KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Nord Stream Sabotage and the German Arrest Warrant: Why Poland Said No, Croatia Detained, and What France Would Do

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Nord Stream Sabotage and the German Arrest Warrant: Why Poland Said No, Croatia Detained, and What France Would Do

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On the morning of 19 August 2026, Croatian police walked into a hotel in the coastal city of Pula and arrested a Ukrainian professional diver on a German European arrest warrant. The man, identified by German prosecutors only as Vladimir Z. and named in international media as Volodymyr Zhuravlev, is suspected of helping to blow up the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. A court in Pula placed him in pre-trial detention the next day, pending a decision on his extradition to Germany. The arrest made headlines around the world, not only because the suspect was reportedly working as a diving consultant on a Hollywood film about the very sabotage he is accused of, but because the same man had already beaten the same German warrant once: in October 2025, a Polish court refused to surrender him, ruling that Germany had no jurisdiction and that the destruction could be seen as a justified act of a defensive war. One suspect, one warrant, two opposite answers. That contradiction is the most instructive extradition story in Europe this year, and it raises a question with direct practical consequences: what would happen if the German warrant landed in France?

This analysis answers that question the way a French extradition lawyer would prepare it. It sets out what Germany charges and who the two Ukrainian suspects are, why the Polish and Italian courts reached opposite results on German warrants arising from the same blasts, and how a French chambre de l’instruction would examine such a warrant, step by step, under Articles 695-11 to 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It closes with the two Cour de cassation rulings of the summer of 2026 that now frame every defence argument of this type, from second warrants after a refusal to health-based challenges and the limits of mutual trust. Anyone facing a European arrest warrant in France, or advising someone who is, will find here the exact checkpoints that decide surrender.

I. Why the Same German Warrant Gets Opposite Answers Across Europe

A. What Germany Charges: The Nord Stream Blasts and the Two Ukrainian Suspects

On 26 September 2022, a series of underwater explosions severely damaged the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea, near the Danish island of Bornholm, in international waters within the Danish and Swedish exclusive economic zones. The blasts ended any prospect of Russian gas flowing to Germany through those routes. No state has ever claimed responsibility. Denmark and Sweden both closed their national investigations in 2024. Germany did not: the Federal Public Prosecutor General, the Generalbundesanwalt, kept the file because the case affects the internal security of the Federal Republic, and German courts treat the case as falling within their jurisdiction, as wire reporting on the file explains (Reuters, 21 August 2026; AP account of the detention ruling): the damaged pipelines terminate in the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and their loss harmed German energy security and internal safety.

The German theory, as set out by the federal prosecution, is that a team of Ukrainians chartered a sailing yacht, transported military-grade explosives across the Baltic, fixed them to the pipelines on the seabed and triggered the blasts with time fuses. The suspects boarded the yacht using forged identification documents, including a forged Ukrainian passport. Germany issued European arrest warrants for several members of the alleged team and qualified the facts, under its own criminal code, as anti-constitutional sabotage committed concurrently with causing an explosion and destroying structures. Two suspects dominate the proceedings today.

The first is a former Ukrainian army officer identified as Serhii K. He was arrested in Italy in August 2025 on the German warrant, fought surrender through two rounds before the Italian courts, and was transferred to Germany in November 2025. In July 2026, German prosecutors charged him with orchestrating the blasts while acting, in their words, on behalf of Ukrainian state entities, alleging that he led a team of professional divers, a skipper and an explosives expert. He denies any involvement. The second suspect is the diver arrested in Pula in August 2026. German prosecutors describe him as a trained scuba diver who belonged to the underwater team. International media (Al Jazeera, 21 August 2026) identified him as Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a Kyiv diving instructor, and reported that at the time of his arrest he was working as a consultant on the set of Snake Island, a Hollywood dramatisation of the pipeline bombings directed by Doug Liman and starring Sean Penn and Adrien Brody. The detail is colourful, but the legally significant fact is different: this man had already been arrested on the German warrant once before, in Poland in 2024, and had evaded detention and returned to Ukraine before the Polish courts ruled.

The Croatian phase is now moving. The suspect, according to wire reports, was placed in pre-trial detention in Croatia while the court decides on his extradition to Germany. German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt confirmed that Berlin is pressing for surrender, saying the government has a strong interest in establishing the facts and in bringing the perpetrators to Germany to face justice there. His Polish defence lawyer, Tymoteusz Paprocki, immediately raised the argument that will dominate the Croatian proceedings: that a Croatian court ruling on the warrant now would amount, in substance, to ruling on something already decided in Poland, another Member State of the European Union. Whether that objection succeeds depends on legal questions on which European courts have just given flatly contradictory answers.

