proven grounds to believe that surrender would expose a seriously ill person to a real risk of a significant reduction of life expectancy or of a rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration of health. The passage deserves quotation in full, because it is now the operative checklist for every health-based surrender file in France: the executing authority doit, en application de l’article 23, § 4, de la décision-cadre précitée, surseoir à ladite remise et solliciter de l’autorité judiciaire d’émission la fourniture de toute information relative aux conditions dans lesquelles il est envisagé de poursuivre ou de détenir ladite personne ainsi qu’aux possibilités d’adapter ces conditions à son état de santé afin de prévenir la réalisation d’un tel risque. Suspension plus targeted questions — not refusal. French procedure already contains the domestic tool for this dialogue: Article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that Si la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’Etat membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit Etat la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires. Ten days for receipt of additional information: the French text organises the speed that mutual trust requires, while the Framework Decision organises the substance of the exchange.

Applied to the Paris decision, the test failed at two levels. First, the investigating chamber had treated the German reply as too general and abstract without, in the Cour de cassation’s view, exhausting the judicial dialogue or demonstrating that the risk could not be removed: the Court faults the chamber for not showing that it had pursued the exchange to the point of establishing that the risk could not be set aside within a reasonable time. The public prosecutor’s first ground put it precisely — the chamber had dismissed the assurances as general without exhausting dialogue and without characterising the impossibility of removing the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within a reasonable time — and had decided without establishing systemic failures in German detainee healthcare, a point on which the Court follows its consistent line that mutual trust is only rebutted by concrete, individualised findings, not by abstract doubts about a Member State’s system. Second, and decisively, the chamber had not established the substantive threshold itself: it never found that surrender would expose Mrs T. to a real risk of a significant reduction of her life expectancy or of a rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration of her health that could not be ruled out within a reasonable time. A wish for near-future psychiatric hospitalisation and an incompatibility with transfer and remand, as stated by the expert, do not automatically equal that threshold. The distinction matters enormously in practice: many serious conditions require hospital care without entailing that any surrender would irreversibly destroy health within a short time, especially where the issuing state offers a prison hospital unit or external hospitalisation. The chamber jumped from diagnosis to refusal; Luxembourg requires the intermediate station of adapted solutions.

Practically, the dialogue the Court demands is not a formality of sending one letter to Berlin. It means formulating precise, individualised questions linked to each point of the medical report: which establishment would receive her, which psychiatric unit with which capacity, which treatment would continue without interruption, which alternatives to remand exist under German law pending trial, and what timetable applies. It means assessing each answer against the expert’s findings, if necessary by ordering a supplementary expert opinion on whether the proposed arrangements remove the risk. And it means documenting every step, because the Cour de cassation reviews precisely that paper trail. The German authorities in this case did guarantee access to necessary care, including in a prison hospital or an outside hospital — a fact the Paris chamber itself recorded — and the supreme court held that recording guarantees while dismissing them as non-individualised, without pushing the exchange further and without characterising exceptional circumstances, left the refusal unjustified. Defence lawyers should read this as both a warning and a roadmap: demand the dialogue, shape its questions, propose the adaptations yourselves, and force the issuing state to answer on each medical point, because a thin file helps nobody — neither the chamber, whose decision will be quashed, nor the person sought, who loses months and faces a second round.

B. Refusal only as a last resort — and what the renvoi court must now do

The second half of the E.D.L. test, also quoted by the Cour de cassation, defines the only exit that remains: Si, au regard des informations fournies par l’autorité judiciaire d’émission ainsi que de toutes les autres informations dont l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution disposerait, il apparaît que ce risque ne peut pas être écarté dans un délai raisonnable, cette dernière autorité doit refuser d’exécuter le mandat d’arrêt européen. En revanche, si ledit risque peut être écarté dans un tel délai, une nouvelle date de remise doit être convenue avec l’autorité judiciaire d’émission. Refusal is therefore the last resort after a documented failure of adaptation, and even postponement remains the preferred outcome where stabilisation or arrangements are achievable within a reasonable time. The operative part follows: CASSE et ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt susvisé de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, en date du 17 juin 2026, et pour qu’il soit à nouveau jugé, conformément à la loi ; with referral for retrial. Nothing in the ruling orders surrender; everything in it orders method. The renvoi chamber starts again, but on rails: suspend, question Berlin precisely, examine adaptations, and then either agree a new surrender date or refuse on a fully characterised, irreducible risk.

