On 23 September 2026, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court convicted Mahamat Said Abdel Kani of crimes against humanity committed in the Central African Republic in 2013. The verdict closes a trial that opened on 26 September 2022, ran for 130 hearings, heard 58 witnesses called by the Prosecution and 3 called by the Defence, admitted 3,863 items of evidence, and gave 32 victims represented by counsel Sarah Pellet the right to participate. Sentence has not yet been pronounced: the Chamber will now open sentencing proceedings, a reparations process will begin for the victims of the crimes covered by the conviction, and both sides have 30 days to appeal. For an international audience, and in particular for anyone living in France who could one day face an ICC arrest warrant, a surrender request, or a French prosecution for international crimes, the Said judgment is worth reading closely. It shows how The Hague connects a commander to crimes committed inside a detention centre he ran, which charges survive the criminal standard of proof and which do not, and what procedural safeguards surround the accused from arrest to appeal. This analysis explains the verdict in plain terms, then sets out exactly how France arrests, detains, and surrenders suspects to the ICC, and when France chooses to prosecute these crimes itself in its own courts.
I. ICC guilty verdict of 23 September 2026: what Mahamat Said was convicted of
The official press release of the Court states the outcome without ambiguity: On 23 September 2026, ICC Trial Chamber VI found Mahamat Said Abdel Kani guilty of crimes against humanity committed in the Central African Republic in 2013. That single sentence carries three pieces of information that matter for practitioners. First, the convicting formation is Trial Chamber VI, presided over by Judge Miatta Maria Samba, sitting with Judge María del Socorro Flores Liera, Judge Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez and Alternate Judge Keebong Paek. Second, the conviction concerns crimes against humanity only, a category with its own legal elements under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Third, the temporal and geographic frame is narrow: Bangui, in the Central African Republic, in the year 2013, at the height of the Seleka takeover. Anyone building a defence in this type of case therefore knows that the fight happens on three fronts at once: the definition of the charges, the linkage of the accused to each specific incident, and the standard of proof applied to each count separately. The Said verdict illustrates all three, because the Chamber convicted on some counts and refused to convict on others arising from the same detention site.
A. Which crimes at the Bangui OCRB led to the conviction
The crimes were, in the words of the Court, committed at the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (OCRB) in Bangui, Central African Republic, between 12 April and 30 August 2013. The OCRB was a national police building turned into a Seleka detention centre, and the judgment describes what happened inside it during those four and a half months. After reviewing the evidence submitted at trial, the judges convicted Mr Said, beyond any reasonable doubt, on four counts of crimes against humanity: imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts. Four convictions, each corresponding to a distinct legal category, all anchored to the same place and the same period.
Each of these four labels has a precise meaning. Imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty covers the detention itself: people locked up at the OCRB without legal basis, held in conditions that violated fundamental rules of international law. Torture as a crime against humanity covers the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering on detainees. Persecution covers the discriminatory dimension: detention and abuse directed against an identifiable group on prohibited grounds. Other inhumane acts is the residual category for acts of similar gravity that intentionally cause great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health. French criminal law mirrors this architecture almost exactly, which is why the verdict reads so naturally to a French lawyer. Article 212-1 of the French Code pénal provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, and its list includes “5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international”, “6° La torture”, the persecution of an identifiable group, and “11° Les autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou psychique.” The full text of Article 212-1 of the Code pénal shows how closely the French definition tracks the Rome Statute, down to the requirement of a concerted plan against a civilian population in a widespread or systematic attack.
The part of the verdict that defence lawyers will study most carefully is the acquittal. The very same Chamber, on the very same facts, held that the Chamber acquitted Mr Said of the war-crimes charges of torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, holding that the reasonable-doubt standard was not met on those counts. Identical underlying conduct, different legal characterisation, opposite outcome. The lesson is structural: crimes against humanity and war crimes do not have the same contextual elements. War crimes require a nexus with an armed conflict and, depending on the provision, a protected status of the victims that the Prosecution must prove independently. When that nexus or that status is not established beyond reasonable doubt, the count falls even though the suffering of the victims is undisputed. The presiding judge acknowledged that suffering expressly, noting the testimony about the lasting impact of the crimes on the victims, their families and their lives and the evidence from OCRB detainees that they still suffer physical and psychological harm as a result of their detention and abuse. A verdict can therefore recognise victims fully while refusing to convict on counts whose legal elements are not proven. For families following the case and for counsel advising clients, that distinction between established facts and proven legal characterisation is the single most important point of the judgment, as set out in the Court\u2019s press release of 23 September 2026. It also explains why Judge María del Socorro Flores Liera appended a separate opinion: even within the Chamber, the application of these standards to the evidence deserved individual reasoning.
