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Caught by an ISIS Payroll in Iraq, Convicted in Slovenia: How Eurojust Moved the Evidence and How France Would Handle the Same File

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Caught by an ISIS Payroll in Iraq, Convicted in Slovenia: How Eurojust Moved the Evidence and How France Would Handle the Same File

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On 3 September 2026, Eurojust announced a conviction that every cross-border defence lawyer in Europe should study. The District Court of Ljubljana sentenced an Iraqi national to five years in prison for having been a member of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2016. The man had arrived in Slovenia in March 2019 and applied for international protection there. The judgment is the first in the country to convict an applicant for international protection of membership of a foreign terrorist organisation. The ruling is not yet final, so the appeal phase is live. What makes this case remarkable is not the sentence. It is the paper trail: the decisive evidence was an ISIS payroll record obtained from Iraq, through a brand-new Eurojust cooperation channel, days before the defendant’s pre-trial custody clock ran out. Without that document, the man would have walked free. This article reconstructs how the evidence travelled from Baghdad to Ljubljana, explains under what conditions such battlefield evidence can convict in a European courtroom, and sets out, from a French lawyer’s perspective, how Paris would handle the exact same file: admission of foreign evidence, pre-trial detention, surrender, and the defence moves that can still defeat the prosecution.

I. How an ISIS payroll record from Iraq secured a conviction in Slovenia

A. What evidence did Iraq send to Slovenia through the Eurojust channel?

The story begins in 2016, with the accused serving inside the Islamic State’s military apparatus in Iraq. According to the Eurojust press release of 3 September 2026, the central piece of evidence was the accused’s inclusion on the payroll of the terrorist organisation’s Dat al-Sawari military unit. The records showed a salary paid to him together with an additional allowance for his relatives. In terrorism-financing and membership cases, payroll evidence of this kind is the closest thing to a smoking gun: it does not merely place a suspect near a group, it documents an administrative, paid, durable relationship with its armed structure. Prosecutors in Paris, London or Berlin know this well, because the same category of seized ISIS administrative documents has underpinned several European trials of returning foreign fighters over the past decade.

The accused first arrived in Slovenia in March 2019 and applied for international protection there. He then travelled to Germany on two occasions but was returned to Slovenia. That detail matters for lawyers: within the European Union, an asylum seeker who moves on to a second Member State is normally taken back by the State responsible for examining the claim, under the take-back machinery of the Dublin III Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. Germany sending the man back to Slovenia is therefore the routine operation of European asylum law, and it is precisely what France does, in both directions, every week from Paris: France requests take-backs from Italy, Spain or Germany, and executes take-backs toward those same States. The consequence here was that Slovenia, the State where the man had lodged his claim, remained competent, and its Specialised State Prosecutor’s Office opened the criminal investigation on Slovenian soil.

The Slovenian authorities already held some evidence about the alleged terrorist activity, gathered with the help of information exchanged through international law enforcement cooperation, including INTERPOL and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. But that was not enough to secure a conviction. The file needed verification and additional material from the source State, Iraq, for use in the Slovenian proceedings. Obtaining evidence from another jurisdiction is slow at the best of times, and in complex terrorism investigations it can require extensive judicial cooperation. Here the Slovenian prosecutors were also racing a hard deadline: the maximum period for which the accused could remain in custody pending the proceedings was fast approaching.

This is where the new institutional machinery made the difference. On 30 June 2026, barely two months before the conviction, Eurojust and Iraq’s National Centre for International Judicial Cooperation signed a Working Arrangement to combat terrorism and serious organised crime at Eurojust headquarters in The Hague, between Eurojust President Michael Schmid and Judge Ali Hussein Chafat of the Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq. The arrangement provides a framework for strategic cooperation and the exchange of information between the Agency and the Iraqi authorities. Through the established Eurojust channel, the Agency rapidly put the Slovenian prosecutors in direct contact with their Iraqi counterparts, including advance guidance on the forthcoming judicial request so that Baghdad could prepare and expedite its execution. The Iraqi material arrived inside the custody window and, in the presiding judge’s own assessment at the delivery of the judgment, it proved instrumental in establishing membership of the terrorist organisation and securing the conviction.