The same day, the same chamber, the same reporting judge, delivered the instructive contrast. In decision No. 26-84.072 of 29 July 2026, published in the Bulletin, the Cour de cassation rejected the appeal of Mr W. M. N. against the Paris investigating chamber’s decision of 18 June 2026 authorising his surrender to the Romanian judicial authorities under a European Arrest Warrant — a case decided on referral after an earlier quashing of 16 December 2025 (No. 25-87.663). One day, two surrenders, two opposite outcomes: refusal quashed for Germany, authorisation upheld for Romania. The juxtaposition is worth more than any commentary. It shows a supreme court that does not take sides between issuing states or between severity of charges, but enforces a uniform discipline of reasoning: the executing chamber must justify, step by step, either the refusal or the authorisation, answer the parties’ essential arguments, and apply the Luxembourg dialogue where health or fundamental rights are invoked. For practitioners, the pair of 29 July rulings should be read together as the summer 2026 state of the art of French surrender review.

What should the renvoi court concretely do now in Mrs T.’s case? First, order if needed an updated medical assessment, because more than two years have passed since the warrant’s notification and health evolves — a stale report weakens any decision in either direction. Second, address to the German judicial authority a detailed, itemised request covering reception facility, psychiatric care continuity, remand regime and alternatives, with a clear deadline consistent with Article 695-33’s ten-day logic and Article 23(4)’s reasonable time. Third, examine seriously the adaptation proposals instead of dismissing them as abstract: a guaranteed prison-hospital placement with named unit and capacity is, on its face, the kind of specific answer the first round lacked, and the chamber will have to explain, point by point and with medical support, why it is or is not enough. Fourth, if the risk is confirmed as irreducible within a reasonable time, refuse — and this time the refusal will survive, because it will rest on the full record Luxembourg requires. Fifth, if the risk can be removed, agree a new surrender date with dates, escort and medical arrangements, rather than refusing. Either way, the decision must answer the parties’ essential arguments explicitly, since insufficient or contradictory reasoning equals absence of reasoning and leads back to the Cour de cassation.

Three practical lessons emerge for anyone arrested in France on a European Arrest Warrant with a health issue. First, disclose the medical situation immediately and completely: the dialogue can only protect what it knows, and late-produced reports compress the timetable and look tactical. Second, build the file as a dialogue file from day one — expert report with precise incompatibilities, list of concrete questions for the issuing state, proposals for adapted detention or supervision, challenge to each general answer with a request for specifics — because the Cour de cassation now reviews the dialogue, not just the diagnosis. Third, use time without abusing it: the Framework Decision’s time limits still run, and the executing court must decide within a reasonable time whether the risk can be ruled out; a strategy of pure delay, without medical substance and without engagement with the proposed adaptations, will not survive. Conversely, prosecutors and issuing authorities should understand that detailed, individualised, time-bound guarantees work: Berlin’s general assurances failed in Paris, but specific, verifiable care arrangements, examined in good faith, are exactly what Luxembourg rewards with surrender. The 29 July 2026 ruling is therefore not a pro-surrender or anti-surrender decision. It is a pro-method decision — and in surrender litigation, method is outcome.

Conclusion

The 29 July 2026 quashing will not make headlines like an ICC arrest warrant or a cross-border manhunt, but for the daily practice of European surrender law it matters more than most spectacular cases. It confirms that France can refuse to surrender a seriously ill person to Germany — the door remains open — while defining exactly how that door is used: a closed list of refusal grounds, a presumption of adequate care that must be rebutted individually, a mandatory suspension-and-dialogue phase under Article 23(4) of the Framework Decision, and refusal only where a precisely characterised risk to life or of rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration of health cannot be removed within a reasonable time. The Paris chamber’s mistake was to treat a worrying diagnosis plus general assurances as enough; the Cour de cassation demands the full journey from diagnosis to irreducible risk, documented step by step. Read together with the same day’s Romanian authorisation upheld in No. 26-84.072, with the Grand Chamber’s 4 June 2026 detention-conditions rulings, and with the Dutch refusal of surrender to France over prison conditions, the decision places France firmly inside a European movement that refuses both automatic surrender and automatic refusal: every warrant, every illness, every guarantee must be examined concretely, adversarially and on the record. Anyone facing a European Arrest Warrant in France on health grounds should therefore prepare not one battle but two — the medical file and the dialogue file — and start both on the day of arrest.

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