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Nord Stream Sabotage: Croatia Clears Extradition of Diver Suspect to Germany — What a Paris Lawyer Would Do

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nord Stream Sabotage: Croatia Clears Extradition of Diver Suspect to Germany — What a Paris Lawyer Would Do

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On 24 September 2026, Reuters reported that a Croatian court had cleared the extradition to Germany of a Ukrainian diving instructor suspected of helping to blow up the Nord Stream gas pipelines in September 2022. The suspect, identified in German filings as Vladimir Z., was arrested on a European Arrest Warrant in the coastal city of Pula on 19 August 2026. His lawyer immediately denounced a biased and political ruling and announced an appeal. What makes this case remarkable is not only the sabotage of one of Europe’s most strategic energy infrastructures. It is that the same German warrant had already been refused once: a Polish court declined to execute it, holding that Germany lacked jurisdiction and that the destruction of the pipelines could be seen as a justified act by Ukraine in a defensive war. One warrant, two Member States, two opposite answers. For anyone facing a European Arrest Warrant in France — or advising someone who does — the Nord Stream file is a live demonstration of how surrender proceedings work, where their limits lie, and what a defence lawyer in Paris would actually plead if the same file landed on the desk of the chambre de l’instruction.

I. Nord Stream extradition: why Croatia surrendered the diver suspect to Germany

A. Who is Vladimir Z. and what does Germany accuse him of?

German federal prosecutors describe Vladimir Z. as a scuba diver who belonged to the group behind the explosions that damaged the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and one branch of the never-commissioned Nord Stream 2 pipeline on 26 September 2022, near the Danish island of Bornholm. Both Russia and Western governments have described the blasts as sabotage. According to Al Jazeera’s reporting, the man is Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a Ukrainian citizen, professional scuba diver and diving instructor affiliated with a diving school in Kyiv, whom German prosecution filings identify only by first name and initial under German privacy rules. German media added a striking detail: at the time of his arrest, Zhuravlev was reportedly working as a consultant on the set of an upcoming Hollywood dramatic reconstruction of the bombings, a film project centred on the very sabotage he is accused of joining. Croatian police detained him in Pula on 19 August 2026 on the strength of the German European Arrest Warrant, and he appeared before the County Court in Pula the following day. Through his lawyers, he denies any involvement in the blasts.

The German case does not stop with the diver. In July 2026, German prosecutors charged a second suspect, former Ukrainian army officer Serhii K., with orchestrating the blasts while acting on behalf of Ukrainian state entities. That man had been arrested in Italy in August 2025 and transferred to Germany in November 2025; he too denies any involvement. The two tracks — an alleged diver on the boat and an alleged organiser acting for state entities — show how Germany constructs jurisdiction over sabotage committed outside its own territory: German courts treat the case as falling within their jurisdiction because the damaged pipelines terminate in the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and because their destruction affected Germany’s energy security and internal safety. Under European Union law, a European Arrest Warrant is, in the words of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté” (in substance: the judicial decision by which one Member State obtains the arrest and surrender of a person wanted for prosecution or for serving a custodial sentence). The Framework Decision behind that definition, Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, rests on mutual recognition: in principle, the executing judge enforces the issuing judge’s decision swiftly, and examines only the limited refusal grounds the text allows. Croatia’s judges applied exactly that logic when they authorised Vladimir Z.’s surrender.

Three features of the file explain why the Pula court said yes. First, the warrant is prosecution-driven and recent, issued for acts that Germany characterises as grave sabotage of critical infrastructure, which comfortably meets the penalty thresholds that make a warrant executable. Second, nothing in the Croatian proceedings suggests the suspect consented to simplified surrender, but consent only accelerates the timetable; a refusal to consent, as in this case, triggers a full judicial examination without changing the applicable test. Third, and decisively, the executing court found no mandatory ground for refusal in European Union law as transposed in its own system: the man had not already been finally judged for these acts, he was plainly above the age of criminal responsibility, and no established discrimination in the issuing of the warrant was demonstrated. The County Court in Pula confirmed on 24 September 2026 that it had made its ruling but said it could not give details until the parties decided whether to appeal — and the defence has already announced that it will. Under the surrender system, an appeal suspends the physical handover while the higher court re-examines the file, which is why Vladimir Z. remains in Croatia for now despite the green light given to Germany.