The custody race deserves emphasis because it is the hidden spring of the whole case. Eurojust states plainly that the case finished on the last day allowed under the applicable custody time limit, and that without the swiftly obtained Iraqi material the defendant would have had to be released from detention. Any French criminal lawyer recognises this configuration instantly: terrorism investigations live under the same guillotine in Paris, where the juge des libertés et de la détention extends pre-trial detention in slices and the file must be trial-ready before the legal ceiling. The Slovenian lesson is therefore a general one. In cross-border terrorism cases, the battle is often not about guilt or innocence in the abstract. It is about whether the foreign evidence arrives before the custody clock expires, and whether the transmission channel used will survive the defence’s admissibility attack at trial.

B. Can battlefield evidence from Iraq convict a defendant in a European court?

The short answer is yes, but only if three conditions are met: authenticity, lawful collection, and adversarial testing. Payroll sheets seized from a collapsed terrorist administration are not court-ready exhibits on arrival. The defence will attack them on every front: who seized them, where, under what chain of custody, whether the translation is reliable, whether the name on the list is really the defendant, and whether any statement or confession in the file was extracted by coercion. European human rights law draws a hard line here. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture absolutely, and evidence obtained by torture cannot ground a conviction in a Member State court. Article 6 of the same Convention then requires that the accused be able to challenge the evidence against him in adversarial proceedings, including foreign documents whose authors will never enter the courtroom. A payroll list, precisely because it is documentary rather than testimonial, usually survives these tests better than interrogation records: it can be authenticated by expert analysis, corroborated by travel data, witness accounts and the defendant’s own movements, and tested by the defence without summoning its Iraqi author.

French case law adds a second filter that defence lawyers across Europe should copy: the specialty of mutual legal assistance. When a State obtains evidence through a foreign cooperation request, it may use that material only for the offence for which cooperation was granted. The French Court of Cassation stated the rule bluntly on 21 May 2025 (Crim., no. 25-81.595, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR00838): “le principe de spécialité de la commission rogatoire internationale, qui implique l’obligation pour l’Etat requérant de n’utiliser les pièces qui en proviennent que dans l’instruction de l’infraction déterminée pour laquelle elles ont été accordées, est lié à la fois à la compétence des juridictions et aux règles de droit international, et constitue par conséquent une cause de nullité d’ordre public pouvant être soulevée par toute personne sans avoir à démontrer l’existence d’un grief”. In plain English: using MLA material beyond the offence named in the request is a public-policy nullity that anyone can raise without showing prejudice. The ruling concerned a Franco-Colombian file, but the principle is universal, and it governs Iraqi material in Slovenian hands exactly as it governs Colombian material in French hands. Defence counsel in the Ljubljana appeal will be checking, line by line, whether every exhibit from Baghdad stayed inside the perimeter of the request that produced it.

A mirror image of this evidence flow recently passed through French courts in the opposite direction. On 16 September 2025, the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation (no. 24-84.262, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR00936) examined a case in which France had transmitted to Germany, “en réponse à une décision d’enquête européenne des autorités allemandes du 26 juillet précédent, de preuves issues de l’information susvisée, recueillies en France à l’occasion d’une enquête menée par des autorités judiciaires françaises”, material drawn from the interception of Sky ECC encrypted communications. The German prosecution then relied partly on that French-supplied evidence. The pattern is identical to Ljubljana: one State collects, a formal European cooperation instrument moves the material, the receiving State prosecutes. The French ruling shows how systematically European courts now work with imported digital and documentary evidence, and how the defence’s response must be equally systematic: challenge the collection in the source State, challenge the transmission instrument, and challenge the use in the trial State, because a flaw at any of the three stages can neutralise the exhibit.

There is a third lesson in the Slovenian file: speed is a procedural weapon. Eurojust’s advance-guidance technique, asking Baghdad what the incoming request should contain before it is formally sent, is the difference between evidence that arrives and evidence that expires. French investigating judges use the same anticipation reflex with their foreign counterparts, and the Article 694 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, which organises the transmission of French MLA requests to foreign judicial authorities, is the domestic starting point of every such race. For practitioners, the message is operational: when a terrorism client sits in pre-trial detention and the decisive evidence sits abroad, the defence must diary the custody ceiling independently, demand release the day it expires, and force the prosecution to prove that every foreign exhibit arrived through a lawful, specialty-compliant channel.

