On 9 September 2026, in Luxembourg, the General Court of the European Union dismissed the third legal challenge brought by Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich against the European Union sanctions imposed on him after the invasion of Ukraine. Press Release No 124/26 announcing the judgment in Case T-358/25, Abramovich v Council, records that the Court dismissed the action and upheld the restrictive measures taken against him. For anyone whose funds, shares, real estate or business interests are frozen in France under the same European sanctions regime, this judgment is the most important document of the autumn. It explains, in unusual detail, how the Luxembourg judges test an individual listing, which arguments fail, and which narrow doors remain open.
This analysis is written from Paris for an international audience: executives, shareholders, family members, bankers and advisers who discover that an EU listing reaches directly into French bank accounts, Paris apartments, company shares and notarial transactions. The French lawyer’s perspective matters here because the European freeze bites in France through a specific national machinery, with its own publication rules, its own enforcement by banks and land registries, and its own case law on what a freeze does and does not excuse. The 9 September judgment confirms the listing; it does not end the legal conversation. A parallel ruling delivered one week later, on 16 September 2026, annulled part of another listing in the same sanctions family, proving that well-aimed challenges can still succeed.
The stakes go far beyond one billionaire. The criterion that keeps Abramovich on the list, the leading-businessperson test, applies to dozens of designated persons with French assets. The reasoning on evidence, periodic review and proportionality will shape every pending and future challenge. And the French courts have already shown, in a landmark 2020 ruling, how strictly they interpret the effects of a freeze once it lands in France. What follows is a close reading of the judgment, then a practical map of the two battlefields that count: Luxembourg, where listings are annulled, and Paris, where frozen life must be managed.
I. Why the General Court Kept Roman Abramovich on the EU Sanctions List
A. The Leading Businessperson Test: Evraz Steel, Norilsk Nickel and a Substantial Revenue Stream for Moscow
The Council did not list Abramovich for something he personally did on a battlefield. It listed him under a criterion introduced in June 2023 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023 and Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023, which target leading businesspersons active in economic sectors that provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian government. The Court recalls that after the attack launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Council froze the funds of leading businesspersons falling under that definition and barred their entry into and transit through the European Union. Understanding this criterion is essential, because it is the legal engine of the judgment and of many parallel listings affecting assets in France.
The Court first validated the criterion itself. The designation criteria, the judges held, come under the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council in foreign policy matters, and they are objective, sufficiently precise and proportionate. Two reasons support that finding: first, the criteria specifically target leading businesspersons operating in Russia, against the background that the main economic operators there have close ties to the state; second, they catch persons active in sectors generating significant revenue for the Russian government, defined as activities of non-negligible importance that fund the government’s actions and policies. In plain terms, Luxembourg accepts that in the Russian economic system, size plus sector equals a presumption of relevance to the war effort, and it leaves the Council wide room to draw that line.
Abramovich argued that he was being exploited on account of his public notoriety, that fame rather than economic function explained his designation. The Court rejected that reading outright: it was the application of those criteria to the scale of his capital holdings that led to the measures, not any desire to exploit his public notoriety, as he had argued. The message for other listed persons is blunt. Complaining about selective media exposure achieves nothing. The only question the Court asks is whether the shareholdings and the sector match the criterion.
On the facts, the match was, in the Court’s eyes, overwhelming. Abramovich is, in fact, the majority shareholder in Evraz, the parent company of one of Russia’s leading steel and mining groups. He also owns a shareholding in Norilsk Nickel, one of the world’s foremost palladium producers and a major player in refined nickel. Those activities, the judgment continues, which together represent a substantial source of revenue for the Russian government. Steel and mining are textbook examples of the sectors the 2023 criterion aims at, and majority control of Evraz places the applicant at the very centre of the target the Council described.
