On 18 and 19 December 2025, European Union leaders took a decision that reshaped the financial war over Ukraine without settling it. They agreed to borrow on the markets to lend 90 billion euros to Kyiv for 2026 and 2027, and they gave the European Commission a mandate to keep working on a far more radical option: a reparations loan built on immobilised Russian sovereign assets. Around 300 billion euros of Russian assets are immobilised worldwide, more than half of them inside Euroclear in Belgium. France holds its share of frozen Russian money, property and securities, in Paris banks, in company registries and in court files. For account holders, creditors, banks and listed persons in France, the Brussels saga is not abstract diplomacy. It decides whether a frozen account can be touched, seized, licensed or lent, and by whom.
This article explains what the December 2025 deal actually decided, what the reparations loan would mean in French law, and what French courts already do with frozen foreign assets. The Court of Cassation settled two decisive points in the last six years: prescription stops running while assets are frozen, and no enforcement measure, not even a conservatory one, can be taken on frozen funds without the prior authorisation of the French Treasury. The Paris enforcement judge applied that rule to Iraqi assets in February 2025, and the Second Civil Chamber confirmed it for Libyan sovereign funds in February 2026. Anyone with frozen assets in France, or with a claim against a sanctioned debtor, needs to understand this machinery now, because the reparations loan debate will put it under unprecedented strain.
I. Can the European Union Use Frozen Russian Assets to Pay for Ukraine
A. What the December 2025 Deal Decided: a 90 Billion Loan Now and a Reparations Loan Still on the Table
By late 2025 Ukraine was expected to run out of funds early in 2026 without new support, and the European Parliament had repeatedly demanded that immobilised Russian assets be used for Ukraine’s defence. On 3 December 2025 the European Commission unveiled a package of five legislative proposals built around two options for 2026 and 2027: a reparations loan that would borrow the cash balances held by banks and financial companies sitting on immobilised Russian central bank assets, or joint EU borrowing guaranteed by the headroom in the EU budget. The briefing of the European Parliamentary Research Service describes both options and notes that Belgium continues to resist any use of the immobilised assets, recently backed by Italy and Bulgaria, while Hungary opposes any further support through the budget headroom, which would require a unanimous amendment. Read the briefing here: Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027: Reparations loan, revision of long-term budget ceilings.
At the summit of 18 and 19 December 2025, leaders chose the cautious path. As Reuters reported from Brussels, they decided to borrow cash to lend 90 billion euros, about 105 billion dollars, to Ukraine for the next two years rather than use frozen Russian assets, sidestepping divisions over what diplomats called too controversial a plan for a quick decision. Belgium demanded guarantees against potential Russian legal claims, and one stated aim was to counter claims that Europe is weak. The full report is here: EU leaders will loan 90 billion euros to Ukraine, but fail to agree to use frozen Russian assets. The reparations loan was not buried. Leaders mandated the Commission to keep working on it, with Belgium’s approval identified as the key. The Jacques Delors Institute summarises the saga and recalls that the Commission president had argued that the cash balances attached to those assets could support a reparations loan, a plan that met resistance over its economic and legal risks, before the European Council of 23 October 2025 asked the Commission to return with more financing options: EU support to Ukraine in 2026: the saga of the reparations loan.
Three legal knots explain the deadlock, and each of them runs through France. First, immobilisation is not confiscation. EU sanctions freeze Russian central bank reserves; they do not transfer ownership. Turning cash balances into a loan to Ukraine, repayable only if Russia pays reparations, would move the European Union from freezing to using someone else’s property, with sovereign immunity and the protection of property as the obvious lines of counterattack. Second, the money sits in private hands under national law. Euroclear in Brussels holds the largest share, but French banks, custodians and companies also hold frozen Russian cash, securities and revenues, and any loan mechanism would need to borrow those balances through institutions supervised in each Member State, under each national freeze regime. Third, unanimity governs sanctions decisions while budget solutions need their own majorities, which is why Hungary’s opposition to the headroom option and Belgium’s demand for guarantees have pushed the file into 2026 without a final instrument. Our analysis of the September 2026 sanctions rollover, when 3,000 Russia listings survived on a seven-day truce, shows how fragile unanimity has become: Midnight on 22 September: 3,000 EU Russia Listings Survive on a Seven-Day Truce.