B. Why Poland refused the very same German warrant

The Croatian ruling cannot be understood without the Polish episode that preceded it. In 2024, Zhuravlev evaded arrest in Poland and fled back to Ukraine. When Germany’s warrant reached the Polish courts, they refused to enforce it. Their reasoning, as reported by Al Jazeera, was twofold: the German authorities had no jurisdiction over the pipeline destruction, and the destruction itself could be viewed as a justified act by Ukraine in a defensive war. Poland, which had long opposed the Nord Stream projects on strategic grounds, thus turned a surrender examination into a quasi-political assessment of the underlying conflict. The suspect’s Polish defence lawyer, Tymoteusz Paprocki, drew the logical consequence for the Croatian phase: if a Croatian court now hears the same case, he argued, it would amount to ruling on something already decided in Poland, another Member State of the European Union. That argument goes to the heart of the European Arrest Warrant system, because it invokes the ne bis in idem principle — no one may be prosecuted twice for the same acts — which is one of the few mandatory grounds on which an executing judge must refuse surrender.

French law states that mandatory ground in terms that expressly cover decisions rendered outside France. The Cour de cassation recalled in a 16 July 2026 ruling that “Le premier de ces textes prévoit un motif obligatoire de non-exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen lorsque la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre État membre que l’État d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet de ce mandat” (in substance: a final decision for the same acts, whether French or from another Member State, makes refusal mandatory). The provision in question is Article 695-22, 2°, of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, which transposes Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision. On paper, then, a Polish refusal could look like exactly the kind of foreign final decision that blocks a second surrender attempt in Croatia or France. In practice, everything turns on two words: “décision définitive” (final decision) and “mêmes faits” (same acts). A refusal to execute a warrant is not automatically a final judgment on the merits of the criminal acts, and European Union law gives those two words an autonomous meaning that national judges do not define freely.

That autonomous meaning was restated in France only months ago. In a published judgment of 31 March 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation held that the words “same acts” form an autonomous notion of European Union law, defined as covering a set of concrete circumstances inextricably linked together, irrespective of the legal classification of the acts or the protected interest — the well-known Mantello formula of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment of 16 November 2010, Mantello, C-261/09). The Court added, following the Court of Justice’s MSIG judgment of 11 September 2025 (C-802/23), that the notion covers only the materiality of the facts: acts that are merely similar, sharing only the same criminal intent, are not the same acts. For Zhuravlev’s defence, the lesson is double-edged. If the Polish court’s refusal is characterised as a final decision on the very same diving-sabotage acts, it could support a ne bis in idem objection in any Member State. But if the Polish ruling is characterised as a refusal to surrender based on jurisdiction and on a political reading of the war — without any final determination of his individual criminal responsibility for the Bornholm explosions — then Croatia was entitled to treat the German warrant as still fully alive. The Pula court’s decision to authorise surrender suggests it took precisely that second view.

II. What a Paris lawyer would do if France received the same warrant

A. Could a Polish refusal block a French surrender? The “same acts” test in Paris

Suppose German police locate Vladimir Z. in Paris tomorrow and the German warrant is notified to him by the prosecution service — in the Spanish-terrorism case decided by the Cour de cassation on 16 July 2026, the file records that “le procureur général a notifié le mandat d’arrêt européen” to the person sought, who was placed under judicial supervision and did not consent to surrender. The Paris chambre de l’instruction would then have to decide. The defence’s first and strongest card would be the Polish refusal, pleaded under Article 695-22, 2°. A Paris lawyer would obtain the full Polish judgment, have it translated, and argue that Poland finally determined that Germany has no jurisdiction and that the acts are covered by a justification linked to the defensive war — in other words, a final decision on the same acts by another Member State. The prosecution would answer that a non-execution decision is not an acquittal, that Poland never tried the diver for the Bornholm facts, and that jurisdiction objections concern the issuing State’s competence, not the individual’s guilt. The chambre de l’instruction would then apply the test the Cour de cassation laid down on 31 March 2026: are the Polish proceedings and the German warrant about one set of concrete circumstances inextricably linked in time and space, with the Polish court having actually ruled on those circumstances to establish the offence, fix responsibility and, where relevant, impose a penalty? The 2026 ruling insists on that verification step, recalling the Court of Justice’s Juan judgment of 21 September 2023 (C-164/22): the mere mention, in a foreign judgment, of facts relating to another Member State’s territory does not prove identity of acts. A Paris court would therefore dissect the Polish reasoning line by line. A Polish holding that Germany lacks jurisdiction, without findings on what the diver personally did off Bornholm in September 2022, would most likely fail the identity test — and the surrender would survive the objection, exactly as it survived in Pula.

