On 8 September 2026, at 09:30 in the morning, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court opened a hearing unlike any the Court had held in the Darfur cases: a full day devoted to reparations for the victims of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, known as Ali Kushayb, the former Janjaweed leader found guilty of 27 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. No reparations order was expected that day. The judges listened instead to the victims’ lawyers, the Prosecution, the Trust Fund for Victims, outside experts and the Defence, before retiring to decide what repair looks like when the crimes are mass murder, deportation, torture and persecution committed more than twenty years ago in Darfur. For victims scattered across Sudan, Chad and refugee camps around the world, the question is brutally practical: who pays, how much, and through which court can the money actually be collected? This article answers those questions, and it explains the part of the story that international coverage almost always misses: what France does when The Hague sends it a reparations order. French law gives the Paris criminal court a direct enforcement role over ICC fines, confiscations and reparations decisions, and French courts have built, case by case, one of Europe’s most detailed doctrines on prosecuting crimes against humanity committed abroad. If you are a victim, a witness, a relative of the disappeared, or simply someone whose assets or liberty could be touched by an ICC order enforced in France, the French procedure is the one that will decide your fate.
I. What did the ICC decide at the 8 September 2026 hearing in the Ali Kushayb case?
A. From a 27-count conviction to the reparations phase: how ICC compensation works after a guilty verdict
To understand the hearing, start with the criminal record. On 6 October 2025, Trial Chamber I found Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman guilty of 27 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan, between August 2003 and April 2004, as the Court’s official case page records. On 9 December, the same Chamber sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment, with credit for time spent in detention from 9 June 2020 onwards, and he remains in the ICC detention centre until the Court designates a country where he will serve his sentence. Both sides appealed: the Defence filed notice against the conviction on 6 November 2025, and the Defence and the Prosecution each appealed the sentence in January 2026, so the Appeals Chamber still has the criminal case on its desk.
Reparations run on a separate track, and that separation matters for victims. Under the ICC system, a conviction opens a second phase in which the Trial Chamber decides how the harm suffered by victims will be repaired. The Court can order the convicted person to pay reparations directly, or it can route awards through the Trust Fund for Victims, and it can choose individual awards, collective programmes such as medical care, schooling or memorials, or a mix of both, depending on what fits the victims best. The Chamber issued its order setting out the reparations process and timetable on 9 December 2025, the same day as the sentencing, and the hearing held on 8 September 2026, as announced in the Court’s official media advisory, was the oral centrepiece of that process: three sessions of submissions before the judges begin deliberating and issue the reparations order in due course.
Three features of that hearing deserve attention because they shape every euro that may one day be paid. First, the Chamber stated plainly that no reparations order would be issued at the hearing itself. Victims’ associations sometimes present such hearings as the day of the award; they are not. The hearing collects positions, and the order comes months later, which means victims need to have filed their positions and evidence before the deliberation starts, not after. Second, the list of speakers shows how wide the Court casts its net: the Common Legal Representatives of Victims, the Prosecution, the Trust Fund for Victims, the Registry, three groups of outside experts admitted as friends of the court, the authorities of the Government of Sudan if they chose to appear, and the Defence. Sudan’s seat at the table is not decorative. The crimes were committed on Sudanese territory by a Sudanese national, much of the evidence and many of the victims are in Sudan, and any collective reparations programme will need at least the non-obstruction of Khartoum to operate. Third, the appeals against conviction and sentence do not freeze the reparations phase. The Chamber presses on with submissions while the Appeals Chamber reviews the criminal judgment, so victims gain time rather than losing it, but with a shared risk: if the conviction were ever overturned on appeal, the legal basis for reparations against the convicted person would fall with it, leaving only the Trust Fund’s voluntary resources.
The practical lesson for victims is therefore a double one. File and document early, through a legal representative, because the deliberation record closes; and understand that an ICC reparations order is a judicial title that still has to be converted into money, through the convicted person’s identified assets, through the Trust Fund, or through national courts asked to enforce the order. That enforcement step is where France enters the picture, and it is the most underestimated part of the whole system.