B. What Already Flows to Ukraine: Windfall Profits Separated From Frozen Principal
What the European Union has already done is legally distinct from the reparations loan, and the distinction matters for every file in France. In 2024 the Council decided that the extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian assets would be separated from the frozen principal and largely earmarked for military assistance to Ukraine. The Jacques Delors Institute records the sequence: the Council decided that frozen assets and the profits they generate were to be managed separately, and then that most of those profits would fund EU military assistance. The principal stays frozen. Only the windfall moves. That architecture was designed precisely to avoid the confiscation objection: the owner keeps title to the assets, while the extraordinary income produced by their immobilisation is skimmed off.
For a French practitioner the lesson is immediate. Interest, dividends and capital gains produced by frozen Russian holdings in a Paris bank are already subject to that separation logic, while the underlying securities and cash remain untouchable without a licence. A client who sees revenues swept away while the account stays blocked is not facing a bank error. That client is facing the 2024 mechanism working as designed. Conversely, a creditor who hopes the reparations loan will somehow unlock Russian money in France for private enforcement misunderstands the instrument completely. The loan, if it ever exists, would channel cash balances to Ukraine’s state budget, not to private creditors, and it would not lift a single freeze. The freezes live in EU regulations that apply directly in France: Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 on individual listings and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 on sectoral measures. France enforces them through its own freeze code, and French courts have spent a decade explaining that enforcement against frozen assets without Treasury authorisation is void. That is the second half of this article.
II. What French Courts Do With Frozen Foreign Assets: No Seizure, No Licence, No Shortcut
A. No Enforcement Without the Treasury: Bank Sepah, the Libyan Sovereign Fund and the Paris Enforcement Judge
French law gives the freeze a national handle that bites every person on the territory. Article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that the ministers for the economy and the interior may jointly order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance acts of terrorism, or by entities owned or controlled by them: « Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent ; 2° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes morales ou toute autre entité elles-mêmes détenues ou contrôlées par les personnes mentionnées au 1° ou agissant sciemment pour le compte ou sur instructions de celles-ci. » Complementing it, Article L. 562-3 of the same code allows the minister for the economy to freeze funds linked to actions sanctioned by Chapter VII United Nations resolutions or by acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: « Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne ». EU regulations apply directly, and these articles are the French machinery that designates the authority, organises the register and punishes evasion.
The landmark French ruling on frozen assets and private creditors is the Assembly plenary judgment of 10 July 2020 in the Bank Sepah case, appeal No. 18-18.542: Assemblée plénière, 10 July 2020, No. 18-18.542, Bank Sepah. Two creditors holding claims predating the 2006 UN resolution against Iran tried to enforce against the frozen funds of the Iranian bank in France. The Court of Cassation rejected their first argument and referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, asking whether the EU freeze regulations must be read as barring, without prior authorisation from the national authority, any non-allocative measure such as a judicial security or a conservatory seizure under the French enforcement code, and whether the fact that the underlying claim predates the sanctions and has nothing to do with the Iranian nuclear programme changes the answer: « 1°) Les articles 1er, sous h) et j), et 7, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) n° 423/2007, 1er, sous i) et h), et 16, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) n° 961/2010 ainsi que 1er, sous k) et j), et 23, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) n° 267/2012 doivent-ils être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à ce que soit diligentée sur des avoirs gelés, sans autorisation préalable de l’autorité nationale compétente, une mesure dépourvue d’effet attributif, telle une sûreté judiciaire ou une saisie conservatoire, prévues par le code des procédures civiles d’exécution français ? 2°) La circonstance que la cause de la créance à recouvrer sur la personne ou l’entité dont les avoirs sont gelés soit étrangère au programme nucléaire et balistique iranien et antérieure à la résolution 1737 (2006) du 23 décembre 2006 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies est-elle pertinente aux fins de répondre à la première question ? » The message for Russian-asset creditors in France is stark. Even a claim that long predates the Ukraine sanctions, even a measure that merely preserves rather than transfers, needs the green light first.