B. Why Poland Refused While Italy Surrendered: The Three Fault Lines in the Warrant System

The Polish and Italian rulings on the German Nord Stream warrants read like decisions from two different legal orders (eucrim, Max Planck Institute, January 2026), and understanding why is the key to the whole affair. In Poland, the Regional Court in Warsaw refused on 17 October 2025 to extradite the 46-year-old Ukrainian identified as Volodymyr Z. and lifted his pre-trial detention. The court gave two principal reasons. First, it held that the conduct, viewed as an act carried out within a just defensive war waged by Ukraine, was not a crime under Polish law, so that double criminality, the requirement that the facts be punishable in both states, was not established. Second, it denied that Germany had jurisdiction at all over explosions committed in international waters, suggesting that jurisdiction belonged to an international tribunal for armed conflicts at sea or to an ad hoc tribunal appointed by the United Nations. Both holdings are extraordinary within the European arrest warrant system, and both were rejected elsewhere.

In Italy, the same German investigation produced the opposite outcome. The Bologna Court of Appeal first authorised surrender, saw its decision annulled on a procedural ground concerning the remote participation of the requested person, and then re-ordered surrender on 23 October 2025. On 19 November 2025, the Italian Court of Cassation confirmed the surrender in judgment 37897/25, and the suspect was handed over to Germany on 27 November 2025. The Italian supreme court’s reasoning, analysed in depth by commentators (Canestrini Lex, commentary on Cass. 37897/25), closes nearly every door the Polish court had opened. On functional immunity, it held that the immunity of state organs under customary international law can be invoked in warrant proceedings only where it is rigorously demonstrated that the conduct was carried out as an official act of a foreign state, and that generic references to military status, press investigations or hypothetical attributions to the state of origin are not enough. On the political offence objection, it held that since the 2021 reform of the Italian implementing statute, the political nature of the offence is no longer an autonomous ground for refusing a European arrest warrant, and that political motivation matters only where there is a concrete risk of discriminatory prosecution incompatible with fundamental rights. On detention conditions and the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, it held that specific, up-to-date information supplied by the issuing state on cell size, occupancy and prison regime can prevail over older general monitoring reports. On successive decisions, it held the point most relevant to Croatia today: where one Member State has refused to execute a warrant on the same facts, the executing authority of a second Member State is not bound to follow that refusal and must only take its reasons into account, in the light of mutual trust, before departing from it on a reasoned assessment of the case.

Germany’s own Federal Court of Justice then settled the domestic side in January 2026, dismissing the complaint of the suspect surrendered from Italy against his arrest warrant. It confirmed both the strong suspicion of offences within the federal prosecution’s jurisdiction and the risk of flight, rejected the immunity and combatant-privilege defences, and grounded German territorial jurisdiction in the result of the offence: the pipelines were rendered inoperable where they end, on German territory. Three fault lines therefore run through the European case law. Double criminality and the just-war justification divided Warsaw from every other court. Jurisdiction over sabotage committed outside any state’s territorial waters divides the Polish view from the German effects-based answer. And the authority of a first refusal in one Member State when a second Member State is seised divides the defence’s reading of finality from the Italian and now European mainstream, which treats the second court as free to decide differently. Each of these fault lines would be tested again if the warrant arrived in France, and French law answers each of them in its own way.

II. What Would Happen If the German Warrant Landed in France

A. How a French Court Checks a German Warrant Before Surrendering Anyone

French extradition lawyers begin every European arrest warrant file with the same definition, because it allocates every later role. Under Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” In plain terms, the warrant is a judicial decision, not a diplomatic request: the French executing judge does not retry the German investigation, and the German description of the facts and of the penalty governs, within limits that are listed exhaustively by statute. The warrant must contain, under Article 695-13, the identity and nationality of the person, the issuing authority, the enforceable judgment or arrest warrant behind it, the nature and legal qualification of the offence, the date, place and circumstances of the facts, the degree of participation of the person, and the penalty imposed or provided for. A defence team in Paris therefore starts by auditing the warrant’s contents against that checklist, because a warrant that does not say precisely what the person is accused of, where, and with what role, cannot be executed.