The judgment also closes two evidentiary escape routes that advisers often explore. First, the applicant could not show that selling his Evraz stake was a realistic option: the Court found that he had failed to show that selling his Evraz shares was impossible. The figure behind that finding is striking. According to the Evraz annual report for 2021, steel revenues accounted for 66.3 percent of the group’s annual revenue in 2021, according to the Evraz annual report cited by the Court. A holding of that weight in a sector of that weight cannot be waved away as passive or marginal. Second, the Court recalled the procedural history: By judgments of 20 December 2023 and 10 September 2025, the General Court had already dismissed his earlier actions in Cases T-313/22 and T-1105/23. The September 2026 ruling is therefore the third consecutive defeat on the same factual core, each time under renewed listing acts. Repetition matters. Every dismissal thickens the file the next chamber will read, and every renewed act gives the Council a chance to repair the statement of reasons. A challenger who simply replays the previous case should expect the same result.
For holders of frozen assets in France, the lesson of this first part is diagnostic. Before spending resources on a challenge, test the file against the criterion honestly. Are the holdings controlling or merely portfolio investments. Is the sector one the Council treats as a revenue source for Moscow. Can divestiture be documented with bank mandates, refused bids and regulatory blocks, rather than asserted. The Abramovich file failed each of those filters, and the Court said so step by step. A file that passes them looks very different, as the ruling of the following week demonstrated.
B. Why the 2025 Renewal Acts Survived Review: Periodic Reassessment, Proportionality and Fundamental Rights
European listings are not frozen in time. The Council must re-examine them at regular intervals, and each renewal is a new legal act that can be challenged separately. In this case, after receiving the observations submitted by Abramovich, the Council adopted new acts extending the measures, thus prolonging the measures, first until 15 September 2025, through Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025, then until 15 March 2026, through Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 of 12 September 2025. These are the very acts the September 2026 judgment upholds. The detail matters for practitioners: the six-month renewal cycle means a listed person with property in France faces a moving target, and each cycle opens a fresh two-month window to bring an action in Luxembourg.
The Court gave real weight to the periodic review. It noted that the proportionality of the measures and of the criteria rests in part on their confirmation at periodic review, since the underlying factual context had not changed. Where the factual context has not changed, the Council is entitled to maintain the listing without reinventing its reasoning from scratch. The applicant had argued, in substance, that time itself should erode the justification. The answer is that time only helps if the facts move: a genuine exit from the sector, a completed sale of the controlling stake, a documented loss of influence. Abramovich, the Court found, he had failed to put forward any less restrictive alternative capable of achieving the objectives pursued. Courts cannot invent a softer measure the applicant never sketches.
The fundamental-rights objection received the same methodical treatment. Sanctions restrict property, movement and business, and the Court measured those restrictions against the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees everyone’s right to enjoy, use, dispose of and bequeath lawfully acquired property, while allowing regulation of the use of property in the general interest. The judgment concludes that the measures the measures satisfy EU law requirements for restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the free movement of EU citizens. Three elements carry that conclusion: the restrictions they rest on a legislative basis that clearly and precisely defines their scope; they they respect the essence of his free-movement rights because they provide for exemptions and periodic review; and and they are proportionate and appropriate to the goal of promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Ukraine. Derogations and reviews are doing heavy lifting in that paragraph. The system is deemed tolerable precisely because it contains safety valves: humanitarian and basic-needs authorizations, periodic re-examination, and judicial review. A challenge that ignores those valves, treating the freeze as an absolute confiscation, misdescribes the measure and loses credibility.
One further procedural point deserves attention from international readers. The press release closes with the standard notice: An appeal limited to points of law may be brought before the Court of Justice within two months and ten days of notification of the judgment. An appeal is not a retrial. The Court of Justice will not reweigh the Evraz shareholding or revisit the nickel market. It will only sanction errors of law: a misreading of the listing criterion, a breach of the rights of the defence, a failure to state reasons. After three consistent defeats on the facts, the corridor for an appeal looks narrow, and the two-month-and-ten-day clock runs fast. Anyone advising a listed person must calendar that deadline on the day the judgment is notified, while simultaneously preparing the next annulment action against the following renewal, because the March 2026 expiry will itself be replaced by a new act.