B. Who speaks for Darfur’s victims at The Hague, and what each voice asks the judges
The victims do not speak with one voice at the ICC, and the 8 September hearing illustrated why. Their Common Legal Representatives carry the individual stories: killings, village burnings, forced displacement, sexual violence, looted livestock and destroyed livelihoods across the Wadi Salih and Mukjar areas. Their task is to translate thousands of individual application forms into categories of harm the judges can price and repair, and to argue for the blend of individual and collective awards that fits a community where almost everyone lost someone and almost everything was burned. Individual awards recognise personal suffering; collective awards rebuild clinics, schools and water points that serve victims and their communities together. In mass-crime cases the Court has tended to favour the collective route, supplemented by symbolic individual payments, because the money available never matches the harm suffered, and the Kushayb representatives had to make that painful arithmetic explicit.
The Trust Fund for Victims plays a different role, and confusing it with a bank account is the most common misunderstanding in ICC reporting. The Fund can complement a reparations order with its own resources, raised from voluntary state contributions, and it can implement the collective programmes the judges design. But it is not an insurer of The Hague’s judgments: its means are limited, its Darfur portfolio competes with Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and other situations, and anything it spends must follow the Chamber’s principles. The Registry, for its part, handles the unglamorous machinery that decides whether victims ever see money: identifying and contacting victims, verifying identities in a region where civil records were destroyed, and mapping the convicted person’s assets. The outside experts admitted to the hearing pressed the legal boundaries: how far can reparations reach when the convicted person is likely insolvent, can the order target assets held by relatives or networks, and what standard of proof applies to each head of harm twenty years after the facts?
The Defence position is structural, not emotional. Kushayb’s lawyers contest the scope of liability, argue that the reparations phase must respect the presumption linked to the pending appeals, and will scrutinise every causal link between a count of conviction and a claimed harm. Sudan’s position, if expressed, weighs state cooperation against state exposure: Khartoum may prefer a collective programme it can claim as stabilisation policy over findings that point at state organs. Out of these competing positions the Chamber must build an order that is enforceable, and enforceability is a legal test with teeth. An order that names no assets, no enforcement states and no verification method is a moral victory and a practical defeat. That is exactly why the French enforcement mechanism matters so much: France is one of the few states whose statute books contain a ready-made judicial pipeline from a Hague reparations order to seizure and transfer of money on its territory.
II. Can ICC victims actually collect compensation through France?
A. How the Paris court turns a Hague reparations order into seized money
France is not merely a political supporter of the ICC; it wired the Court’s orders directly into its criminal procedure. The starting point is a provision many practitioners have never read, Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Cooperation here is not a diplomatic slogan; it is a full title of the Code, running from Article 627 to Article 627-20, covering surrender of suspects, transit, taking of evidence, and, crucially, enforcement of the Court’s financial orders.
The enforcement key is Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its wording deserves to be quoted in full because it answers the victims’ central question: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République.” In plain terms, when the ICC asks, the Paris criminal court authorises enforcement of the Court’s fines, confiscations and reparations decisions on French territory, on application by the public prosecutor. The same article adds two guarantees that victims’ lawyers should note carefully. First: “Le tribunal est lié par la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, y compris en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux droits des tiers.” The Paris court cannot reopen the merits of what The Hague decided, including on third-party rights; there is no retrial of the reparations order in Paris. Second, for confiscation orders that prove impossible to execute as written, the court may order any measure needed to recover the value of the assets concerned. Value-based recovery, in other words, is built into the statute.
The destination of the money is fixed by Article 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “L’autorisation d’exécution rendue par le tribunal correctionnel en vertu de l’article précédent entraîne, selon la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, transfert du produit des amendes et des biens confisqués ou du produit de leur vente à la cour ou au fonds en faveur des victimes.” Fines and confiscated property, or the proceeds of their sale, are transferred to the Court or to the fund for victims, and the article adds that they may also be allocated directly to the victims if the Court so decided and designated them. Any dispute about allocation goes back to the ICC. For a Darfur victim, the chain is therefore legible: ICC reparations order, request to France, Paris court authorisation, seizure or value recovery on French-held assets, transfer to the Trust Fund for Victims or to designated victims.
Three practical conditions determine whether that chain ever moves. First, there must be assets or persons within French reach: bank accounts, real estate, company shares, or funds transiting through Paris. ICC convicts rarely keep villas in the 16th arrondissement in their own names, so asset tracing, including through relatives and front structures, is usually the real battle, and French investigating judges have the full arsenal of financial investigation tools once the Paris court is seized. Second, timing matters: protective seizure must come before dissipation, which means victims’ lawyers should be mapping assets while the reparations deliberation is still pending, not after the order is issued. Third, third parties holding the assets are heard by the Paris court, but the court remains bound by the ICC decision, so their challenge can only concern the enforcement mechanics, not the existence of the debt. Anyone holding funds that might be targeted, and any victim hoping to be paid from them, needs French counsel at that stage, because the Paris hearing is the last gate before transfer.