Procedurally, the case is not over. The Court recalls that both the Defence and the Prosecution have 30 days to appeal the verdict. Under Article 81 of the Rome Statute, both the convicted person and the Prosecutor can appeal an acquittal, a conviction, or a sentence, and the Appeals Chamber reviews errors of procedure, fact, and law. In parallel, and as announced in a decision issued on the day of the verdict, the judges set the timetable for sentencing proceedings, while a reparations process will begin for the victims of the crimes covered by the conviction. The full reasoning is available in the Trial Judgment, with a non-authoritative summary of the verdict read in Court and published questions and answers in English and French. Further background on the proceedings is collected on the Court’s case page for the Said matter. Any serious commentary on this verdict must be built on these primary materials, not on second-hand summaries.
B. Why commanding the OCRB made Said a direct co-perpetrator
The mode of liability chosen by the Chamber is as instructive as the counts themselves. The judges found that given his role and functions as the Seleka commander in charge of the OCRB, the Chamber held that Mr Said acted with the required intent and knowledge and convicted him as a direct co-perpetrator of these crimes. Three elements are packed into that sentence of the press release, and each corresponds to a classic battleground of international criminal defence.
First, the factual premise: command of the place. Said was the Seleka commander in charge of the OCRB, the very building where the detentions, torture, and persecution occurred between April and August 2013. Command responsibility in international law does not require the commander to have personally laid hands on every victim; control over the detention site, authority over the guards, and knowledge of what happened inside can suffice when combined with the right mental state. Second, the mental element: intent and knowledge. The Chamber found that Said acted with the necessary intent and knowledge, meaning he meant to engage in the conduct and knew that the crimes were being committed as part of the broader attack. Third, the legal conclusion: direct co-perpetration under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, the provision that allocates individual criminal responsibility among those who commit a crime jointly with others. Direct co-perpetration expresses the idea that each co-perpetrator makes an essential contribution to a common plan, so that the crime is attributed to each of them as their own act rather than as mere assistance.
For defence counsel, this is where future cases will be won or lost. The Said reasoning rewards the Prosecution when it can document the chain of authority over a detention site day by day: who held the keys, who signed the registers, who ordered transfers in and out, who was present when detainees were beaten, who could have stopped it. Conversely, it opens the classic defence lines: absence from the site at the material time, lack of effective control over the actual perpetrators, broken chains of command in the chaos of 2013 Bangui, or knowledge that never reached the accused. The 30-day appeal window exists precisely for these arguments, and the Appeals Chamber will review whether no reasonable trial chamber could have reached the same conclusion on the evidence. Note also what the Chamber did not do: it did not need modes of liability based on ordering, instigating, or superior responsibility, because direct co-perpetration covered the conduct. That choice simplifies sentencing exposure but concentrates the appeal on the factual findings about control and knowledge.
A comparative glance at French law shows why Paris practitioners follow these Hague cases so closely. French genocide law, at Article 211-1 of the Code pénal, defines genocide as “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, followed by wilful killing, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, and subjection to destructive conditions of existence. The vocabulary of concerted plan, protected group, and listed underlying acts is the same grammar as the Rome Statute’s Articles 6 and 7. A lawyer who can plead command structures in The Hague can plead them in Paris, and the reverse is equally true. The core texts of the Court, including the Rome Statute itself, are published in the Court’s collection of core legal texts, which should be the first port of call for verifying the exact wording of Articles 7, 25, 76, and 81 before citing them in any filing.