The combined effect of the two halves of Part I is a clear hierarchy of arguments. Attacks on the criterion in the abstract fail against the Council’s broad discretion. Attacks on the facts fail without hard evidence of disengagement. Attacks on proportionality fail where derogations and reviews exist. What remains is the precise, evidence-heavy, act-by-act challenge: the right plea, against the right renewal act, within the time limit, with documents the Council has actually seen. That is the Luxembourg route, and it is examined next.
II. How to Fight an EU Listing When Your Assets Are Frozen in France
A. The Luxembourg Route: Annulment Actions, Deadlines and the Evidence That Wins
The Treaty gives every listed person a direct path to the Luxembourg courts. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union opens annulment actions for lack of competence, breach of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers, and Article 275 of the same Treaty adds the sanctions-specific key, empowering the Court to rule on actions brought under the conditions of Article 263(4) for review of the legality of decisions imposing restrictive measures on natural or legal persons. In practical terms, four pleas carry most cases: lack of competence, breach of essential procedural requirements including the duty to state reasons and respect the rights of the defence, infringement of the Treaties and the Charter, and misuse of powers. The Abramovich judgment shows each of them failing on a strong-evidence file. The companion case law of September 2026 shows them succeeding on a weak-evidence file.
Timing is the first discipline. The Treaty sets a strict two-month time limit running, depending on the case, from publication of the act, its notification to the applicant or, failing those, the day the applicant learned of it. Two months from publication in the Official Journal or from notification is brutally short for building an economic-evidence file across several countries. The professional reflex must therefore be inverted: do not wait for the renewal to start working. Maintain a standing delisting file, update it at every renewal cycle, submit observations to the Council before each rollover so that the file the judges will read already contains your documents, and file the action the moment the new act appears. Miss the window and the renewal becomes unchallengeable, however weak its reasoning.
The second discipline is evidentiary. Compare the two outcomes of September 2026. Abramovich lost on 9 September because the Council’s file contained majority control of a steel giant, a significant palladium and nickel position, and a 66.3 percent steel-revenue footprint, while his file contained no completed divestiture and no less-restrictive alternative. One week later, on 16 September 2026, the same court dismissed Roman Trotsenko’s action in Case T-459/24 and, in the same breath, annulled the later listings of Polina Gagarina under the EU restrictive measures concerning Ukraine. Specialist EU litigation coverage summed up the double ruling as a dismissal for Trotsenko paired with annulment for Gagarina’s later listings (EU Law Live, 16 September 2026). Sanctions press coverage confirms that the Court dismissed Roman Trotsenko’s application to annul his Russia sanctions designation in Trotsenko v Council, T-459/24, a case in which the Council had listed him in 2024 (Global Sanctions, 18 September 2026). Two files, two outcomes, one lesson: where the Council’s evidence of control and economic function is thin, dated or contradicted by the applicant’s documents, the plea of manifest error of assessment can win, and it wins act by act, which is why only the later Gagarina listings fell. Our newsroom has covered that twin ruling and its French consequences in detail, and readers challenging a listing should study it alongside the Abramovich judgment as the pair that now defines the frontier between losing and winning files.
The third discipline is pleading precision. Each renewal is a separate act with its own statement of reasons, and the Court reviews the act actually challenged, not the sanctions policy in general. Recycled pleas copied from a previous lost case invite summary rejection. Winning pleas attach to the specific evidence the Council relied on for that specific renewal: a shareholding that has changed, a resignation that has taken effect, a company sold, a sector reclassified, a Council letter that repeats reasons the facts no longer support. Rights-of-the-defence pleas work when the applicant can show the Council relied on material never disclosed for comment. Failure-to-state-reasons pleas work when the listing letter is a template without individualised explanation. Proportionality pleas work when the applicant proposes a concrete, less restrictive alternative and shows why it achieves the same objective. Abramovich proposed none, and the Court noticed.