B. When France prosecutes the crimes itself: universal jurisdiction, the anti-terrorist prosecutor and the Syrian precedent that Sudan should study
Enforcement of ICC orders is only half of the French picture. The other half is France’s power to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad, in French courts, even when neither the victims nor the perpetrators are French. That power sits in Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger” genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes as defined by French criminal law. Three locks frame that power, and each of them matters for Sudanese cases. The suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed through real ties such as length of presence, reasons for staying and family or professional links. Prosecution requires an express request from the anti-terrorist public prosecutor in Paris, who holds a legal monopoly over these cases. And no prosecution is possible if an international court or another state claims the person: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” France defers to The Hague; it does not compete with it.
The definitions France applies are its own, and they are severe. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code defines genocide as acts committed under a concerted plan to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group in whole or in part: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”, punishable by life imprisonment: “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code defines crimes against humanity in matching terms: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, followed by a list running from wilful killing and extermination to torture, sexual violence and persecution. The Darfur charges against Kushayb, murder, deportation, torture, persecution, map onto these French definitions without strain, which is precisely why Sudanese suspects who settle in France are exposed.
The case law sharpened the tool. In a landmark ruling on Syrian crimes, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation held, on 24 November 2021 in case No. 21-81.344, that the double-criminality condition of Article 689-11, the requirement that the facts be punishable where committed, necessarily requires the foreign law to contain an offence with a constituent element covering an attack on a civilian population under a concerted plan: “Dès lors, l’exigence posée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, selon laquelle les faits doivent être punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis, inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté” (Cass. crim., 24 Nov. 2021, No. 21-81.344, published in the Bulletin). The ruling quashed a Paris decision in a Syrian case where Syria, like Sudan, has never ratified the Rome Statute. The parallel is direct: Sudanese suspects cannot hide behind Sudan’s non-membership of the ICC system to defeat French jurisdiction, but prosecutors must prove the foreign-law mirror carefully, element by element.
A second line of cases widens the net for torture. Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French courts to try “toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention” against torture, and the Full Assembly of the Court of Cassation held on 12 May 2023, in case No. 22-82.468, that a torturer’s official capacity covers members of non-state armed groups exercising quasi-governmental authority: “Cependant, la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire” (Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, No. 22-82.468). For Janjaweed-style militia violence, where perpetrators act outside regular state structures, the question whether torturers acted in an official capacity is often the whole case, and French law now reads that condition realistically rather than formally.
Victims themselves hold a procedural key that foreign observers often miss. Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’action civile en réparation du dommage causé par un crime, un délit ou une contravention appartient à tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par l’infraction.” Anyone who personally suffered direct harm from the offence can join the criminal trial as a civil party and claim damages there. In universal-jurisdiction cases this mechanism lets Darfur victims constituted as civil parties before the Paris specialised unit seek court-ordered compensation inside the criminal judgment itself, alongside or independently of anything The Hague orders. The Paris war-crimes unit, the investigating judges of the crimes-against-humanity pole and the anti-terrorist prosecutor form the institutional triangle that handles these files, and their dockets already include Syrian, Liberian and Rwandan cases that show the machine works, slowly but really.
Conclusion
The 8 September 2026 hearing did not award a single euro, and that is exactly why it mattered. It closed the evidentiary debate and opened the deliberation that will produce the first ICC reparations order for Darfur: a judicial title that will then have to be enforced, asset by asset, state by state. Victims should prepare now, by keeping their ICC victim applications complete, by documenting harm with anything that survives displacement, medical records, photographs, witness contacts, and by watching where the convicted person’s networks hold value. Anyone who may hold or administer funds linked to the Darfur crimes should take the opposite precaution: map exposure, verify the origin of funds, and take French advice before the Paris court is seized, because once the ICC request arrives, the Paris judges are bound by it and the argument shifts to mechanics, not merits. And Sudanese suspects living in France should understand the double exposure clearly: surrender to The Hague if the ICC asks, French prosecution if it does not, with definitions and precedents that already cover their alleged conduct. The Hague decides; Paris collects or prosecutes. That division of labour is the real engine of international criminal justice, and the Kushayb case is about to test it at full power.