II. Arrested in France on an ICC warrant: the surrender procedure step by step
France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, and its cooperation with the Court is not a matter of diplomatic courtesy but of domestic statute. The opening provision of the relevant title states the principle in one sentence: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” That is Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it continues by delimiting its scope: “Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” In other words, the whole machinery that follows applies to exactly the kind of person the Said case concerns: someone prosecuted or convicted by the ICC for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes within the meaning of Articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute. What follows is the procedure as it actually runs when ICC police cooperation reaches French soil.
A. What happens in the first 24 hours after an ICC arrest on French soil
The procedure starts with an ICC request for arrest for the purpose of surrender, transmitted to France, and executed by French police. From that moment, a strict clock starts running, and the first hours determine the rest of the case. The governing text is Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which opens with the rule: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within those twenty-four hours, the safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply: notification of rights, access to a lawyer, medical examination, and the right to notify a relative. After verifying identity, the prosecutor informs the person, in a language they understand, that they are the subject of an ICC arrest request for surrender and that they will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal.
Two guarantees in this text deserve emphasis because clients ask about them first. The right to counsel is immediate and concrete under Article 627-5: the prosecutor informs the person “qu’elle pourra être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office par le bâtonnier de l’ordre des avocats”, and further advises them “qu’elle pourra s’entretenir immédiatement avec l’avocat désigné.” Everything is recorded in an official report transmitted at once to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. The second guarantee concerns liberty. If the prosecutor decides not to leave the requested person at liberty, the person is brought before the liberty and detention judge, described in the text as “juge des libertés et de la détention qui ordonne son incarcération à la maison d’arrêt.” Detention is therefore ordered by a judge, not by the police or the prosecutor, and it happens fast. There is, however, a narrow alternative: where the judge considers that appearance at all stages of the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed in light of the principles of Article 59 of the Rome Statute, the judge may place the person under one or more measures from Articles 138 and 142-5, the French toolkit of judicial supervision and house arrest with electronic monitoring. In practice, ICC surrender cases rarely result in liberty, because the flight risk is presumed high and the requesting jurisdiction is a permanent international court rather than a state with which arrangements can be negotiated. But the legal possibility exists, and counsel should plead it with concrete guarantees: fixed address in France, surrender of travel documents, regular reporting, electronic bracelet, and employment or family ties documented from day one.
The Paris stage follows. The investigation chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal examines the surrender request, verifies identity, the regularity of the procedure, and the absence of a manifest error, then the surrender is ordered by the chamber and can be challenged before the Court of Cassation, with the government authorising the actual transfer by decree. Two further provisions complete the picture for practitioners. First, protective measures ordered at the request of the Court on French territory are executed at the advance expense of the Treasury, as Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for conservatory measures, with a maximum duration of two years renewable at the request of the ICC. Asset freezing for future reparations is therefore part of the French cooperation toolkit, and families with property in France should take this seriously from the moment an ICC investigation becomes public. Second, where the requested person is already prosecuted or convicted in France for other matters, Article 627-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends the surrender provisions to that situation, while providing that a person detained on those grounds cannot obtain release under certain provisions and that “La procédure suivie devant la Cour pénale internationale suspend, à l’égard de cette personne, la prescription de l’action publique et de la peine.” Time spent in the ICC process suspends limitation periods: there is no running out the clock while The Hague proceedings are pending.
One common confusion must be cleared up. Surrender to the ICC is not extradition. Extradition, governed by Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applies between states: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre.” Surrender to the ICC follows its own self-contained title, with its own judges, its own time limits, and no assessment of the requesting state’s justice system, because the requesting authority is an international court created by treaty. The practical consequences are significant: arguments that work against extradition, such as prison conditions in the requesting state or the political character of the offence, have no equivalent purchase against an ICC surrender request, where the detention regime is that of the Court’s own detention centre and the charges are by definition the gravest international crimes. Defence energy is therefore better spent on identity challenges, procedural irregularities in the arrest, competing proceedings, interim release with guarantees, and above all the case on the merits in The Hague.
