On 24 September 2026, reporting from the United Nations General Assembly described a striking scene: the President of the United States urging every country to leave the International Criminal Court at once, calling it “evil” and “a rogue institution,” while almost nobody followed him. Only Naoero, the tiny Pacific island nation formerly known as Nauru, announced during Assembly week that it would formally withdraw from the Rome Statute. Venezuela and Chad had already announced exit plans since Washington launched its campaign, launched in July by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, to dismantle the ICC brick by brick if necessary. Against them, the Netherlands’ Prime Minister told the Assembly the Court is “under attack,” asking how anyone could oppose prosecuting the very worst crimes. Behind the speeches sits a harder edge: Washington has imposed financial sanctions and visa bans on Court staff and prepared measures that could undercut the Court’s ability to operate. The stated trigger is the arrest warrants the Court issued in 2024 against Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his then-defence minister and a Hamas commander over the Gaza war. For readers in France the question is concrete. France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, and French law holds a complete machinery for arresting a person the Court wants, ordering surrender within weeks, enforcing the Court’s fines and reparations through the Paris courts, and prosecuting genocide and crimes against humanity in French courts when surrender does not happen. This analysis explains, from inside French procedure, what Paris can still do while the storm around The Hague keeps growing, and what a suspect, a sanctioned person or a victim should do from France right now.
I. Can France Still Arrest and Surrender an ICC Suspect While Washington Sanctions the Court?
A. How Does France Arrest and Hand Over Someone the ICC Wants?
The starting point is a single sentence of the Code of Criminal Procedure that has not moved: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” That sentence is Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it does two things at once. It declares the political choice — France takes part in punishing the crimes and cooperates with the Court — and it points to the detailed Title that follows, which organises every step from provisional arrest to the enforcement of sentences. The American argument that the Court oversteps by claiming jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states changes nothing in this French text: once the Court transmits a request for arrest with a view to surrender, the French track opens automatically, whatever Washington thinks of the underlying warrant.
The first hours follow a strict clock. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that same period the person receives the custody safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 — notification of rights, lawyer, interpreter, doctor — and the prosecutor, after checking identity, informs the person in a language they understand that an arrest request for surrender exists and that they will appear before the investigating chamber within a short fixed period. In practice in Paris this means the person arrested at an airport, a hotel or a residence is brought before the Paris prosecutor, told exactly which Court request targets them, given a lawyer immediately, and held for the investigating chamber. There is no informal shortcut and no executive discretion to make the file disappear: the prosecutor transmits, the judge decides.
The decision on surrender belongs to the judiciary, not the government. Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” Every other question raised before the chamber — immunity claims, jurisdictional objections, political arguments about the legitimacy of the warrant — is referred to the International Criminal Court itself, which deals with them as it sees fit. The investigating chamber rules within fifteen days of the person’s appearance, and a further appeal lies to the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation. The control exercised in Paris is therefore narrow but real: identity, obvious error, procedural regularity. It is the same family of judicial control the Court of Cassation polices in every surrender and extradition file coming through Paris. On 18 November 2025, for example, the Criminal Chamber ruled on a challenge against a Paris investigating chamber decision in a surrender file where the person had been arrested abroad and handed to the French authorities, recalling the chain of arrest warrants, the formal extradition requests and the physical handover: “M. [N] a été interpellé aux Emirats Arabes Unis le 1er novembre 2023 et remis aux autorités françaises le 19 juin 2025” (Cass. crim., 18 Nov. 2025, No. 25-85.814). A few years earlier, the same chamber had reviewed another Paris investigating chamber ruling confirming continued detention in a major criminal file, opening with the now-standard formula: “M. [D] [N] a formé un pourvoi contre l’arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, 8e section, en date du 25 juin 2021” (Cass. crim., 5 Oct. 2021, No. 21-84.194). The lesson for an ICC suspect in France is direct: the Paris investigating chamber and then the Court of Cassation will check the file with genuine care, but they will not retry the Hague case, and political declarations from any capital are not a ground for refusal that the chamber can apply.
Two refinements matter for real files. First, Article 627-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends the same surrender procedure where the wanted person is already being prosecuted or has been convicted in France on other charges: “Les dispositions des articles 627-4 à 627-10 sont également applicables si la personne réclamée est poursuivie ou condamnée en France pour d’autres chefs que ceux visés par la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” Such a person cannot, however, claim release under the ordinary surrender-track release provisions while the French case continues, and the Hague proceedings suspend limitation periods against them. A client already facing a French file cannot therefore use it as a shield; if anything, the French file freezes alongside the surrender track. Second, the money side of cooperation runs through Paris as well. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” Crucially, “La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans.” Renewable on a fresh Court request before expiry. Accounts, real estate and other assets in France can thus be frozen at the Court’s request through the anti-terrorism prosecutor, with a hard two-year clock that forces the requesting side to justify any extension. For targets, that two-year limit is often the first real lever: every renewal must be reasoned, transmitted and ordered again, and each step can be challenged.