The procedure that follows is fast and unforgiving. After arrest, the person appears before the chambre de l’instruction, which verifies identity, collects observations on the proceedings and asks whether the person consents to surrender. The Cour de cassation clarified the exact nature of that first hearing in its ruling of 29 July 2026: “L’audition de la personne recherchée en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen par la chambre de l’instruction, en application de l’article 695-30 du code de procédure pénale, ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise, de sorte que cette formalité est préliminaire à tout débat.” If the person consents, and the legal conditions are met, the court records the consent and grants surrender within seven days, with no appeal. If the person refuses consent, the court rules within twenty days, and that decision can be challenged before the Cour de cassation. The practical lesson is brutal: consent is irrevocable, it also opens the question of waiving the specialty rule that would otherwise protect the person against prosecution for other pre-surrender offences, and it must never be given without advice. Under Article 695-46, any later German request to prosecute for offences other than those that motivated the surrender, or to re-surrender the person to a third state, comes back to the same French chambre de l’instruction, which is why the specialty decision taken in the first week can shape the entire German trial.

On the merits, the French court runs through closed lists of refusal grounds, and this is where the Nord Stream defences would live or die. Refusal is mandatory in the cases of Article 695-22, which include the European ne bis in idem rule: surrender must be refused “Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen”, provided that, in case of conviction, the sentence has been executed, is being executed or can no longer be executed. Refusal is optional in the cases of Article 695-24, which include pending French proceedings for the same facts, the commission of the facts in whole or in part on French territory, and offences committed outside the issuing state’s territory where French law would not allow prosecution for extraterritorial facts. Double criminality sits in Article 695-23: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.” But the same article removes that control for serious cases: “un mandat d’arrêt européen est exécuté sans contrôle de la double incrimination des faits reprochés lorsque les agissements considérés sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à trois ans d’emprisonnement ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté d’une durée similaire et entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions prévues par l’article 694-32”, with the issuing state’s legal qualification then falling within its exclusive appreciation.

Applied to a Nord Stream file, that exception would almost certainly switch off the double-criminality debate that won the day in Warsaw. Article 694-32 lists thirty-two categories, and two of them fit the pipeline blasts on their face: “2° Terrorisme” and “32° Sabotage”. Germany punishes the charged sabotage and explosives offences with well over three years’ imprisonment, so a French court would execute the warrant without asking whether French law criminalises the same facts in the same way. And even if the control applied, French law would easily be satisfied: Article 421-1 of the Penal Code defines as terrorism, where intentionally connected with an individual or collective enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror, offences including “Les vols, les extorsions, les destructions, dégradations et détériorations” and explosives offences, while Article 322-6 punishes “La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui par l’effet d’une substance explosive, d’un incendie ou de tout autre moyen de nature à créer un danger pour les personnes” with ten years’ imprisonment and a 150,000 euro fine, and Article 322-1 covers ordinary destruction of another’s property. The just-war reasoning of the Warsaw court has no equivalent in the French statute: the closed lists contain no general justification for acts committed in a foreign defensive war, and the abolition of the political-offence exception between Member States, which the Italian Court of Cassation confirmed for its own system, applies identically in France. Jurisdiction would be examined only through the narrow French prisms of Article 695-24, facts committed on French territory or extraterritorial offences France could not prosecute, and neither helps a suspect whose alleged facts unfolded between Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Poland.

B. What Paris Just Decided: Second Warrants, Health Claims and the Limits of Mutual Trust

The decisive reason French lawyers can now predict the outcome of a Nord Stream-type file with unusual confidence is that the Cour de cassation decided the two closest possible cases in the summer of 2026, and both pushed toward surrender. The facts will be familiar to anyone who followed the Romanian press: a European arrest warrant issued by Romania for the execution of a three-year-and-four-month sentence imposed in June 2019 by the Brasov Court of Appeal for influence peddling and complicity in abuse of office, a requested person arrested at home in France, and successive French rulings first refusing, then authorising surrender. The press reported the final rejection of 29 July 2026 as the end of the Paul of Romania extradition saga, and the published rulings match that file in every verifiable detail.