B. When France prosecutes international crimes itself instead of surrendering
Surrender is only half of the French system. The other half is domestic prosecution: France can try genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed abroad in its own courts, and the Said verdict shows exactly the kind of fact pattern that could end up before a Paris court if the suspect lived in France. The key provision is Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the universal jurisdiction clause for the gravest crimes. It provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, namely genocide as defined in the Code pénal, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes defined in Articles 461-1 to 461-31 of the same code. The text then sets three cumulative filters that every file must pass.
The first filter, under Article 689-11, is territorial anchoring: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, with habitual residence defined by a sufficient connecting link assessed through the duration of presence, its conditions and reasons, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material, or professional ties. Mere transit through a French airport does not suffice; settled life in France does. The second filter is prosecutorial monopoly: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” The antiterrorist prosecutor in Paris holds the key, and the public prosecutor must verify that the ICC is not already prosecuting and that no competent international court has requested surrender and no state has requested extradition. Complementarity is therefore written into the statute: if The Hague wants the person, The Hague takes precedence. The third element is victim participation: where the Paris prosecutor general is seized of an appeal against a decision to close a case without further action, the complainant who reported the facts must be heard on request, and a rejection must be communicated in a reasoned written decision. Associations and victims who file complaints with constitution of civil party in these cases are not spectators; the statute gives them a procedural voice at the decisive moment.
Why does this matter alongside the Said verdict? Because the same OCRB-style fact pattern, transposed to a suspect residing in France, would be examined through this exact grid. A former detention-centre commander living in the Paris region, denounced by victims, would face the questions in this order: habitual residence, ICC priority, prosecutorial initiative, then the merits under Articles 211-1 and 212-1 of the Code pénal. And unlike ordinary crimes, these charges do not fade with time: proceedings before the ICC suspend limitation, and the substantive crimes are imprescriptible in French law, so neither the passage of years since 2013 nor a quiet life in France extinguishes exposure. The European arrest warrant system, for comparison, operates on refusal grounds set out in Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including amnesty, final judgment for the same facts, and limitation issues; but that instrument governs surrenders between European Union member states and has nothing to do with ICC cooperation, which follows its own title. Conflating the two is a frequent error in press commentary and must be avoided in any serious defence strategy.
For potential clients reading this from abroad, the practical checklist is short. If you learn that you are named in an ICC investigation, do not travel without advice, secure counsel in the country where you are present and counsel admitted before the ICC, preserve every document showing your actual functions and whereabouts at the material time, and avoid any public statement about the facts. If you are arrested in France on an ICC request, exercise the 24-hour rights immediately, ask for a lawyer at once, give a fixed address and concrete guarantees for any release application, and prepare the Paris hearing within the five-day window as the decisive procedural battle. If you are a victim of crimes of this type, French law offers two paths that can run in sequence: complaint before the French courts, which may trigger universal jurisdiction proceedings if the suspect resides in France, and participation in ICC proceedings as recognised victims with legal representation, as the 32 victims in the Said case obtained through counsel. Each path has its own time limits, evidentiary standards, and risks, and the choice between them should be made with a lawyer who practises both.
Conclusion
The Said verdict of 23 September 2026 is a textbook of international criminal justice in a single case. It convicts a detention-centre commander as a direct co-perpetrator of imprisonment, torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, committed at the Bangui OCRB between 12 April and 30 August 2013, while acquitting him of war crimes arising from the same conduct because the specific legal elements were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It moves now to sentencing and reparations, with a 30-day appeal window open to both sides. For France, the case is a reminder that cooperation with the ICC is hard domestic law: arrest within a 24-hour presentment rule, immediate access to chosen or appointed counsel, detention ordered by a judge, a Paris hearing within five days, and surrender through a dedicated procedure that is not extradition. And where the ICC does not claim the suspect, France can prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes itself when the suspect lives on its territory and the antiterrorist prosecutor takes the initiative. Whether the next case ends in The Hague or in Paris, the decisive factors will be the same as in Said: documented command over the place of the crimes, proven intent and knowledge, and charges whose every legal element is established beyond reasonable doubt. Anyone concerned by such proceedings, as a suspect, a witness, or a victim, should seek qualified advice before the 24-hour clock starts running rather than after.