B. What Crimes Can France Prosecute Itself Instead of Surrendering?
Surrender to The Hague is only one branch of the system. The Rome Statute is built on complementarity: national courts prosecute first, and the International Criminal Court steps in only where states are unwilling or unable to act genuinely. France has given itself the domestic offences to match. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code defines the crime: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants” — wilful killing, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, conditions of life calculated to destroy the group, measures to prevent births, and forcible transfer of children. The wording matters for defence work: genocide in French law requires a concerted plan aimed at the total or partial destruction of the group, not merely large-scale violence. Files that shock public opinion do not automatically meet that definition, and the debate in a French courtroom will focus relentlessly on the plan element and on the group as defined by the statute.
Crimes against humanity sit alongside it. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code punishes with life imprisonment: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique” — including “1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination” alongside enslavement, deportation, imprisonment in violation of fundamental international law, torture, and sexual violence. Again the locks are visible: a concerted plan, a civilian population group, a widespread or systematic attack. A prosecutor must prove each lock; a defence lawyer attacks each in turn. War crimes complete the picture in the later articles of the same book, and all of these offences can be tried before French criminal courts where jurisdiction exists — including, since France’s adjustment laws, cases with limited territorial links where the suspect is present on French soil and the classic connecting factors are met. This is why Paris matters far beyond the surrender track: a suspect who believes The Hague is weakened by American sanctions may still face a French investigating judge in Paris, applying French definitions that carry life sentences.
The enforcement side closes the loop. Where the International Criminal Court itself has convicted and ordered fines, confiscations or reparations, France does not re-try the case; it enforces. Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République.” The Paris court is bound by the Hague decision, including on the scope of the confiscation, and applies French procedural rules to carry it out. Then Article 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directs the money: “L’autorisation d’exécution rendue par le tribunal correctionnel en vertu de l’article précédent entraîne, selon la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, transfert du produit des amendes et des biens confisqués ou du produit de leur vente à la cour ou au fonds en faveur des victimes.” Victims designated by the Court can therefore receive the proceeds directly. American sanctions on Court staff do not touch this circuit: a French court order, a French prosecutor, French bailiffs, and funds transferred to the Court or its victims’ fund. Anyone holding frozen or targeted assets in France — bank accounts in Paris, apartments, company shares — should understand that this enforcement channel runs on French judicial authority alone, and that challenging it means acting before the Paris court within French deadlines, with French evidence, not waiting for geopolitics to resolve the file.
II. What Do US Sanctions and ICC Withdrawals Change for Suspects, Victims and Lawyers in France?
Short answer: less than the headlines suggest, and in some respects nothing at all — but the margins where things do change are exactly where a Paris lawyer earns their fee. France’s obligations run from its own ratification and its own statutes, not from the daily state of American-Dutch relations. Still, three shockwaves from the current campaign deserve precise measurement: withdrawals from the Statute, sanctions on Court personnel, and the political pressure on states that, like France, continue to cooperate.
A. Does Leaving the ICC — or Sanctioning It — Stop Arrests in France?
Start with withdrawals, because Naoero’s announcement makes the mechanism topical. Under the Rome Statute’s withdrawal clause, a State Party may withdraw by written notification to the UN Secretary-General, and the withdrawal takes effect one year after receipt — it does not release the departing state from obligations arising while it was a Party, including cooperation in proceedings already underway and financial commitments. Venezuela, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger therefore remain bound for matters already before the Court, and Naoero will be too until its own one-year clock runs out. More importantly for our readers, none of this concerns France, which has filed no such notification, whose officials publicly stand with the Court’s European supporters, and whose 125 co-Parties — the figure cited across this week’s coverage — continue to form the overwhelming majority of the Assembly of States Parties. A suspect who travels through Paris cannot invoke another country’s withdrawal, and a suspect who claims that the Court has lost legitimacy because six or seven states out of 125 are leaving will find that the Paris investigating chamber, bound by Article 627-8 to order surrender absent obvious error, has no legal box in which to file that argument. It will refer such questions to The Hague and order surrender in the meantime.
Sanctions on the Court raise harder practical questions but the same legal answer inside France. The United States has frozen assets and banned visas for Court officials and prepared broader measures aimed at the Court’s operations — its bank accounts, its suppliers, even, critics warn, the private counsel who represent victims and defendants. These measures can genuinely disrupt life in The Hague: transfers blocked, software licences pulled, travel plans cancelled. Our firm already described, in today’s companion coverage of counsel working under sanctions, how defence teams adapt. But on French territory, an arrest request from the Court still arrives through the normal cooperation channel, the prosecutor still seizes the investigating chamber, and the chamber still applies Articles 627-5 and 627-8. No American executive order binds a French judge. The US Justice Department’s public rejection of the Court’s jurisdiction over American and allied personnel is a statement of American law for American officials; it is not a defence before the Paris courts, where the only question is whether the French statutory conditions for surrender are met. If anything, the sanctions campaign strengthens one French argument rather than weakening the system: counsel for suspects can point to the pressure on the Court when demanding rigorous respect for defence rights, time limits and detention review — French judges are historically receptive to arguments that an embattled institution must be held to its own standards, not to lower ones.