II. How France would handle the same terrorism file

A. Would a French court admit Iraqi payroll evidence against an accused in Paris?

Transpose the Ljubljana facts to Paris and the file lands on the desk of the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office and an investigating judge of the Paris judicial court. The charge would be association de malfaiteurs terroriste, the French workhorse offence for foreign-fighter and membership cases. Article 421-2-1 of the Criminal Code defines it as follows: “Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de participer à un groupement formé ou à une entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d’un des actes de terrorisme mentionnés aux articles précédents.” An ISIS payroll entry naming the accused inside a military unit, corroborated by his presence in Iraq in 2016, maps directly onto that definition: participation in a formed group, preparation characterised by material acts, terrorist purpose. French courts have convicted on comparable Iraqi and Syrian administrative material for years, and the European framework points the same way: the EU Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism harmonises the definition of terrorist offences across Member States, including travel and support conduct, so that a Ljubljana membership conviction and a Paris association de malfaiteurs prosecution describe the same underlying behaviour in mutually intelligible legal language.

Admissibility in Paris would turn on the same three filters as in Ljubljana, applied with French tools. First, authenticity and adversarial debate: the payroll sheets would be translated, submitted to expert examination where necessary, and debated before the trial court with full defence access, as Article 6 of the Convention requires. Second, lawful collection: material obtained by torture is unusable, and the defence would demand disclosure of the circumstances of seizure in Iraq. Third, and most distinctively French, the specialty of the international request illustrated by the 21 May 2025 ruling: every page from Baghdad must remain inside the offence perimeter of the MLA request, failing which the exhibit falls to a public-policy nullity. France also operates the European Investigation Order for intra-EU evidence moves, and Article 694-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the grounds on which a French magistrate may refuse to recognise or execute such an order, a reminder that European evidence circulation is organised but not automatic: privileges, immunities and fundamental rights remain refusal grounds.

Two practical differences would shape the Paris version of the case. The first is custody time. In France, terrorism custody in police hands follows the extended mechanism of Article 706-88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Pour l’application des articles 63 , 77 et 154 , si les nécessités de l’enquête ou de l’instruction relatives à l’une des infractions entrant dans le champ d’application de l’article 706-73 l’exigent, la garde à vue d’une personne peut, à titre exceptionnel, faire l’objet de deux prolongations supplémentaires de vingt-quatre heures chacune.” Pre-trial detention is then ordered by the juge des libertés et de la détention, and Article 694 MLA requests run in parallel while the clock ticks. The Slovenian near-miss on the custody deadline would therefore feel familiar to any Paris terrorism practitioner: the file must be complete, translated and adversarially tested before the ceiling, or the accused is released. The second difference is the asylum overlay. Like Slovenia, France applies the Dublin III Regulation, and a man who claimed asylum in France before surfacing in Germany would be subject to the same take-back logic. But asylum and criminal prosecution run on separate tracks: an applicant for international protection can be prosecuted, detained and convicted while his asylum claim follows its own course, and a terrorism conviction will in practice destroy the protection claim. Defence strategy must therefore fight on both fronts at once, without letting statements made in the asylum procedure contaminate the criminal defence.

One further French specificity matters for surrender scenarios connected to such files. Suppose the Iraqi-payroll suspect is arrested in France under a European Arrest Warrant from another Member State, or France requests his surrender from elsewhere. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the European Arrest Warrant as a judicial decision issued by one Member State with a view to arrest and surrender by another, and French courts apply the statutory refusal grounds strictly but narrowly. On 16 July 2026, the Court of Cassation (no. 26-83.852, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR01136) ordered surrender under a European warrant even though the person concerned had been acquitted in Paris on 1 September 2021 of association de malfaiteurs terroriste linked to the Basque separatist organisation ETA, holding that the prior French acquittal did not trigger the refusal ground and that there was no need for further inquiry before ordering surrender: “celui-ci a été relaxé le 1er septembre 2021 par le tribunal judiciaire de Paris du chef d’association de malfaiteurs terroriste”. The lesson for our Iraqi-payroll suspect is stark. A French acquittal for terrorism membership does not mechanically shield a person from surrender to another European State for connected facts, and each requested State will examine double-jeopardy arguments through its own statutory lens. Anyone moving between European States with a terrorism file behind him must assume that an acquittal in one capital does not close the file in the next.

B. Arrested in France on a foreign terrorism file: how to fight detention, surrender and trial

Consider the concrete situation: police arrest the suspect in Paris on the basis of foreign intelligence summarised in an Iraqi file transmitted through Eurojust, or on a foreign arrest request. The first hours decide much of the case. In terrorism matters the garde à vue follows the extended regime quoted above, with successive 24-hour extensions decided by a judge, medical examinations as of right, and a lawyer whose intervention can be deferred only on strict statutory conditions for compelling investigative reasons. The defence reflexes are immediate: note the exact time of arrest, demand the lawyer without delay, challenge any deferred access in writing, require a medical examination, and give no substantive statement before the file, including the foreign exhibits and their translations, has been disclosed. Anything said in those first hours about travel to Iraq, contacts, or money received will be read back at trial next to the payroll sheet.