The defence would not stop there. A second line of attack would invoke the optional refusal grounds, starting with Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française” (in substance: no offence under French law means the court may refuse). Here the Nord Stream facts cut against the suspect: French law criminalises both ordinary destruction and terrorist destruction. Article 322-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui est punie de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d’amende, sauf s’il n’en est résulté qu’un dommage léger” (two years in prison and a 30,000 euro fine for destroying another person’s property, absent merely slight damage). And Article 421-1 of the Criminal Code classifies as terrorism, where intentionally connected with an individual or collective enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order by intimidation or terror — “lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur” — offences including “Les vols, les extorsions, les destructions, dégradations et détériorations” (“theft, extortion, destruction, damage and deterioration”). Moreover, the same Article 695-23 removes double-criminality control altogether where the issuing State punishes the conduct with at least three years’ deprivation of liberty and the conduct falls within the listed categories of Article 694-32, leaving the legal classification and the applicable penalty to the exclusive assessment of the issuing judicial authority. Blowing up a subsea gas pipeline would satisfy French criminal law several times over, so a double-criminality objection in Paris would have almost no prospect — a Paris lawyer would plead it only to preserve the record, not to win on it.

A third, more promising optional ground would be the existence of French proceedings. In a published ruling of 2 December 2025, the Cour de cassation recalled that Article 695-24, 1° of the Code of Criminal Procedure, transposing Article 4(2) of the Framework Decision, allows refusal of surrender where, for the acts covered by the warrant, the person sought is being prosecuted before the French courts or where the French courts have decided not to initiate or to discontinue proceedings — and that the relevant test is again the identity of the material acts, understood as a set of inextricably linked facts regardless of the classifications used by the issuing State. Concretely, if the Paris prosecutor had opened its own investigation into the Nord Stream sabotage — France has a real connecting factor through European energy security and through any French victims or interests — the chambre de l’instruction could refuse or defer surrender in favour of the French case. The 2025 ruling censured an appeal court that had refused surrender on this ground without properly checking whether the French murders and the warrant’s corpse-burning allegations formed one inextricably linked set of facts. The message for the defence is clear: a French-proceedings objection only works with a precise, act-by-act demonstration, not with a general claim that “France is also interested.” And French territorial jurisdiction itself would need a hook: Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code provides that “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République” (French criminal law covers offences committed on national territory), with an offence deemed committed in France as soon as one of its constituent acts took place there — “L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire” — while Article 113-6 extends French law to crimes committed abroad by French nationals. A purely Ukrainian-on-Ukrainian sabotage in Danish waters, with German victims, offers Paris no natural territorial hook — which is precisely why Germany’s Mecklenburg-Vorpommern reasoning matters, and why France would more likely execute the German warrant than compete with it.

B. The French defence playbook: information requests, detention, specialty and appeal

Beyond the refusal grounds, French procedure gives the defence powerful procedural levers, and the 16 July 2026 Spanish-terrorism case shows how Paris judges use them. In that case, the Paris chambre de l’instruction had authorised the deferred surrender to Spain of a man wanted for directing or belonging to a terrorist organisation — the Basque separatist organisation ETA — while he had been acquitted in France of terrorist criminal association for partly overlapping periods and was still being prosecuted in France for related ETA logistics facts. The Cour de cassation partially quashed the surrender order. Its central reminder binds every French surrender judge: “si la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’État membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit État la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires” (in short: insufficient information means the court must request more, with ten days for receipt). Transposed to the Nord Stream file, a Paris lawyer would systematically demand the German warrant’s underlying detail: the precise diving acts attributed to Vladimir Z., the dates, the boat, the explosives, the evidence placing him at Bornholm rather than merely in a divers’ chat group, and the exact scope of the Polish refusal. The ten-day complementary-information mechanism both delays surrender and forces the issuing State to solidify a file that, in the Nord Stream saga, still rests on contested intelligence and press leaks. For related tactics on successive warrants and refusal strategies, readers may consult our analysis of second European Arrest Warrant proceedings and surrender refusals in France.