The deepest objection — that the Court tries nationals of states that never joined — is as old as the Rome Statute and has never prevailed as a bar to cooperation by a State Party. The Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on a Party’s territory, whoever the suspect’s passport, is the design of the treaty France ratified, and the 2024 warrants over Gaza rest on that construction. France’s own courts apply the same territorial logic every day. A challenge to that architecture belongs before the Court’s own judges, and Article 627-8 says exactly that: other questions go to the Court. Paris surrenders first and lets The Hague argue law. Anyone advising a high-profile client must therefore be blunt: as long as France remains a Party — and nothing in the current French political landscape points toward withdrawal — transit through, residence in or assets in France mean exposure to arrest, surrender and enforcement, regardless of what Washington announces next.
B. How Can a Suspect, a Listed Person or a Victim Act From Paris Right Now?
For a suspect who fears an ICC warrant — a former official, a businessman named in a situation country, a dual national who served in a chain of command — the Paris playbook starts before any arrest. A lawyer in France can verify exposure through the cooperation channels, prepare proof of identity and nationality that defeats obvious-error findings in the client’s favour where the file genuinely confuses two people, assemble evidence on the plan element and the context that the French judge cannot examine but the Hague judges must, and line up counsel authorised before the Court so that the defence speaks with one voice from the first hour of custody. If arrest comes, the twenty-four-hour presentation to the prosecutor and the fifteen-day ruling window of the investigating chamber leave no room for improvisation: the file must already contain the consular contacts, the medical certificates, the family and residence guarantees for any release application, and the precise procedural objections — flawed identity, breach of the custody safeguards, competing French prosecution under Article 627-11 — that the chamber is actually competent to hear. Cassation review follows, and as the Court of Cassation’s surrender-track rulings show, it is a serious control of reasoning and regularity, not a rubber stamp. None of these steps depends on American policy; all of them depend on acting early, in French, before French judges, with documents the judges can use.
For persons hit by the financial side — assets frozen at the Court’s request through the anti-terrorism prosecutor, or targeted by parallel European Union sanctions listings that often accompany international criminal exposure — Paris offers two distinct battlefields. Against a Hague-ordered conservatory measure, the two-year maximum of Article 627-3 is the anchor: diarise the order date, demand the renewal decision in full, and contest necessity and proportionality before the competent French judge with bank records, valuation evidence and proof of lawful origin. Against an EU listing, the action lies in Luxembourg within its short deadline, but the factual base is built in Paris — contracts, board minutes, resignation proofs, divestment records — and our office has shown repeatedly how annulment actions succeed when the Council’s reasons are stale or generic. Related coverage on this site follows both tracks: our analysis of overflight and transit-arrest exposure for ICC-wanted travellers (Netanyahu ICC overflight and transit arrest) and our guide to defending sanctioned counsel and frozen persons from Paris (ICC sanctioned Court and Paris defence). Where a pillar page of the ICC-defence cluster exists, this article links to it in full; where the cluster hub is still being built, this piece is written to serve as a reference for future follow-ups on individual situations.
For victims, the message is the mirror image and it is encouraging. The reparations circuit of Articles 627-16 and 627-17 is open and working: Hague decisions enforced by the Paris correctional court, proceeds transferred to the Court or its victims’ fund, designated victims paid. A victim residing in France or the Paris region files through counsel before the Court, then enforces in Paris — the same city, the same courts, the same bailiffs as any French enforcement. The competent actors are all local: the Paris prosecutor for requests, the anti-terrorism prosecutor for conservatory measures, the Paris investigating chamber for surrender, the Paris correctional court for fines, confiscations and reparations. A victim in Paris or anywhere in Île-de-France prepares the same dossier as elsewhere — identity, harm documentation, causal link to the charged crimes, bank details for payment — but benefits from direct access to the enforcing jurisdictions, without rogatory detours. US sanctions do not close this door; they make early filing wiser, before any operational disruption reaches the fund-transfer stage.
Conclusion
The week of 22 September 2026 will be remembered for loud speeches: an American president calling the International Criminal Court evil and urging mass exit, a micro-state leaving, European leaders applauding their defence of The Hague. Beneath the noise, the French legal position has not shifted by a millimetre. France cooperates under Article 627, arrests within twenty-four hours under Article 627-5, surrenders on an obvious-error standard within fifteen days under Article 627-8, prosecutes genocide and crimes against humanity under Articles 211-1 and 212-1 where it holds jurisdiction, freezes at the Court’s request for renewable two-year periods under Article 627-3, and enforces the Court’s fines, confiscations and reparations through the Paris correctional court under Articles 627-16 and 627-17 for the benefit of victims. Withdrawals take a year to bite and do not cover pending cases; sanctions on Court staff complicate life in The Hague but bind no judge in Paris; objections to jurisdiction belong before the Court’s own judges. For suspects, listed persons and victims alike, the practical consequence is the same: the decisive moves are made in Paris, early, documented, and in French procedure. Our office makes them every week.