Six years later, the Second Civil Chamber closed the last loophole, in a case about a sovereign wealth fund that reads like a rehearsal for Russian central bank litigation. On 5 February 2026, in appeal No. 23-15.936, the Court ruled on a garnishment served on Société Générale against accounts held in the name of the Libyan Investment Authority, to enforce an arbitral award against the Libyan state: Second Civil Chamber, 5 February 2026, No. 23-15.936, Libyan Investment Authority. The Court recalled that under Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/44 on Libya, all funds belonging to the entities in Annex VI, including the LIA, or held or controlled by them outside Libya on 16 September 2011, remain frozen: « tous les fonds et ressources économiques qui appartiennent aux entités énumérées à l’annexe VI, parmi lesquelles figure la LIA, ou que celles-ci avaient en leur possession, détenaient ou contrôlaient à la date du 16 septembre 2011 et qui se trouvaient en dehors de Libye à cette date, restent gelés. » It then held that no enforcement measure can be taken on frozen funds or resources where it would not only remove them from the debtor’s estate but also give the pursuing creditor a mere preferential right, without prior Treasury authorisation: « que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement. » And it drew the procedural conclusion without appealing to equity: « Il en découle qu’à défaut d’autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, aucune mesure de saisie-attribution, laquelle emporte, à concurrence des sommes pour lesquelles elle est pratiquée, attribution immédiate au profit du saisissant de la créance saisie disponible entre les mains du tiers et de ses accessoires, ne peut être autorisée ou validée par le juge de l’exécution, saisi sur requête en application de l’article L. 111-1-1 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, sur des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel des avoirs en exécution du règlement n° 2016/44. » The competent authority for France, the Court noted, is the Directorate General of the Treasury. Replace Libya with Russia and Société Générale with any Paris custodian, and the template for the coming Russian-asset enforcement wave is complete.
The Paris enforcement judge had already applied exactly that logic to frozen Iraqi assets. On 25 February 2025, in case RG 24/80751 opposing Montana Management Inc. to Instrubel N.V. over seizures served in June and July 2019 and conservatory seizures dating back to January 2014, the judge retracted a 2019 ex parte order and annulled the garnishments, sales of partnership rights, judicial pledges of securities and conversions of conservatory seizures, ordering their full release: Paris Enforcement Judge, 25 February 2025, RG 24/80751, Montana Management v. Instrubel. The operative part retracts the 2019 ex parte order: « RETRACTE l’ordonnance rendue par le juge de l’exécution du tribunal de grande instance de Paris le 29 mai 2019, » then annuls the 2019 seizures: « ANNULE les saisies-attribution, saisie-vente de droits d’associés, nantissements judiciaires de valeurs mobilières et conversion de saisie conservatoires de créances et de valeurs mobilières en date des 27 juin 2019 et 24 juillet 2019, » annuls the 2014 conservatory seizures: « ANNULE les saisies conservatoires de créances et de droits d’associés en date du 20 janvier 2014, » and orders full release: « ORDONNE la mainlevée totale de ces mesures, ». The debtor had even asked for a preliminary reference to the EU Court of Justice on whether Treasury authorisation was truly required before any seizure of sanctioned assets, and the judge decided the existing framework was clear enough to rule. For creditors eyeing frozen Russian holdings in Paris, the precedent could not be more direct: serve first and ask the Treasury later, and the seizure dies.
A related shield protects foreign states themselves. Article L. 111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures states: « Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête. » Any attempt to attach property belonging to the Russian Federation in France, from diplomatic-adjacent real estate to central bank balances, must therefore pass two successive gates: the ex parte leave of the enforcement judge for state property, and the Treasury licence for frozen property. Miss either one and the measure is annulled.
B. Criminal Seizure, European Freezes and Confiscation: the EPPO Precedent, Third-Party Rights and Time Itself Frozen
The criminal side of the machinery is just as unforgiving, and it now operates across borders through the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. On 24 September 2025 the Criminal Chamber dismissed appeal No. 24-82.625, validating a seizure ordered by the French European Delegated Prosecutor and maintained by the liberty and custody judge, in execution of Belgian freezing instructions transmitted through the EPPO: Criminal Chamber, 24 September 2025, No. 24-82.625. The underlying file was a VAT fraud, customs undervaluation and money laundering investigation against a Hong Kong group importing Chinese goods into the European market, with an estimated tax loss for Belgium of 303,346,695 euros for 2019 to 2023. The Belgian delegated prosecutor delegated investigative acts to the French counterpart, who authorised the seizure of 159,322.21 euros from a company account near Paris, while the Namur investigating judge issued a conservatory freezing order and a freezing certificate the same week. The dismissal confirms that a foreign freezing decision channelled through the EPPO can bite a French bank account within days. Sanctions evasion files, which the EPPO and national prosecutors increasingly treat as customs, fraud and laundering cases, will use exactly this channel against frozen Russian circuits in France.