A final Luxembourg note concerns sequencing with French proceedings. An annulment action in Luxembourg does not automatically suspend the freeze in Paris. Funds stay frozen, banks keep blocking, notaries keep refusing, until an annulment or an authorization says otherwise. That is why the Paris track must run in parallel from day one, which is the subject of the second half of this part. Readers who want the broader picture of frozen Russian wealth held in Europe, including the debate over using immobilised assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction, will find it in our companion analysis of the European reparation-loan mechanism and the legal avenues to challenge it from France.
B. The Paris Route: What a European Freeze Means Day to Day in France
European regulations apply directly in France, but their daily enforcement runs through French hands: the banks that block the accounts, the notaries who halt the sales, the land registries that record the freeze, and the ministers who administer the national machinery. French monetary and financial law builds a complete scaffolding around the European acts. Article L562-2 of the Code monetaire et financier provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to or controlled by persons involved in terrorism financing. Alongside it, article L562-3 of the same Code covers the international track: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to persons designated under “les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne”. An EU listing therefore triggers, in France, a coordinated national freeze renewable every six months, mirroring the European six-month renewal cycle described in Part I.
The circle of persons bound by the freeze is deliberately vast. Article L562-4 of the Code monetaire et financier states that “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre”, and it binds every natural person on national territory as well as the entities listed in the anti-money-laundering provisions and any company operating in France, including branches of foreign groups. In practice, that means a Paris bank freezes the accounts the morning the EU act is published, a French insurer suspends the policies, and a notary in Paris or on the Cote d’Azur refuses to complete the sale of an apartment owned through a listed person’s holding structure. Article L562-5 of the same Code adds the prohibition that makes the freeze airtight: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel”. No direct payments, no indirect arrangements, no use of the frozen resources for the benefit of the designated person. Family members, business partners and advisers who route around the freeze expose themselves to criminal liability, which is why every step in Paris must pass through the authorization channels rather than around them.
Publicity completes the machinery. Article L562-9 of the Code monetaire et financier provides that “Les décisions des ministres arrêtées en application des articles L. 562-2 , L. 562-2-1 , L. 562-2-2 et L. 562-3 sont publiées par extrait au Journal officiel et sont exécutoires à compter de leur date de publication.” Publication starts the clock and fixes opposability. Article L562-8 of the same Code allows the freeze to be entered in the land registration systems: the measures “peuvent, à la demande du ministre chargé de l’économie, être publiées au fichier immobilier ou au livre foncier dont dépend le bien immobilier appartenant à la personne dont les fonds et ressources économiques sont gelés”, with a parallel mechanism for vehicle registration certificates. A listed person who owns a Paris apartment or a villa held through a French property company will therefore find the freeze recorded against the property itself, blocking any discreet sale. And article L562-10 of the Code monetaire et financier warns third parties that “Les mesures prises en vertu du présent chapitre sont opposables à tout tiers qui peut invoquer un droit sur les fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel, y compris lorsque ce droit est né antérieurement auxdites mesures.” A mortgage, pledge or claim born before the freeze does not defeat it. Creditors of a listed person must therefore adapt their enforcement strategy instead of assuming their anterior rights will prevail.
French case law adds a severity that foreign readers often underestimate. In a landmark ruling delivered in Assemblee pleniere on 10 July 2020, the Court of Cassation held, in the Bank Sepah litigation, that “Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités” (Cass., Ass. plen., 10 July 2020, Nos 18-18.542 and 18-21.814). A frozen debtor therefore keeps bearing default interest while the accounts stay blocked. The freeze is no excuse for non-performance where the measure targets the debtor’s own activities, because the exteriority required for force majeure is missing. For listed persons with French judgments, loans or contractual penalties running against them, the meter keeps turning while the accounts stay blocked. Negotiating standstills with creditors is therefore as urgent as fighting the listing itself.