The first ruling, dated 6 August 2025, pourvoi number 25-84.847, quashed a Paris refusal to surrender. The chambre de l’instruction had refused surrender by invoking, without citing them, elements outside European Union law: the age of the facts, the state of health, a succession dispute, and the deletion of the Interpol notice. The criminal chamber answered with the principle that now governs every French surrender hearing: “Sous réserve du respect des droits fondamentaux de la personne recherchée et des principes juridiques fondamentaux consacrés par l’article 6 du Traité sur l’Union européenne, garanti par l’article 1, § 3, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil, du 13 juin 2002, relative au mandat d’arrêt européen et aux procédures de remise entre Etats membres, telle que modifiée par la décision-cadre 2009/299/JAI du Conseil du 26 février 2009, l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne saurait être refusée pour des motifs autres que ceux que prévoient la décision-cadre et les textes pris pour son application.” In other words, mutual trust is the rule, the statutory lists are exhaustive, and a court that wants to refuse must anchor its refusal in a listed ground, with full reasoning capable of review. Health alone, age of the facts alone, or the removal of an Interpol notice, which is a police-cooperation instrument distinct from the judicial warrant, cannot carry a refusal. A defence team that wishes to argue detention conditions or medical incompatibility must therefore produce objective, precise and current evidence about the issuing state’s prisons and hospitals, request supplementary information from the issuing authority, and tie every factual claim to Article 3 of the European Convention or to a listed statutory ground, because anything else will be quashed.

The second ruling, dated 29 July 2026, pourvoi number 26-84.072, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR01161, rejected the final appeal and authorised surrender under a second Romanian warrant issued in January 2025 for the same sentence, after a first warrant had been definitively refused in November 2023. It contains three holdings that translate directly to the Croatian phase of the Nord Stream case. First, on finality: “l’arrêt susmentionné en date du 29 novembre 2023 portait sur un mandat d’arrêt européen distinct, de sorte que, faute d’objet identique, son autorité ne peut être opposée à l’examen du mandat d’arrêt européen objet de la présente instance.” A refusal decides one warrant, not the underlying liability, and a new warrant reopens the examination, particularly where, as here, the issuing state produces new material, in that case documents on the composition of the sentencing court, assessed in the light of the Court of Justice’s Breian judgment of 29 July 2024, case C-318/24. Second, on double jeopardy: “la procédure relative à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis en vue de l’exécution d’une décision de condamnation ne constitue pas une poursuite nouvelle pour les faits objet de cette condamnation, de sorte que le principe ne bis in idem ne lui est pas applicable.” Surrender proceedings are not a second prosecution, so the Polish lawyer’s objection in Pula, that Croatia would be re-deciding what Poland decided, faces the same wall in French reasoning that it faces in the Italian case law: the second court takes the first court’s reasons into account but decides freely. Third, on fundamental rights: the court verified that the Paris judges had examined and dismissed, in separate reasoning, each alleged violation of the rights protected by Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision. Scrutiny is real, but it is structured scrutiny, ground by ground, not a general retrial of the foreign case.

For a suspect in the position of the Pula detainee, the French playbook that emerges is therefore precise. Challenge the warrant’s formal contents under Article 695-13 before anything else. Never consent to surrender or waive specialty without a full map of German exposure, because consent is irrevocable and unappealable within seven days. Do not spend the twenty-day contested phase on the just-war or political-offence theories that succeeded only in Warsaw: French statute and the 2025 to 2026 case law leave them no room. Concentrate instead on the three grounds French courts still genuinely examine: a true European ne bis in idem bar supported by a final decision on the same facts and the same person, with proof of execution or non-enforceability of any sentence; a documented, individualised risk of inhuman or degrading detention or of medical incompatibility, built on current evidence and tested through requests for supplementary information to the issuing state; and any listed Article 695-24 ground such as concurrent French proceedings or partial commission on French territory. Everything else, however passionately argued, runs into the sentence with which Paris now closes these cases: outside the listed grounds, surrender cannot be refused.

Conclusion

The Nord Stream warrants have turned the European arrest warrant into a natural experiment. Poland refused on double criminality and jurisdiction, Italy surrendered after testing immunity, political offence, detention conditions and successive decisions one by one, Germany confirmed its jurisdiction through the effects felt where the pipelines end, and Croatia must now decide whether a Polish refusal binds a Croatian court. The French answer to each question is already written: the sabotage and terrorism categories switch off double-criminality review, extraterritorial jurisdiction objections fit none of the French refusal grounds, political justification has no statutory home, a first refusal in one Member State does not bar a second examination, and surrender proceedings are not a second prosecution. The Pula court’s decision, expected in the coming weeks, will show whether Croatia follows the Italian-French mainstream or the Polish exception. Either way, the file proves the point Paris made twice this summer: within the warrant system, mutual trust is not a slogan but a rule of decision, and only listed grounds, proven with current evidence, can displace it.

📄 Official circular