Once seized, property is protected by one of the strongest procedural guarantees in French criminal law, and owners of frozen assets should know it. On 13 December 2023, in appeal No. 22-87.237, the Criminal Chamber quashed a Bordeaux investigating chamber ruling that had rejected a third party’s restitution claim, for breach of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights: Criminal Chamber, 13 December 2023, No. 22-87.237. The Court recalled that every natural or legal person is entitled to respect for their property and that, while states may regulate the use of property in the general interest, the persons concerned must benefit from fair proceedings including adversarial access to the file: « Il résulte de ce texte, tel qu’interprété par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, que toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens et que, si ces dispositions ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possèdent les Etats de mettre en vigueur les lois qu’ils jugent nécessaires pour réglementer l’usage des biens conformément à l’intérêt général, les intéressés doivent bénéficier d’une procédure équitable, qui comprend le droit au caractère contradictoire de l’instance. » A chamber seized with a restitution claim must therefore check that the third party received, in good time, the seizure reports or the special-seizure requisitions and order, plus the precisely identified file documents on which it bases its reasoning. A sanctioned person whose yacht, apartment or shares are seized in a French criminal file is not without weapons. The seizure must be adversarially documented, or it falls.
Two final rules complete the picture, and both favour patience over force. First, confiscation in criminal cases is now the default rather than the exception. Article 131-21 of the Criminal Code provides: « La peine complémentaire de confiscation est encourue dans les cas prévus par la loi ou le règlement. » It applies as of right to felonies and to misdemeanours punished by more than one year of imprisonment, and it reaches every movable or immovable asset that served the offence or was intended to serve it. Sanctions evasion, laundering and customs fraud around frozen Russian assets routinely cross that threshold, which means a criminal conviction in France can do what no private creditor can: transfer title to the state. Second, time itself freezes with the assets. In Bank Sepah the creditors argued that limitation had continued to run, and the plenary Assembly’s reasoning treats the freeze as a legal impossibility to act. Article 2234 of the Civil Code states: « La prescription ne court pas ou est suspendue contre celui qui est dans l’impossibilité d’agir par suite d’un empêchement résultant de la loi, de la convention ou de la force majeure. » A creditor blocked by a freeze does not lose the claim by waiting. The claim sleeps until the freeze lifts or the Treasury licenses enforcement. Filing an unauthorised seizure to stop the clock is worse than useless: it produces an annulled measure and costs.
The General Court’s sanctions case law of 16 September 2026 adds the Luxembourg complement that French files cannot ignore. When the Council’s evidence goes stale, listings fall, as one applicant partly proved that week, and when the file shows ongoing support for the Russian war effort, listings stand, as the other applicant learned the same day: Trotsenko Lost, Gagarina Partly Won: What the EU General Court’s 16 September Sanctions Rulings Mean for Frozen Assets in France. A delisting in Luxembourg does not automatically unblock a Paris account while a later listing remains, and a maintained listing does not dispense a creditor from the Treasury licence. The two tracks, Luxembourg validity and Paris enforceability, run in parallel and must each be won.
Conclusion
The reparations loan is the most ambitious legal engineering the European Union has attempted since the first Russia sanctions of 2014. It would borrow the cash balances of immobilised Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine, with Russia’s hypothetical future reparations as the only repayment horizon. The December 2025 summit chose 90 billion euros of joint borrowing first and left the loan on the drafting table, because Belgium wants guarantees against Russian lawsuits, Hungary blocks the budget alternative, and no one has solved the confiscation objection. The 2024 windfall-profits mechanism shows the lawful outer boundary so far: skim the extraordinary revenues, never touch the principal.
In France that boundary is enforced by judges who have already written the script for the Russian-asset decade. No conservatory or enforcement measure on frozen funds without prior Treasury authorisation, from the Bank Sepah reference of 2020 to the Libyan fund judgment of February 2026 and the Paris enforcement judge’s annulments of February 2025. No attachment of state property without ex parte judicial leave. Cross-border freezes executed in days through the European Prosecutor, adversarial seizure files or annulment, confiscation as of right for the offences that sanctions evasion generates, and limitation suspended while the legal impossibility lasts. Whether the reparations loan ever sees the light of day or dies in another unanimity negotiation, these are the rules that will decide, file by file in Paris, who actually touches frozen Russian money. Any holder, creditor or bank concerned should map its position against them now, before the next European Council rewrites the stakes again.