Detention pending surrender is the second lever. A person arrested on a European Arrest Warrant in France who does not consent to surrender is brought before the chambre de l’instruction, and the court decides between detention and judicial supervision while the file is examined. The Spanish-terrorism case shows a man left under judicial supervision (contrôle judiciaire) for months between notification and the surrender ruling. In a Nord Stream-type file, the defence would argue for supervision with strict conditions — surrender of passports, residence with family in France, regular reporting — against the prosecution’s flight-risk argument, strengthened by the suspect’s 2024 flight from Poland to Ukraine. The flight history cuts both ways, however: it evidences both a motive to flee and, paradoxically, stable roots in Ukraine to which supervision conditions could attach. The defence would also plead the political-offence dimension head-on. The Polish court’s “justified act in a defensive war” reasoning has no equivalent in the Framework Decision’s exhaustive refusal grounds, and French courts have consistently treated sabotage of civilian energy infrastructure as ordinary or terrorist criminality rather than as a protected political act — Articles 421-1 and 322-1 leave no room for a war-justification defence before the executing judge. The proper forum for contesting Germany’s jurisdiction and the war context is the German trial court after surrender, not the Paris surrender hearing. A Paris lawyer would therefore frame the political argument narrowly: not as a refusal ground, but as context supporting release under supervision and opposing any fast-track consent procedure.

The third lever operates after surrender: the specialty rule. Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci” (in short: prosecuting surrendered persons for other pre-surrender acts needs the executing court’s consent). In plain terms, once Croatia — or France — surrenders Vladimir Z. for the Bornholm sabotage, Germany may not prosecute him for other pre-surrender acts, nor hand him on to a third State such as Denmark or Sweden, without the executing court’s consent. Given the sprawling Nord Stream investigations in three coastal States, that protection is far from theoretical: the defence should insist, before any consent to simplified surrender, on a precise delimitation of the acts covered, so that the German trial cannot quietly expand from diving logistics to espionage, conspiracy or state-responsibility charges without a fresh judicial check. Finally, the French system offers the pourvoi en cassation against the surrender order, examined within short time limits, on the exact grounds the 2025 and 2026 rulings illustrate: defective reasoning on the identity of acts, failure to request complementary information, or misapplication of the mandatory and optional refusal grounds. The 16 July 2026 partial cassation in the ETA case proves that Paris surrender orders do get quashed when the reasoning is thin — which is why the thorough, act-by-act motivation the Cour de cassation approved on 31 March 2026 is the standard every defence file must force the court to meet.

Conclusion

The Nord Stream extradition saga condenses everything that makes the European Arrest Warrant both powerful and fragile. Germany issued one warrant for sabotage that struck at the continent’s energy lifelines; Poland refused it on jurisdictional and war-related grounds; Croatia authorised surrender on the same instrument; and the suspect’s appeal will now test whether the first refusal has any preclusive force. For readers facing a cross-border file, the practical conclusions are straightforward. First, a refusal in one Member State never automatically kills the warrant everywhere: only a final decision on the same material acts, within the autonomous European meaning restated by the Cour de cassation in March 2026, triggers mandatory non-execution. Second, the executing judge is not a trial judge: jurisdiction objections, war justifications and conspiracy theories belong before the issuing court, while the surrender hearing is won or lost on refusal grounds, information requests and reasoning defects. Third, France applies this system with rigour but also with real procedural guarantees — complementary information within ten days, reasoned decisions subject to cassation, detention versus supervision choices, and the specialty shield after handover. Anyone arrested in France on a foreign European Arrest Warrant, anyone learning that a warrant circulates in their name, or any family watching a relative detained abroad on a European file should have the warrant, the underlying foreign judgment and any prior refusal decisions reviewed by counsel immediately: the first days after arrest determine detention, and the first hearing often determines surrender. A French lawyer’s insider knowledge of the chambre de l’instruction’s expectations — precise act-by-act comparisons, translated foreign decisions, targeted information requests — is frequently the difference between a handover within weeks and a refusal that stands.

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