If the investigating judge seeks pre-trial detention, the decision belongs to the juge des libertés et de la détention after an adversarial hearing. Article 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure frames that hearing precisely: “Le juge des libertés et de la détention statue après un débat contradictoire au cours duquel il entend le ministère public qui développe ses réquisitions prises conformément au troisième alinéa de l’article 82 puis les observations de la personne mise en examen et, le cas échéant, celles de son avocat.” In English: the judge rules after hearing the prosecutor, the examined person and defence counsel. That hearing is the defence’s first real opportunity to attack the foreign evidence: demand the complete MLA request and the Iraqi response, check specialty compliance exhibit by exhibit under the 21 May 2025 case law, contest translations, request an expert on the documents, and propose judicial supervision with surrender of travel documents as an alternative to detention. In terrorism cases French judges detain more often than they release, but a detention order built on untranslated, unauthenticated foreign sheets is vulnerable on appeal before the chambre de l’instruction, and every extension must be re-justified.

Where surrender is in play, the procedure depends on the instrument. Inside the European Union, the European Arrest Warrant leads to a hearing before the chambre de l’instruction, which authorises or refuses surrender on exhaustively listed grounds; outside the Union, classic extradition runs through the same chamber’s opinion, then a government decree that can be challenged before the Conseil d’État. Three defence axes from the Ljubljana file transpose directly. First, specialty: the requesting State may prosecute only for the facts for which surrender was granted, and the French specialty case law on MLA evidence shows how seriously French courts police this boundary. Second, prior acquittal or conviction: as the July 2026 ETA ruling demonstrates, a Paris acquittal does not automatically block surrender, so the argument must be built fact by fact, comparing the exact material scope of the French judgment with the foreign warrant. Third, human rights guarantees: since the European Court’s Soering judgment against the United Kingdom (application no. 14038/88 of 7 July 1989), European States condition surrender on assurances against treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and France applies the same logic when it extradites or surrenders. A suspect wanted by a State whose prisons or interrogation methods raise an Article 3 risk can demand guarantees, and the surrender judge must examine that risk seriously.

Related proceedings add further layers that a Paris defence team must coordinate. An INTERPOL Red Notice may surface during any identity check; the response combines a request for access and deletion before INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of Files with domestic challenges to each measure taken on the notice’s basis. A parallel asylum claim must be handled so that protection interviews do not generate statements usable by the prosecution, while preserving the non-refoulement shield for as long as it lawfully applies. And where several European States hold pieces of the file, as in the Slovenian case with its Slovenian, German, American and Iraqi inputs, the defence should map every transmission: which instrument moved which exhibit, for which offence, with what judicial authorisation. The Eurojust coordination that convicted the Ljubljana defendant is exactly what makes such files formidable, and the same coordination is what makes them fragile, because each additional transmission is an additional admissibility checkpoint. Readers facing an analogous multi-State file can compare it with this desk’s recent analysis of the British-French joint investigation team convictions of a Vietnamese smuggling network, where the same Eurojust machinery produced convictions through coordinated evidence sharing.

Conclusion

The Ljubljana conviction is a proof of concept with a live sequel. It proves that battlefield administrative evidence, an ISIS salary list from 2016, can travel through a two-month-old Eurojust cooperation channel and become a five-year prison sentence in a European courtroom, provided it arrives before the custody clock stops. Its sequel is the appeal: the judgment is not final, and the defence will now test authenticity, specialty and adversarial fairness before the higher Slovenian courts. For France, the file is a mirror. Paris would prosecute the same facts as association de malfaiteurs terroriste, admit the same payroll sheets subject to the same three filters, detain under the same race against the legal ceiling, and surrender under rules where even a prior French acquittal does not guarantee protection. The operational message for suspects, witnesses and counsel is therefore the same in Ljubljana and in Paris: diary the custody deadlines, demand the complete foreign transmission file, hold every exhibit to its specialty perimeter, and never assume that an asylum claim, an acquittal in one capital, or a border crossed will close a terrorism case. The payroll survived the collapse of the caliphate. Only rigorous defence work can stop it from deciding the trial.

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