Against that strict background, the European regulation itself provides the only lawful breathing space: prior administrative authorization. Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, in its consolidated version applicable in France, allows national competent authorities to authorise the release of frozen funds where they are “nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins essentiels des personnes physiques ou morales, des entités ou des organismes énumérés à l’annexe I et des membres de la famille des personnes physiques qui sont à leur charge, notamment pour le paiement des vivres, des loyers ou des mensualités de prêts hypothécaires, des médicaments et des traitements médicaux, des impôts, des primes d’assurance et des factures de services d’utilité publique”. The same article covers sums “destinés exclusivement au règlement d’honoraires d’un montant raisonnable ou au remboursement de dépenses engagées pour s’assurer le service de juristes” (Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, consolidated version). Two lifelines follow for anyone frozen in France. First, daily life can be funded through a reasoned application to the competent French authority, documented expense by expense: rent for the Paris residence, school and medical costs, taxes, insurance. Second, and strategically vital, legal fees for challenging the listing can themselves be authorised, so the freeze does not silence the right to a defence. Applications must be precise, quantified and renewed as needed, because each authorization is specific and conditional.
The practical sequence in Paris therefore runs as follows. First, map everything: accounts, securities, crypto held through French platforms, real estate and the companies that hold it, insurance contracts, receivables owed by French debtors. Second, notify and regularise: inform the banks in writing, stop all prohibited movements, record the freeze with the notary handling any pending transaction so that no party signs an impossible deed. Third, apply for authorizations covering basic needs and legal fees before cash runs out, because urgency strengthens the file. Fourth, open the Luxembourg track within the two-month window of the next renewal, with the standing evidence file described above. Fifth, manage creditors in light of the Bank Sepah rule: interest accrues, so negotiate suspensions referencing the freeze rather than defaulting silently. Readers facing the mirror-image problem, a company frozen merely because of a presumed link to a listed shareholder, should read our analysis of how to rebut the European fifty-percent control presumption and release the company’s accounts from France. And where the difficulty is a French bank blocking funds by mistaken identity with a sanctioned name, our guide to proving you are not the designated person sets out the homonymy procedure step by step.
A final Paris note for international readers. Sanctions files with French assets concentrate naturally in Paris and the Ile-de-France region: the major banks’ sanctions-compliance departments sit there, the competent ministries and the Treasury offices that process authorizations are there, and the notarial and property machinery for high-value Paris real estate operates there. Building the file where the assets and the decision-makers are avoids months of correspondence between jurisdictions. A listed person who keeps a Paris apartment, accounts in Paris banks and counsel in Paris can run the Luxembourg challenge, the French authorization requests and the creditor negotiations from a single command post, with documents, translations and bailiff-level proof gathered to French evidentiary standards.
Conclusion
The General Court’s judgment of 9 September 2026 in Abramovich v Council is a defeat for one man and a manual for everyone else. It confirms that the leading-businessperson criterion survives substantive review, that majority control of a steel and mining giant plus a palladium and nickel footprint satisfies it, that renewals stand where the facts stand still, and that proportionality is secured by derogations, periodic review and judicial access. It also confirms, by contrast with the Gagarina annulments of 16 September 2026, that thin or outdated Council evidence still loses. The frontier is now drawn with unusual clarity: files built on notoriety complaints and recycled pleas will keep losing, while files built on documented disengagement, act-specific pleas and strict deadline discipline can win.
For holders of assets frozen in France, the judgment changes nothing on the ground today and everything about strategy tomorrow. The freeze remains fully enforceable through the French monetary and financial machinery, interest keeps running under the Bank Sepah rule, and third-party rights do not pierce the measures. But the authorization channels for basic needs and legal fees remain open, the next renewal will open a fresh two-month window in Luxembourg, and every renewal forces the Council to justify itself again. The winning posture is therefore dual from the start: manage the frozen present in Paris with rigorous applications and creditor diplomacy, while preparing the Luxembourg challenge as a standing, evidence-rich file rather than a last-minute reaction. Sanctions litigation is a long game of renewals, and the players who treat each six-month cycle as a new trial are the ones who eventually leave the list.